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Thesis Abstract
Globally ,n.insgcmce1t og,eements hove emerged •• more effective in a,suring longterm nature con.servstion on pri,·.cc !and, thsn ,egulato,y mechanisms olonc. Rcmictivc
permanent coven:mts in p,irticul;ir, which ,ire !•golly bindmg manogcmcm og:recmen!, in
perpetuity. hove been adoptc,l in most States om:i Te,ritoric, in Australia. However, there is
re!ucmn,:c •mong bndholJers to toke them up.
Sound understanding of the factors thot in~uence the decisions of londho!ders
rcgsrdin~ the upwkc of pcnnanent covenants is impurtom in plo,ming and suategizing for
increaicd covcnom upmkc. The oim of thi< thesis i, to furtl,cr this understanding ond to
support d,c design of o coordinotcd covenant meclwnism for nature conservation on private
land, in Australia. This thesis postulated that the decision oflondholder., regarding the uptoke
of permanent cm·cnants could be explained within the theo,ctical fr:tn,cwork of landholders'
adoption of land ond •gricuhurol consm:ouun practice~ and lcdmo\ogie,.
Three self-administered ques1.ionnai,cs wc,e cmplnycd in this study through ,ru.il
surveys on three groups of lsndholders in two i\u.s~olion States (Victoria ond We,tcm
Au,trolio): one for pcrm,nent cownont holders, anmher for fixed-term agreement and fixed.
term covcnont holders in Victon'o and Western 1\um.,li.1 ,cspcctivcly, ond onother for non·
holder., of covenont or agreement holders in both Stoic,. Data, both quruitotive and
quantitam·e, were collected on demogrnphics, socio,cconomics, bndholdc"'' octirudcs, and
property chornct«istics. 'O,c data onolysis included frequency distributions and propouions,
analysis of variance, multiv:uiate regression poth an:dysis, and content an,!ysi, of wrinen views
of londholdcrs on incenti,·cs and disincenti,·cs for covenant uprnke.
Landholder.,' decision, regarding uptake of • permanent covenant nre influenced
directly, and/or indirectly by SC\'erol intcroctive factors catcgori,cd into fa·c non-mum.Uy
cxclusi,·c constructs: landholders' confidence in permanent co,·cnont mechanisms, nature
conservation ethic, outlook on property rights, level of economic dependence on the prnperty,
11nd nature conservation equity.
ln both StMes, there is lack of comprehensive knowledge about perm.anent covenant,
leading to ocgati,·c perception, ,i.bout tlic purpo,e, intention,, and ability of pcnmnent
covenants to delivc, the desired out~omrs, and tl,e,c offccr landho!de<1' confidence in
pcrmoncnt covcnonts. In i.ddition, mi,conccptiom :ind misundcrsmnding abound on 1hc rights

nuuchcd to priv,1e property and the relationship b,rwecn these rights and permanent
cmrcnams. Furthermore, policy measures to compensate for loss of landholder., perceived
property righis

MC

likely to induce relatively similar measure of response to permanem

covenant uptake nmong all landholder caiegorico. There is a need for clarification of the
:illotment of property rights m•er Liok,gico! resources tho! ho,·e o public good on private
property among the differem daimocu,.
Volunto,y uptake of managemrnt agrcemcm, mostly attrncts the londholders who are
least economicolly dependent un thci, property an<l chose w;,1, !,,,_,_,~ a hii:h conservation ethic
and appreciation of conset\·ation values on their propeny. The presen,·e of the economic
dependent category of landholders jnstifics 1h, use of finonciol incentive, ·to motivate their
uptskc of pennancnt covenant,.
Recent smendmcnts to the tosation low to address loss in lsn<l ,·o!ue ,uc likdy to have
di,p~portionotc m,gnitude of impsct of consm·otion policy on different landholder groups,
confirming the need for a pre-implemcntntion policy impact nssessmrn, on !l,e rdC\·ont
landholdc, groups.
There is lrck of a comprehensive policy frsmework for nom,e conscr:otion on' iirivnie
land to address the complex issue, d,nt affect private conscn,ition cffons. Development

;;,f

incentive measure, thnr ensure ,u,toined moti,·ation to conscNc nature oml a grnduol shif1
from compensoro,y approaches 10 stewardship support measur,s arc n<<ecssa,,_.. ln view of the
trons·generation and trsnsferobility of land. progums thot promote a ooture consen·ation edtic
need to move bcyo·,d current londowners to potenti.J fumrc ones.
Extension programs con oddrcss perceived dis,dvantng,s to, and losses to be incurred
by landholders csusod by, tsking up n pcrrmnent covcnam. Extension progrnms and policies
that clarify the conoection between biodiversity on privocc lsntl, landowner.<' gonls and
nspirntions, and the link between humnn wcUbcing and the healthy maintenance of the
enviromncnt can ,neournge a value and ethic for nature conservation and in tum motivate 11,e
upto.kc of penmnent covcnsnts and lond st,wardship. Clarification to landholders of the
importoncc of the biodiversiiy on a specific property to the m·cr:ill regional ,nd national
biodivcr,ity pion, ond need,, and d,c importance and value of o specific bndholder's
contribution to conserving biodiversity arc necessary to motivate the uptake of permru,ent
co,·enants.

Definition of terminologies and key abbreviations used in
the thesis
Nalur< "'""""lion t1m11: refers in tl,is scuJy to area, ,ct asiJc in thcir natunl condition on
private bnd to conserve some nacurol fcoturcs such a, wetl,nds, busl~onJ, nati,·e vcger,tion,
or native grosslmds. TI,ey Jtu)' olso be orcas 1hat arc habitat for rue, endangered or vulner:ible
pl:mt or anim,.1,pecies, orcos that arc used as 1r.1mit routes by some nMi,·c animols, ;tJ;eas thot
sc<Ve an impon,m enviroMiental protcctfrc rnlc, areas thst sc<Ve important "'Oler bobncc
function, to the region, and mhcr functions which might be considered rdevwt for noturol
heritage purposes.

l'mnda<nl "''""""'' (Co,.n,mls in p,rptlui()): refer to a volun~1ry man,gement agreement in
pc,pctuity th,t is anachcd to the land title, binding current and funuc owners of the land

Coi~naal m,diamfm,: refer 10 the social, economic, and in,titutionol anJ org:misotionol
measures for pro,~ding volunrnrr opportuniti,s tu landholders 10 place• penmnem covenont
on their land.

Fix,d-lm11 "'""~11/s ~~~,-IF'.,J): ore legally binding rnnmvation agreements between
landholders and anmher p:my that ore attached to the fond Ude for the specified period. A
fixed-term covenant in this 1hc,i> refers to" 15 or )0-yeu O!,>tccmcnt practised in Western
Austrnlia unde1 tl,e Remnant Vegetation l'rotcction Scheme.

F,>.~d./tm, agmmm/s ~'ro, Vfr): refer to voluntat)", non.binding informal ogr«ments between
0

a landholder and anotl,cr part)"· In the <:ont«t of this study, this refers to the L:lnd for Wildlife
Scheme in Victono.

No ro«Mnl or agmmtnl (l\'ortiv): refers to 1!,c obscnce of any 1)1'C of agreement or covenant
for nornre rnnscrv:ition between the landholder and other party or parties.

lnttnli,~ mtaJNrtr. ttfcr to mc:,sures introduced by govemmcn~ government agencies, private
agencies, or individuals either in fo_,m of policy or direct prmisions to fantlholdm with a view
to motivate them to make a decision to place a permanent covenw! on lond.

Landholder: i, a term used interchongcablr w'.1h 'bntlowncr', 'ponicip~nt', 'suhjccts' and
'respondent' to refer to the proprietor of the form or property torgctcd in the study.

Profl'!Y: refm to the demsrcored piece of land un<lcr tl,e priv,te ownmhip of the landholder
who is the oubjec! of the study.

xxii

1Ji11dillff'li!Je this term is opp!fod in thi• ,tudy in reference to !he wricty of :ill life Klrnu· the

different plonts, animals onol rnicro-of&21lisms, !he gc,1cs !hey contain, and !he ecosystems of
which they form• part (•• defined in Australia's Nuiona! Str.ttcgy for !he Conservation of
Biological Diversity).
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CHAPTER!
The Nature Of The Study

Tht aim of Ibis chapter is Jo provide the backgro1111d and ;i1Jff/iralio11 for tht
nsean:h a11d ifs theortliral 1111dnpi1111i1,g.
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Section 1: The Setting

~

"~-

1.1.1

'\

Inuoduction

TI,e need to conserve blodivcuity on private land in Australia is widcly recognised
(Bates, 2001; Binning & Young, 1997; Commonwealth of AustraLia, 1994; Woodhall &
Sutherland, 1995) because the biodi,·mity is under threat and private land contains much of the
country's

on-represented

or

under-represented

biogcographico.l

region,

(Productivity

Commission., 2001). Leg:,! mechanisms, widdy used in public protected area systems, arc alone
ineffective for as,uring long-term nature conservation on priV:tte land- they hnve high cost and
inefficiency of enforcement (Brigg,, 1998; Farrier, 1995; Hawks, Cubboge, Haney, Shaffer, &
Newman, 1993; Kbpproth &Johnson, 2001).
Management agreements and covenants have emerged a, significant alternatives
throughout the world, and more recently in Austrnlia. Covenants-legally binding manogcment
agreements in perpetuity have received attention in Australia lately because of their ability to
ensure long-tenn (petJT1anent in tcnns of land tenure} nature conservation. "Th cir cffcctivene"
in conscn':ltion is confinned by different social science mode!, and empirical findings {llrnn~
2000). Despite this, there is a noted reluctance of fondholdcrs to toke up pcnnancnt covenants
(Binning & Young, 1997). Furthcnnorc, the decision of a large cro.s-scction oflondholdcrs to
enter a volunta,:y co,·cnant on their land is motivated little by the de,ire to conscn·e (Binning &
Young, 1997; Trust for Nature, 1996) and mom by other reasons tlm have not been
comprehensively investig.,tcd or understood.
Most studies on nature conservation on private land have focussed on motivational
factors and the neceSSOI.)' incentives for landholders to rctoin na~vc remnant vegetation and
grasslands (Austrnlian ond New z.,,,l,nd Environment and Conservation Council, 1997;
Binning & Young, 1997; Denys Slee and Associotcs, 1998; Eh & bmbcrt, 1998; Gilfeddcr &
Kirkpatrick, 1995;Jcnkin,, 1998; Walpole, Lockwood, & l\files, 1998). Some of the studies have
recommended the use of management agreements to ,uppmt long-term nm,re conservation on'
private land.
There has been limited empirical re,catch on factors tl,ar influence the decision of
priv:uc !ondholdcn; in the use of specific mechonisms such a< volunt.,,:y covenants for nature
conservation in Australia. Preliminary studies in this area have been carried out in Western
Australia and Victoria (e.g., Orsini, 1996; Safstrom, 1993) nod more recently, a natiot,o.l survey
on landholders' perceptions and attitudes to pem,onem covenant has been conducted by
Stephens (2002). These stlldies provide a frnmcwork on which comprehensive studies on tl1e
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array of factors that influence londholders' d~sions in the uptake ofvoluntarr cov<nont con b~
carried out.
Understanding the ,easons for londholders' (lccision, regarding tl,e uptake of
pennancnt covcnonts is fundame.ttal to the fonnulation of effective and efficient policies on
nature conservation on private land. 11,e purpose of the present srudy, therefore, is to
detemtine the viable mechsnisms and options for achfoving long-term nature conservation on
private land through • comprehensive understanding of the factors that influence private
landholders' decision, towords the uptake of s permanent covenant.
Specifically, this srudy explore, the factor, that influenced or arc likely to influence the
ded,ion of landho!dcra in Victoria snd Western Australia on the uptake of a perman<nt
covenant and the nece1Sary Stste and Local governments' policy tools for encournging the
uptske of permanent covenants. An as;cssmcnt is made of the foctors that influence the
dedsion of londholders in the uptake of a pcnnanent cm·enant in different categories of
londholders who include the following: pcnnanent covenant holders in Victorio, fixed-term
covcnsnt holders in Western Austnlia, fixed·tenn agreement holders in Victoria and non·
holders of conserv:1tion covenants or agreements in Victoria ond Western Australia.
Justification for inclusion ofVictoria and WestcmAumalia in the srudy is made in Chapter 2.
The brood hypothesis of this ,rudy is that the motivation offondholders in the upuke
of permanent covenants is a function of an interaction of factors tha1. include landowners'
perception, ond attitudes to ~ovcnant mechanisms, their pe<eeptions of tl,e necessity of a
permanent covenant for long-term nature conservation, and the will to consen·e nature on their
land. L:indholders' motivstions csn also be hypothesized to he a function of their as,e.. mcnt of
the present and furure utilitarian vs!ue of the land, the instirutional arrangements by
government and the level of incentives available to sustain the motivation. These motivational
factots fmm the decision framework of landholders on the uptake of a permanent covenant
and tl,cy arc tltc basis for designing effective policy measures for encouraging voluntary
permanent covenant uptake on p!iva>e land.
Implicit in tl,e present study is the premise that there a.re similarities in the factors that
influence private landholdets' uptake of volunta'}' nature conservation agreements such as
covenonts nnd the factors that influence the adoption of agricultunl conservstion prnctice, and
retention of native vegetation on private land Tiris prcrnise is based on p,eliminary finding, on
tl,c factors that influence Ltndholdcrs' uptoke of pcnnanent covenants (Orsini (1996) and
Safstrom (1993); factors that influence the adoption of agricultunl conservation practices and
technologies (e.g., Campbell, 1991; A. Curtis & De Lacy, 2001; Reeve & Block, 1998); and
factors that influence the retention of remnant vegetation on private land (Coate,, 1987;
Jenkins, 1998; Lockwood & Walpole, 1999a, t 999c; J\1iles, Lod..-wond, & Walpole, 1998)
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However, most adoptions of agriculturil con,erntion prnctices ond technologies and retention
of remnant ,·egetation on private land by fondholdcrs do not invoke legnlly binding
arrnngcments. 11,erefore, diffemices can be anticipated in the types and m,gnirude of factors
that influence fondholders' decisions on tl,c adoption of conservation mechanisms and the
uptoke ofpcnnanent coven:nm.
'lbe leg:dly binding narure of pennanent covenonts on present ond furnre owners of
tl,e land di,tinguishe, tl,em from other non·!cg:,lly binding or binding mmagement agreements.
In effect, decision, of landholders reg:,rding their uptake ore likely to be influenced by different
sets of factors and/or magnitudes to those that influence the upt1kc of otl1cr management
agreements. This study is nm intended to justify the use of pcnnanent covenants

a,

the best

mechanism for long·tcrm nature conservation on private land; but rather to establish how their
use con be tailored to cncournge thcit uptake by lmdholders as a long·tenn nattuc conservation
option.

1.1.2

Aims and Objectives of the study

In order to achieve the stot~d purpose of this ,rudy, three specific aims and

th'eir respective

operational objective, were identified. 11,e first aim i, to estabful: tlie factors that have
influenced the ded,ion oflandbolders to take up• permanent covenant, which can charactcrize
the decision framework on permanent covenant uptake. In order to ochieve this

,um,

an

ossessmenl wos made of landholders' socio-demographic situations, economic situation, onsite
factors, social affiliations and attitudinal factors in relation to their dcciiion to take up a
permanent covenant. In addition, the relative importance or influence of these factors in the
decision ou uptake ofpcnnancnr covenants was estimated.
11,e second aim of the ,tudy is to pro,ide e·:idencc of the influence of porticular 1ociodemographic factors, economic factors, onsitc factors, and social ol"filiations, institutionol
factors and ottitud.ina! factors, on the likelihood ofnon·ho!den ofpennanent covenants to take
up a permanent covenant. 1bi, was carried our by invcstig:iting landho!den,' demographic data,
socio-economic conditions including level, of income and economic dependence on the land,
,hart and long-tenn goals and objectives for their land and perceptions and attirndes to longtenn nature conoervation. It was also carried olll by a,se,sing landholders' attitudes to
pennanent covenants u mechanisms fot supporting long·tcnn nature cometv.1tion, in tcnn, of
their necessity, impact on land value ond property rights, cquitability, comp,tibil.ity with short
,and long-term objective, of the land and the economic implications on their property.
niis second aim was also corried

Olli

by establishing the rclatioo,hip between the

abovi,.mentioned factors and the likelihood of the landholder taking up• pcmunent covenan~
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Comparisons a.c also made between the factors thot charnctecise permanent covenant holders
•nd non-holders of permanem co,·euon1, in order to e,iablish the factors that most closely
predict the likelihood ofbndholders' decision lo take up a permanent covenant. An ~stirnation
of the rclati,·e irnpon:mce of tl,e identified factors io made.
The third aim of the study is to emblish the b:miers and incentives for permanent
covenant uptake by investigating tlie views of landhold~ on, and expectation for, variow
economic and non·cconomic incentives meosurcs.

1.1.3

Research Questions
The following rcsearch question, aim to address tl,c objectives of the present ,rndy:

ls there evidence of foctots tl,at typically characterize !ondholders who have a
permanent covenant?
•

h there a rclatiomhip between exogenous factors such as the ratio of conservation to
total land area, age, tenure on bnd, socio-economic &p!.'sition 11.nd landholders' uptake
or likely uptake ofa permanent covenant?

•

Is there a refotionsh.ip bctw~cn endogenous factors such al landholders' knowledge and
awareness and familiarity witl, pennallent covenant mechanism, and landholders'
uptake or likely upt:ikc of a pennanem cov<11ant?
h there a rdationship bct\1:een endogenous factors such a, perception, ond attitudes to
permanent covcnrn1, a, mechanism, for natu,c conservation, in terms of the
covenant,' benefit,, necessity, rnd impict on bnd v:tlue, effectiveness in assuring longterm notu~ conservation and effcctivcne" over other mechanism,, and !andho!di,rs'
,uptake or likely uptake of o permanent connont?

•

I, there a relationship between endogenous factors such as attitudes to private property

rights, perceptions on equity and !andho!dm' uprnke or Likely uprnkc of a permanent
covenant?
•

What are the specific barriers and incenrives to landholdcn' upt:ike of a penmnenl
covenant?

1.1.4

Synopeie of the theeie
lnis the5is is divided into ,ix chaplets. The fint ,cction of chapter l contain• an

introduction to the study, including its aims and objcctiv~,. A brief overview of management
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agrccmems and covcnant practices and a detailed c:qm,ition of the application of specific
management agreements schemes ond covenanu in perpetuity arc ptovidcd in the second
section. The third section comain, o review of literarurc on tht> theoretical framework of
landho\deu' decisions for adopting ogticulturnl and conservation mechonistns and innovations
on their lond, which i, proposed as tl,e framework on which decisions on the uptake of
pcnnonent CO\""enams are based. A tcview is made of selected Australia federal and state
(Victoria and Western Australia) government policy tool, tl,at address natllrc conservotion on
private lond. Victorio ond Western Austrnli• were selected for tlic review because they contain
the sampling fnme oflandholdm .vho arc in~uJed in the srndy. These landholders ate likely
to be affected hy the so.id policy tools in their decision on the up toke ofpennsnent covenants.
The second ch"Pter presents the method of darn coUection and analysis. It also
contains on inttoduction 1.0 tl,e study questions. A description of the measr1tcd v:u:iabks,
justification of the study methods, description of the survey design outlining the ,election of
srudy sites, tl,e sampling methods and the operational issue, encountered in s=pling, are n!so
provided In odtlition, description of the de,•elopment of the questionnaire in,1r11mcnt, and the
p,ocedorc followed in pilot testing sod its findings are provided L!stly, description of the
proccdwces used in corrying our them.Un survey ond dnta onolysis is presented.
The objective of Chapter 3 and 1he following two chaptt:rs is to provirlc • description
of the landholders in relation to their demographic, socio-economic and otritudinal
characteristics ond p,opc,,y characteristics. Scuion I of chaptc, 3 contains the findings of the
descriptive analysis for permnnent covenoiu holders. Description of the landholde<S based on o
,ynthesis of tl>eir comments and view, on policy incentive, and the use of covenants is
prm·idcd in section 2, while section 3 contains • discu1;ion of the findings of this chapter.
Chapter 4 i, divided into four sections. 11,e fitst section conl:lin., • description of th•
chancreri~tics of fixed-tenn covenont and Cixcd-tenn ogrcemcnt holders as outlined above. The
relationships between several independent variables in the study and londholdcrs' attitudes to a
p=nonent cm·enant uptokc nre olso provided Results of multivariate path analysis arc
presented in section 2, while a synthesis of comments ond views of landho!deu on policy
incentive measures for motivating a pcnnoncnt covenant uptake i, presented in section thrr.e.
The lost section contains • preliminary discussion and conclusion of the chapter corried out
using a comp:uison between the Stat~,.
Chapter 5 co,·ers landholders who do not have any fonn of covenant or ag«ement fu,
n,:iu,c conservation on their land. lt.s o,g,<li,ation is identical to that described in Chapter 4.
Chapter 6 is divided into three 1ections. The first section presents an introduction and
description of a conceptual mode! that i, constn1eted from the research finding, showing the
<elationships between the various factors and covenant uplllke. The s:cnnd section conlllins a
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discussion on the interactions of these faetor,. ,\ttentien i, dr:ivm to t!,e con,i,lency of the five
factor constructs, other factors and policy tools represented in the modd with relevant theory
ond literature. Discus,ion on the approptia!c inccnti,·e measures for up1;1ke of pcnnanent
covenant and justificotion for their use is also presented. The third section contains the
conclusions of the chapter including tl,c rnntribution of !~e thesis to knowledge and
recommendations for further research.

ihe section that foUows present, a w,i~-w of literature of some of tho volimtary apprnaches to
nature conscrvotion on pri,·,te bnd in ,\umalia, in pa<ticular imnagcmcnt agrccmccts and
covenant,. Tnc aim of tl1is review is to outline the ,trUctmc of t!,cse voluntary approaches
including their function aml tl,e requirements for their upt:ake.

-<.>
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Section 2: Approaches to nature conservation on private land using
management agreements and covenants
ln ~Us section, a general overview of manag~meotogreements as mechanisms for nature
conser,,atJon on private lond is provided. "11Us is followed by a more detailed overview of
,pecific nature conservation schemes rcpre,cr,tcd by the groups of lmdholdcrs in this study:
J..;ind for Wildlife progrrun in Victoria, Remnant Vegern~on Protection Scheme in \'(1cstcm
Australia and Pcnnancnt covenant proisram under Trust for Norure (Victoria). TI,csc ore
reviewed with the aim of drawing a:tcntion to the schemes' attrihu1co, which could have on
innuence on landholders' decision towards the uptake of a pcrmanmt mvenant.

1.2.1

Management Ag,cemcnts

Reviews of the use of man,gcment agreements as ,·olunt1r;· schemes for nature consen·otion
on pri,·atc lond by Binning & Young (1997) and S1ephcn, (2001) indicate that there lm been an
increase in their use in most State, and Territories in Au,mtlia.
,\ "management ,grccment", in the context of nature conservation, i, nn umbrella term
denoting , suite of contracts or arrangements between owners of land and otl,cr persons or
agencies th>t will suppotl conscn,aUon activiUcs on d,e la~d (findby & 1-Iill)er, 1994). These
arrnngcments arc sometimes rcfcned to as stew.irdship agreement, as they dclincote the
rospon.sibilitics of the contracting parties for the c,rc of bnd. /1.fanagcmcnt agreements ore also
a form of collabor,tivc mnnagemcnt arr,ngcmcnt (!tcnard, 1997). 11,cy arc used on private fond
"an alternative to mandatory suite of legally ,·nfo,ccable mechonisms such as regulotion, and
legislaUon (often rcfcnd to by the economic ai,J k,\,l fraternity,, "tcgulatory command and
control') because of tl,cir grcatcrcfficicnc:1 i,, r-:,,r am\ monitoring rcqui.tcmcnt.
Monagemcnt agreements ore normally ·,ntcred into voluntarily ond c:m be initiated by
the londowner (rcfrrrcd to as Landowner lnitiatd Agreements) or provided '" trnnsitiona!
•greemcnls to landowners that .,re disad,·antagcd by the implcmenrntion of new or modified,
nature cunscn·ation policy or kgi,lotion, or to protect priority arcos of high conserv;uiun ,·alues
os Unique-Site Ag1£~ments (Dinning & Youog. 1997). Mmagement agreements c:m be legaUy
or nnn-legolly binding and their duration """ be fixed·tcrm or permancllt (in perpetuity). In
addition, they csn include all or a purtion of a landowner', pwperty.
Monagcment agreements arc most useful where a pri,·,tc landholder docs not have
altcnutive mechanism, wit!, which to ircurc the long-tenn protection of land and/or sufficic~.t
skills and/pr resources to provide adequate protection to high v,luc conservation foitures on
the land. In Austrnli~. management sgr«ments hive been used to protect wildlife habitats for
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rnrc and thre"Jtened flora and fauno and binlogical diversity in thre~tcned hndseapes. They
enable londholdm

ID

retain the management of the bnd thereby cfficiendy employing local

knowledge, skills and resource>, thus pmviding greater stability and continuity (!lensed, 1997)
pa<ticularly when the beneijt of the agreement arc apparent.

1.2.1.1

Non·legally binding management agreements
Landholders and resource uscts favour voluntary programs that do not require legal

undcm.king over binding contrnctual arrangements

ot

compensato,y measures. Some examples

of volunta,y non-legolly binding managemcm agreements in Australio indudc nation,!
programs such as the Lmd for Wildlife, the Indigenous Protected Arc.i,, program of the
Narum! Heritage Trust (NI-IT) and the Grassy Ecosystem Grnnt of World \Vide Fund for
Nature {\V\'(/F), Others include State or Territo')' bosed agreements such as d,e Wildlife
Refuges Scheme, d,c Con,cNation ,\greemcnts by the Namrc Conservation Trust in New
Soud1 Wolcs ond d,e Woodland Wotch Scheme by \'V\W in Western Austrolia.

Land for Wildlife program (Victoria)
TI,c L~nd for \VtldLifc p1ogrn.m in Victorio is the only voluntary non-legally binding
agreement included in chi, study. It is administered b)' the Deportment of Norn,,! Resources
ond Environment (DNRE) with the assistance of Bird Observe" Club of Australia (BOCA).
The aim, of the program arc 10 ,up port the moititenonce and cnhoneement of n,u·ve flora and
fauna on private fond through cooperotive ogrcements, provide finoncial incentives ond
advisory services and to encourage the integr>rion of narnre conservation with. other land
management objectives (Land for \X1ildlifc, 2iJOO). TI,c pmgram membc,.hip l,,s exponded
rapidly faom less th,n a hundred in 198! to over five thousand members in the )'Car 2002. It
covers properties with " total are• of over 115,000 hectares of wildlife habitot such as
rainforest, freshw,>ter wctl,nds, box and ironbark and red gum trees, scrubs and herb-lands ond
grnssland, (L~nd for Wildlife, 2000).
Properties ore rcb~steud under bnd for Wildlife on satisfying a set of criteria, through
a formal assessment by the staff of DNRE, members of BOCA or authorised volunteers,
Assessment eritcria arc not strictly defined but rcqllire thot properties sati,fy at !cost one of two
criteria- properties ore managed in a WII)" th"1 pursues the maintenance atld enh,ncemcnt of
native Aoro and fauna and proportks and; properties arc mamged in o w,y that attempts to
inlef\l'Ote nature conservation with 0th.er land monagcment objectives. Clari~cstion of the
intentions of the landholder, the attributes of the property including its obili,y to support
wildHe, its habitats and potcntii! manogcment problems, arc indided in the initial assessmenL
Lwdowners whose properties ore scceptcd for registrntion receive a certificate of registration
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and n signed Land for Wildlife Agreement containin3 the terms and conditions of membership
(Land for Wildlife, 2000).
Properties that fail to meet at least one of the I.Wo assessment criteria may be reviewed
in future for rebristrstion

Oil

fulfilment of recommended changes or actions, Registered

properties arc reassessed after a f<:w yca.s, providing the opponunity to re,:iew landholders'
goals and to discuss any issues rebting to the pragnm. 11,c incentives provided to fandholdcrs
under the program iticludc a signage sho\\11\g that they arc members of I~~nd for Wildlife,
cncoungcment alld tcchnico\ ad,·ice through visits by extension officers and a periodic
newsletter with informotion on v.ildlife monogcment issues. A limited editio,i badge ond
certificate to honour landholders who achie,·e a ten-)'esr membership ore il.•o p,o,·ided as
incentive, (L:,nd fm Wildlife, 2000).
The uncertainty of delivery of c~pected conservation outcome, in non-leg,lly binding
programs makes diem less favonrablc choice rn conseMtion organisotions despite tl,cir lower
operating costs than legally binding progrnrn~ (llrothcnon, 1989).

1.2.1.2

Legally binding agreements
TI,e common characteristic of restricti,:c binding agreements i, that they cu,W! certain

right, of a landholder over their use of alld impact on the property (Young ct ,I., 1996). The)'
,re attoched to the Lind tide and are msde berwccll die owner of• propert)• or agreement
halder and a non.profit organization, government agency or department.
Different types of legally binding monogemem agreements are in u,c around the world
snd in 1\ustulia. Fixed-tcnn sgrcerncnts "' opposed to restricti,:c permanent agreements arc
only binding over the specified period of the agreement. Some example, of leg;dl}" binding
restrictive fixed-tenn ,grccmcnts in Australia include d,c 30 ycors conscrvotion cm•cnont under
the Rcmtiont Vcgctstion Protection Schomc in Western Australia, and the Propc.ty Agreement
in NSW, which is colltaincd in the N,ti,·c Vcgetatio,i Conservation Act (1997) under the
Deportment of Land and Water Conservation. Tiic lstcr Agreement i, between • landholder
and the Department of Lind and Water Conservation. lt outlines the msnagcment of noti,:e
vegetation

Oil

tl1c property for a specified period (Department ofLtnd ond Water Cooserv•tion

(NSW), \998). However, ~-0tl, agreements provide the option of pu,nanency and offer
illcentkcs in fonn of fcncirilt grsnts and financi,l as.iM•occ to cover on-ground consc<Vation
work in New Sou ti, \Voles (Solly S•cph~n,, 2001),
A review of tl,c Rcrnn,nt Vegetation Pmtection Scheme in Western Australia
examining its characteristics and operation is pro,:ided below, u it i, the only legally hinding
fixed·tenn management agreement (fixed-tcnn covcn,nt) included in this study. lnform~tion
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on this ,;chemc i, important in pointing out auributcs 1h111 m,y have , role in infiueneing its
members' decision tOW:1rds the up toke of a pcrmoncnt covenant.

RemnMJt Vcgcraticm Protection Scheme (ll"cstcm Austr.Wa)
The Remn,nl Vegetation Protection Scheme (!WPS) is a conservation mechouism
cstabliihed io 1989, which pr,,,.ided for both mmdatory and mlumary protection of native
vegetation on pri,·otc land. '11,c Scheme wos d""dopcd in Wc1tem Austr,ilio following call, by
people of different discipline, for 1hc need tn (Utb widc,prcod ,nd continued dcaring ofnati,·c
,·cgctatiun on priv,1c land through the imrL-<luction of oppropriatc land c\coring control
«gul,tions Oenkin~ 1998). l~1nd denting rell"la1ions that empowered 1hc St,te G,wemmcnt to
intel'\'enc and prewnt cle.1ring of lond where ,uch denting wa. viewed likely to cause lmd
degradation were ~,ieued under 1hc Soil and Ulnd Conscrvotion ,\ct (1986) tbercofter
Under the 5,,i[ and I.and Consen·ati,in Act, a pri\'a!c landowner is rcquircd to 11otify
the Cummissirmcr ufSoil Con,en·,tion of intent to dcnr more than one hectare of land at least
9(1

d•)'• before such oction. '11,e Cummissioner then as,e,scs 1he likelihood of land d<;,.,.,dotion

resulting from the clearing. !f au assessment indicotcs there is likelihood of detrimem~I eff<ct of
cknring on the bncl, pcnnission to deac is denied nnd the bnd is placed under mondamry
dca·,ing protection under the Soil and l~1nd Comm•ation Act by the i,suance of a Soil
Conscn•otion Notice, or by the lmdo,..,i,er entering an Agreement to Resel'\'e10enkin,, 199B).
Remnant Vcgeiation Protection Schen,e under the 'Agreement to Re,cr•:c' requires
bndowncrs to protect nrc,s of high quality vegetation ss a regulatory condition for grant of a
permit to subdivide the property, mske chonges of land.use or to dear pm of the lond.
FoUowing an amendment to the Soil and L1n(l Consm·ation Act in 1990, pro,·i,iom
were made fot landowner, to protect rcmnont vcgct,tion by use of Cousccvation Cm·enant
mechanism. The co,·cnam is ,cgistcred on the Certificate of Ti~r., tither in perpetuity
(i'cmi,ncnt Covenant) o, m·er a fixed period of at least 30 ye,r, in rerum for fencing subsidies
for the land sreas under protection. Under the RVPS, hndholdcts received up to ,\$1200 per

km for fencing arcos placed under the scheme. Funhermore, grants for on.ground works
moybe avlllhb!e through the Department or Conservation and L:,.nd Managemcmwhero lond ls
placed under a permanent co,·enonl,
,\ lando,,;ner asses,ed to have valuable native vegetation the property, therefore, has
the option of entering a fixed-term covenant voluntarily or placing ~,c mandatoty ogrcemcnt

I A formal ngiecment between lite Commissioner of Soil and !..and Conservation and the landowner,
registered as a memorial on the Certificate of Title, in which \he landowner accepts the land
assessment and lite importance of rcrnining naliH: vegetation on the land.
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on th" land u'1der the 'Agr«mem to reserve' under Soil and L1nd Conscr,otio" Act (1986) at a
time when an applicotion to subdivided or change ofbnd·use or clearing of land is sought from
govemmeot. The co.,dirional dllracteriscic of this agreement (Agreement lo Reserve), in which

a landholders may only be pcnnittcd to chmge land-use typ~ or to subdivide the property upon

ii'

entry into o fixed.term co,·cnant, i1w:tlid.1tes the cbssificacion of the Agreement's •• totally
"voluntary", particularly b<:Ctusc the prim•')' intention of the landholder under the ',\grccmcnt
to Reserve' is not the conservotion of remnant vegetation. Conditional gnnt of perm.it to
landhnlders may create the pcrcepcio:m of coercion into the scheme and therefore be less likely
to gu:u,mee qu.1lity consem,tion of the remnmt vegetation. Currendy die Scheme i, suspended
and under program review.

1.2.2

Covenants in perpetuity (Permanent covenants)
,\)though the retention of conservation feature of significant value on pri,·ote lond hos

benefit to d,c wider public, government or private agencies cannot afford to buy and maintain
every conservation area on private property that rn~rits prcscn·ation. Comer,ation covenants in
perpetuity referred to in this study as "permanent cm·enants" or "casements" in the United
States, provide d,c possibility of mointaining significant conservation foatun:s on the properties
often at pri,11.te e,pense.
Pennonent covenan1, nrc flexible dorum.cnts amchcd to the l,md title 11.nd tailored to
indi,idual propertic, nnd the needs of individuol JandhnlJe,,., "ll,er ,cstri,t the u,c of the fond
by specifying the obligations ond cntideme:tts under which the land is to be managed (13inning
& Young,

1997). Permanent covenants, therefore, place n long-term commiunent on d,c

landowner and 1he priv,te or public conscr,,ocion ,gem:y for the pro1<etion of important
eomcrvorion value. of the land while aUowing the landowner to retain possession of the land
(HiUyer & ,\ti.in,, 2000).
In Westem Australia, the Transfer of Land ,\ct (1893) aUows local governments or
public ,gencie, to enter into a covenant will1, landowner on , wide range of issues in duding
nature conservation (Clement & Bennett, 1998). TI,e ,dvantage of pcrm,ncnt covenants for
nature over other forms of non-binding mmagcment agreements is d1cir obility to restrain
opponunistic behasiour such as the connrsion of the conscn,acion lond to other land-uses
when it is profitoble to do so (Young ct al., 1996). Such change, arc Likdy (o occur when there
is a change in the tideholder.
Another ad,•anta~ of pcnnancnt covenants i, that they offer an opporrunity for
creating o new form of protected areas outside the conventional protected ar,a •pt.em. In
Australia for exomple, this is in accord will, Federal Government's commiunent to crClltc more
protected are3' for biodiversity conservacion, as a measure for implemennng d,c Nation;!\

12

Chapter l:The Nature of the Study
Strategy for Conserv,tion of Biodiversity {19%). ln a<ldition, pcnnancnt covenants arc viewed
as more cost efffctivc than public acquisition and inanagemcm ofland (Hillyer &Alkins, 2000).

A rc'\llcw of the process •nd legal basis of a permanent ca,·cnant '.1l this study is
provided in the following text it1 order to sccentua!e the attribute! th•r have possible influence
on the perceptions ,nd attitudes oflantiholdcrs towards its uptnkc.

1.2.2.1

The process and legal basis fot permanent eovenanlS
The landholder or the co,·cnnntcc can initiate the process of entering a permanent

covenant on l,nd. A private !nndho\dcr (cnvcnantor) can identify an authorised conservation
org:mization or public agency (cm·enant<e} "ith whom to enter imo an agreement and
negotiote the rc,trictians on the use of the con,c!"\"ation area that ~re to be induded in the
•gteerncnt. "The ogrecmcnt t.ike, into account the gu.Ja and needs of the covcnantor and the
need for preservation of the conservation feature, on the prnpcrtics. The agreement also set!
out the monitorit1g and enforcement protocol to be fo\!owed. Lc[:"l representation is often
rc<juircd in the drafting and review of the ngrcemecu.
Consetv,cion covenant, c,n be modified or tcmiinotod with tbe ag1ccment of both
eovcnacitce and ca,·cnantor or by :t cou,t of low, p,rticuhrly when the conservotion objective•
of the covenant became impossible to ochicvc. Ths :1.bi\ity to chollengc a pcrm,ncnt covenant
in , cou.t of law or change it in the future may cause them to be viewed by conscrvationminded landholders as unreliable for assucing 1b_c long-tcrm noturc conservation and provides a
rrnson for their rduct:ince in its up toke.

1.2.2.2

P(Ovisions and management requirements under a permanent covenant
A covcnontcc often pro,·idco certain supports t,., • ca,·cnontor in return for a covenant

For example, in the National Trust of Ausmdb's (Western Austr.1!io) covenant program
covenanmrs hove the possibilirr of receiving vorions inccniivcs such as access to sp«ialist
environmental manogcment advice, support in tl,c preparation of m.,nogement plans and access
to rcgionol officers and access to fonding from tl,e program md other funding prognms to
support the iinp\cmcntotion of, management plons. In adilition, covcnantors can have link:igc,
to

a rnngc of 'i'ecia!ist communiiy g<oups nnd other programs th;11 can provide tr.1ining :u,d

support with e~pcrtisc, volunteers and specialist activities, such•• seed co\!ection, rc•:cgctotion
and weed conuo!, advocacy and ,uppo,t. l'inoncial support is ol,o provided !o «Ncr legal costs
0£ establishing the covenants. The National Tn,st coll,borales with governments at various
levels and other conservation groups to odvocate for reduction in land rates and taxes
covenanted land.
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In the Act to ;>mend the law relating to t:intion law (faxotion Law Amendment Act,
No 2 of 2001, an<l No. 167, of 2001· Schc<lulo 7- Conservation Covcn,i.nts), provision is mode
for consc,v,ition incentives in die form of tax deductions for cnnscrvatk>n covenanting nr
denotions of land or b,rg:tin ,ales with retained rights of occupancy. The new measures ol,o
provide copitnl gains tax exemption, on hnd bequests for conservation. I! addresses loss in land
value by providing income tox deductions ond ccncession, on capitai gains tax trcauncnt

a,

incentive, to J:mdowncrs and ccrtnin deductible gift recipients to to.ke up a perm•ncnt covenant
for natu,c conservation. Such deductions ore avoibble to landowners at the time of property
sole to cover"")' loss in mar~et value of thcir property bees use of having placed a permanent
covenant on it.

1.2.2.3

Permanent covcmmt schemes under Trust for Nature in Victoria and
Fixed-term covenant in Wcstcm Australia
Permoncnt covenant, in Victori•

MC

established by an independent statutory body.

Tmst for Nature olm referred to as 'The Trust' under the Victorian Conservation Trust Act
1972 A permanent coven,nt can onl)' be placed on land that has signiflcont ecology, natunl
aesthetic, historic interest, or importance for conservation of wildlife or native plants (section
3A (1)). It is enfo<ecoblc ., " restrictive covenont, though it may ascribe positive actions to be
corricd out by the covenant or in its ogtecment.
The Trust operates the larg,st number of covcnonts an<l is one of the mo51 acti,·e
covenant initiati,·es in Australia. As at December 2002, 473 coven•n!s covering more th•n
19140 hectares had been registered. !t also pu,chascs land of high ccmscrvation value through a
revolving fund (frust for Nature, 2002).
Legal costs •ssociated with placing the covenant on tl,c bnd arc covered by the Tru1t
hut the covenontor m•kes n once off donation of S3,500 per property to fund on-going
monitoring and mar.•gcment of the covenant by tl,e Trus~ The restrictions placed upon
landholders by a cm·enant cover all or pm of the orea under tl,e agreemcm. They also prohibit
sub·division of the conservation arcs and require that it be fenced. All domestic grnziog animols
and feral animals such as cats are to be excluded from tl1e conserved areas and the role of
domestic dogs and l•ndholders' r:,ponsibilitics in controlling exotic weeds and removal of
timber Me outlined (fmst for Nature, 2003).
The ,i.greement require, covenontor. to undertake the conservation or core of :my
bushland, tree,, rock formations, buildings, or other objects on the land. The octions aud dutie~
of the covensnto: and covcnontcc arc contained in a management program designed in
conjunction with the landowner. It includes a monitoring component, which CVll!uatcs the

"

cffecti•,'enc,s of the covenant once cvecy three years (Whclon, 1996)

14

Chapter !:The Nature of the Study
The task of designing a co\•cnant that mcelS :ill the attributes desired by both parties is
difficult and complell. Further, it i, not dear from the Trust for Nature: Article', text whctl,cr a
permanent covenant can be placed on conservation features, such a, wetl:md,, or on
conservation features thot arc used to mitigate erosion anti salinity, where such fearure, do not
incorpor:ite bushland or trees.
Covenan;~. may be terminated by the Trust or varied by agreement between the Trust
and all persons ha\ing an inttlcst in the land an,J bound by the covenant, with the approval of
the J\.finister. Section 3A (3H9) of the Act cmi,·~crs the Minister, if he considers owners of
land in the vicinity to be ~ffccted, to direct the Trust to give notice oftl,c proposed termination
or variation and other owners gi\•cn the oppornutity to make submissions within a month
(Victorian Consetvation Tru,t, 1994).
1be llfini,ter can make an order r<:lttitting the whole or nny part of land tax or rates
payable in rcipect to the lmd, under section 4 of 1hr Victoria Conservation Trust Act 19711,
where the Trust believes preservation of fand subject 10 a conservation covenant is not
economicolly feasible and preservation i, endangered TIU, power. however, has not been used
to date. Its record in signing on many bndholders into covenants has made the Trust a model
for othrr Au,trnlian States snd Territories.
In Western Australia, two covenant initiatives by the National Trust of Au,tnli.
'-(Western Au,trnlio) and the Department of Come ..vition ond Lo.nd Management (C,\Llrl) arc
ii1~clled after the Trust for Nature Covenant initiative (Bradby, 1998). The Conservation and

LaJid Management Act of 198i i, currently under review tc, \.,1oaden its pmvision and support
for cm•enant initiatives. This covemnt i, described earlier as the Remnant Vcgcmtion
Protection Scheme under the Comrnissione, of Soils and Lo.nds.
In Western Australia, covenant. can also be entered into between a landowner and•
local go,emmen! or public authority, uncle, the Trnmfer of Land ,\c~ ,\U covenant pmgrams
in Western Austral;, offer a level of financial incentiw to encourage the uplllke of covenants.

,;
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Section 3: Theoretical framework for the uptake of conservation covcn:itlts \\
'I

i,'
1bis s~tion reviews the literatU<e on the specific factors that arc predicted to in!1ucncc
the ded,ion of landholders in the uptake of permanent covenant. The theoretical framework
on which these in!1uences take ploce is also presented. ln view of limited empirical research on
the uptake of rcotrictivc management ogrccmem, for nature conservation, this review draws
significantly from findings of empirical research on factors that influence the adoption of land
conservation and agricultural technologies on privotc lond and retention of native vegetation.
Thc,c adoption and retention scheme• and covenants arc hypothesized to sh1te seven!
common factors that in!1ucncc the decisior.i ofbndholders on their use.

1.3.1

The complc1dty
As with overall conm'Vation ofbiodivmhy on private land (Farrier, 1995), 11.doption of

conservation innovation by private bndholden i, multifaceted, with a complex adoption
d~i,ion framework involving several factors {\'(/aniner & Moul, 1989). Lo.ck of wide adoption
of many cost·cffcctivc land conservation measU<rs is the rc,ult of a suite of social, 11n1cturnl,
culturnl, perceptual, and financial situations and proce1>cs rather than a technical problem
(Vancloy & Lawrence, 1995). Some of the situation, cited by Vanday and Lo.v,rence that arc
hypothcsi1.cd to have rde•:ance to decision, on the uptake of penn•ncnt covenants include the
complexity of the man,gemem practice, incompatibility with farm and personal objectives and
lo~s of !1e.ibility throur,h tight rcstricuon,. Other ,ituatioos include implementation cost,
uncertainty about bencfu, from the invc,uncm and connicring infonnation about benefits or
con,cquence, of •doption, perceptions of the environment, infrastructure that an support the
implementation of t:1c required actions and the social infraslnlctute, referring to the influence
of other fanncrs on iudividuil farnicr's decision.
Encumbrance• on the !and title and other restrictions on use of the land under
conscrw.tion Cltn hinder landho!dcn from taking up nature conservation schemes Qames, 1997;
Producti,·ity Co,nmission., 2001). Furthcnnorc, r,'Sistance to adoption of conservation
mech•nism, i, likdy !o oco.u if landholders perctive the propmed program 11.c1ivities not to be
in thcir intcrc,t (C.,ry, 2001). Smdics in the United States have shown thot formers are
motivated 10...,m!, cnvirorunental protection and porticipotion io the varioU, environmental
program• when they have a stoke in the outcome, of conservation (K!approth & Johnson,

2001).
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Landholders have a unique way of managing their properties with which they are
comfortable and this can impede change to innovations or adoption of ton,ervatinn
technologies (Drost, Long, \'Vilson, & Miller, 1996). They ore o.Jso more likely to implement
innovations or practices tho! they 1icw to be profitable, simple to implement and compatible
with their goals and objective, of the lnnd (Klopproth &Johnson, 2001).
Landholdcts respond positively to narure conservation efforts a, Jnng as proposed
conservation measures ore not perceived a, " threat to their livelihood in terms of social and
economic wdfarc, long-term objectives for the land and possibly long-term tenut(' with a
notion of retaining land in the family. Me,isurcs tho! ore viewed 10 be cconomic:illy
unfavoutablc, :ilienoting

~'J fond from its owner, or decreasing its m.uker vo.lue might not be

readily accepted. The Jorge amount Of litenturc on adoption of conservation innontiom and
mechanism confirms that adoption is a function of n complex set of factors (Warriner & Moul,
1989).
Hanington Krupnick, & Peskin (1985) propose seven.I question, thot have to be
addressed in order to influence the behaviour of landholders towa«ls adoption of conservation
measures. Some of these include ascertaining who will pay for conservation nn private land;
how lO reconcile individual needs and circumstances with desired conservation outcomes and,
how to set conservation goals and standrnls that ore flexible ,nd fair to o.ll. In principle,
motivation for narurc conservation on private land depends on influencing individual
behaviour, 'and particular government policies that have on importont role to ploy in
influencing farmers regarding land conservation progiam, (Hollic!t, \99G).

1J.Z

Linking attitudes to i..ichaviour
It is not the intention in this study to explore the relationship, between attirudcs to a

permanent rovenant uptake and its acruo.J uptake behaviour. A principal air~ is to establish the
perception, and attirudcs of landholders to rcrmoncnt covenants based

al, several attirudinal

measures. for this reaso,l a brief cxplanotion f'.">- inclusion of attitudes in the study as • measure
of a landholders' likelihood of uptake of• p=nancnt covenont is given.
Attitudes have long been the fntllS of research by sociologist, and psychologim. They
arc defined by Manning, Valliere, & !-.fintecr, (1999, p.45) as "an orientation toward certain
objeci, or situations that is cmolionally toned and relatively persistent". In addition, " ••. they
ore learned, they ore a measure of how people fccl abom issues and they arc an ei<ptcssion of
value or belief resulting from an application of a general vo.luc
siruations".
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'There is a comprehensive liter:iturc of research on attitudes toward environmental
issues. St<ldics by Vanclay & Lawrence (1995) and Haw, Cocklin, & Mercer (2000) and others
hove suggested that attirudes arc not predictive of behoviour beousc behaviour may change
even though the underlring auitudes remain the same because ofin1eivening fachm. However,
Vanclay & Lawrence concede that the influence of attitudes on behaviour is evident in
situations when other ttlfluences that arc likely to affect behaviour and action, are minirni,ed,
or when the attirude i, specifically relevant to behaviour, or where individu:i.ls arc kcenlr aware
of thcir attitude,.
Myers (1996) a,scrts tl,.t attitudes and bd,oviour arc linked in specific c11cs,
pnrticubrly where attitudin:i.l and other relevant mrasurc, ;ire included in the ,,.e,sment "/ogcl
(1996) ,dds that attitudes arc predictors of behaviour when anolysis of the relation.hip involves
sttitudinal component, and additional inAuencing variables in a multivariate setting. Attitude
theory ·,uggests that attitudes arc better predictors of beha,~our tll which tl,ey are specifically
related (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). Attirudc, can be strong pm.'Jcr.:irs of specific behaviour;,,
rcsrarch conducted within the frsmcwork of the Theory ofRc:i'i'oned Action (Carr, \98B; Eagly
& Chaiken, 1993; Fishbettl & Manfrcdo, 1992). Furthermore, succmful adoption of

consuvation practices is likely 10 be influenced more by farmers· attitudes and perceptions tl1m
any other factor (Miranowski & Shortle, 1986; Smothers, 1982).
In encapsulating the importance of attltudiml measures, Haw ct al. (2000) contend that
prognms should focu1 on countering the barriers that prcvcnt lan<lho!ders from adopting more
sustainable prnctice1, os wcU a, al!cmpa"ng to inOucnce attitudes.

'fhcr

funher point out that

fosieriug appropristc attitudes remains important beomse it reinforces the importance of
undenaking mo« ,ustainable practices, thus prnmoring long-term commitmenlS. These latter
views on •ttirudes support thcir inclusion in the present study as predictors of the likelihood of
actual uptake of permanent covenanlS when measured by severnl variable,. Attitudes can be
addressed by educarion and awarenes, in a policy frnmcwork.

1.3.3 Factors influencing covenant uptake
1.3.3.1 CharactctiBtics of innovation or mechanism
The principal factors that influence the adoption of conscn11tion innovations by landholders

vary with the type of innovation. Guerin (1999), for example, points out that adoption of soil
conservation prnctice is attributed to the practice itself. The characteristics and operation uf : __
given mechanism or innovation and the .Utcmotivc innovations, as well as the principl;s on
which they opcr:itc can also inOucncc landholders' adoption decision,. The ease of oppli:stion
m sdoption and versotility of conservation innovations or prncticcs ;ire important elements th•t
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influence their adoption (Drost ct al, 1996). In reference to decisions on the uprnke of
pcnnanent covenrnts it i• anticipated in this ,rudy that bndholdm will only uke up a
permanent covet1ant when thoy Jndentond it well, hove confidence in it over other
mechanisms and when they view it to be c.,y to implement rnd in accord with their goals and
objectives of the !and.

1.].3,2 Fulltime orpart·time farming and age
Hog:,n (1996) char:icmised landholdcn' willingness to participate in con,crvation
program, according to whether they Were full-time or part-time fanncrs and according to the
size of their properties. Part time londholden were more likdy 10 participote in the program
tl,an full-time fanners were because tl,cir opportunity cost of taking land out of production was
much lower tlmn for octivc fanne". They were ol,o less concerned about po,sible hidden costs
of adopting the program and were likely to be interested !n on-site amenities generated by the
conserved areas than full time farmer>. It i, therefore anticipated in this ,rudy that landholders
who arc full-time on d,e land and in cffc~t economically <1epcndcnt on the property are more
~1.cly to hove a negative attitude towsrds the uptake ofpcrmonent cc"·enont thon those tl10t ate
port-time and con,c9uently less cconomicolly dependent on tl,e property,
Drost ct a!. (\996) found tliat oge was a factor that influenced adoption of low-input
practices on fannbnd,. Older landholder, were more resistant to adoption of low-input
practices because the)" perceived them to be unfeasible or impractical 1bcywere more sceptical
about the benefits of odopcio11 since it would in any case not occur in their lifetime. D,ost ct oL

(1996) .tlso fuund the the risk of learning and applying new techniques was a burier to
adoption of new technologies for older landholde". In this study, therefore, it con be
anticipated that older landholders are more Likely to have ncg:,tive attitudes to tl,e uptake of
permanent envenom than a<e young landholders.

1.3.3.3 Duration of land ten we and type offann managed
1-faw et al. (2000) cite studies in which positive corrciations have been establi,hcd
between tl,c decision of primar;· producer, about environmental stewardship and tlie duration
oftcnme. In contr.ist to this obscrvatiol!, it is anridpatcd that la11dholders with a Jong period of
land ownership in the family ore more likely to show resist,u,ce to the uptake of a permanent
covenant than 0<e landholders with a shorter period of family land ownership, Tius forecast is

in view of thcir confidence in their .~bility and accumulated experience

to dt.:I with the

conservation threats on tl,e land without tl,e use of a binding co,;enant mechani,m.
Buttel, Larson & Gillespie (1990; dted in Vanclay & Lawrence, 1995) point at evidence
that suggests d,at the adoption of innovative cn,;ironmental practice, occur because of

19

Chapter 1:The Nature of the Smdy
commercial reasons rather tlian because of the environmental benefits, cspeci.Uy among
commercially oriented farmer, os opposed to 'farming as • way of life' oriented farmers. Tiu,
suggestion inherently categorises farmers into two group, bo,ed on whether the source of thdr
motivation in decision-making regarding the adoption of an innovotion is economic or not

1.3.3,4 Primary motivation, covenant knowledge and awareness
Klapproth & Johnson (2001) identified the prim"')' motivation of landholders as the
factor that differentioted between tl10se that had an interest those that lack of interest in a
conservation ttcservc progr.un. Those tliat were interested in the program were primarily
motivated by nature, environmental conservation and economic reasons while those that did
not want to enrol were more dtl,er concerned with the economic lo,s because of'idopting the
program orwiohed to avoid the program's rules and regulations.
lnadcqnate knowledge aboot a p«:scribed innovation can limit its adoption (Guerin,

1999). Knowledge and awareness particularly of its benefits and tl1e issue/, tliat it aimr to

address arc important in tl,c decision on adoption cf conservation innovations. Thus,
conservation mechanisms thot ate little known are not likely to be easily adopted. In Ohio (US),
for ex.tmple, infonmtion (diat leads to increased awareness and knowledge) wo, one oi the
mo,t populru: dcations by farmers ., requirements for adoption of conservation practice to
succeed (Batte, Jones, & Schnitkcy, 1990).

1.3.3,5

Relevance and Goals
Adoption of conservation innovation ,nay not occ11r even when all is known obont a

conservation mechanism becoose of its incompatibility with the bndho!der's go.ts and its
perceived irrelevance. Harrington ct al. (1985) identify. condition, that must be met for
volunt"')' progr.im, to soccced, individuals must agree that the goal, of the program are worth
putsing and that thcir actions will advance the goal, non.compliance must be observable in
order to create social pressure fo{compLiancc and the cost of the program should not greatly
°"ceed its private benefits. Nowok (1987) points out that relevance of an innOV11tion in terms of
its consistency with lsndholder needs, socio-economic status, goals and attitude, towards
diffcr:cnt practice, are crudal 10 its adop lion.
In Line with the above findings, it is hypothesized thst landl10\ders who have a strong
·;,
nature comervarion ethic and a higher .level of knowledge and awareness about penn:u:.ent
covenant, arc Likely to be positive aboot the uptake of pennonent covenant. Furthermore,
commercially oriented bndholders, o, indicated by their level of dependence on their prnpcrty
and the primary land-use type for thcir income, are Jen Likely to rnke up a permanent covenant
thon those that farm 'as a way oflire' orwitl, Little income dependence on the land.
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1.3.3.6

Economic factora
Economim argue that individuals mokc rntioc,ol dccisiom in choosing option• tlm

seem to them most likely to secure tl,cir largest ne, economic advantage. Most ni1ol landholders
live in an economic environment gaining employment or economic benefits from the land or
outside the land. Therefore any major decisions regardi"g th cir land might riRlnly be influenced
by the economic implicstion of the toking either decision (Vanday ~' l~~wrencc, 1995). This
view is consistent with Dunlap & Van Licre (1984) in 1hcir conclusion tl,a, concern, for tl,c
environment is " significant moti,·ation for oppropria!e e,wiromnental behaviour only wl~cn
basic economic otid survival needs arc met. Hallick (1990) argues 1h,t farmers' choices

ar,

rnnstrainc<l within some mulcidlmcnsiona1 "decision ,pace" bound.uies within which they
operate and a fanncr's objectives and pernptions of his/her economic situotion arc some of
the decision detennin,11ts held within these boundaries.
Tisdel & Hwisoti (1999) suggest thst biodiversity may be thr<atcned whctc tl1orc is •
perception of imbalanced ecoimmic benefits in relation to conservation effort and pcrccivcd
greater benefits from ahcmativc lnnd-usc,. 11,is sugg,stion is ,upponcd by studies in the
United States, wltich showed that a pos,ible economic loss from adoption of a conservation
program was the great concern of landholders. In additio", they were unwilling tc incur costs in
programs that had only long-term economic rcrorns (Norris & Shabmon, 1988). Economic
measures of land condition in terms of its productivity olso influence odoprion of conservation
practices or i11novation (Sinden & King, 1990). The level of fann debt is another si1uation:i,
barrier tlrnt is likely o influence significantly the decisions of lnndholdcrs to undertake
conservation measures that ro9ui1c or 1rndc off financial input (Haw r.t ol., 2000).
In ,\ustralia, economic constraints hove been cited as barriers, ,pcci6cally in tbc uptake

of pennanent covenant. In Victoria speci6caUy, difr.cultic, have been encountered in
ptomoring cm·enants to formers who arc under financial stress (l'rust for Nature, 1998). Post
research hos shown ,doption of conservation innovation to be posici,·dy corrd,tcd wit!, farm
income (Gartc! & Gartd!, 1985: Worriner & Moul, 1989). In applying econmnic re1sons to
dcdoions ,,gruding the entry of a permanent covenant on J.nd, it can be hypothesi;ed that
fandholders compare expected costs and bmefits of ovail:iblc opportunities and choose that
which they pcrcci,·e would promote their g:c:o1est welfare.
It is cxpcct<d in !his study that greater effort i, needed to convince landholder:, to

uptake a pennanem covenant on th cir lond where they perceive a loss in market value of their
fond because of placing a pennonent covenant on it. Similarly, lanJh,:,ldecs who perceive the
possibility of financial obligation arising from entering a permanent covenant on their land
would be rcluct:mt to cake up a pcrmonent cm·enant on their land.
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1.3.3.7

Perceived risks and benefits
Adoption of conscr,,otion innovstion i, n,ore likely to meet with re,ist:mcc where the

perceived benefits snd ri,k, ore not dear (Guerin, 1999; Hallick, 1990). On the other hantl,
formcts will adopt conservation t~cbnologie, when they perceive land degr,dotion to be,. risk
to them ond when ther r~cognisc that it is occuoing Olickson, Saffigna, Vond,y, & McToinsh,
1987~ !,linimi,ing financi,l risk is paniculsrly importsm for encouraging sdoption of
sum.inablc farming practices (Drust ct ol., 19%), becouse as Con,cher (1998 p.392) notes,
environmental chonge only becomes"" issue if people feel "threatened". The advantages of on
innovation over others tl,st ore alrcody in use have to be clear before odopcion con toke place.
In following the ossertion by Rickson Ct ol. (1987), londholdei:,' perceptions of rhk, of
,kgrndation of a conservation area in the la11g-tcrm m•y contribute to thcir decision towards
entering a permanent cm·enant, especiolly when pemunent covenants arc viewed a,
appropriate mechanisms for averting such ,kgrodatiot1. 111ereforc, the landholders' decision
reg,uding the uptake of a pcrmonent ,ovrn,m c;in be influenced by their perception of risk,
ond benefits to their short ond !ong·tenn form objectives.
Other risks such as unde,irol,lc impact of odoption of con,ervotion pmcticcs on the
agciculmul production of the land con influence the decision to coven mt uptake. In the !Jnitcd
Stites, for example, hndholdcrs expressed fear that the retention of conservation areas under
the progr,m would lead to undesirable comcquences ,uch"' pests like deer and noxious weed,
onto tl,e farmland (Klapptotl, & Johnson, 2001). Simil.sr sentiments have l,een c"f'ressed in

,\ustrnlfa in regard to cmmcction of nati,·c vegetation on farmlond, (Coates. 1987; Jenkins,
1998) to weed ond ferol snimal~.
Alexander (1995) orgues tl,ot formers arc more concerned with using the land to
support themselves ratlier than how to mointain the ecosystem. Landholdei:,, in most instances,
need to percci,·e tl,e direct and tangible bcndits of the mechanism or program (Noni, &
Shobman, 1983). T1,ddl {1998 p.218) assert, that lo col communities often ho"e few incentives
to conserve biodh·ersity bcc,.use "they often appropriate little economic benefits from this

conservation". In F.1yctte count}·, IL, United States, for example, londholdei:, were willing to
adopt the conservation program if the proposed actiot1s under the pro1;ram had direct bencUts
such as a permit to extr:,ct motecial, grnzing tights snd fo,ondal incentive, (Klapproth &
Johnson, 2001). 'll,e benc~ts of a program or mechanism innst therefore be dearly c,rnblished.
"The spon of time before hecicfit, cnn be reoliscd con also infiuence the adoption of,
conservation innovation. Norris & Shabman (\<)8B) suggost that even whc11 economic teoson,
are the motivation for program adoption, farmers arc unwtlling to incur costs in propo,ei\
program activicie, or investments that have only long.tenn cconomi~ n:rum,.
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1.3.3.8

Equity
Und,,,r Article 19.2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the text p,esupposcs

tha, there arc benefits that flow from the use of biodiversity and that these ought to be shared
between the custodians of biodiversity and the public (Glowka, Burhcnne-Guilmin, & Synge,
199~). Simibrly, there i• ~ view .,mong n cross section of landholder, in Australia that the cost
of natu~ conservation on ptivate lond should be slwed equitably between them md the public
and that recognition should be mode of the services p,ovided by landho!dm to the brooder
community (Aumalfan ond New Ze,fand Environment ,nd Conservation Council, 1997;
Productivity Commission., 2001).
Co!:\tnon (1996) and Jmlh•& Russell (1997) ~uppolt this view in thcir observation that
conservati,,n initfotiocs may came a disproportionate sprcod of costs and benefits over spoee
and time, thus creating or acccntuiting perceived or real socio! and econoniie inequalities for
different landholders in different ways. Concern by farmers that d1ey might be forced to benr
the cost or incur los,es frnrn con,crvation actions that primatily also benefit the public has
been noted in the United States (Klspproth & Johnson, 2001). Tisdell (1998) asserts thot loc,J
communidcs have few incentives to conserve biodiversity because they do not equitably share
its benefit,. Thc«forc, despite the increased recognition of the in,portallcc of encournging
con,etvation of n,curc on private ls11d by governments and the public, sevcro! issues hove not
been oddrcssed ·who should pa)", how individual needs aud circumstances can be accounted for
and how we should set goals snd standards that ore lk,iblc and fair to all (l·larringron et al,
1985).
11,e rn.'ljor tenet of the equity theory, as p,rt of 1hc theory of motivation, is that humon
beings work to res!Orc <'<[Uity when they arc confronted with inequitable situations (11anington
ct ol. \985). Moni,da (2002) outlines the components of equity (In relation to equity tlieory of
distributive justice) ss the proportionality of contributions ,mJ outcome, and equol ratios of
contributions and outcomes for ,imilsr actors. Similady, Bennett {1996) define, equity in tenm
of treatment, opportunity and outcomes - that tho,c in need arc not denied equal opportunities
and outcomes, while in the ecacnt of sea.cc resources tho,C who do not bavc a need ore denied
so tl,at those who have a need can ha-·e the opportunities and achieve similar outcomes. This
theory may be particul,rlr rdeonnt in the apportionment of financial and other economic
incentives among llndhoklers foe encouraging thcir participation in noturc conservation
activities. lr,tcrgenerational cquil)• on tl,e other h,nd is viewed in tem,s of the distribudon of
utility over time (Common, 1996) in which a consumption foregone todsy makes avaihb!e units
of consumption at~ future due.
Krattigcr & l.<'sser (1995, p.211} argue !hot "equity is both important for moral rcosons
and for the need 10 sb,re benefits and costs "' a means of encouraging conseivation". 11iis
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suM,m dl!t land ploccd under vo'-'.Mory covenants should ,cccivc the appropriate 1ccognition
in kind to cover cnsts incurre'1 ir. ,~,c ;unngcmcnts and in some cases, opportunity costs
foregone by the pri.,ste !andholdc, In conscr:ing nature for the bmcfit of the community.
However, the answer to wh•t is cquitoh!c ii subjective, being linked to individual pcrccptior,s
and values. A secure bosis for determining equitability can therefore be difficult to achieve,
requiring on understsndlng of all factors that different stakeholders use to dctcmllfle equity on
an individual basi, and then arri>ing •t a consensu, over what might be occeptable to most.
One of the chollcngcs in the use of mmagement agreements is how to achic,·c an cqllitablc ,nd
cost-effective incentive rnechonism fo, motinting private fondholdcrs to pJ<ticipo!e in nature
conscrvncion.
llinning & Young (1997) mokc the link between equity and duty of care ond
stewardship. S1ewordship in this context is defined a, the pmnership between landholders and
other boilics, formed to can)' om set conscr..ation objectives where bencfiti of conscr1:ation
extend beyond the landholder to the public. Stewardship, therefore, involves actions by the
landholde< beyond d1c dnty of cate, which is defined as the expected rcasonnblc ,csponse by a
landholder to prcnnt harm cmsn•ting from nctions or inaction, on tl,e property to others.
Binning & Young (1997) funl,cr osicrt tl1at stewardship is the better alternative to "cmnmon'1
and control" nnd that compen,atioti should be pai'1 to landholders only for octivitics over and
above the duty of care. Pc•rcc & Wnrtford (1993) note that the impor:,.ncc of maintaining
access to natur:,I capita! for ensuring equi~ is more appnrent among landholders who hove a
strong din.ct dependence on the notur:,! resource b,sc tlrnn landholders who do not have such
strong depcnde1,.ice.
Lnndholdern may recognize a prohkm that requires conservation actions bur feel it i,
beyond their scope of effort to undertake it. In such circumstances Kbpproth and Johnson
(2001} point out that ,·arying the level of teclrnical assistance may be ncccs,nry nccording to
individual 1,eeds. A,sistsnce is •lso particufarly imponant in the inuoduction of a conservation
program a11d when the expected conservation practice, arc complex and landholders arc
unfumilnrwith them
Compensation and substitution progmmmcs (Spergcl, 1997) arc a way,of achieving
~quity, particulorly wl,ac the service provided by the landholder in a pe<marient coveuant is
da,sificd a, " community conservatioo service. However, the mechanism and criteria for
allocating cquitoblc compcnsotion •nd a resource substitute that provides equal benefits to
those forcgouc in the case of substitution programmes hove to be determined.
Lcgi,lativc and rcgul.~tory frameworks con be used effectively to p'<.-vem inequity by
assigning costs aud benefits of conservation in ways thoc ste more eqllirnble. For CJ<ample,
benefits can be distributed in proportion to incurred costs of monaging the conservation site,
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purchase of inputs of labour and capiia! item, (llorrini-Fe)'crabcnd, 1997,). Dut)' of core is not
explicit in current legislation in Australia. However, its inco,potation in legislation hos bc~n
recommended as a means to offset d1c tendency of legislation to concentrate on the more
inefficient and cosdy to implement 'command and control' reb'1.lbtions (Botes, 2001).
11,e d1rust of such duty of care legislation would be to set standards that ttquire
individuals to act within their 'reasonable ,nd practical' ability to prevent harm to the
environmc,,t where tisk occur, (Bates, 2001). "The principle of prevention of harm refers to
present and furure generations, thus linking duty of care to the concept of intergenerational
cqLllty. Ther: is, however, difficulty in establishing the point at wh.ich the duty of care ends ond
the conunun.ity conmvation service begins (Bitming & Young, 1997). lltls creates" challenge
in detetmining fairness in compensarion that addresses costs or losses incurred beyond the duty
of care. Furthermore, beconse conservation values and expected actions under duty of care ,·ary
from one private land to another, it is difficult to detenninc the different levels of «compensc
to nward each landholder.

Brant

(2000)

assert,

tlw many londholders

w,nt

to adopt conserv,tion

praetices/s)~terns but they ore hampered by high sod,! and/or economic cos!S. He further
mes.cs the importance of high enough monetary compens,tlon in voluntary conservation
sgreemcnt to ensure that soci,l benefits outweigh soci;il cost and th,t they coincide with
landholders' short an<l Jong-tcnn pl,n,. If equity in compens,tion is not pcrcdvc<l, this cottld
lead to loss in motivation in the case of a permanent covenant uptake and in the long-terrn
man,gement of the conservation area.
Jodha & Russell (1997) point ont th,t safeguards to enhance equity in conservation
progrnmmc, may invo!,·c a mix of mea,utcs deaLing wid1 compensotion foe sacrifices, providing
a share in d1c gains in the short and long-tcnn, incorporating die views of the sffected people
in the choice and de,ign of cmiservation mmures. Ag,tln, in the United States, the federal
government provided cost share pa)'ment to formers who instilled conservation practiccJ on
their property. "lltls payment in principle is society's ihare of the cost of conservotion for the
benefits that it gains in it (Brnm, 2000).
Jodha & Russell (1997) fnrther note d»t in order to apply eqLllty in conscrvarion it is
necessary to know the socio-economic profde of tl1e participants and thcir dependence on the
resources thnt arc placed under comefl'l1tioo. E~Lllty should ensure them are p!;111s to minimise
the disruption of people's lives resulting from participation and loss of ,ccess to the resources.
EqLllty promoting compensatory measures Qodhn & Russell, 1997), which arc often inlluenced
b)' existing institutional arrmgemcnts and dcciiion making processes ass~ciated with the
conservation initiative should be employed.
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One of the objective, of this srudy is 10 explore the views of landholders on equity in
respect 10 the bearers of com thot arc associated wid, the 11ptake of a pcrmoncnt covenant and
the degree of public involvement in co,t ,haring for conservation on private land It i, expected
that landholders who perceive the need for compensation for land placed under a narure
conservation coven,nt arc les, likely to take up o permonent cm·cnant tl,on those that do not
perceive such need. £1urthermorc, it i, expected that the types of equity measure, required to
motivate landholders in d1e uptake of permanem covenants will vary between the different
categories of fondholdcrs in the stud)',

1.3,3.9

Property rights
There is no unh·crsal definition of property rights (Merer, 2000), since it conatantly

chonge, wit!, tiine and in acconlance to society's expectations and the context in which they arc
applied. However, property rights ,ssign the authority for any non-prohibited use of specific
goods (Eggerts,on, 1990) and the rights rn daim that use or the benefit, tlm flow from the
goods (Macpherson, 1978). ,\ right bestows on an individual the obility to compel the State to
defend their interest in a particular outcome (Sjaastad & Ilromley, 2000).
Property tights, therefore, "establish relationship, among participants in any social and
economic system and express the relative power of the rights beaur" for a speci~ed period
(Meyer, 2000, p.!). Eggert~son (1990, p.34) goes further !o state that the concept of propnty
rights is broad, extending bc)'onJ the legal concept 10 include soci;al norms. These ,ocial norm,
arc "s11pportcd by tl,e force of etiquette, social custom, ostrncism and fonnal leg.illy enacted
law, supported b)' the State,' power of violence or p11nishment" (Akhian, 1977, p. 129-130).
M>epherson (!978) points out thot as society changes, property can become controversi;al in
term, of what it i, and what it ought to be. People's perception, ofit arc also bound to change
with rime becou,e it is set up with specific puq,o,e at a particular time. £1urthcrmore, 'Toe
perception and re:ility of it makes property bod, a concept and on institution, both of which
influence each otl,c, m·er time" (Macpherson, 1978 p.1). '11,c limits placed on the oction of an
owner of property arc influenced by the expectation, nnd rights of ,ocict)' as formally
sanctioned and sumined by !ow (Meyer, 2000).
Perceptions of incursion of a permanent covenant on their private property rights arc
on issue likely to influence tl,e decisions of landholders in the uptake of a permanent covenant
Concern about an increased burden of government regulations on property o••mcrs and the loss
of control over the management of the property under a form;al conservation amingcrnent for
'the public good, has been rnised in different parts of tl,e world (Bates, 2001: United States
Dcpartmmt of Agriculture, 1999).
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Despite the notion among man)' people that the land under th~ tide can be used,
enjo)'Cd and uc,tcd ai the)' wish, historicol actions hr governments ~nd court,, however,
suggest that prop my rights of private owners arc ,bared with the public (Meyer, 2000). Cullct
(2000) points out that all external interest in n,rure .,onservation on private property fall under
the institution of"common property" rather than "pnvate propcny" and that uscts nf common
propenr share rights to the resources and ore subject to rules ond restrictions that govern the
use of those resource,. An)' deoling with the property under common property, therefore, hos
to take into occount the entitlements of others and i, subje<:t lo appro,·a! of those with stake,.
The boundary between obligotion ond rights vorios; with paucm, in rights and
obligations, ,cnccting prevailing judgements on what is fair

a,

detennincd by people's ,·o!uc,.

M,cphcrson (1978, p.3) explains 1h,t property is " ... an cnfoteeablc chtim became and in so for
"the prevailing cthicol theory ho\J it is a ncccssoty humon right". Nevertheless, " ...it is not to
approve of"")' system of proporty " morally right or to imply th,t the defining of the acn,,J
right as an cnforce,ble claim implies that force justifies tl,c right".
Property rights a,c therefore • bundle of rights, such os !he right to sdl, lcosc, don~te,
subdivide, gr,nt a covenant, just "1he public a!,o hos a bunillc of rights, such

a,

to tax, take

for public u,c ,od regulate use (Fmicr, 1995). 'Jloese rights con be added or ,ubtractcd, thus
changing tl,c amount of benefits strcoming from the rights. Recent trends have kd to addition
of public rights to include the right to air and water quality protection, to species comctvation
,nd prc,crntion. What is pcteciwd to be tl,e occorded right, in reg,rds to fond·usc may differ
from one lonJlwlJcr to anotl,er and from one period to anolher. 11,c bundle of rights to• suite
of benefit, from a given set of resource, in ;\ustrnlia arc controlled through pri,·,te ownership,
public open access, public closcJ access ond stole ownership as in many Olhcr dcmocrncic,
(Meyc,, 2000).
Klapproth &Johnsrn, {2001) note that lmdholders' fear of possible future introduction
of rcb'lllations by government to restrict their use of buffer wnes is , dctctttnt to the decision
to enter into on ogroement for ~,cir reservation. Attenuation of property rights by the State and

avoidance of responsibility for maimcnancc of the conservation zone were other reasons
mentioned by fandholdcrs as factors deterring their entr)' into an ogrccmcnt to reserve tl,c
buffer zones. Parricr (1995) argues that compcns,tion pnymcnts for the imposition of land·use
mtriction, aec undesirnblc and instead incentives in fonn of stewardship p,yrnents should be
given to landhol<lcrs for positive land management th3t supports tl,e conservation of
biorn\·crsity.
In formulating consen•arion rncch:utisms, account should be rnken of ~,e fact that
formers must ~lso produce economic products, mainuin form profitability, meet their debt
obligations and enjoy tl,e rights of all other citizens. Brant (WOO) assert. that success in
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con,en·stion on pt:iva1e land occurs when flexible incentive, are b,scd on socio-economic and
politicol condition, of the targeted geogmphicol orea and tl,e pMticular chor:octet:istic of fanners
within the targeted area.
Property rights ho,·e relevance in soci,J relationships beyond the more oppa<cnt
relationship between people ond propmy (Vira, 1995). Thcir dcfmilion and allocolion,
therefore, requires that they be considered in the broad rrcial context in which they are to be
applied (Cutlet, 2000). "11,i, study investigates landholders' vi<:Wl about restrictions on land-use
for nsrurc conservation purposes - a perspective thst is .(doted !o the concept of property
rights. Jt is onlicipatcd tl10t landholders who dislike such r,,tricti,a1, on lond·usc hove a lesser
likelihood of toking up" permanent covenant tlrnn tho,e th.i do ,1nt n,inrl the ,eslriclions.

1.3.3.10 Conscrva1ion c1hic and stewardship
Environmental ethics arc gcncr.Uy broad and more ,i.1:.~tract thon vo.lue., as they opply
to human-environment relotionship, (Manning ct a!.,

1999). 11,c)' deal more specifically with

human conduct towsrds, or interoction with, the hiophysico! environment. TI,c drivers and
structure of this imcroction and wbot conslitutes the appropriote .clation,hip, uc i,sucs deal!
with in environment.al ethics (!,tanning ct al., 1999).
Environmental ctltics have C\"olvcd from an ideo!Og)' of domi,tion ov~= uature to•
more modern ecological concept of ho.lance with nature cmbr;1cing the wise use of its
resources. S1ewardship s! a theme connotes peoples' entrustmcnt with a duty to core for the

'ii

earth and its ,csources in order to se«.irc its continued provision, for lhe present and future

/I

generations ond porterity. In the comcxl of this di,coune, the etbicol londholdcr evaluate, the
impact of a decision rcgording the mointcnoncc of nature ce>nscrvation with a long·tenn
perspective, in relation to its benefits and costs.
For 1hc purpose of this study, nature conservation ctltic is sddrcs,cd in the perspeclivc
of landholders' pe,ccptions and attitude, to long·tcrm nature conservation and the c.ient of
the inRucncc of the voluc they place on nature on the uptake of a pennancnt consctvation
covenant. There is c,·idencc in Vicir,ria that some lnndholders who have ploccd a permanent
covenant witl, Trust for Nuu.c are influenced to do so b)" " 'love' for nature ntl,er than b)"
economic gains (\1;11ebn, 1996).
M,111y issues ,ind d,:d,ions on nature <onsel\S1tion on private land cannot be addressed
solely through technical c:tpcrtisc or science becou,c they arc linked to impocta:it vo!uc, or
ethic.al components which arc in tum linked 10 the socio! environment, the economic
environment, 10 perceptions and to kno11.·lcdge of nature conservation (Ilongston, 1994~ These
linkages must be taken into account in setting up nature conservation mechanisms.
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How do you build• nature conservation ethic ond stew.irdship in landholdcc,; and the
public? Comrmnd and control measures c.nnot ;ilonc contribute much to their development
(Bates, 2001). Funhcrmarc, even when iucentivc, ,,.., used, they may not be sufficient in
quantity and quility to prompt the necemty input by landholders to satisfy the appropriate
level of cnvironmem;il stewardship (Ihm, 2001). Linkini: duty of care with the concept uf
ecologically sustainable dc-vtlopment or simil>r concept that landholders relate to, m•y
stimulate tl1eir interest to carry out actions that go beyond the duty of care. Tius notion is based
on tl,e premise that humans behove ration.U)• to safeguard what they viev.• to be in their
interest.
Some mechanisms aimed ot encouraging a nature conservation ethic ore in ploce in
Victo,fa. The Cnmmu,tity Custodianship program seeks to fo,tcr the under.tand.ing ond
in\•olvcment of the community in tl,e conscwation of biodiversilj. Two particular schemes
unde, the program arc the Lind for Wildlife Scheme (discussed earlier in tl.i, chapter) and the
Botanic Guard.ion assist groups. The buer assist groups in the community to active!)' monitor
•nd m:moge tlircatcned specie, on public land.
l! is brpo!lmized in ihe preoent study th,t londholdcr, who have a slrong conservation

ethic demonstrnted by, among od,er things, strong value ond attachment to the norurnl
environment, hove o stroni: likelihood of taking up a pc,moncnt covenant. Under.landing the
factors tliat innnence lsndl,olde.s' decisions to toke up a pcrrnoncnt covenant is important in
determining the policies and 1he incentives meosure, (mon<taty or non-monct•ty) tliat arc
necoss,r;· for motivating their p"'ticipation.

1.3.4

Incentive measures for nature eonsetvation
Article 11 of tl,e Convention on Biological Diversity supports the use of incenti\•es in

nature conser,atlon by calling on member countries to 'adopt economically and socially sound
measure, that oct

o,

incentives for tl,e conservation ond sustainable use of components of

!>iological ,hcrsitt. The 'mc,sures', occording to de Klemm & Shine (1997) should include the
removal of disinccniives ond provision of incentives to conserve biodiversity.
Incentive, arc :mongcmcn!S tho! cnco11ragc desirable bebaviour in contnst to use of
penalties, which ot best main1ain the status quo or discourage conservation efforts (Yoger,
1994). They can be direct or indirect and their use bas the potential to inctca<e conservation
effom and pmvide o brood scope for achieving environmental objectives in • mo,c cost·
effective way than tl,e tnditional rogulatoty mechanisms (Agriculture Western Aumolia, 1997).
An onnual provision of ,\UD S 900,000 10 the Remnant Vegetation Protection Scheme (JlVPS),
which eJpired ir. tlie year 2000, wos a tlircct incenti\•e by tl,e St,tc Government of Western
Australia for noturc conservation on private land to landowners (Agriculrure Wei tern Australio,
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1997). Thi, scheme i, cuucntly under review and is one of the consenm!on mechanisms under
focus in thi, study.
Examples of economic incentives at a local government level inclu1e the Ilrisb,nc
municipality', Voluntary Conservation Agtccment (VCAJ: A porutershlp of the municipality
with landowners. Under the ogreemcn~ a landowner nominates the conserv,tion area on their
pmperty and the council pmvides the finoncial assistance for carrying out the required
cnvimnmcntal sctivities(L Ryan, 1998). A ,irrular agreement, the 'Higher VCA', ploces a
permanent coven•nt on die conservation area br n,-wning the agteed oreo into the conservation
zone under the local town-planning scheme. The council, in return, provides the landholder
"'ith fre~ technical advice, on·ground management training and financial ossistance of a
maximum of 1500 dollars cssh award'" 3;:: r,crccnt annual general rates (I.. Ryan, \993).
Morc> rc>ccntly, there has been an inc«ase in number of similor schemes 01 State and
loc,l government leveb in most State, and Territories in Austmlia. "lbcre is incrc>osing literature
and empirical research on the use of incentives as an alternative to regulatory measures for
cncour:ai,>ing nature conscrvotion on privat~ lan<l in ,\u,tralia (e.g., Binning & Young, 1997;
Dinning, Young, & Cripps, 1999; Lockwood & Walpole, 1999c; !,files ct al., 1998; Western
Australia Municipal ,\ssodation, 19911; Your,g ct al, 1996} However, an evaluation of the role
ond actual impact of incentives in noru,e conservation on private land has nor been c,rricd out
because tlicir adoption is ,elativelr ,cccnt to Australia compo<ed to the United States and
Europe.
Incentive policies can be moncrnrr or non-monetary, although often a combination of
the two ii used to acbicvc tlie desired objccti,-...~ such ns the equitable sharing of the cost of
conservation. Perverse incentives to naturc canservatio11 arc meosu<cs aimed ot encou.. ging
particula< sectoral goals or activities such as agriculturol production, but i11 the process lead tc
unfavourable decisions rcg;uding natme conservation. The State Land Tax (\Vcstem Australia)
is an eiample of a perverse incentive to conscr,,otion of ,cmnant ~cgctation, It denies tM<
exemptions fur land under consetvlltion while offering exemptions to fan<l area, that a<c under
tree plantation or used for primary pmduction. It olso fails to discriminate agoinst agricultural
land and non-agricuhurol that is solely dedicated to comcrvotion by tuing them al the i:.."Tie
rates. In essence, !his situation is inequitable for landholders wbo leave their land under
con,ervotion.
Disinccnti,,,,, on the other hand, arc measures tl,at discou'3gc acti,itics that support
not1,1c conservation. In Western Austrol.ia, signi~conl a<cas of land that arc used for nature
conservation arc subject to various toxes and charges which can cause landholders to make onti·
conservation decision, such as subdivision, clearing by ste,lth or other attempts to reduce the
economic penalties (B<3dby, 1998). At the !oc,\ government level, '3te chorgcs ore levied on
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conservation areas under bushland in se,·er,] Shires and councils. Although there ore signs th,t
this is changing, the,e is need to identify the policr m""sures that are disincentives to nature
conservation ot state ar.d local levels.
Designing of appropciote incrntive measures for moti,·ating desired conservation
decision, rcGuirc< the identification of disincentives and pervctlc incentives to nature
conser\ otion. Tbc particula, economic and non-economic incentive, ond the extent to which
0

they infiuencc or rnn influence the uprnkc of pennanent covenants in Austrnlia are not cleady
cstsblishcd. One of the objectives of this study is to identify the bmier-1 and the appropriate
incentives for the uptake ofpcrm•ncnt covenonts among different categories of landholders.

1.3.4.1 Effective incentives policy mcasmes
In policr formuliuion, economic instruments are often used ;n conjunction with
rcgulatocy ,neosurcs to ma,cimise their joim effect. O'Connor (19%) points out that flexibility
of instrument design h,s the distinct aclvanmgc of creating "h)•brid" instrumeucs where the
objective is to achieve a bsbnce smong competing objectives such as cffidCt1cy, effectiveness
snd equity.
TisdcU (1995) proposes scverni economic incentive mcasmes that may cnhoncc the
conservation of biodiversity. f,omc of tl,c,c include financial incentive, for retention and
conse."'ation of natunl areas, encouragement of non-cor,.mmptive nsc oftl,i, conserved Jiving
,e,nurccs aml concessionacy fur,ding for development projects outside nsturc reserve, to
enhance the income base of landowner, and reduce economic p«ssurc to exploit the noture
reserve.
in countries whcre people ore highly reactive to economic incentives, rcgu!atocy
mechanisms can be complemented by economic incentives, thus facilitating quick, efficient and
/or mme cost efficient means to address mviroruneutal problems. For example, it has bcCtl
recognized in ccntrnl and eastern European states that if the rnte, of economic incentives ore
set high enough they can reduce the high use ofnanm,I «sources (Ibc Regional Environmental
Cent«, 1998).
Compens,tion and substitution are other forms of incentives thot can support
conservation where tl1erc is" loss in economic value of a norunl resource or an economic loss
resulcing from limiration of access 10 natural resource, when a vl'lunt"'}' agreement is ploced on

it (Spcrg,,l 1997). They can mkc the fonn of cash payments, good, or services al'd substirution,
which involve the provision of alternative sources of resources whose occess hu becll Limited.
The Natural Rcsou,ces Adjustment Scheme (NRAS) i, an example of such a compensatocy
incentive meas= in Western Auma\ia, which was introduced to protect rcrnnont buihland by
providing adjustment assistance 10 l•ndholclers who a,e disidvantagcd by the restrictions on
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land clearing. This :ype of economic incentive has the potcnti,.l to ,educe land clearing (K.
Bradby, personal communication June 26, 1998).
Incentives for nature consen·atim1 have to be adequate in quantity and quality to
guarontce a level of vo!unt,ry undcrto.lting of the desired conservation actions. Yoger (1994)
points out that the type nnd lwd of incentive to u,e depend on a number of foctors such as
availability of funds in tl,e case of rnondary incenti,·cs and case of application and
administrntion of the incentives. 11,ey also depend significantly on the perception of the
incentive recipient rcg:mling nature conscrntion and its value, ucipient's perceptions of
opponunity costs linked to adoption of the desired cons~rvation mea1mrcs, tlrn prospects of
cornpcnsalion for consen1ng nature for community welfare and thcir moral obligations/sense
of stewmlship. The tronsacliott cost a11d administrntive cfficocy of disbursing the incentives

MC

important considcrnlions ,cg:uding conscr:ation values.
There is disparity among landho\c'e,s on what ore adequa1e incentives. For example, in
reference to fencing, Western Austrolio formers found the limited finonciol cover for the cost of
tree replanting ond foucing of rcmn,m vegcmtion and 100 pc,cent tox deductions fo, landco,e
to be inadequate. Most farmers preferred impru\'ed financi·d compensation for time and
materials spent on n,rure conservatinn, others preferred fencing gront schcme, that offi,rcd the
highest ,mount of funding, while others had no interest in fencing grnnt schemes, preferring to
fund th cir own work Qenkins, 1998). Elix & Lambert (1998) aloo found that most farmers were
not interested in 'direct handou(s' for conservation work but preferred opportunities for co·
opernti,·e efforts with provision of go,·~mmem funds for conserntion moterials as the
landholder pmvidc, tl1e labour. In the cited exomplcs, the porlicipants were in unison about the
essential mle of financial incentives in motivoting landholders to noture conser1ation.
Ikerd {1990) and Victorian Conserv,tion Trust (Victorian Conservation Trust, 1994)
point out that in situations where economic factors
_/; \

il'.I

MC

a constraint on londholder behaviour,

finondal and other incentives sec necessary to encourage adoption of innovacion. Although
subsidies have the potential to encourage biodiYmity conservation on private land, Tisdell

(1995, p.218) pnints out that their p.1yout requires that several issues be oddrc;scd. Some of
these issues include cffom to minimise the si,c of the implcmentiJ\g agency, trnnsaction costs
of delivering the subsidies, the intcgrit;· of those involved in the conscrntion process in
ensuring compliance and on estimation of the subsidies requ:fed. ru,thcnnorc, p•)·out of
subsidies requires ar. efficient deli,·cry mechanism· ensuring the suhsidie, target those tl,at "'~
effective in ensuring consctvatlon end gu..rds against possible blackmail by landholder, to
extract maxunum surplus fmm those willin.: to pay tl,e subsidy.
Kfapprotl, ,nd Johnson (200l) found tlmt financial cost-share wos a significant factor
in motlvating the a<loprion of conservalion proccices among some landholdcn and not others.
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Among those that were not motinted by cost.shore incentive,, Bell, Roberts, English, & Park
(1994) note thot thcir attitude toward the goal of the pmg,am, rnthe, thon the availability of the
cosHhorc itself and probably irrespective of the smount of cost-share offored, was responsible
for their decision. Othc, findings in the United States show that landholders' decisions toward
adoption of conserv,rion practice were sensitive to the amount of cost-share offered, with
offers below a crnsin amount failing to provide the desired motivation for adoption of the
practice (K!approth &Johnson, 2(l{)J).

1.3.4.2

Non-economic incentives
Contrnry to convenrional ,vi,Jon, regarding farme.'s ,e,i,tanr.c to the adoption of

practices that hove economic cost-beorinb, ,rudies in the US (Alonge & Manin, 1995;
Korsching & lllruio, 1991) show tlm landholders ore prepared to try out the prescribed
conservation prncticc if there wai some form of non·1noneta1y incenrivc. 11,c extent of the
influence of non·monclary incentives, as with monetary incentives on !sndho!ders' uptake of
permanent covenant, is notwcll undemoad.
Information snd education programmes ore fonns of non-monetary inccnrives often
used in norure conservation. Binning & Young (1997) nmc that landholders often do not
conserve vegetation Jue to bck of informotion on its benefits and ,igr-ificoncc and because of
lack of knowledge of appropriate management actions for effective conservation. Yager (1994)
,1,ggests thot social rccognirion ,ho,ving •ppreciotion for conscn,ation efforts would be a
,uirnblc non-monetary (non-economic) incenti,·e. Recognition of tltis kind ma)" incluJc prime
ministerial ur otl,cr federal govemmem aw.uJ, of honour. However, incentives of this tj--pc 0<e
effective when so:..cial recob,nition attached to such awortl, is more highly valued than monetary
gain (Yager, 1994).

·:~{;
Jenkin, (1998) found lhot some landholders

..

rui .. ,Hf-mo~vstcd

.·

towa,d, noture

conservarion on tl,cir fond even in the absence of mori~.rnry in~enrives. Furtl,ennore, some
farmers viewed a visit from a tcchnico! person to help to Pre('ore a conservation management
plan ~nd providon of information on conserv,tion management, constituted a conscrvotion
inc<':,tivc. Elix & L1mbert (19!18) found that !he type and administrati,·e arrnngemcnts for
conservation agreements were critical in the decision of lsndholdm regarding thcir
psrricipotion; U-,tnsparcncy in the priority setting process and consultation with landholders
,lverc vicwetl as significant moti,·ation for p:uticipation.
Jenkins (19~8) points om the need for funher studies on" wider rang~ of moneL1ry
and non·monetary incentfre measures for nature conservation and priv,tc l,nd. This srudy aims
to identify current ond potentiol mca.urcs by state and local govcmmen11 and actions by
covenant agencies tl,ot act as incentives for encouraging the upto.k<o of permonent covenant,.
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Titls sectlon has provided a theoretlcal framework of the factors that uc likely to
influence bndholders' uptake of a permanent eoven;>nt ;>nd ;>n overview of current and
potentlal incentlve m.,,.,ure, for narurc con,eNarion on private fand

1.3.5

Policy framl!Work for nature conservation on private land in Australia
Under the Austrnli•n Constitution, Sutes hove the primary responsibility for publk

land management except over Commonwealth land (Environment ,\usttalb, 2001), They also
hove power over lond management when printcly owned in so far as to protect tl,e public
fmm any harm arisi11g ftom its management. 'Ille policy and legislative framework thot deols
with noturc conserv3tion on private land in Australia is contru!lcd in vorious documents at
different levels of government. lt also differs in comprehensiveness between Stntes and in
addressing the major issues of concern in respect to narnn, conservation on private bnd
Vanday & Lawrence (1995) assert \hot failure of adoption of environmental
con,crvotion practices cannot wholly be blamed on farmers' negative attitude, towards land
ethics; it is also due to the govemme11t's shmt politicnl tin,cfrnme that often fails to adequately
r,,cognisc and effectively address the complcxities of land degmdatlon in policy intcNentions.
Various pieces of legislation have been enacted ot Federal and State government !cvcls
in Australia to address nature conser,otion on pri,·atc land ond focussing on vo!unt:1ry action~
Most of these legislation, such •• the Envirnnment Pmtection and Biodiversity Conservation
,\ct (1999) arc underpinned by both financiol incentives and regulation. However, the
effectiveness of existing policy instnunents nt different levels of goi,cmment in promoting
nature conserv3tion on privote land, porticulady thw,·gh the management agreements h11s not
been fully evaluated
An overall review of the policr and \cgis\ntlon and thcir effect on conservation of
biodiversity in A11stralio is provided by Bates (2001). He cites weaknesses in the existing
legislation in covering biodiversity conseNotion, in particular their lack of requirement of the
implemcnring amhoritles to toke into account biodiversity conservation in thcir activities,
uncertainty in application and inefficiency in nppro•ch of the legislation with decentralised
tesponsibility for biodiversity protection. He fu1thet points out that even legislation that is
enocted specific.Uy to protect biodiversity lends inadequate support, often with no guideline,
on how to relate and weigh conservation values of biodiversity against economic and sod;al
imperatives (Dates, 2001).
Jn view cf noted inadequacies in policy instruments to address nature conscr,otion on
priv,,te !:ind, one of objectives of this study h; to establish the views of londholders on the
necessary pohcy instruments by State and Loe,\ governments for motivating the upt1kc of
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permanent covenant,. The overall aim is to g,thc,r informal.ion to aid in the dcvdopmen1 of
appropriate policy interventions for nature conservation on private lond in Australia.

1.3.6

Conclusion
Different forms of manogement agreements have been designed to enUot greater

ponfr:ipoLion of printe landholders in nature con,crvotion. Restrictive covenants in particufar
arc gaining wide acceptance by governments in Australia, though their promotion has been met
with apprehension by a cro,..section of landholders. The effectiveness of e.~ch mech,mi,m
depend, on its design ond acceptance by a wide cro>S,section of landholders. Adoptio!l of
norure conservation rncchonism, is ~kdy to be influenced b)' a suite of factors, which are very
similar to those that influence the adopcion of new ogricultura! innovations and technologies.
Go,·emment policies con contribute sign.ificontlf to the atLitudc of private landholders
regarding conservotion of nonirc.
TI1e prediction of tl,e factorn that arc likely to influence the dcd,ion oflondholdcrs in
the uptake of permanent covenant, is b,sed on several social, management and economic
thrnrie, co,·cring decision-making, motivation, property rights, equl~· and behaviour.
Understanding the like!)' response oflandhol<lc.s to environmental, sodal ond economic policy
measures in thr.ir decisions rcgording the uptake ofparticu!or conservation mechanism, can aid
in the dcsig,ting ofnppropriote noturc eon,crvotion mechanism,.
Knowkdgc ond owarcness of the consen·ation mechanism undoubtedly ore likdy to
determine the case of adoption ofpem10nen1 coven on ts. The rdevonce and comps ability ofthn
covenant mechanisms with the goals of tl,c hndholders hove the potential to influence
adoption rate especially when there is wide disparity between the demands of tl,c mcchanl,m
and the goals of the fol!dholdcrs. Economic f,,;:.,rs including economic incentives can restrain
or moti,·ate consen·otion outcomes on private land. Identifying the economic factors tl,01
motivate ond tlmsc th,t constrain approprbte landholder behaviour toward, nature
conservation con aid in the designing of effective nMure conscrvarion mechanism,.
Other fuctors tlc1t have been considered in this tlmis as likdy to influence the decision
of bndholde.s in the uptake of restrictive permanent covenants o,e the strcngtl, of
conser,:aLion ctltic of the in&idoal l111dholder ond the perceived risks and benefits of the
covenant uptoke. Otl,er likely factors include landholders' perceptions on cquitability in tl,e
appropriaLion of com nnd benefit, between the Lindholdcr and the public md tl,cir perceived
changes to the security ofla11d knu,c ot1ributcd lo t],c upi,,kc of the conservation covenant.
O'Connor (1996) points out th>t the impkmentation of environmental policy (or other
nature conservation measures) m•)" be difficult or impossible when tl,ere is a deficiency in
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instmrncm design. l'urthcnnorc, difficulties in implcmcmstion can occur when the insttumcnt
requires 1ophisticotcd technical c;ipabilitics due to its complc,ity, particularly when an
in,uumcm design fails to recogniz" the soci,l and potitico.l dimensions of succe,sful
lmplcrncntolion, or wh=re tl,c legol and inslitutiono.l fromcwmk is weok, or it cannot be
supported cconornicall)'· Various forms of incentive mcaourcs have been used successfully to
encourage the adoption of agricultural and conscrvstion technologies. Simihr incentive
measures may be appropriotcd to motivate tlie uptake of permanent covenant by private
landholders.

'The chapter that follows details tl,e methods employed in the pment srudy to collect
and analyse dota andinfonnotion from landholdcr1.
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The aim if tbi! thapttr is lo providt a dttailrd oprni1w andjiulijilalion eflh1 mtlhodr mpl'!)'td in the
colledion and anJfysil of the data and info1111alio11 on land/Joldm who pariidpat!d in 1hi1 1/Nefy.
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2.1

Introduction

Tius study intends to estnblish !he factors that inlluenccd, and those that arc likely to
inllucnce, the decision or la11dholdc<S 011 the uptake of permanent covenants. It is cxploratocy
and ,im, to answer questions fomm!atcd through the survey of rclcv•nt litenrure and d,eories
on adoption of consec,,ation prncticc, •nd innovations on private loads, which ore articul,ted in
Chapter 1.
TI,c primory inform•tion gathe,cd in the study rcfate, to perceptions, attitudes and
view, or individu,l landholders. An ackn(iwlcdgcment is made that landholdr.rs' decision·
making procc,oc, arc C<'mpl~x nnd an inference m•dc is that a combinntion or ,even! factors
-"nder study arc rcspo·;tblc for the decision or landholders on the uptake of a pcnnancnt
covcn,m. Because there arc no external criteria for assessing perceptions and attitudes, tl,e
study lent itself 10 a ,utvL1' mea!"(']l method as the principol somcc of primary data, ns
described by Tull and Hawkins (1983).

2.2 Description of Survey Design

2.2.1

Selection of study Hites and sampling method
The area, of study were the State~ of Western Australia and Victorio. 11,e choice of

Victoria for the study was bec;iu,e of its long experience (since 1986) and recorded success
(ove, 300 covcnont,) wit!, tl,e implementation of its covenant prq,'t.lm, Fnrthcrmore, it has
•!sc served as a ,et·up model for covenant programs by agencies in other Amtrnlian Srnre, and
Territories. Western Au,ttalia "'"' selected for the study for ~,c following reasons:
the Stare ha<l littlc experience with d1e use of permanent coYenonts in nature
conscrvotion M the commencement oflhis study;

•

there was a StatP government commitment to cncournge the u,e of
management agtcc,;,.,nts to support narure couservation on private land;

\

•

two covenant programmes bnstd on Trust for Nature's (Victoria) covenant
program had already been initi,ted;
in oddition, the researcher had on interest in the State because of its proximity
to his permanent residence.
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2.2.2

Sampling gmups, frame~ ;ind proccsfes
Sampling groups in both Vicroria ond Western Australia indudcd !he following:

landholder,; with a pcnnoncnt covenant on thcir properties (Pcov), landholders without a fixcdtcnn management ogrccmcnt or • fixe<l-tcnn covcnont (Fcov) and landhol<lers with ncithc, a
fixcd-tcnn nor• pcnnancnt covenant on their lan<l (Noco,·).
'11,e sampling unit was the privoie landholding. The head of the landholding or !he
principsl decisio11 mskc, of majorbndholding operations was designated as d,e responden~
Table 2.1 d'1•im tbc categoric, of landholders selected from infonnation databases of
landholders in bod, States. lo Western Australis, two categories of landholders We1'e sc!ecte<l:
those with a rixcd-tenn covenant ond those widmut any form of a conservation •greement or
covenant. Landholders with s permanent covenant were omitted in \Veotem Australia because
tl,eir tom! number at the time of conducting tl1e research ""'' sm,JJ (<30) and the1efotc
insdcquatc for an optimill)' ,ct target of 150 lomlholdcrs for the purpose of the study.
Table 2, 1

Categoric, of londholdcrs selected and databases used, for the study in
Victoria ond Western Austrnlia
Fixcd-tenn covenant

Non-holders of covenant or

Trn,t for narurc

Lond for \V~dlifc

V1ctorisn Fnnn Tree and

covenant list

Scheme

L:mdcarc Association

Remnant Vegetation

Agriculrural Properties and

Protection Scheme

Clients list

Permanent

agreement

covenant
Victoria

Western
Australia

x

Key, 'X' depicts cstegory not indudcJ in the study
Collection of dot>. from ,ill categoric, of landholders in the survey was carried out in
two stages: a questionnaire piloting st,~ge and a main survey stage,. A small sample of
landholders (<~O) from cnch category wss sclcctcd to participate in the former 11>.ge and •
much !srger sample(> 100) selected to participated in the lstcr ,toge.
A list of privutc landholders without any fonn of a conicrvarion agreement or
covcnont in Western Australia ""'' drmm from the Agricultural Properties and Clients
(AGl'aC) database held by The Dcpmmcnt of Agriculture (\Vestem Australia). The <lotobasc
lists infonnation on ." population of 14,000 private agricultural landholdings in Western
Australia. This dotob,sc hos been used successfullj' by Coste, (1987) and Jenkins (1998) to
sample landholders in" stu<l)" of farmers' oiriru<lcs to native vegetation. In the prosent stud)" a
sample of 515 landholdings listed in the database that contai11 some form of nature
conservation fcoturcs were ,elected using a random non-replacement method The ;tiin of
sampling was to achieve a sample of landholders wbo had a likelihood of having sig,tificant
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noture consetvation arcss and to ensure thot on!)' Isndholdcrs who <!id not have ony form of
covenant or ,greementwerc included h the designated categor)',
Because the AGPaC dotsbosc did not contain information to confirm whether tlie
randomly somplcd landholders hsd a fixed-term covenant, a comparison of tl,e sample was
made wit!, a full list of landholders on tl,e Remnant Vegetation Protection Scheme (RVPS)
fixed-term cm·enant database held by Agriculture (Western Austrnli,). Twcl,·c properties were
confirmed to hove n fixed-tcnn covcn,tit and were therefore excluded from the category,
lea.·ing • somplc of 503 l.rndholders. From the sample of 503 landholders, forty landholden
were randomly selected to participate in the questionnaire pilot testing. Another 450 were
selected at nmdom from the rcmnining sample for inclusion in the main sutvcy.
11,e Remnant Vegetotion Protection Scheme daiabasc of bndhol~crs hcld by
Agriculture {\Xie.tern Australia) was the sampling frame to sdcct !sndholdm with a fixed-term
covensnt. "lbe Remnant Vcgetstion Protection Scheme (RVPS) is• component of the \"¥;'estem
Australian Sme Landcare Program implemented under tl,e Conoctvation and Land
Ma'1ngcmcnt Act of 1984 (Agriculture Western Australis, 1997). Ir ws. designed 10 as.i,t
landholders to protect nnd enhance remnant vegetation on private land b)· providing fencing
subsidies with a provision for landholders to enter a covensnt in perpetuity (Permanent
Co,·cnant). At the time of taking the sample, tl,c scheme had 1150 registered landholders with a
fixcd-tenn covmont.
Four hundred and ninety landholders were selected from the RVPS database by a
rsndom non-replacement method. Of cl,e,e, the first 40 landholders were selected to participole
in the pilot tcoting of cl,c questionno.ire ond !lie rest (450 lnndholders) were moined to
participate in the main study.
Ju Victoria, 529 landholdcu wicl,0111 ony fonn of a covenant were selected by •
random non-replocemcm mctliod from the Victorfan Farm Tree and L1ndcarc Aisociation
(VFll..A) d,tobase held by the Victorian Farmers Federation. The daL,bosc canto.ins
information on 10,172 fondholdcrs and cl,cir properties. VPILA is sn umbrella organisation of
475 landco.re groups with a focus on consetvotion and bndcsre issues. The database was chosen
., the sampling frame because it contains o list of individuals tl,at were like!)· to hove the
r"'luired set of data of landholders witl, v,lusblc nature conservation features on their property.
This was ~uspcctcd by virtue of their membership to the ,\ssodation.
A li,1 of the 515 landholders wss ,cm to Trust for Nature Victoria and Lond fo,
Wildlife (Victoria) to confirm ifony of the propercies had a permanent covenant or a fixed-term
covenant, respectively. It """ confirmed that 25 landholders hod st lem one of t!ie two
conservation agreements. 11,e,e were therefore removed from the .. mplc lc:,ving 490
landholders. The first 30 landholde.s were sdcctcd lo porticipate in the pi!D! testing of a
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questionnaire targettd

~t

landholdcts without an)' form of agreement or covcrn11tt and the

remaining 460 landholders were sdccted to porticipste in the main study.
A sample of lmdholdm with • voluntary non.binding fixed-term agreement on their
land in Victorio wss taken from a database of landholders in the Land of Wildlife Scheme,
which is hdd by the Department of Norum! Resources and Environment (Victoria). The
adnntogc of the dat,basc as a sampling frame is it crnuained a large number of lanrlholdcts

(4~00) that have a volumar)' agreement fo, nature consc,vation, of which 107 also had a
pemi,nent covenant and therefore were not included in the sampling frame. A rnndom non.
repbcement ssmplc of 490 londholderS to participate in ~,e study was token from a list of 4493
landlmldcrs who only hod a fi,cd-term L1nd for Wildlife ag..ccment. The first 40 landholder., in
the somp!e were selected to pnrticipate in the pilot 1csting of a questionnaire targeted at
landholders ,vi~, a fo<'<i-term ,greemcnt in Victoria, while the remaining 450 were selected to
po1ticipatc in the moici survey.
TI,e Trust for Nature database of pemrnncnt covenant holders was the sampling frame
of landholders with o permanent covenant. 11,e datobase crn,tained 406 landholder, (616
properties) with a regi,tcccd or spprovcd covcmnt br the Trust fot Nature', llo.1id of Trustee
at the time of total sampling. Three hundred ond seventy six landholders (comprising all
la,idl,oldcrs) were sdectcd to pnrticipotc in the main study while 30 were ,elected to participate
in• pilot testing of the questionnaire targeting londholdcrs with a permanent co.-cnont.

2.3

The Survey Instruments and Method

Sclf-odministc,cd que,rionnairc sun'C)' instruments disp1tchcd b)· post were cmp!o/ed
to gather the requirtd information. They arc less time conmming and cbc,pcr thnn face-to-face
intccvicwo yet have the ability to prm·idc a relative!)· high number of rcspomes within the
consttaints of time and available financial r~iourcc,. "Jltis is evident from successes of their u,c
to collect information from landowners (cg., Elix & Lambert, 1998; Jenkins, 1998; Reeve &
Block, 1998).

2.3.1

Questionnaire Development and Data Collection
Three similar questionnaire instruments we,e designed and each modified to c:.ter for

tlie three distinct groups of landholders in both s•_.tes (sec appendices 2.4 to 2.6). "Ilic
development of the qucstionnai.e instrume111, was done referring to iuformation from 1imilu
and relevant srudieo (•!},Jenkins, 1998; Reeve & Bl~ck, 1998).
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TI,e instruments contained a nlll'\bcr or smcrncm,, srruc1nred to measure the degree
or respondents' diIT«ent perception, and attitudes to norurc conservation and reasons for the
uptake or likelihood or uptake of a permanent covcnmt. R.e.spondcnt• were aoked to stote their
level of agreement or disogrcement and in some cases the level of importance that they utached
to a noted issue. TI,c re,pon,e to the statement "! would not consider a permanent ci,venanl
under any circumstance" ,,:a, assigned the depetident varioble as • meosurc of landholdm'
attitudes to the lfltllke of a permonent covenant and as a pm")' measure of landholders'
lik<,lihood oft.king up a permanent covenant. L:indholders that agrtcd with tl,e statement were
reckoned le,, likely to has·e a positi,·e ouitudc to permanent covenant and in rum reckoned 10
hove a lesser likelihood of taking up • permanent covenant tlian those that di,.grc<:d with the
srntcment.
Selection of tl,e independent varinbles to osse~s in the srudy wa, ba.cd on ob,en·ation,
in litcrnturc of their positive relationship with adopriC.n of agricultural conservation practices
and technologies o,id retention of remnant vegetation on private land, as discusocd in Ch1tpter
1. "The selected independent variables included;
\.

oge oflondholdcr.

2.

duration of fomily ownership of d1e prnpcrty;

3.

land-use 1)1'Cs on the pmpcrty;

4.

ratio of conservation area to torn! •re• oflhc propc,ty;

5.

hndholders' long-term goal, for tl,c p,opcrl);

6.

familiarity with and awortncss of permanent covenant;

7.

association with conservation groups or organisations;

8.

infiuenee of neighbours or friends on the upi..ke of• permonent covenant;

9.

perception and attitudes to long-tenn nature conserv;1.tion;

\0. Perccprions ond attirudes to permanent covenants in term, of their imp,ct on land
value;
11, perceptions snd attitudes to permanent covenants in terms ofthcir P"'ccived benefits;
12. perception, and attitudes lo covenants in tenns of their dfcctivencss for long-term
nature conservation and effectiveness over other rncchan.ismi'J
i:;'
13. perceptions and attitudes to permanent covenonts in terms ~,f their necessity for longterm conscrvscion of narurc in privMc land:
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14. pc.ccplian, and anirndes to covenants in tcnns of th cir rcstticlions on !and-use;
15. primary motivation for having retain«! ,rnrure conservation fearurcs on tl,c property;
16. Jobour commitment on the property;
17. rntio of income from propctl)' to mtal income;
18. level of financial debt on the property:
19. views on equity considerations~, incentives to pennancnt covenant uptah;
20. view, on tl1e pre-requisites sad inccnlive, for a pcnnanent covenant uptake;
Relationship, between the dependent variable an.J the twenty independent variable,
were a,scssed to establish the factors that were likely to mRucnce the decision of landholders to
the uptake of permanent coven ams.
In sddition to an introduction co th,. study contained in tl1e front page of the
questimmoires, a mme detailed introduction to the srudy and its purpose was gi,·cn in a letter
that occompsnicd the dispatched quc,tionnnires (sec appendices 2.2).
Both qualitative and qusntirntive Jata were gathered in the ,ur,:ey. ,\ structured p=
specified set of relatively direct questions (the stimulus) w,,., used in the questionnaire to elicit
informntion from tl,c respondent,. Eliciu,tion of bot!, open and closed responses was used
according with the type of inforrnntion required A!tl,ough it is cheaper and cosier to process
closed responses, Llnsing (1971) notes that they present o greater risk of persistent
misinterpretation of mesning. Closed question, wen, used in form of ,imp!c dichotomies (yc,no responses) and multiple choir~··
In eliciting inforrnotion of person,\ nature such as age and income, explanation of why
o particul,r piece of infonnotion is required was provided. In addition, ore was token to avoid
biased words thot could sui;gcst certain frclings, and leading questions exposing the researcher',
point oh~ews.
A Likert Scale, cmrunonly nsed as the measurement technique in questionnaire ,urvcrs,
was employed in tlie srndy using a five point attirudinal measure, namclr Strongly agree -Agree
- Uncertain - Disagree - Strongly disagree, in tl,c questionnaire to elicit \nndholdcu' attitudinal
rating. Depending on the question posed, the assumption was made tioat tl,e higher tl,e rating
that each respondent scored, the more posilive or negati,·c tl,cir attitude was to sn aspect of a
pcnnanent covenant under study.
Similarly, a five point Likcrt scale cmploving the levels of importance namely Definitely
not impodant - Probably not importont - Neutral - l'robably important - Definitely importsn~
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was used to mcasur., tl,e perception and degree of importance they .nach to giYen issues in
considering a dcci,ion to take up " covenant. A higher rating indicated a greater importance
attached to the js,~e under consideration. Severn! studies (cg. Manning ct ol., 1999; Rinterfcld &
Cupchik, 19%) usc<l similsr scaling method, to determine respondents' perception of various
cnvi.mnmcntol issues. ln Western Australia, Coates (19B7} and Jenkins (1998) used a
questionnaire with Likcu-scsle rne.ssmemcnt of f.1<mcrs' attitudes to native vegetation. Vanclay
(cited in Vanday & I..:iwrcncc, 1995, !),77) used fi•:c attitude scales u,;ng a fi,·e point i.lcrt scale

(\= strongly disagree; 5= strongly agree) w rncasme diffe,ent asp<.:ts of stti:·,dcs to the
cn,·llonmcnc, each of which ""'' a,•cr,gcd and used to calcu!ote the final attitudinol score.
\>ricstly and Evans (1996) used a 5-point response format to probe respondents' perception of
the effect of trnnsmissio11 line on tl,cir property value.
The questionnaire design slso :tllocatcd spoce for respondents to add any other
mfonnation and to ro.ise issues that might not hove been ccvered in the survey but which they
viewed to be rclevam to tl,e study. In nddition, an a,sunncc of confidentiolity of the
informotion 1hat they provided was clearly given to the rc1pondents in tlie c,:iver letter and on
the front page of the qucsrionnnllc.

2.3.2 Ethical considerations
The questionnaire as the principal source ofinfonnotion in this ,rndy was administerc<l
as part of a univcr1ity re,carch project ond unccnnected with nny politicol industrial c,·
commercial organi.ation (e.g., Eim, Rcichcr, & l'cdpadec, 1993). 'll,e purpose of the study""''
clearly spelt out in a cover letter sent out wi~, the questionnaire Instrument (Appendix!). A
statement of as,ur>nce of confidentiality for the infonnation provided by the re,pnndents and•
clarificstion that porticipotion in the survey was voluntary was mode clear on the first page of
the questionnaire (Appendices 2-4). Approval to conduct the study was sought from, ond
granted by, Edith Cowan University', Hilman Rcsenrch !!~lies Committee (HREq before the
survey was conductrd.

2.4

2,4.1

Questionnaire Pilot testing Stage

Aims :ind Objectives
Qucstionnoire pilot testing is an important step in instrument development and helps

to pre·cmpt failures in otherwise weO conceptualised surver• (Warwick & Lininger, 1975). It
serves as a useful check on the ,cliability and v,.lidity of the darn. \,;larwick & Lininger (1975,
p.145) point out that "the purpose of • pilot test is to 'evaluate the questionnaire items by
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reviewing the adequscy of the "mpling instructions, , .. likelihood of controversy arising from
the survey, ntc of rcfu,als and the ovcrill appropriatenes; of the survey method to the problem
at hand". Furthermore, they suggest thst " sarr.ple of 20-50 interview, should be used ir. the
pilot tcs~
In following W;uwiek am! Lininger (1975), the aims of tltis pilot test were to sharpen
the focus of the questimmaitc item,, to ensure the meaning of items, 10 structure ecru.in
,csponses and to eliminate questions later viewed to duplicate the «sponses to other questions
or to offer inadequate responses for mcetin~ ilie objectives ofilie study.
J\sscs,ment and :malysil of tl,e questionnaire items were targeted to meet the following
objectives:
(a) to establish the expected teoponsc rates to tl1e questionn:Um;

(b) to cstoblish iftl,c tespondcnt understands what tlic survey is about:
(c) to establish whcilicr tl,e wording ofilic items is clcsr;
(d) to establish whether ilic mpondcnts draw tlie s,me meoning from the questions as
intended;
(c) to estoblish whetlier the answers obtained from ilie «spondent ate ade<j\\01~ for the
purpose of the study;
(f) to establish whethc, significant dm.ils arc provided ir •he an,we13 to questions;

(g)

to establish whether tlie items ore ')'nchrnnised between the different categories of the

questionnaire;
'll1e rlcsigned questionnaires wc,e tested on a sample of londholders from the ilirec
population categories.
Random somplcs of lsndho!dc<S from differ<'!';! !sndlm!dcr categories described earlier
were used in tl,e Pilot test of the questionnaire. TI,e rdevant test questionnaire for cod,
landholder cotegory snd a covering le11cr c:;pfaining the objectives of the study were mailed to
each of the selected lnndholdcri;. 11,e mail dispatch wos corried out wiili the assistance of the
go,·cmment dcpanmcnts or agencies holding tl,e dotsbasc. In adilition to explaining tl,c
objectives of ilie study, the covering letter requested iliat the bndholdcr identify any
questionnaire item, that were unclear and to comment on the case of or difficultie,
encountered in, responding to the questionnaire it=•· A replied-paid sc!f-oddrcsscd envelope
to each fondho\dccwss enclosed.
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2.4.2

Pwce~s and findings of Pilot test smvey
Tobie 2.2 sho'v.; the return rates from the pilot survc)'S. These return rates were used to

predict the expected return ralcs of the rnoin survey. Tney were also used to detcmunc the level
of sampling required in order lo adUe,·c the target number of responses in the rnoin study. The
ovct:111 questionnaire return rate of36.3 percent in Victoria was in Linc with the exp"cte<l return
rates of the first mail Sllrvcys before a reminder sent to non-respondents. Low over.a: return

.\.·,

rate of 14A percent in Western Austr:ilia was the result of" VC..")' low return rate from the g,oup

'

oflnndholdcrs without any fonn of covenant or agreement.

Table 2. 2 Return rates from the pilot testing of questionn:Ures on respondent> in Victoria
and Western AustroLio.
Qucstionn~irea
Western Australia
Landholder Agttcmrnt Di,patchcd Received Return
me
Coie""ri"
No Covenant
<O
4 10%
Fix<d·tcrm Covcn,nt
31%
14
l'crm,nent Covcrr,nt
Totals
14.4
80
18
%

Victoria
D!opotched
Received

Return
hie

40
40

'"

.

30
110

12
10
11

"

30%
25%

37%
36.3%

11,e !ow response rate among bndholders with a lixed-tenn co,·en•nt in Western
Australia in contrsst to other landholder cotegorics ,.,..,., auributed to hck of a person•liscd
letter of introduction from the institution with which the landholders were familiar, which
accompanied other questionnaires. Followtng this deduction, a decision w.is re•chc<l that
questionnaires in the maiu snrvcy would be accompanied

by a ,,.ermnali,ed covering letter from

the institution that held the landholder infonnation datahasc.
The overall percentage of non.rcspome to questionnaire items was low. 11,c three
0~1-cnded questions located at the end of the questionnaire and questions thot inquired about
personal financial information porticulaily debt ond income levels hod a higher non-response
rntc. The problems wc1c addressed by writing a more persuasive cxplonation of why the
information wos necessary .1nd by miking .~ stltcmcnt :,f assur~n~e of confidentiality clearer
and in mmc o\Jservable bold print than before.
11,e d,ta gothe«d in the pilot test stoge were reviewed to determine the necessary
changes to the questionnaire item, for the main ,ur,."Cy. A visual verificotion w.,s carried out to
establish that all que,tions had been •nswcrcd ond that the instructions for •nswcring the
questions had been followed. 11,e aim w.i, to establish the proportion of incomplete
questionnaires {with missing responses to more than five items) and items thot were not
onswercd according to tl1e instruct.ion, provided, a, well as the proportion of questionnaire
instc111t1cnts in which~~. occurred
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Numeric.! format codes for dosed response categories hod earlier been established ond
• coding key formed ot the time of formuloting the questionnaire. TI,c code, for the responses
to each item were entered into a 1'.licrosoft Excel spreadsheet and notes of all comments
received from the respondents on tl,c queotionnaire instrument were ma<le in ordcr to facilitate
ch~ngcs to the qucslionnoire.
\Vhere morn t.hon 15 percent similM responses occurred in the general category 'otl,ers'
for an)' given item (this is the expected number of respondents in a distribution of responses in
an item with an a,·enge of six categories), new categories and codes w~~e assigneJ. A frequency
distriburion of e<1ch variable in the srndy (represented by an item (question)) was cmied out in
order to identify anomalies in the dataset such

:is

wrong!r coded item,, the number of

quesrionn>ires with incomplete response,, tl,e type and percentage of each questiocinoire item
wi<hout a response, tl,c m,mher of completed questionnaires and tl,e percentage total
questionnaire re.sponse,. Frequency distribulions also enabled a visual test of the nonnality of
the dstose~
An assessment of nli,sing data was parlicularly impo,tont for vcrif}1ng the availability
of sufficient data !or c,cating expected new vari.,hlc, from tlie combina'lon of two or more
variables in the dau set. ,\n example of a new variable fanned from• combio,ation of voriables
is tl1e rntio of conservation orca to total prop,·rty si7.c,
The finding, of tl,c frequency distribution and the analysis of the respondents'
conunents on tl,e questionnaire .,,ere used to rephrase questions, to ,educe the number of
questions, or to .corder the questionnillc items.
Respondents did not have difficulties in comprehending tl,e question,. However, tl,e
reviewer felt tl,e need to chao,ge the structure of several question, in order to avoid possible
multiple interprcmion~. In other coses, a review of the ,election mlcgaries for dosed questions
was necessary in ardor to include all possible responses tl,st were provided by respondents in

the 'others' category.
Aftc, incorporating the necessory changes to tlie questionnaire based on tl,e analysis of
d~ta and information, furtlier input w,s prnvidcd b)' a staff pond at Edith Cowan University
and by a panel of officers from the Nation,tl Trust of Au,tr.ilia (\Vestcm Australia). The
Dcpartmrnt of Conservation and Land Management (CALll-l) and the Department of
Agriculmrc (\Vcstem Auotralla) olso made input. 11,e aim of the inpu, wos to rc5ne the
quc,tionnaire design.
Changes were made to the fin,tl qucslionnoi«s in response to the stated objectives of
the Not tc,t survey (Refer to Appendix 2.1). The moin changes included addition.! categories,
rephrasing of questions where landholders indicated they did not undcn,tond the meaning or
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where questions reflected a me.ming other than the one thot was envisaged. The format of tlie
questionnaire was also changed and the questions ,e;1rn1nged in order increase ,eadability and
continuity of Ideas in answering the question,.

2.4.3 Main Survey
A sornpling intensity of 150 respondents for all Iandholdet c:itegories e%ccpt
lanr'.holr.le"' with a permanent covenant wss ;lmved at using a confidence level of 95 percer,t
•nd a confi<lencc inter,.•,.J of eight percmt In addition, based on tl1c average rcrnm ntc of the
pilot srndy, sample sizes ranging from 338 to 464 lsndho\dets wetc taken in ordet to achieve
the rcquircd 150 rc>pondcnts per lsndholdc, rntegoi:y in each State.
Table 2.2 shows the response rotes of the different categories of landholders who
participated in the study.
Table 2. 3 Response rates of d.Jffcrcnt categories on respondents in tl1c main study for
Victoria and Western Australia.

..

Qne,tionnoire,
WuternAuotralio
llecdv,d U,coble
Londholdar
V•!id
Di,patcb«
Agreemenl
Cate,.orlco
No Coven,nt
338
DO
'14
Fixed-tem1
450
153
155

,.,ll<rn<n,

Vic!orla
.~d

ltcccived

Oocablc

iopatcb«

38.5%

'64

34.4%

m

,,'""

153
210

144 32.9%
194 50.8%

""

187 5<)%

Covenant

Pem,ancnt
Covenant
Total,

No,
•2etic,hlc
788

No<

'73

'EEli«hlc

W5

1270

267

583

5,s

•t lkcum rate i, c:dc"htcd a, ,h, raU<> of rcccived questionn,i«, to ,·olidly di,p1tchcd qo<>rionna.i1<
Overall, 1270 and 788 questionnaires were ,cnt out effectively (v:ilid dispatches) in the
moin snrvcy lo londholdets in Victoria and Western Au,trnlio respectively between Ma«h and

April 2000. TI,is period w:,s comidcrcd opp,opriote os farm sctiv:ities are often reduced
following sowing of the fields. A reminder letter was enclosed with a copy of the questionnm<!
and sent out to oddressccs that had not rcrurned the fitst copy ofter 2 months. The ta.iget of the

'5~mpting was to achieve 150 completed qucstionn:tircs in each landholder category from eoch
of the two States.
Following the fast mail-out, 150 completed questionnaires were received from Fixedterm covenant holders in Western Australia but only 87 wc.c received from landholders
v.-ithout any form of covenont or agreement in Western Australia. The reminder to tl,e latter
gn,up <esultcd in an increase in the over.ill rctum to 114 completed questionnaiw; (sec Table
2.3). In Victoria, a return rnte of 32.<) percent (153 response,) from !ondho!ders without a
covenant or ogrcemcnt on thck property was achieved with only one mail-cu~ Fifty-one
percent (210 responses) und 59 p.-~ccnt (220 re,ponscs) return ntes We<e achieved aftet a

48

Chapter 2: Study Methods
reminder from londholders with a fixed-teml coven,nt and permonent e<»-enant holders,
mpccti,·cly.
The returned questionnaires we,e entered into the Excel spreadsheet on • desktop
computer.

·n,;, was

folk"':cd b)' dot, control- a validarion process, which invoh·cd a detailed

os,cssment of the returned questionnaire, for missing dot,. Doto editing was carried out to
ensure thot the rcquesied d,1a were present and ,.ccume before furtl,cr coding could
commence [l"ull & Hawkins, 1983). Where more than five percent of the items were missing,
the qucstionn:tirc wos discarded. Less th,n five percent of any bndholdcr category
9ui:stionnaircs were d,scardcd in the process.
The d.na and information detivcd from the q,,cstionnaire were transferred to SPSS
d,ta onnly,i, software on the desktop computer. ,\ 1~duction of dot• was carried out hy
gcncr,1ting new ,·oriablc,, such as rhe ratio of conserv,cion nrca to total property size, level of
knowledge abom a permanent covenant, ratio of income from the property to the total income
of the landholder nnd cnkulation of summary ,iatistics.
Queotionnai,e item& used lO mea,urc different varfablce in Ute atudy
The quostionnairc item< (extracted from ,\ppcndiccs 2.4, 2.5, and 26) That were used
to answer the diffcrcn! questions and 10 con,!rUct or represent the vari,bles used in the sNd)'
ore dcsctibed:

M l'mrption, of'"'~'"'"' bwfir,
(Statement). l would NOT have placed a permanent covenant on the conservation a<eo,
of'")' land if I were convinced !hot altcting them for agricultural production ,muld bting
greater economic return, than they currently do. (Fort.mdbo/dm ~-ilh a p,mtanmt amnanl)
(Smcmcnt). ·11,e beflefil• of a pcrmsncnt covenant on my land arc NOT apporont to me
(For landh,ldert n'illxJNI "'!>' a"~rr,m,a!, anJ 1/xw wilh afi.wd /mn 'l~mmml or m,~n.,nl)

[b] N,msi(>•far /on~lrmt """"' ,vorrm,Jiort.,, 1/m'r l,md
{Question). How much did the foUo"ing stated reasons (a-f) infiucnce )Our deci,ion to
plocc a permanent co,·enruu on your land? (Q Concerned sbout a likelihood of the
conscrvalinn "'""' being altered by future owners or manag,,rs of this land (Forhnd~o/dm

n•ith a ptrm<1nml ro,wanl)
(Statement) 11,e nature conservation fcanuc, on my land will be conserved by the
monagemcnt th,t will iakc over from me even \VITHOUT plocing a ,·oluntary
permanent covenant on it (For landho/Jm withoJ1! "'!>' agmmrnl, and Ihm wilh a f,x,d /;rm
,tgmmml or mn11anl)

49

Chapter 2: Study Methods
{1] lmpa,.t on land,..,/,,,
(Question) To who! extent did the following concerns influence the size of the
conser•:ation oreo on which you placed a permanent co,·cnant? (a) Concerned obout •
possible lose in morkct v:ilue of my property bcc:iu,e o~ entering a permanent covenant
on my land. (Forlddho/J,rr i,ith a p,rmantnl cm~nanl}
(Stotcmcnt) Placing

,1

permanent covenant on my land would most Likely co11Se it to lose

in morkct value ~'or /andh,ldm wilh1J1,l 111!)' "!,""'""'' aod

,1,,,,. with a f,:,.~d term O!f'ltl"nl or

ro1~n11n~

[dj CompattbiliD· i,•ilb /on1,-tm11 •l?Jrrlim ojl!Jt kmd
(Smement). Before l plnccd • permanent covenant on my land, I anticip.icd retaining
ownmhip of my pm;-,erty in the family in the future. (For /aodho/Jm wilh a P,111Jaoml
rovtnant)
(Statement) Bcfoi.\ I ploced a permanent covenant on my lmcl, I anticipated retaining tl,e
mon,gcment of my property withm tl,e family in tl,c furui-.,, (For landholdm with a
P,111Jan111t nm11anl}
(Srntemc1u) I plan to retain ownmh.ip of nt)' property within the family in the future (For
landho/dm uithonl a'!J <1!,mmmf, and tho,e with aftxtd tmn agmmmf or ro,•manl}
(Statement) I plan m retain the manogcment of my property within the fomily in the
future (For landboldm ,,_,;1/ionl ""J <1!,r:,m,nt, n•J thoto u•1)/i 11 ft.wd tm11 i,gm,,,.nt or roNnnnl)
[,] Effirlif~nm 01~r ,tl1tr m,cl,aniims
(Question) How much did the following stated ressons (•·fl inOuencc your Jcci,ion to
place a permanent co,·enon! on )'Our lmd? (a). Convinced there were no otlier cquolly
effective mechonism, thsn pcrinanenl covenant, for promuting the long-term nature
conservation on private lands {Forhndholtl!rt wifbaP,111Jantnl rov,aanl}
(Statement) 11,ere ore more effective inechanism, than ,oluntory permanent covenants
for promoting the long-term noture conicrvation on private /andr (For lnnd/10/.1,n Oilthout
any aJ,mmmt, and 1.10J1 will, a)1'.wJ fmn 11!,rllm<nl or roi~nant}

ff/ LanJht,/dm' 1111itndt1 lo IDn!,·lmn n11il1r1 ro11mwllan
(Question) Before you entered a voluntary permanent covenant on your lond, how
import;tnt were the following issues in determining your decision to place a permanent
coven am on your !and? \X/hether a pcnr,1nen! cm·cnant would give greater aisurance for
long·tenn nature con,crvarion tl,on under the other comcrvarion agreements. (For
landho/dm 1Vilhaprrm11n.-nl ro1•11an1).
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(Question) Wb,t importance would you give to each of the followlng issues in deciding
whether to enter a ,·olunt.,}' permanent covenant on your land? Whether• pennoncnt
covenant will assnre the long·term nature conservation. (rOr kind/m!dt:r; wi1hout alf)'

agr1,mrn/, and tlmr wilh a fi.wd t,rm agmm1nl or ((}l'lnanr).
{!} Tota/arta ofproptt!J
Question 1. \Vlrnt is the total area of )'Onr property in hecmrcsl (For all ror,goriu

of

/,;ndholdm)
Question 2. How many hectares of your property ore under~ permanent conservation
coven•nt? (F•ra/1 ,ar,gl!lits ,jla11dhold1r;)
Question 3. What size of your property (NOT leasccl land) do 01hcr natural features
occupy? (l'or a/1,ar,gone, of bndboldm}
Question 4. \'vhat size of rnur prop my do the nature con,ervatlnn features O'I your
property occupy? (,11/ ,at,gatiu of kmd~o/din)
(NB. In cakuloting the percentage ratio of mt:tl area under conservation to total orea of
the property for landholder.; with a pcrman~m rn,·,nant, the su.m of Question 2 aml
Question 3 was dh-ided by Question I, and the ratio CJ<p:.~scd as • percentage
thereaftcr).Simihrly, in colculating the petcentagc ratio of 1,.. ,-,,J orea under conservation 10
total ares of the property for other !,ndbolder •,

~t~~;>'

JCS Question~ was divided by

Question 1 and expressed as a pcrccnrnge thcreofter.

[h} Ay of rr:,pood'"1
(Question) In wbal ycorw<re you born? (l'iira/J /,,ndMld:r,at,goniI).

(,} /)umrion efproperty in /ht famify
(Question) I low long Im this property been in your family~ (Fara/I landholderrnt,g:,,iu).

(Question) Which of the following statements below QabeUc<l •·m) be,1 describe )'Our
one prim•')' reason for h»·ing retained tbe present conservation oress an your property

BEFORE )'Ou placed o pcnnanent covenant? (For/and/m/,krt wi1hap,m1antn/ ro,~naM}
(Question) Which of the following ,tatements below QabeUed a-m) best describe your
primary reaion fot having rctainc<l these cnnserv,iion area,

of)'JUr

propeny to dote?

(t>J.,.se in<lic•tc one primiry rcoson hy writing {I) in the box nut te the statement (For

lnndlmld,n will10J1/ "'!I' tl!f'lmml, and Jh,m ~.;,1, aJ,xed 1,m1 agrrtm,nt orrov,nant)

{k} l'iirm D"P'
(Question) Wlm type of farm do )'OU manage? (l'orall lnndhD/J,rrol1!J)rifI).
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[/] &ow/!dg,,,ad <1wt1rtnm about pm11amnl rr,e,nant
(Statement) I have NEVER he,1d about a permanent coven:m1 for nature conservation
before now. (For landboldm •if/,011/ an)' agmmmf, and Ihm u•ilh "fixed lmn agmm'"I or
rom,anl)
(Stotcmcnr) I am familiar wi1h the avo.ihb\e permanent covenant progrnms for nature
conservation in the State (For /andholdm wi1bo11t "")' agmmm/, and thm with "ji.wd /mn
agmmtn/ or ,v,~nanl)
(Statement) I am familiar with the process of entering a pennanent cm·enant progrnm,
for n·,turc conocrvstion on m)' lond. (For ld,,dbo/dm u·itbo11t "'!>' agrmmnl, and tlxm •'ith a
fix,d llmt ijg,rtlm,n/ or rov,11anl)

[m] fulalionship bthn111 kmdho/dm' tronomir dtpmd,nu on ti,, prop,rty and tl!1ir 1,ptak, or fik1fy ,,p:ak, of

Question 1. Which of the following categories best des-ribe, your approximate tot:tl
income before rnxes, derind from sou,ces OUTSIDE your property in the ye..r you
placed~ pctmoncnt covenant on your land? ~'or kindholdtn with a p,m1an1111 «wtnant)
Question 2. Which of the following catcgon'es best describc1

)'Our

approximste lotol

Income before i,ies, derived from your property Qnduiling le<1sed are:i,) in the yc:tr you
pl,ccd a pcrmanem covenant on your hnd1 i'For landbo/Jm with a f"mt~~ml rovmanl)

Question 1. Which of the following c.,trgories best describe your •pproximatc gros,
income before uixes, dcri,·cd from sources OUTSlDE yom: property in 19991 (For

/andhofdm wi//){JU/ a'!)' agrttmmt, mid thrm with afixed t,rm agmm,nl orro,~nan/)
Que,tion 2. \'ilhkh of the followi11g categodes best describe your approximate gross
income, before taxes, dcriV<"d from your propcrcy \including lcs,ed areas) in 1999? (For

fandlmidm n41bo111 d'!J agmmml, ad Ihm with afi.wd lfrm 11gmmml or rot~n,m/)
(ND. Mcosmement variable i.e., the ratio of landholder income from property to total
income, was calculated by dividing the m,ilian of the r;inge in which the lsn<lholder's
income from the :,ropeny (Question 2) lies to sum of median of external income
(Question 1) and medfan of income from the propcny (Qncstion 2) fo, c.\Ch londholder
category.

11,c ovct;lgc of d1c median income was ollocated to missing income values or in cscs
where the respondent withheld the income information.
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{n] Injl11mr, offdendr/ n,ighbo11r, and ronm111/iM group ,if]il1~fion1 on fandholder:l 11p,alu or lik.1fy 1,piakt of
a p,rmanml ro«nanl
(Question). l-J<>W much did the following stated rcosons (a-f) lnfiuence your decision to
place a pcnnanent co,·enont on your land? The presence of neighbours or friends having
a pcnn.ncnt covenant on similar nature consc,,,otion areas as n'linc {For /Jnd/w/d,r, ~ilh a
pmnanml ro,~aan,'.1.
(Statement) I v.ould be inclined to enter n permanent nature conscrtation cuvenom on
my !ond if neighbouring landholders or friends wit!, similar natural areas had pcnnancnt
covenant on thcirs. (Forfandbnl,im wit/1011/ a'!)' agmmml, and 1/11m wilh afi-«d lmn l1JJw11ml or
rownanl}

[o] M,mbmbip lo a nat11rr rontin111iongrtJ1,P/o,gani;a/ion
(Question). In tlw period before

)'OU

placed a pennoncnt covenant on your land, were

you a member or did you suppot! any of the following or mhcr nature conservation
groups/ organisations? (For fandholdm with a p,rmanmt ro,~nant)
(Question). Arc )'OU a member or do you suppo,t ru·.y of the foliowin11 or othe, nature
conscr,:ation groups/organisations? (For fandhofdm wi11N·1/ "'!Y agmmtr.1, and Ihm wirh o
jixtd 1,rm agmmml orn,wnanl)

[pj Ir tbm a r,!,1/ionsl,ip btM111 fandb()/d,r,' sodo-tronomil dispnsirion and lh,ir 1,ptake or /ik,f; 1,ptnk, of a
rownanl?
(Question). \'Vhich of the following categories best describes your approximate gro,s
income before taxes, derived from sources OLITSJDE your pmpcrty in 1999? (For
landholders i.•ilho11/ d'!)'<l!,rtlmtnl, nnd il11Jst wilh 11f,x1J /1r111 agmminl orrovinant}
(Question). Which or the following categories bc,t describes your oppro:cimate gms,
income, before rnxes, derived from your pmpcrty (including leased area,) in 1999? (For
fandho/d,rr i.·ilbou( d'!)' .grr,m<nl, and tbost will, afi~·,d Im,, agmm<nl or m,nanJ}.

fq} Dtbt on prop1>1J
(Question). How much debt did you have on )'OUr property at the time y,;~ placed •
pennancm covcnont on it? (For landholdtn w1/h a pmnanmt m,~nan~
(Question). In which of the following categories docs the debt amonot fall? (For
landho/d,rr wilho11t a'!} ,1.!f<tmtn/, and 1ho1e in1h afa.~d lmn agrt,m<nt or rownan~

fr] A11i111d, toward, th, uptnb a/pmnantnl ro,~nanl
(Statement). l would not consider~ permanent covenant under any circumstance. (For
landho/derr w1)ho11t "'!'>' Offttm<nl, and lhore wilh afJ).~d Im,, agmm<nl or rownan~
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(Qu,stion). Before you placed o pcnnonent covenant on )'Our lmd, did you have on)'
other conservation ogreemcnt or a fixed tcnn co\•er1ant on it? {For Modho/dm wiJh "
pmn•nml t:tJVMllJt~.

M An /kn 1v,ndhkr that""" b1 u!td as indirotors for moniloring chang1 in landho!d,r at/i/ud,1 to ro1~nanl
uptllkd

Nll.11iis was •nswered by determining tl1c existence of significont relationships bct\\•een
independent variables in the study and the dependent variable diat can be identified ond
mcisurcd to give on indication of change in attitude to covenant up!akc among
landholders without any agreement and those with a fbtcd tenn igrcement or covenant.

{I} lnr1nh"«1 mra111m far mofi1uting /hr 11//Jk, off>imt11n,nl ro1•nan/S on prin,11 hnd,

,,
II

ii

(Queslion) Before i·ou entered a voluntary pcrmwcnt co\•cnant on your bnd, how
impomnt were the following issues (a·c) in determining rour decision to place a
pcnnanent covenant on your land; (Use the following scale \.6 below to make your

rnting_). (•) whether I would receive long te,m manag<ment advice, (b) Whether there
would be increased public recognition snd appreciation of the con,cn."Otion values on

Ill)"

fond, (dJ\Vhcthcr by entering a permanent covenant I would receive some ongoing
fin,ndol support to carry out the necessary conse.v•lirin work. (For Mndholdtrt

JYI(/, "

prmtan,n/ rovrnant).
(Statement) Non·finoncial recognition h)' State ond Lool government of my effort, to
conserve nature would be a signifir.ant •t"P in mou'vating me to enter a covenaut on my
land (For kmdho/dm wit/xml "'!>' agrr:tm,n/, llnd /boil i.-ilh "fiw,l t,m, agmminl or ro!'lnanl}.
(Question). Wll>t importance would )'OU give to the following issues deciding whether to
enter a perm,ncnt covenant?) (•) \Vhcthcr l would rccei,·c long-term management
advir.c on conserv,tion. (b) \Vhethcr thcic would be increased public recognition and
appreciation of conse.vation vahie, on m)' l,nd (c) Whether liy entering a pcrmoncnt
cm·cnant I would rccd,c some on.going financial support to cart)' out the necessary
conservation work. (Far /,,ndJ,o/dm witho11/ lln;· dJ,rr<mml, and tbo1t wilh "f=d !11111 d!,l?lm<nl or
amnantf
(Quc,lion). In )"Our opinion, what actions or policies can the Stole and Local government
put in place to make it more favourable for landholders to entcr a pc.nn•ncnt coven,nt
fornature conscn·ation on their land? {For a/lhindh0!d,r "11<grmtr)
(Question). Arc there ~n)' comments you would like to make on other i,sucs relating ro
nature conservation on private lands and/or permanent covenants? (FDr all hndholdtr
rolt.f,Oritr}

'

""
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(St:uemcn1) I om familiar with the avoilab!e prnnancm ~o,·rnan1 program• for nnturc
con,entalion in the State. (Porlandho/Jm withf1J.:td-ltm, and no ro1•nantoragrw11tnl}
[11] Equi{)· ron«mr in nlllnrt ro111m,ation on privaft lands /hat hll,t a h,ari•!, on roi•nanl uptaJ:.,

IJ·

/an,lhofdm.
(Question). \V!mt pcrccnrnge of the cosl of natwe conservation on your lond do you
consider should be covered by the public if you were to place• pcrmonent coven1nt on
your land 1od:i)·? (Fora/I {andbofdrrrol<.§!nfr)
Smement. I believed d,e colt of ,mering a pcrmrnent covenant on my land should be
covered

by 1he agcnc)'/mg:inlsation issuing rhe co,•enan~ (For landhofdtn with a p,manrnl

ronnanl}
(Question). In youroplnion, whst sctions or policies can d,e Stale nnd Loco! govemme111
pu1 in pfocc to m,ke it more favoutabk for bndhold,:rs to enter a permanent cannant
for narure conservation on their lond? (For a/f lan,lhofd,r Mtgon"<r}
(Qucstio1t). Arc there any comments you wo,Jd bkc to make on other issues rcl1ting m
norure conscrvotian on private bnds and/or permanent covensim? (l'iir af/ /J,Jht,fd,r
calrgoriu).

NB. The 1.•st two questions prm~dcd responses in a quslit,tivc form in terms of
stotements. The response for each respondent """ visuaUy accessed and the ideas
cJprcssed in the statements wcu extracted nnd coded under scpar.ttc c•tegories.
11,ereforc, all statements from the respondents thot expressed• similar ide• were coded
uncb: the same category .
•1'(

2.5

Stages in Data Analysis

Descriptive statistics wss carried out initially to identify anomolics in the data sn This
""'' followed by a cross tabulation to provide inform,tlon on how mpondents wid, a given
value on one variable responded to one or more other varfobles.

2.5.1

Descriptive

analysis

Frequency distributions and averages of the new measUicmcnt variables were used for
ill landholder cotegorics. 'Jbesc covered exogenous landholder variable, such as lhcir •go, long·

tcnn management goal., dependence on income from lmd, socio-economic variables, and
perceptions and attitude to a pennancnt covenant upt•ke and it, rcloted feature,. Others
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covered were exogenous property variables such as totol property size, principol la"'I use !)pc,
size of consetvation are•, percentage rntio of consetvation area to tmol property size and
consetvation t)pes. The purpose of the dcscripti,·e analysis was to determine the percentage
distribution of coses among the different levels of each variable in order to establish the initiol
prnfilc, of each landholder catego,y.

2.5.2

Tests of variable relationships
Contingency tables for landholdc,s without on)' form of on agreement and tlrn,e witl, a

fixed term agrecmcnt/cm·enant were consttucted sep:trntcly. In both cases, codes of the
attitudinal level, for the dependent vorioblc 'attitude, to a permanent covenant uptake' were
listed on top of the columns, while catcgojc, of the independent vnriablcs were placed in the
rows. "11,c frequency of cases of ~sch cell was insect ed. in order 10 reduce the number of cd!,
that had !css than five cases and for case of interpretation of the result, the attitudinal k·vels of

tl1c dependent variable for ench landholder were groupl"d into five !cvds by combining the two
attirudinal levels 'Neither ,grec or disogree' and 'Don't know', into one lcvd referred to

a,

'Neutral'. All others levds were left intact.
Somer,'D tc,t (Newson, 2002) and Goodman and Kruskol tau test (Goodmm &
Kru,kal, 1972) were carried out to de1erminc the significance of the relationship, between the
independent variable, and dcpendl"nt ,·ariable for each landholder cotego,y. Somen'D 1c,1 onl)'
applied wh~rc both independent ond dependent ,·oriablcs were ordinol. Only otati,ricallr
significant reblion,hips between the indepmdl"nt and the dependent variable at a probability
level of 0.05 or less hod their cells in the contingency tohle coMidcred for in1erpretation. A
non-sig,tificant test me.1nt that no association between 1he dependent and independent
,•ariables we,e present and d,e observed difference, in the cells could be explained by chance.
The tests determined 1he independem ,·ariable, that have an individuolly ,ignificant ossociation
with the dependent variable to worrant further i,wcstigation and ,election for possible inclusion
in a multivariate path anal)~i,. Independent variob!c, showing a high lack of mociation with
tbe dependent voriable could be removed from further onalysis.

2.5.3

Path analysis using multiple tcgccssion
The purpose of path anal)·sis was to establish the direct and inditcct effects of seven.I

voriahles thlt were hn1othcsized (predicted) to hove on dfcct on the dependent v:uioble (i.e.
altitudes to a permanent covenant uptake), to cxpl:iin the proportions of variance and to
c,timate tbe m;gnirude of corrdotion, among the variables.
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In the present study, path •n.tysis wa, used to give• quontitsrivc intcrpma~on :o an
a,sumcd caus:tl system constructed using the information on the obser,cd correlstions between
the va,iabks, qu•btatiw information provided by the respondents and other infonnation b,ml
on knowledge, thcoreticol fonnufation and mumptions ond logical on:tlysis (Wrigh~ 1934),
Ilccau>c path nnalpis is concerned only with linear, adilitivc relationship, among a set
of variables measured

Oll

interval (or continuous) scales, only those vori,blc, meeting this

criterion were selected for anolysis, 11ierefore, path di,grams were constructed to ilisp!ay
graphicolly the pottcrns of caus•I relations among a set of th~sc variable~. TI,e proposed models
in the present stud)· were rec,•rsivc (unicfuectionol cau,al flow~ indico~ng that no two nriob!cs
con be both cou,a! atid effect on encl, other at" given time.
The predictor ond mediator v.,ri.sbk., thot were selected for indusio1, in the path
an•!ysis arc shown by their cod,·s and description in Tables 24 ond 2.5, rcspccti,·c!y.

Table 2. 4 Pwlictorvariables hniotl,esi,.ecl and entered in tl,e initi:tl pod, model for their
effect on ottimdes tn a permanent cm·enant upt•kc of landholders in Victoria and
We~tcm ,\umalia tl,at hwe no covenant or agreement and those with• facd-tenn
agreement ond fixed-term covcnont,
Predictor (Exp!onatory)
variable• code,

Variable description

,lge

Age of lhc respondcnl•

Knowlodge

Lc,·el of knowledge ahout pcrmonent co,·cn,m,

L:ng1b

L:ngth of properly owncnhip in the family

Coo1_,intc1<!1

ln1crost in long·lcrm no1u,c con,cl\'ation

Ownetsl,ip

Long-lcmigo,l for r<tenrion of owncr,hip.

M,na~cmcnt

Long-l«m go,1 for retcntioe1 of man,gcmcnt

Membcr,hip

Afflli>tiom/a,soci,rion "1th coo,scn•oti~n org•ni,.tion,

Conllotio

Ratio of<onscl\'acion "'" to prop<rty ,izc

F1n....•upp01t

Frcqucm:r of,cccpnon of finmml ,upport

l.ahou,

Lcvd ofl,bour comntilmrnt

Debt

Lc,·d of fu»nci,l debt on ptopcny.

lkon_dcpcnd

E<onomic dcpc01Jcnce 011 piopcrty (% ntio of income)

Slotc•

$1010 of 1·ictori, or W'e,tern ,lomaloa

•note: the predictor nri,blc 'm1c' ""' onlr tc,tcd in the p,th regtc,.ion model in,..,Mng d,c com~1ncd
nnn·holdcu of• covcnmt or ogtccm,n1 in l'icton, •nd Wemm Aum,li>.
11,e nriable selection for inclusion in the path anal)sis "'"' based on finilings from
literature revfow and the 11otistical~· significant rclatlon.hips bctu·cen individual independent
v,rioblc, and •ttilUCcs to a permanent co,·cnant up1ake for eocl, of the four cat<"gnric, of
lmdho!dcrs on whom the pa1h an•l)'sis w:ts c,rried out. Furthermore, only varioble, that met
the criteria for inclusion !n • regression ,nalrsis ~.c. measured on continu.,us or orilinal scale)
were included in the h)l>othcsizcd input path m:xlel '[1,c respomc cotcgories of the ordinal
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voriab\es were reduced from ,ix to five csicgocie, b/ combined the response 'I don't know'
with the neuunl response 'neither og,cc nor disogrce'.
TI,e endogenous (mediotor) voci•blc, (foble 2.3) we,c treated"' independent vaci1bles
in a test of their relationship with the output vaciablc (aitirudcs to a pcnnancnt covenant
uprnkel However, they wcr~ treated as ii,.. dependent v1rioblc, in respect to their relationship
"ith tl,c hnmthesized predictor (exogenous) variables ,hown in Fi~rc 2.1.

Table 2. S Mediator voriablco hypothesized and entered in the initial path model for tl,cir
effect on •ttitudc, to a permanent covenont upi..ke of landholders in Victocia
and Western Australia that have no covenant or agreement and those with 11
fixed·t<".rm agreen1cnt and fixed-term coycnont.
Mcdialorvariablea code

Variable dcocriptlon

Effectiveness

Effcctivonc" of porrmncnl covcnont for long-tcnn canserv,tio" o,..,,
oll,or mechanism,

Rwriction,

-~11i1ndc

,~enc fits

P«ceplion, oc" lhc hcnofo, of a pcrm1ucnt co,•enmr

10

imro,cd «siriction, on lmd-u,e

V,lueJo,o

Perception of 1hc impact of peim,net>t covenant on Land voluc

N«c"ity

Porcc>,..:d noccs,ity of• permanent covenant

Nonfln_rccog

-~llitud< 10 non-foi,m:i,1 rcrngnition fur permanent covenant uptake

5,!inity

Percei,·cd cffoc1i,·cncs, of pcm\:mmt covcn1nt fm solinity conuol

Compcn .. tion

A1tirndc

2.5.3.1

10

compensolion for pe<manont co,·onmt uptake

Procedure used in Path Analysis
Diogrnmmatical rcprcscnt•tion of tl,c input path mode! for :tll lan<lholdcr c:itcgorie, i,

depicted in Figure 2.1. The m,:,dcl illustrates the hyputhc,i~ed podis between the predictor •ml
mediator variobles ,hown in Tahlcs 22 and 2.3 respectively, the hypothesized carrelotion,
betwr.cn the predictor variables ond the correlation• between the mediator vaciobks. All the
variable, in tl,c mo<lcl were predictc<l to have <lircct effects on the dependent v:uiablc 'onitudc,
to permanent cover,snt uptake' and oil predictor voriablcs were predicted to have an effect on a
mediator vnti•ble on which • sttaiglu line originating from them points, Similarly, all mctliS!or
variahlcs were predicted to have an effect on other mc<liotor voriab\es on which there i, a
o,rvcd Linc joining the two v•riables. However, Figure 2.1 does not highlight tho effects of all
the v;iriablcs in the modd on the output variable (,\ttirudcs to a permanent covenant upi..kc).
·n,is is omitted in order to make the model more visuo!lr comprehensible.
The hypotl,csis ond assumptions of tl,e rclotionship between variables in the model

"

were intuitive~· derived, based upon ~«uru,c rcse•rch, qualii..tivc information provided by
landholders in the study and the author's knowl~dgc ohout relationships between the Vllcioble,.
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Correlation matrices among 1he variables and ,rnndardized regression path rncfficiem
(beta weight) were used to construct o path di..-r,r:im. A strnigh~ single headed arrow in a path
diagrnm <lrn.WII from eoch imlepcndent variable and pointing to the dependent variable
represents nn effect relationship between the independc'flt and dependcm variables (sec Figure
2.1). TI,e direction of the arrows depicts the hypud,esized direct and indirect path,.
Conclations between endogenous or exogenous variables were depicted with curved
Lines wicl, arrows on each end (sec Figures 2.1) to inilicatc that clicre is no envisaged caus;i!
effect of either variable

0,1

the other ond consequcncly that the rclocion hetwecn the variables

remained nnmalys;J' (Pedh;1Zur, 1982). In addition, because the reason for the conclalion,
between exogenous variables is unknoWII, it i, possibl~.to assess their direct or indirect effects
through intervening variable, but not the indirect effects of the exogenous variables through
eoch other (Namboodiri, Carter, & D\;llock Jr., 1975). l'inal.ly, an arrow was dra\VII from a
residual varial•lc into the dependent vari,bk to indica!c the uneNpl>.incd variance (see figure
2.l).
To estimate the magnitude of direct and indirect paths for all londho!der cotegories, •
series of regression ,nolysi, were corricd out by entering the variable 'Attitudes to a permanent
covenant' os tl,c Jcpendcnt (output) v:uiablc and all exogenous ,nd mediator (endogeno~•)
vari,bh hniothc,ized in tl,e modd w,rc entered as the indcpcndem vorisbles. The aim of chis
first rnodd w"' to csublish the variables !hot have a direct effect on sttitudcs to a permanent

""

covcMn! uptake. TI,c value of adjusted/standnrdizcd Rl (ll.ladi), which represents the amount
of change in cl,e depen,.knrvariable that is attributed to a Jingle standard deviation unit's wmth
of change in the predictor variable was set at a significont level of 0.05. It wa, ;llso used to
dctenninc how well each exogenous or medi.,tor variable explained the variation of the
dependent variable.
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Sollnlly

Dobt

Bonollte

Neneaall)'

Madlnlor
varl~blee

Prodlctor
variable a

Figure 2.1

Conceptual poth diogr:un showing hypotlic,izcd com:lations between
p1cdictor/pttdic1or, and mcdiomr/mcdiotor vnrioblcs and effects on each otlic,
aU categoric, of londholdcr,.

for

Nole I: All vo:ri,b\c, in the modd ore hrpothc,ied to hove • direct effect on the dcpedend (output)
vorioblo ',itiru<lc, to I'cov upt>kc'. I !ow.-·er, thi• i, not illustntod in the present dugwn inortlcr 10 aV<Jid
ovcr·cluotcring in the di,gnm.·

Note 2: ConstrUction of thi, di,gnm i,, b"'cd on infomution from litm1twc ..,view and bivari>tc
..,l,tion,hip, indmtificd in ,ccrion onc., \
1

I•'I

1\.
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A ,ccond model wos con.lllllctcd using the variables retained in the first model because of their
srntisticol. significance at a 0.05 levd. Separa,ely multiple rcg,:esoion wns carried out for each
endogenous vacfablc ,etoined in tlic modc!nctirig as the dq,cndentvorioble and the c:,:ogcnou,
variables as the independent variable,, The aim of this modd was to establish the p,cdicm,
variable., for each mediator (endogenous) variable.

A final potl, model ',r eoch bndholdtl category w,is constructed by cn!ering all variable,
rc!:tlned in the p,evious sets of rcg,:cssion models into a new «g,:ession analysis. New
coefficients nf each psih from tlic endogenous to the output vaciob!e (attitudes to a covcnnnc
uprnkc) wen, cnmed in the path model, while tl,c previous pa!h coefficients of the c,<ogcoou, to
the mediator (endogenous) variables were imported to the final path model. Li,tly, the over.ill
model fit was assessed by alJruysis ofvarionce (ANOVA).
The over.ill effect of• sdec1cd voriablc on onothcr variable was decomposed into direct
and indin:ct paths in order to col.cubtc the effect of the Individual poths. The correlation bc!W<cn
independent and cl.pendent variables was c:Uculotcd os the sum of the direct ond indirect dfccts

(Carey, 1998).

2.S.3,2 Limiiations of Path Analysis
•
•

Relationship• among voriablcs in the modcl must be linear, additive and ausoL
Relationships in the path diagram must be mrnble by strnightfo<W2Id multiple
reg,:ession and the intctVenlng variables can all sc,ve as <lependent variables in
multiple regression analyses.

•

Patl, on:U)"si, only includ~,. one-way cou,ol p<ogttssion across (m down)" poth
diagnm, with no reciprocal causation between v,riab\es.

•

Path ano\ysis cannot establish the direction of causality, oltlmugh it m"y be used
to evoluate causol. h)1mthescs. It moy also be nsed in some (restricted) situations to
test between two or more causn! h)l'Othcse~ Furthermore, it is also mo« likely to

be useful in hypotheois testing tha11 in cxploratoty research.
•

Rebtionships in a path di,gnun must be cap,bfo ofbcing treated os being on an
intcivol scale. Nominal meosurcment, or ordirutl measurement witl, few categoric,,
including dichotomies, will make path analysis impossible (l'edhozur, \%2), In the
pttsem study, several vorfables that did not meet this criterion were excluded in the
path anol.ysi, thereby restricting the obs=•blc voriab!c rcbtiomhips with the
possibility of missing out important and vilid variable effects in the model.
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Further explonotion or the pmccdurc used in the poth model cunstr.iction i, pro•.Wcd in
section 4 of chapte.< 4.

2.5.4

Evaluation ofsimilaritles and differences in profiles between landholder

categories
lksponses from ,cspondents with• fixed-term ogrcemc11t or covcn:.nt and londholdci;
without nny fonn of coven~nt or agreement in Victoria nnd Western Aunralio were compared
and cootrnstcd with those of permanent covenont holders from Victorio. TI,e purpose w.is to

e""111line the relative importance of various attitmlinal, economic, socio-demographic, socio!
offiliotion influences and oositc factors leading to the uptake of a permanent covcnont.

2,5.5

Evaluating presence of a tcon~ition in attimdes to covenan, upUlke
To estoblish if there is o transition in landholders' attitudes to covenant uplllkc between

the non-holders of a covcn,nt or agreement and fixcd-tenn agreement/covenant holders,
comparison of the pmportions of their attitudinal scores in d,e dependent variable' atritudcs to a
permanent covenant' were carried out visually. L1rge diffctences in proportions (e.g., =jority of
one group of landholders showing a posirivc a1titude to permanent covenant, while the IT!ljoricy
of 1hc 01her group shows negoti,·e altitude 10 n pcrmoncnt covenant) shows 1hc presence of a
transition in bndholders' attitudes to covenont uptake from one group to the other.

2.5.6

Categorizing qualitative da1a
The written quali1oti,·e responses by each respondent to the open-ended question, were

visuoll)" asses•,ed and the different ideas expressed in the ovcrnll stotements were coded into
scpara\e categories as suh-themes. For each respondent, all slll(ements that CJ<prcs,cd a similar
idea (desired actions} were isolated and coded into lhe oppmpriote sub-themes. Linked subthemes we.<e thereafter grouped into new categories rcfcmd to os main themes (incentive
group). The nwnb~rs of respondents contributing to a given suh-thcme were ,cco.dc<l.

2,5,7

Summary of analysis procedure by landholder categories
In order to onswer the general question on the factors that influence the decision of

l.<ndhO:'.ders to the uptake of a permanent rnvenant on !heir land, the following analysis based on

.,·,

answering the associated que,rions was conducted on ,ill landholder csicgories.
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The initial step in the ono!y,is ,,,.,, to rnoblish the p,ofiles (charmcristic,) of
landholders with • permanent cm·enam o, a benchmark on which 10 compa,e the profiles of
other bndholder <>lcgories. A dc~cnp11,·e analysis using frequency distribution, was used to
prmidc the first profile,. ·n,e,c were bo,ed on 28 vari,bles grouped mlD the following
categories: cxogcnou, chor,1etcnstics of !he property, pn,·co,•efllnt bmlholdc,s' expoclatiom of o
pcnnancnt CO\'enant, perceptions ond OllllUdcs to nature conscrvatiot1 and covenants, fai'nilioril)'
,<i!h cownan~<, ]oJll·lcrm go.1ls for the property, alllludcs to pmperty rights ond views on
ince,1ti,·es and cquuy in conscrv.11ion.
TI,e aim of the first srngc in tho Jato analysis for bndholdcrs in both cotegorics wos to
cstoblish thc!r proftlcs based on frequency distnbutions of .U dependent and independent
variables. Cro,~ 1,bulotinn of the var··,blcs wos carried out to provide funher inforrnotion c>n Ilic
frequency distnbution Test of ossoci,tion, bei....·cen the dependent aod illdependent ,·ariohlcs
was carried out os o first step in cst,bti,ltlng 111< '°significant v,riahlc relationships, which
choractcrisc eoch landholder calC,,'<>ry an,! to determine Ilic ,ignificar.t vorioblcs for inclusion in
fun her analysis using multiple regression.
P1th model, w,·,c constructed

fo, each landholder catcgury using multiple regression,,

in order to establish the ,·o.r:iabl<s that pmlict bndholdm' likelihood of taking up o permanent
co,·en,nt.

2.6

Conclusion

This ehop1cr has pmvided a dmilcd m·ervicw and justification of it., method employed
in this r,seareh. 11,c procedure used in 1hc consuuction of the questionnoi,e inmumcn!s for
go1hcring the required infonn.1tion from bndholdcrs ond thc trea!ment of tho g:uherinfonn.1tion
to ;'1', analysi., has been shown.
s,,,,cml operatia<lal issues "'ere encountered in the landhold« sompling prnccss. In

portkufar, long del,ys w,rc cncoome<eJ in the attempt to ,ccess the contact addresses and
i,1fonn,tion on landholders from the Joto bases, particularly in Western Austnlia. llccausc of the
confidentiality of information held by government Jcp01trnent,, there wo, need to demon,tr.ttc
that the requested information was to be mc<l only in tl,c m:tnner 1hat ""'' prescribed in the
ethics declaration (o the Edith Cow2n Unfre<sjty Ethics Committee. Severo! meetings, telephone
conve,sacions and corrc,pondcncc "~th the responsible officers took p!aee ewer a period of lv;o
month, before access to the necessary infonrution w,s granted.
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Access

10

l:mdholden' n.-m,cs and contact oddrtms Md m~ of questionnaires in

Vki,oria nccc.sitatcd tru,·~ng there in person to moct with the organisation• tlut hold the
infonmtion. Apart from tho ua·d time, occcssing the d1toboscs and omcl m."lili:,g out of the

qU<cstio,maircs in Victoria w.s much quicker than in Western Australi•.
Cros,.dotab1Se verificarion of the membership ,ioms of landholders in «lp<Ct 10 the
different consorvatim1 agreements wos .l,o a time consuming part of the otudy. The verification

was neccssitotcd by the lsck of o ccntn~s~d d.,t,bo,c of \andho!dors with all the ,eqllllcd
information.
The nci.:t t]m,c dlOpters p,o,'idc Ilic findings 1nd a prcUminal}' discussion for each of
tl,c three different

iroups of landholders included in the study. 'Il1< ne),:t chapter spccilic:.Uy

p,01.;dc, the findings and discuosion on permanent covenant holder,, 11,c aim of~,. d,~pter is
to <sUlblish the factors thot arc likely to hO\'C influenced 1hc decision o(this gmup oflmdholdcn

to !like up~ pcrm~ncnt covcn;t11t,

,,:

Ii

h'
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Chapt~r 3
Permanent Covenants
Research Findings and Preliminary Discussion

Thir chapter 11m1ain1 fl,, rm,//; of qJ1mtlilali,~ and q11alilalive dala ana!Jris of prm,1111,n/
ror,rnanl holdm in Vittorio ,111d 11 dimminn of !hr finding;. Th, ain11 of th, rhi1}1trar,:
•
/Q u1ab/i1h the far/on Iha/ i1,jl,111m:d la11dholdm' d,ri!ionf lo 111k1 11p 11 prm1011mf
rovennnl i11 order lo ch11ra111ri1e pormlidlpmnanml roven1111f !J11ldm and;
• lo u/ab/i,h landholdm' 1ilw1 011 Ill' barri,rs lo, and irmnlim far, rh, 1iplakt of
pem11J1///// (QIYllllN{f.

C0
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Introduction

Permanent covenants uptake by a covenontor encoil, acceptance of several conditions
relating to land-use in exchange for limited conservotion rnmiagement support from •
covcnftlltee. It hos been noted earlier in chapter one tl,at a ,ignifkant proportion of landholders
ore re!uctont to take up a permanent covenant. "Ibis rducunce is ottributed to attitudinal, ,ociocconomic, nnd situational facto,,, mnny of which are not d<.uly defined Some specific factors
that have bceo identified include an apprcl1c.n,ion abnur loss of rights to tl,cir lond (Binning &
Young, 1997), and potential eco11omic <lisatl.ro,uagc, resulting from the uptake of a pcr:nJncnt
co,·cnant in the absence of nppropriace incemi,·cs (Young ct al., 19%).
One of d,c ruins of this chapter is to identify the orr:,y of factors tl,at motivated
londholders to toke up a permanent co,·enant and the potential incentives for encouraging
rcluctont londholdcrs towards a co,·cnant uptoke. A premise of this study is dm understanding
the attitudinal, ,ocio-cconomic, ond situationol clrncJctcri,tics of permanent covenant holders
can be used to define the boselinc/bcnchmark of at1ributcs for identifying potential permanent
covenant takers. Furthermore, this undcntonding con guide the development of policies and
mategic, for supporting nature conservation on private land.
Victoria wa~ sdectcd o. • case study of permoncnt covenant holders becousc it has o
longer use of pcrmmcnt covcnonts {over 10 ye·,,s) tho fl other States or Territories in Au,trn!ia.
Furthcnnorc, it hod a largest number of pcn11,nent covenant holders of my State or Territory
in Australia at the time of cm1ducting the study, from which to obt,in a sufficiently large

samrt~ of),mdholders for the study.
The response rntc of the surve)' was 58.7 percent from 373 valid dispatches to
lo11dholdcrs. "Ibis rate is considered large and adequate for the purpose of the study.

,".i

/!

(

. ;·,
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Section One; Resu\tA of the descriptive analysis

3.1.1 Ei:ogeoous Charactctistica -Property and Iandholdel'li
The a'<e..igc siic or die properties under a ptlll.lOnent co,,cnant was 266.5 ho. H:tlf of
them were less thon •14 ha and onlr 15 percent are larger thon 500 ha. Three .,r every four
properties were le" than 16o ha. Ninety-four percent of the properties were solely freehold
tenure, and the rest had a portion of the property nrca on lea.e.
A quarter of tl,c properties hn<l the totol area under a permanent Co'<cnant, and 60
percent had more than 30 percent of the torn[ area covered •inder a pcrmaner.t covenant. Onlr
n qusrter oftl,e properties hod kss thoo 10 percent con,etvotion cover.
lhc largest land ares under a pcrm,nent covenant wos 1000 ha and the lowest wo, 0.2

ha. Ninety percent of properties had less than 100 ha registered under a permanmt COV'enon~ A
third of the properties had other areas, a1,m from those under a permanent covcnont, with
nar~rc conservation or signiricant nature heritage fcsturcs: st:reams/ri,·cr,; (20%), wetlands
(11%), and native grassl~nd, (14%).
The pcrcc1>!agc ratio of conservation area to tot;tl property nrea, i.e., percentage of
areas unde< a permanent covmant plus other nature cons«vation areas to total property size
showed 27.5 percent of the properties 11.tc totally under n,ture conscrvatio" cover, and half of
the properties hod more thon 74 percent noture conservation cm·er. Evident!)\ the
o-,erwhdming mojority of la1>dholdings (>75%) had a lsrge proportion (>50%) or tl1ei1 total
lond area under nature conseivation.
Ahnost h,lf or the properties (·17%) were exclusively manoged for con,etvation
purposes and three percent e~dusiYcl)' for hobby fanning. Fifteen percent of the properties
were rnanogcd for ,heep/crnlc. Sevcnty·five percelltr~'Nopertics hod less th.,n 10 ha worked
The respondents' overage 11ge was SB years. Approximately 75 pcrc~nt were more than
50 years old. Oftl,csc, a quarter was more than 65 years old Slighdy o,·er half of the properties
hod been in fanilly ownenhip for less than 20 years, and almost 20 percent of the respondents
li1d ;1.no1hcr agreement before they took up a permanent covenant, with the m•jority (90%) of
these h~ving a Land for Wildlife Agreement.
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3.1.2 Moti\'es for tCtl.'ntiun of namte conservation
The frequent)' di,1ribi,tion oflandbolJcrs accNding to the prim,ty re,sons for hnving
retained the nature conservotion fe-H\>res on theit property is shown in Appendix 3.1. "The
majority of l,mdholdcr; ,el>incd nolUl'c conscrvotioa fc,tures prim,ril)' to suppon the
conservation of native \'<flct•tion.
Approlillnatdy 87 pc,ccn1 of n:sp,mdcnt< ,,UJ t.'icJ would still ha,·e placed a
permanent covenant on th cit property wh~t.hot or not a rcstricuon on clearing was in existence.
Close to sc«n pcrct•nt ssid they would not h"·e done

10,

ind six percent said they were not

sure.

3.13 Long-tctm goals for the prnpcrty and as~ociation influepcc
Si1ty-ocvcn percent of the respondents ai,ticip,tcd rct~itung ownership of thci,
p<opcrty in the family in the futmc at ,he time the)" tof)k up a permanent rovcn.1nl Close to IS
percent did not anricipst< retaining ownership, and 1:i.3 percent were not sure. Very ,imil:ir
proportions w«c c~prcssccl for whether the)' o,>t•:cip.1ted !he ,namgcmcnt of the pruperl}'
would be retained in the fmul)' in the future.
flslf of the rcspondenrn w,;re mcmhcrs of, o, supportrd, une conscn':ltion g10~ or
org,misotion before they took up a perrnonent covcna•u on t~.ci: p,oporty. Twenty-four percent
of the re,pondc1us were n,emlicr of, nr supported two groups, ond 24 percent supported more
than three groups. Therefore, aU rcspo11Jents were mcmbcro o~ or ,upportcd, at !c.. t one
conservation group.

3.1.4 Financial and economic pmfilcs
'ille mojority of ,espondcnt, (Tl%) h,d ""'"er ,~eked fu1anciol support/bcncfo from
any o,g:tnisation or government tlepartment to un,Jmake natu,e conservation work before 1her
took up a permanent cm·cnont. On!)' 16.6 percent had received financial support once, anJ 10.5
percent more tho" once.
·n,c propo,tion, of rcsponJcms b)' the approlim11c income derived from the i,ropc,ty
in the ym they placed a permanent covenant on their land is presented \n ,\ppentlix 3.2 'lbto\
income oflandhnlding

w,, calculated from the ~um of che median of income from inside and

oucsid, the proper!}'· h nngcd from 55,000 IO 450,000. Almost hn!f of die respondent, had a
total income grc:itcr than $42,000, antl 10 percent h,J

:i

1oul income gr<,atcr than $98,()(){l

Ncvc1thckss, the majority of respondents did m,t ha\·c a deb1 on tbcit propcrt}' when tl>CJ'
placed a permanent coven ml on it.
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The proportion of mpomkms og:,.inst the percentage r.itio of income frm,i prop.erty
to their total income is sb°"'n in Appendix 3.3. ,\pproximotdr holf of the respondents did not
derive any incon:e from the property, signifying a low income-dependence on the property.

3.1.5 Expectatio,,g

and incentivea for covcnan1 uptake

lbc proportions of respondct\ls in relation to the importance they accorded to
provision of various service, and actions

a,

p,c-icqui,11c~ and incentive,; for a permanent

covenant up take arc shown in ,\ppendix 3A. Forty-four percent of the respondent, g:,vr
importance to 'acccs, to long-term monogcmcnt ad,·icc' ss on important pre-requisite to taking
up a pcnn,nent covenant. Close to 41 percent did not attach an)' importance to a pennoncnt
coven am', ,biLi1y to lead to 'increased pubLic recognition and appreciation of the conservation
values nn lhcii property'. TI,c m·crwhclming m,jority of respondents anscbed high importance
to a perm,ncnt cm·enmt', ,bility to ;;,sure 1he long-term natli,c conservation in comp>rison to
other cunscrntion agreement<.
Leso 11,an 20 percent of the respondents gave a level of importance to assuroncc of on·
going financial sopport •• a pre-requisite to taking up a pennoncnt con01ont, and olmo,t • third
of tbc respondents did 1101 consider the issue of financial support in thcir decision. In lhcir
decision to take up • pcnnoncnt cm·rnant, almost half of the respondents b,..,.e • !e,·cl of
importance to a cov,·n,nting imUtution's independence from Govemment. Eighteen pciccnt
did not con,iJer this iosue in their decision.

3.1.6 Influence on the amounl of land placed under a permanent
eOVCll3111

Tobie 3. I reports on the ext cm to which the noted issues inOuenccd the amount of
land thot the ,cspondcnls placed under a pennancnt covenant.
Table J. 1 Influence of certain issue,; on the ,i,c of the conscrvarion area placed under•
permanent cm·cnnnt in Victoria

S/al,mrnt To u·ha/ txl,nl diJ 1l1t fol!oaing ,.n,mu (a-b) ill}/umrt /ht 1iv of /ht rr11umulion ana M whirl,)"u
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For the majority of respondent,, the amount of bnd tl,ey placed under a permanent
co,<cnant w.,s 'not at all' inllucnccd by a conccn> ab.-..ut a possible loss in ma<ket value of their
pmpcrty bccnuse of plocing a permanent covenant on

it, nor was it inl!nenccd by • concern

about tl,e pcnnoncnt restrictions on the use of the conscrvotfon areas, Close to .30 percent of
tl,e resl': ~ lcnts were inllucnced 10 vorying degree by the possible lo,. in marker value of their
r,operiy.

3.1,7 InUucnces on pennanen1 covenant upiake
Tobie 3.2 reports on the proportions of respondents according to the magnitude of
inllucncc by tlw different issues in tl,cir up toke of" permanent covenant.
T~blc3.2 l'roportion of respondent~ with a permanent cown.1m in Victorio accntding to the
level of inl!umcc af,·otious issues on thcir permanent covenant uptake
Ratingoflnlluencc in pCrcentage
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"Inc key lint.lings b,scd on Table 3.2 ,,c th 11:

I. 11,c mojority of respondents (68%) were cithcr 'much' or 'vc<y much' influenced to
t,kc

up a permanent co,·cnant by their com;ction there v,crc no oth« equally

effective mcchani,n,s.
2. Almost 41 percent of rc,poodcnts were 'not ot all inlluenccd' to take up ,
pcrmoneflt co,·cn,nt by the notion of ecDnomic gain, in the fumrc.
3. 11ie maiority of rc,pondcntl would ,till h"'·c pl,ced a permanent co,·cnant on their
land if the)' we,e con,'inccd that altering bod for ,gricuhur:d production would
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bring greater economic return, than they currently do. Ne,·crtbelcss, dose lo 13
percent would 1101 lm·c token up o pcnnoncn! co,·en•nt under such circumstoncc,,
and dose to ten percent ,:ud thcr not sure about i1,

4. The m,jorit}' of rcspon<.lc11ts were a li!de nr '"ll at oll influcnc"J lo tok<.· up o
permanent co,·cnant by their cr,m;clion " pcrmoncm cov~nont "'"' an effective
mechanism for present and future measure for salinity control on their !and

5. 11,c m•iority of the respondents 10 '• fair amount', were influenced 1,, toke up •
permanent covenant h)' the ,·iew d10t • permanent covcno!\\ on their fond ""'' ""
opportunity 10 dcrnonstrotc to <llher, the importance of long·lcrm na\urc

co11scn•atinn on pri,·01c !Mid.
6. 11,c rn1jon1y of rcspon<lc'llts were ',·cry much' influmcc<l 1,, toke up a permanent
cm·cnsm by• concern about a likdihood of the «mscn·,6on "'""' being altered hr
future o\\'!ler, or """"~er, of their land.
T;1.blc 3.3 report; the pruporti<>n of re,ponden1s occur<linll t<> ,cure, ba,cd 011 their
rating for the different issues (,cc Table 3.2) that influence<l 11,eir c,wen•nt uptake. ·11,c highest
rating'\' depict, the highest unp'1rtOt\Cc ploeed by the rc,por,den1 un the issue• ,hown in T,b!c
3.2 ond is thcrcfo«· ollocstcd the hii{hcst score ()f f,,·c puitm. ·n,c 'I don't know' response
c,tcgory wos allocated 1he l<,wcst scnrc of ,cm pnit1t.

Table 3.3 lrnpr,rrnncc r.Hi'1g oml scurci on issues thot influence,! rc,pondcnls' dcci,ion to
lake up a permanent cm•enant in Vict<>ri>
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Score, for each ntiog were cakuloted by multiplying tl,e base points of that rating by
the proportion of respondents in that r.ting. 11,c points scored at each rating, ,ho";n in the
column, and representing each issue sho,,.,, in the row,, were summed to obtain total ,:ore for
the issue. The higher the totnl score, the greater th• overall innuonce of the issue ovcr,."iic
others in hss·ing innocnced tl,e uprnkc o[a permanent covenant
Of the six issue, presented in Table 3.3, 'concen, about a likelihood of the
conservation ore.is being "1tercd by future owners or managers oi tl,eir I.ad' had th~ la.gc,1
total ,core and i, therefore the most important of the issues that influenced the respondents'
uptake of a permanent co~cnant. 11ri, wos followed in importance by 'the cnn,iction there
were no other equally effective mechanism, tiisn pcrmancm covenants !or promoting •he long·
term nilurc conscf\·Mion ull priv:ue land'. ·n,e lco,t important issue in the decision !o take up a
pctmanen1 co,·enant were ~n,c presence af !\cighbours or friends ha,ing a permanet,t covenant
on •imilar nature conscrntion areas as mine.' and 'feeling there ·.vere economic !l'lln• to be
realised in the future by using a permanent co,·enant as a long·term nature conoervotio,,
mechanism'.

3.1.8 E1J.uity issues in nature conse[Vation
Respondents were· asla·d if they vic,wed the public to b.-·c any responsibility for the
cost incurred in nature cat,serntion on thcir property, and the pr,;,porticn of tl,e cost, that
should be covered by 1hc public. 11,c expected public con!ribution to tlic cost of conservation
on privste !and by proportions of respondents i, shown in ,\ppendix 3.5. 11,erc were rc!ativoly
equal propmcions of re,pm,dents that affirmed a role for the public (·t3.0%) contribution to
ronscrvation cost and those that did not affirm such role (4,J,')%). Another 15 percent of the
respondents were 'not ,mre'. ,\ltl,ough distribution of respondents was rclati,·e!r even over the

,,

different cost contribution classes, of the respondents 1hot prcfctted a lc,d of pubhc
contribution ta the cost of conscrvntion on priva1c land, o 9uor!cr of them stated tl,01 the
public should cover more than 40p~rccnt of the co>l

J.t.9 Ove[Vicw of factora characterizing permanent covenant holders
The factors that chancterised !nndholders who took up a permanent cunnont ore
outlinc'<i below. These factors arc placed in three categories comprising: what pron,ptcd the
d~d,ion to take up a pctmanent covcnont, p<•·rcqui,itcs for the upto.kc of a pcrmoncnt
co,·cnant, and out,tonding eiogonou, d,aracccri,tiu of!ondholden and their propcrric,.
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Cbamd1riltics ef mpond,n/; baud M lh, naw, th<,/ prompt,J //,,ir uptah ef a p,mian,n/ roi~nanl:
1.

A strong conviction of the Likelihood of the conservation orea, being ahcred by future
ownen; or managers of the property.

2.

Only a fair amount or not ,11 all influenced to take up • permanent covenont by the
possible future economic

3.

g,u,,. because of having a perm~nent covenant.

Strong convictions thcte arc no other equally effective mcchonisms than penrunent
covenants for promoting the loni:·tcnn nature conscrva•ion on private lond.

4.

little or not at oll con,·inccd a pennancnt covenant

W1S

an effective mechanism for

present or measure of future salinity control on the fond

S.

Not at oll influenced to take up a pcnnonent covenant b)' the prc,cnce of ncighbonr, or
friends who have a pcmrnnent covcn,m on similar natute conservation area,.

6.

Influenced to a fair amount to ukc up a permanent covenants a, an opportunity to
demonstntc to others the imponance oflong-tcnn nature consc,varion on privMc land

7.

Would still ha,·e placed a pcnnoncnt covcnnm on tl,cir property .,,,en if ,estrictions on
clearing of native ,·cgctotiun did not exist.

8.

Would still have placed • pcnnanent covenant on the land even if they we,e convinced
that altering them for ogricu!rural p11:,duction would bring greater economic return! tl,on
they did at tl,e time.

9.

Amount of land they placed under a permanent covenant was not at aU influenced by a
concerned about a possible loss in market voluc of their property by plocing a penn,nent
c1_:renant on it, or by • concern about the pcnnoncnt rcstriccions on some use of the

.

"
.:onsc,v.1aon
area,.
10.

Rm.incd the norurc conservntion features on the property primarily for conservation
pu<Poses.

Clmrodmilir; ba,,J on lk pn·rtquiri1t1 for taJ:i,ig_ up ap1m,,m:nl rownanl !,;· !ht llf<!jorir, of mpondtnls:
11.

G,,ve high importance to a pcnnanent covenant's ability to provide greater as.\utance for
!ong·tcnn natute consn,,ation than otl,er con,e=tion agreements.

12. Did not give -~Onsidcration of ,_.,ri~bility of financial support in dctcnnining whethr.• to
: fake up a pcnnanct1t covenant.
13.

Gave high importance to the covenontcc being independent of government.,

14. G~ve some importance to availability oflong·tcnn management advice on consernlion.
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Chan,rltrfrliu ba1ed en ,xo_i;mcliJ fa,tcn cf th, m'fiMfY ef ropondm/t or their prop,rtils:
15.

Had less than half of the to bl income dependence on theprq1crty.

16.

Hod never received some financial support/benefits before they took up a permanent
covenant on thcirprope<ty.

17. Did not have a debt on thcirpropeny when they ploccd a pennanem covenant on it.
18.

Have prnpcrtie, characterised by a ,clatively ,mall area size of less than 160 ha.

19.

Properties hod been in family ownership for ]e;s than 20ye;u,s.

20. Properties had larger th,n 74 percent ratio of comcrvation areas to total land :uea.

21. ,\nticipotcd ,etaining ownership and monogemcnt of d,eir property in the family in the
future at the time they took up a pcnnonent covenant

°'i

22. Were members of one or more conservation groups before they took up a pcnnane,u
covenant.
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Section Two: Results ofQualita!ive Data Analysis

This s~ction contains o s)'nthesls of comments by lmdholdcrs on the actions and
policies that the State and Loco! g<>vemments should put h, place to encnunge private
fandho!ders to take up a permanent covenant. Tiie,e arc dassi6cd into major themes based on
common issues and concerns cxpre,.ed by the respocidents. TI,e aim of this section is to
establish the barriers and incentives \o pennancnr covenant uptake a, viewed by pennanent
;
covenant holda, in Victoria. Undcrs'.1nding what these barriers and incentives are c:m aid in
the fonnufation of oppropriate policy action, for encouraging the uptake of pennanem
covenants.

3.2,1 Views on Stale government policies and actions
The concerns and policies cited hy «spondents, which the !itatc government can

" pri,n~ landholders are
;ddren to encourage the uptake of pcnnancnt coven:tnts among
elaborated below.

(i) Eiuancinj Incentive~
Tax inr,nti,~r. Fifteen r,spondcnts cited the need for Srntc government to <educe or
obolish :ill taxes, including capitol gains tax whe<e reh,v~nr. and stamp duties from sale or
purchase of covenamed lond. Twenty ,cspondcnt, cited the need for Smte government to give
mxation benefits to permanent covcnont holders. Such benefits include tax breaks on interest
and charges for finoncing pu<ehasc, for con,etvotion, Gencntl Service Tax {GS1) exemption
for fencing ond other items bought foe conservation purposes, and tax relief such al
deductibility on expenses for cost, incurred in maintaining the covenant conditions including
weed control and fencing.
11,e notion peesemed hccc is that tox adv;um1ge measures targeted at those with a
pemianent covenant can cncour.1gc 11thers lo uke up permanent coven:um. Specific m"1lsures
cited in dude provision of various fonns of grnnts and assistance to non-pt:imary producers
similar to those available 10 pMlary producers, and b)' providing financial inccnti,·es to
pensiona,.to oct as cruetakcrs o'.'covenant land u1>dcr their ownership.
Fifte{!n respondents s:lid it was necessary for the Government to implement an
effective way of funding all consetvation and rcstomtion works, "in order to ensure the health
of all land (bush •ml agriculture)", Mo<eover, that provision of financial •uppoet, as

11n

incentive, should be from all levels of Governments. In j1,stifying financial incentives,
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respondents noted that conservation was time consuming and expensive. One «spondcnt
explained:

"I d,,n 'I wan/ to smmd grmt,· but.,.. art battling in th( 1"nd al tb, momrnt. At th, ;amt tim,, nalurt
ronsmwJion is pmfaundfyim~rlanl Jo 111. Govtmmenlal alt /11~'1 mml,l!ft smUus ,ibout prottction

ef

nalii~ V<!flalion and wildlife, and no/ lo jml p,,y lip mvirt."
Another respondent note.:!. "Unfort11nal,fy w1 (rlnnot rtfy on a/tn,i,m Jo pmlld ,no11th J.11//lallon

on privat, /,,nJ', and another noted: "Thm is ""d lo efftr a 'r,,rml 'lo /iJn,kwnm in ord<r lo mah a
r?ll!JOr d!ffinn«." A ,moll number of respondents also r,commendcd that financial support

should be pmvided as compensation for loss of pmduction of area under a permonent
covensn1.

Finanda/fy support hrol!f11~rnnmi/~nd r,,ytiiarions, Thirteen respondents felt that the State
gm·emmcnt had the responsibility of providing financial support to local go,·emment to
underwrite some ,~>Venue loss to them bcc,.use of rote reduction pas,ed on to landowners with
.1

pcnnanent covcnan~ snd lo fund programs of covenanting organisations to focilitote a more

co,'..,prehensive coverage of conservstion pdorities on private lands.

Cor.r ros/J •/ ,v,~nanl 11ptak,, ftndng and m11nngunml, Twelve respondents noted the need
for State Govcmmem to cover all costs associated with taking up a pennonent covenant,
including legal costs ~nd the full cost of tide adjusunent. Some considered that this could be
done by tax deduction, Porty-nine respondents cited the need for liMncial assistance with
fencing mat~rial and its maintenance nnd tc-esrnblislunent of '10tive bush, and covering the cost
of managing areas uncle, a pcnnancnt covenant.

01h,r finandnl inmrtiw,: fifteen respondents mendoned the importance of various
financial inccnti,·es for encout.1ging landholders to take up a permanent covenant. The
incentives include removal of all or port of the com of placing, maintaining, and reh:1bilitating
conservation orc,s unde, a pe,manent c?«nan~ Such fioanciol incentives by State government
could be in the fonn of grants for e,ta~lishing focilitics for public use including walklng trails,
toilets, and sign,, :uid free o, discounted services to help maintain areas under

~

permanent

covcnon~ A range of other firumciol «obted incentives suggested by different respondents
include provision of carbon credits on old timber area,, removal of fee, charged by water
authorities on conservation, and provision of low intcrel! loons for acquisition and
con,ervation.

QO Maimgcment suwon ;md advice
S11pport rontrol

ef rmd

and wrmin: Twenty-four respondents cited several wo.y, of

providing this support: provision of ,ubsidy, a,.i,tancc for fencing to keep ont vcnnln
associated with specific a,eos of conservation, provilUng free vermin bait through government
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dcpsrtments, ghing direct finoncisl sssisrnnce, and assilllng with removal ot• fetal :mim:tls.
Other suggestions include prm~ding traps on loin or rents! tt> control iaLbir p'>puhtion,
providing logisticol support, raking m•er th~ n,ponsibilitr of weed con!.tol from the bndowner,
and adoption of a coordinated appro,ch to weed control pmicul::rlr from c,!cmal sources
such as adjoining roadside"' p<1blic bnd.
One respondent justified the need for suboidiaed ossisto.nce on conltol of weeds os
follows:

.. n9· pmprrl)• i, 1/mr/"l')Oll.1l1d ,m,/ ,t/ali,~!,·

Jo·, 1 ""' quir, 11m~11, lo do th, bum.,,ffi ,u if

11ru,;/fy mp11irdfar ftarof lo,i~~ ronlml of!h, {irt." Another mpondent noted ".•. ir.,;d,qval,

rontmf of

omd and P,!li makts effarl, i,/ n1,1mlcnar;c, of ,~itnJr.t,J land mJ'Jnlill~Jin/' ond further pointed out
tl,e difficultie~ in funding weed control patticubrly when income i, derived ,woy frm,1 the land.
It wos suggested b)· some respondent, thnt Green group, cuuld assist in control the pests ond
weeds mechonicolly ,o o, a,·oid poisoning notivc !and and onimo!, .
.Manag,m,n/ a111ild11« ,111J ,;,/.,c,: Ten rc,prmdents cited the need for the State
go,·emmc11t lo provide assistonce in se>·eral nmtagemcnt ond ad,isory issues on conservation
on private land. Eomp\e, of the support include setting up of con<crvotion area,,
encouragement snd rtgular ad,·ice c·,n manogcmcnt technique,/pl,ns ond comervocion matters,
and cncourogcmcnt on the bes! way iu ma.into.in ond enhance a pcnnancm covenonL Other.
include support in identifying md cstologuing noro am! fauna on covenanted land, odvice on
(I

organic weed control mstcgics, and c,pcrt od,·icc on comm! of soil erosion and ,.linity. It wss
suggested tlmt otl,·ice should be prm·idcd br oppointing opproptiotc en,1,onmental man,ge<S,
pro,·iiling informocion on loco) ecosystem,, a!ld b)' encourage ratepayers to manage propcrtits
environmentally.

Labo11r tup~rl: Four ,c,pondents noted thot labour support wss as an increosing need
·among landholders in srea, such as sproying of noxious weed, and pests snd erndicotion of
mbbit, particulotl)' for Ilic aged or those with li,>tited ph;·sicol mcngtl,. '11,cy ,mted thot it con
be focilitatc<l through volunrnry oc poitl bdp, ,nd that some of the source~ of labcur include
:::tate funded 1:n,plorees such os Grcrn-corps, persons on work-fo,-dole progrom, ond
contractors to carry out fencii,g/ fcnong rcpo.irs. The nccdetl provisions suggested by
respondents arc in addition lo those provided hr Trust for Nature's (fFN) covenant progrom.

(iij\ Awareness and infonnntion
Proma/1 ronm,ulion rnlut1 11n,l ro«nanl aJWrtnm: Thirt)'·two respondents citerl tills

a,

a

rtsponsibility of State govemment. s ...·eni\ o[ them emphasized that cducstion and ,,.,:arencss,

,I1

particularly on the value of conserving arc• under a private ogreemcnt and the existence ond
functioning of a pcrm•~cnr covenant, were the key to encour.iging the uprnke of covenants. To
illus1r.1te thi,, one ,e,pon'dcnt pointed ou~ "Not '"o~h it known i,boul ro1~nanling amongp,opl, who
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rout,/ h, in a p(}Ji/ian re ph1t co"nanl1 on Jhrir lanJ'. Severs! respondents also noted that more
publicity of the scheme was required.
Some of the wsrs suggested hr some respondent, for educating londholders ond
prompting uptake of covcnonts include encourngitig ",nnmmlian mind,d p,op!, and agenlid' to
hO\·c ready onswcrs to <JUcstions about coven,nts, porticulorly in response to why it is imporum
to set sside more pril"o!c land for consen·arion. In addition, education should target the public,
the youth and estate •gents who "/M,." ml, to pl!)' in d,.'mting bll)·m to 1h, t)P, of h11d !Wt Ir righl for
Jh,ir nwlr." It was also suggested that the public could be encouraged w coUcctivdy buy shores
in the ownership ofprivste bush and place a permanent covenant on it.
Otl,cr suggestions on how to promote and publicise covenants include ensuring
simplicity, effe~tivcncss ond finonciol efficiency in promoting covenants and b)" providing
,ignage for properties under a permanent covenont In sddition, strong support snd promotion
of covenants shonld be carried out by :i!I levd, of government aimed at reducing fear,
psrticulady about los, in lond valne, and addressing the misconception of co,·cnonts as leading
10 'tl,c

loss of control of the property'.
Some respondents stated th.1t there wos a need for more org:miscd ways for supporting

and promoting covenant, among landholders. Some of these include supporting educ,tion.tl
and workshop opportunities as well as demonstration sites, ond inc,cssing public awareness
through greater recognition of pcrmanem covenant holdecs. Other suggestions m,dc by
respondent> for ""')'' of publicizing covenants include bimder advertising of properties in
native bush!snd orcos, promoting aspects about tbe benefits to be coined by permonent
covenants such their contribution to quality of Life ond future gcncrntiom and muricm ond the
bene6t1 to the ovcr.tll hc;lth of our catchment region. Publication of tcstimoni,tl, md
"... indi,frinu/ <Jli,rt; (in mnunulion 1111d,r a p,rmanml ,vmrunl), t1nd tbt o,~r,,/{ IHntjits

of amnunll lo th,

rr,mm11m!J"wcrc also cited"' imp<mant infomiotion for promotin~, covenants.

6v) Strengthen poliC)', t~x rc1>ubtion and cnfotccmcnt,
l'oli<y and rtJ,11inlion: Sixteen respondents noted the imporuncc for State government to
strengthen con,crvation policy and cnfo,ccmcnt of regulation!. Several way,

iif which thi.s con

he undertaken include focilitating clime,, lo boundaries where arco, of conservation interest
could be transferred from one tide to another, respecting covenanted areas and adopting
appropciste policies on plouti11g alld deocing, snd giving guarantees for future conservation by
high penalties for fumre dmruction.
Othc, rccommcudations include plocing a bm on mining and native vegetation
clearing in all atc;s dedatcd conservation wncl, imposing tighter ,c,tr:ictions on cleating of any
native ,·egctation bf moking it very unauroctive through incrc;,cd land taxes, protecting
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concerned lnnd 1hrough ioning polices, and supporting conccntrntion effom

,,.;tl, initiol grants.

One responCent condutled, "... 11n1il loru/, ,tau a11d fidrml .f,Ol'lrnmml, 1ndor1e and s,¢port u <'llllll

!)'Ilrm 1hat ind11du tbe rommon good, 1/,1 pro,m

ef p,fr11t1

lmd 10,~nanlt will nmai11 al ,,Jd, ~·ilh th,

pm'l11li11J, t.,pk!ildli1t prurlirt"
Otl,cr respondents suggested tbot policies should ensure !hat there is •n effective way
of funding .U conservation, placing high priocity on nornre conscr\·•don on privote land,
enforcing descing regulations, nnd legisbting for covcnonts to override mining righh.

(,•) Compensation
Ele,·cn respondents cited !he need for State Govemmcut to give compensation to
those with n permanent covenant on thtir land for loss of income, decrease in bnd voluc, and
ns financiol rccompeo,c for stewardship, Some w.ty, lhst the)' recommended for nchieving this
include annu,! payment for limitation ofu,c of conservation area and cost shru:ing for land that
cannot produce te\'enue.

Ml Recognition
Eight respondents cited 1hc importance of non-monetary incentives for rncouraging
the uptake of covenon1o. Some of the inccnlives include recognition of value of co:iscrvotion;
publk recognition of people co,·cnsnting properties, by prc,cntorion of aw.trd, or media
coverage through newspaper artidcs; recognition of loco] knowledge and expertise; and public
ncknowledgcment of the benefits of conservation. One resi,ondcnt summed it as follows:

"01h,r than mom:;• most p,opl, mm rtrog11ilion, P,rhap, 1hf1,m~mm1nt «mfdgiw a /111,r rlgn1d l!J
1hf Pr,mitrto lddho/Jm wl,;wr thankin1, 1h1m far 1h,;r ro111it111ed nm far lh, land. "

'\;
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3.2.2Views on local government policies and actioru
The comments and virn,; by wspondents on the action that the local government can
toke to encourage the uptikc of pennonmt covenants arc grouped into various categories and
categorized below.

(i.) Einsncis) incentives
&d111, wlunlion dud ralet: One hundred and twenty cight respondents cited the need for
rduction or complete waiver of lond "1tes to encourage conservation and the uptake of
pemmnent rovcnonts. Vori1Jus reasons were cited to justify a rcductim1 in rates. The thri,e most

widely cited reasot>s were: in rcc<ignirinn of 1hc impact of covenant

°" potential income and

the work effort, the monctory socrifice mode on areas under a pcnnanent covenant, and d,e

benefit passed on to the wider community of the Shire.
In rcoponse to the lcwl of mtc reduction that should be provided, seven rcopandem,

,toted thot ther~ ihould br. a complete exemption of rotes from 1hc total are, under •
pennancnt covcnsnt. Se,·crnl respond en ls cited the need for partiol rote relief nrying from 10
to 9~ percent A respondent cited a certain Shire to iUustrotc a viable way of in1plementin,: o
rate rebate S)'Stem. TI,c Shire ga,·e $50/ha to a new covenan~ with a minimum of 400 and
maicimum of600 dollars per ycsr. In odiliti,m, it gave 30 dollars per hectare with a minimum of

200 ond a maximum 500 dollars to land that hos on exioting covenant.
(ii) Management ~UPP"Cl

Mdtlrid/ and rq11ipmml "iff<!rl: Seven respondents mentioned tha: loco! govemmcnti
could prm·ide '"PF<><t to landholders aimed at cnhoncing consctvatfon in general. Some
specific examples cited include revcget,1tion snd cor..servation of roadside corridor through
weed control, sensitive maint~na11ce, rerlanting of indJgenou, species, and reversal of scorched
earth po~cies. Other example, cited arc provision of resources for controlled burning,
!>rovision of discounted vermin (rabbit, foxes, cats) and weed control ci,c.mic:Us ond
eqttipmcnts, and su:,pon in tbe construction of dam,, track,, fencing, and trtt planting. In
addition, availability of low-cost hires of machinery for carrying out conservation work such

a,

ripping rnbbit warrens or ,praying weeds was cited.

~iO Policy, plan11ing. enforcement and rcgybtion
Ptmnin2, nnd mjommtnl: Fifteen rcspondmts ,tated the impom,nce for loco! go\·crnment
to have ,tricter planning and enforcement of existing regulations. Some of the measure, cited

include zoning and restrictions of use of important habitot awa,, supervision and policing of
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conservation zoned area.,, and dis•llowing dcvdopmcnt or mining penniis d,at require the
destruction of remnant vegetation. O:he, meosure, include cnforcc,.,ent of planning controls
on remnant n;1tivc vcgct•tion, and fonnulotion of policies thst suppon conservation value such
as the protcctio" of ra,c vegetation communities/habitat including roadside corridors.
Development and implcmcmotion of app,optfate rnan,gernc-nt of roadsides remnant vegetation
in rdotion to covenanted areas were also cited a, other measures in planning.
R,gulaliM andp,119·: Ten respondents mentioned the need for local go,·=ntcnt to enact

new conservation regulations and policio,. 11,ese include a requirement for all l,ndowners to
plant trees, create wildlife corrido,s, •nd protect spcciol area,. Othc,s arc the c,rnblishment of a
trust fund to buy special lands, •nd formulotion of a policy on maintenance and development

of roadsides ns wildhfc habitat and corridors to link properties. Policies oil preservatioll of
cndongercd areas and• requirement for pennits before ony clearing, or ploughing of grasslands,
and regulation to conuol vegetation clearing on private land roadside, and reserves were o.lso
cited as me•surcs for implcrnentacion by loc•l go,·emmcnt.

~)'.) PYb)idt:,: and nworcness and cd1•cMing
Nineteen ,cspohdcnts cited the need for promotioll •nd publicity or covenant, by
providing infonnarion on cm·enantl ouachcd to rntcs notice from Shiro oHice,, ad,•ertising the
existence ofpcnnancnt covenants, snd promoting the value of conscrvacion on private land.

(v) Recognition
five re.spun dent.< cited the importance of recognizing those with• pcnnnncnt covenant
as a w:ty of Cllcouuging others to take up covenant•. Some of tho woys ,uggcstcd for gi,ing
n:cognition include annual awards and official recognition b)· loc•l government of conservation
Vlllucs Oil the land through publicity.

)!
,)
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Section Three: Brief discussion and conclusion

3.3.1 Introduction
The

;um of this choptcr is

to eit>.bli,h the fuctors rhot characterise permanent covenonl

ho!dus, which ma)· be used 10 predict the likelihood of up toke of permanent covenants by non·
permanent c,wcnonl holders. A brief discussion on the significom findings of the chapter is
provided in thi, section. D~tailcd discussion of the lintli1>g, and e\aborstion of their implication
on nature conservation policy is provided in Chapter 6 in relation to finding, from OLher
catcgori"' of landholders conto.incd in Chapters 4 and 5.
Pennancnt covenant holcb, can tniicallr be characterised br four n10in features:
Suong ethic for nature conservation, confidence io permanent cov<noot a, mechanisms for
a,suring long-1cnn nature conservation, little or no economic depemlcncc on their properties,
and littlt• or no economic mOLivstion in rnking up a permanent covenant.

3.3.2Nature comcrvatioo ethic
11,e link between environmental ethics and the uptake of comervotinn actions is
covered widd)· in literature (cg. ElliOl, 1995; Manning ct ,1., 1999; Rolston, 1988). However, the
constitution of o nstu,c conservation ethic in Australia ond the strength of the relationship
bctv.•ccn comcrvatio11 ethic ond odopticn of management agreement, such•• covenants have
not been fully cstobti,hed. According to Aldo Leopold (1948), on ethic may he rcgm!ed a, a
mode of guidance for meeting new or intricote ccologinl situation,, or tl,osc that invoke such
deferred ,cactions, tl,at the p.1th of social expediency i, not discerni!>lc to the as·engc
individual.
A combination of factors demon,ustes that 1hc nptakc of • permanent cm·cnanr
among rhe majority of rrspondcm, was influenced by their high conscrv,tion ethic anti a sense
of stew,udship, which in dude positive attitudes and action 1owuds nature con,ctvation, ond a
desire to exte11d this attitude 10 others. In dti, respect, permanent covcnam holders provide •

guide on whst constitutes" nature conservation crhic. Rolston (1988) assem thor people shape
th cir volucs ,nd conduct siguilicant!)· according to rhdr notion of the kind of universe in which
they live. The evidence that the majority of respondents were 'very much' influenced to toke up
a permanent covenant by a concern ,bout • likelihood of the conservation "'""' bcing altered
by future owners or managers of their land is C'lidencc of thcirvaluc for nature, which is in ~m
demonstrated in their suong interest in its !ong·tenn conservation.
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The •sscrtion of the majority of lomlholdcrs 1ho1 •l,cy would still has·c token up o
permanent co"enant even if rq,<t1btorr ban, on clearing of native "egetation were not in
exfatencc demonslrntcs their imcrcot in long-term noture conservation. Prior membership and
support tu conscrntion groups before the uptake of • permanent co,..enatit i, another
demonstration of interest in nature conscrvotion by the mojorit)· oflondholders irrc,poctiYe ofa
permanent covcmmt. Further discussion on nature conservotion ethic is provided in Section 2
of Chapter 6

3.3.3 Confidence in the co\·cnant mechanism
One reason for the majority oflmdhuldcrs having token up o permanent covenant wo,
their conviction that there were no other cquollr effective mech,nisms forpromo~'l: the long·
term nature conscn•otion on their land. ·n,;,, in effect, dcmonslrntcs their confidence in the
pcrmoncnt covenant o""' nther aniloble conicrvotion mcchmism,. In this case, the ahemoti,·e
mechanism olso in use omong the majority uflondholders was the informal nature comcrvotion
ogrccmcnt under I...1nd for \Vtldlife (Victorio).
In evaluating the suitability of a c.:inservarion mcchonism Iondholdcrs ore mo,e likely to
take up one which they pcrccfrc to hos·c minimum or no threot to the achievement of goals and
objecti,·es on their bnd (Drost ct al., 1996; Nowak, ]<)87). Guerin (1999) confirm, the finding,
that landholders

,,.;u only take up • vo\untory permanent c<>,·cnant when they ha,·e confidence

in it o,·cr other .wailoblc mcchonisrns,

3.3.4 Economic dependence on land and economic motiva1ion for
covcnam uptake
Most rurol properties ore rnana~ed as economic entities with VO<)ing levels

{f

economic input~ and outputs. 1-!nwcvcr, permanent covcnmt holders hod minimal econr,mic
dependence on their property "ith o l,rgc proportion of them dcri>-ing no income fr-Jm ~,c
property and hnving no debt on their prop en)" when they placed a permanent co,·enant on it.
11,e minim,\ dependence on income from the propcny msy be attributed lo a possible
presence of non-cconornicall)· viable land outside the consen·otion area or a concern by
landholders of a possible conflict in goo!, between economic production :md nature
conservation on the property. Controry lo the findings of the present ,rudy, mo,t ,rudics in
adoption of con,en·ot;on practices indico,c a greater use of conservation practices with
increases in form ,izc (Clearfield & Osgood, 1986).
Permanent covenom holders were kast motivated to take up a permanent covenant for
e<:onomie reo.son1. For ei<ample, concerning economic benefits, dose to a third of the
landholders did not consider an ossurnncc of ongoing fin•nci:tl support an important aspect of
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their decision lO take up o perm,nent co,·enmt. Another third did not c,•en consider the issue
nt all. Furd,cnnore. the majomy of londhol<.lc<s were nol at oll concerned o\,om o possi\,lc loss
in market ,·alne of their prnperty when dct~rmining the amount of lan<.I to place under a
permanent co,·e,unt. Onlr a small proportion of 1hcm were influenced to some degree.
"11,e findiugs also show that the majority of landholders were not at ,I\ influenced to
toke up a permanent c,wcnant by the notion there were economic gains to be realised in die
fu111re \,y using a permanent corenant. Fur1hcr evidence that economic imperatives ore not the
,mi~ emphasis in londlm\ders' Jccision lO take up a pcntt.1nent crwenant is sugscsted by the
fact that the ,mjutity who wlluld still ha,·c pl,ccd a pennoncnt cm•enam on their consctvation
areas whether or not aherin1\ them for ,griculturnl producuon would bring greater ccon<>mie
returns 1han those, which would accn,e under conseivation. llm consetvatfon lond-me
m,intained br the landholders also sit,~i,\s their in1crc,t in nmue conscn·otion.
Furlhcrmore, the fact that permanent covenant hu\ders continued thcir invokemcnl i.,
nal\lce consct\·a1io11 despile little on no exten,ol fino'1cial support (the majority h"ving never
received •nr fin,mciol ,upport/bcncfits to undertake nature conse"·ation work on their
property before the)' look up a permanent ccwcnant on their prop<rt)j ch:arl)' <lemon,tntcs
their interest in nat<>re conset\'otio11.
Although ecnntJ'1tic fact<m bad mi'1imal mnurncc on the decision to take up a
perman,•nt cnvcnan~:, ems> section of the landholders cited the need for eslcnsion of financial
support to those that do not yet h,,·c a permoncm covenant. "11,is, they assert, would addre,s
the signific,iu financial difr.cu1'ic:s dw could deter the uptake of n pem,anent covenant even
among those thot ore willing to do so.
11,e four1h choractcristic o( landholders with a permanent covenant therefore, is thot
the)' were not

·n,c

,t

all motivated to take up

:1

permonet1t c01,enant for pos,iblc economic gains.

finding• arc entirely consistent with Gasson & Potter (1988) findings that the least

finmdall.1· c.:mstrained and conscn·otion-oric1ued landholders offered most of their land to
eonscn·ation schemes with mit1ima! c~pectation of compensation.
1

?, :'3.5 Incentives for encouraging covenant uptake
,,.,

Although land]rn\dcrs in this study took np pc,rnonen! co,·enonts voluntanly, there ore
const:m~y expressed vie""" in this stud)· that ecot,omic inccnti,·cs me necessary for encouraging
other landholders to take up • permanc!\l covenant and for supporting conseivoticn efforts
under~ permanent covenont.
What this tells us is that the need for economic incentives for conscrv,tion is not
confined to those with a weak consen·ation ed,ic. Two form, of econnmic pro,ision ore noted
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in the view, of landho!derS. '11,e fir,t i, the provi,ioo targeted ot non-holders of permanent
covenants os on incentive for their uptake of pcrm>nc1lt 1;ovcn.1ots, while d1c s<cond i,
provision, en current holders of a pcrnunent covenant to assist chem in conscrYolion
manogcrnent.
,\hbough various incentive mcosurcs were cited"' necessary for encouraging- ochers co
toke up a pen-nonent cm·enont, tax in«nti,·c, br gm·ernment particubrl)" • reduction in r.tc,
were b)" far the mast frequently died fonn of incenti,·c, for encouraging nature conserYalion
ontl the up coke of permanent covenants. In reality, such .1 la~ inccmi,·c is sm,JJ and ob,ious\y
not torgcted at covering all the cons incw:rcd or benefits forfeited by taking up a pcrmment
coveno,u.
11,c jnstification cited bJ' landholders for proposing- to~ it1ccntivc, is tccognirion of the
impnct of covenant

Ott

pnte111ial income, the work done on the consetl'otion O<ea "'well a, the

monetary sacririce mode on ateos under a pcnnanmt covenant, The second j11,tificotion is tlrnt
the wider community at lo<:ll levcl enJO)'' Conservation benefu, through covenants. ,\s slated in

Chapter\, several local governments in Australia alrcatly provide ,educed rates.
"l11e b·d of rate rcd<1c1iot1 that !antlholdms view shollld be prm•idcd by the local
government diffcttcl from a complete cxcrnp11on for the to1al .1rc., under a pcrmanct\t covensnt
to partial rate relief varying from 10 to 95 percent. RccommenJotio1,s for partial exemption of
rote> were widely made with acknow\cJgctnmt drnt real benefit to the landholder cin on!y be
achieved ifSrnte or l'cder.1lg0Yctt1mcnts compens,1ed loc.1l go...-cmments' for forfeited revenue
from rates currentl;• paid for lont\ under , permanent covcnont. Londholdcr, recognise that
even when totes rebates ore offered the)' arc unlikely lo ha\'e hmefit in real tcmlS, 'Olis is
becsu,c the)' lead to a rc,·cnue shortfall for the local go...-cn1ment, with the likely reduction in
othet scrYiccs to landholders unless extern•! subsitlics tu local govcmmrnts are provided.
Ochct ways of providit1g tax inccnti,·cs at local b·cl wltile ensuring equity in nature
con,e.vation rnn be explored. A l,nc\holdcr citctl an c~•mplc of a viable system of
implementing a rate rebate system slrec<tly in use in some shires. It offers 50 dollars pc, hectsrc
to a new covenant with • minimum of ·!00 and mox.imum of 600 doll,rs per

l'""'·

In addition,

lsnd that hs, on existing covenant received 30 dallars per hcctorc with• minimum nf 200 ontl,
moximurn 500 dollars rcopccti,·ely.
TI,c need for financial and 1cchnical assistance for natun, conscrvot:ion actions on
private !sn<ls is not peculiar tn Austrnlia. l'anncrs in the United St.cc, ilso have similar need,
(Kl•pproth & Johnson, 2001). Direct financial support c11Sures that lontlholders can putchasc
the ncceisar)" inputs at1d service, that are directly related to the con,crYarion rcquitemcnt undcr
• permanent covensnt. 11,c Jnstificacion for <li,cct finonciol support is mode: man)· lsndhol<lers
arc interested in taking up a permanent covenant but arc restricted b)" their financiol constrnints,
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and landholders who olrcadr hove o permanent co,·enont but 1,._,c limited financiol income d,_,c
to chonge in their circumstances sucl, as loss of cmplo)mcnt, rctircmc!l~ o, sickness.
Landholders point om that cm•enont programs need to strengthen the rcv:kw and
monitoring process of pcrmoncnt covenant,. Regular inspection of area, under • permaaent
covenant and adjocent areas is essential, porticubdy when there is rhongc of ownership of the
pmperty. 1l1c cucrcnt trend, in Victorin where a reviC\1-· is corricd out every three years, for
example, is cited as inadcquote for ensuring that the rrcscribcd monngcment tJlon is being
implemented. It can be argued that frequent mr,nitorit>g of prnperty under a volun1:u-y
covenont might not be urgent, as the owt1ers of such property arc highly ,elf.motivated in
conscn·otir,n to ensure the integrity of the conservatio!l areas. In addition, cot\Scnoation
orgal'lisotions ore oftc11 ut1dcr-fondcd ond unable lo rng:igc reb,ular expert rc,•ic-wers for on
it1crcosing number and widely spread properties ur,der o permanent CMenant.
It is dcac, however, ,h,t a section of landholders view more regular moiti!oring os a
sign of cacc by the covcnat1ting orgottisation and dus OCIS as an cncourogcmmt to those with a
permanent co,•et1nnt. On the other hand, some landholders may view such it1crcoscd
mol'litoring ncg:iti,·cly, as a ,igt1 of mi.,tnm by the covcnontor of thcir motives and ability to
ensure the mon,gcment of the cot1Serva1ion areas. Explaining why the monitoring is bcing
carried out is an imperative to i" success. Furthermore, monitoring is needed partirularly where
there is change in ownership or commencement of n lonw1crrn manogcmcnt lease of the
property that is mider o pcrrmncnt covcnont. TI,i, i, to et1sure thot new lot1downcrs ore familiar
with, at1d pr:>ctici"g, what is expected !lnder the lcrms of a perr11anent covenant, as weU as to
discuss with the nc•,11 landholder

O!\)'

neccs•acy odjustmcnt, to the monngement regime in view

of possible chat1ges in latulholdcr gaols and priorities.
Cot1Sen·a1ion orgat1isacions or projects cl101 .,im lo encourage ,·olum.11y participation
into their membership ore likely to hove greater success if they comult with those they seek to
enrol, and collaboralc with other orgac>.isotions that ore likely to add volue lo the participotiot1.
11,ese ,·iews were ltcic.,bted by a cross-section of londlrnldcrs in the present stud)', Similorly,
su~ccss of an)' program and moti,·ation for potticipocion can be assured where the process of
parcicipation is deor ,nd simple, devoid of audmritorianism, burcaucrn~y ond intrnsio!l in
privotc goals. "Jbesc sentiments arc often recited by progrmn odministrators anrl managers but
oftct1 not adhered to comprchensi,·cly.
Although only a noi,-m,jority cross-section of landholders were of d,e view that the
removol of go,·emment involvement in covenam, wol>ld cncouro.gc the up lake of permanent
covcnont, the participation of government it1 the process should not be climit1ated because
govcmmct1t mediotes the legality of a covenant, and is also a ma.ill fut1ding source of covcna!lt
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programs. It is, therefore, difficult to take gm•ernments our of the process \\id,out
compromising some of the potential benefits such as rnx rd1atcs.
Some landholdc<o asserted thot land high in conscn·ation vsluc should be purchased
where s landholder is um•:illing to pince o permanent covcnsnt on it. Aldmugh this is already
bcing carried out b)' se,·ernl covenanting programs in ,\u,tratia am.l abroad through a
mechanism of revoking funds, it con be finnr.ci,tl)' dcmonding to purchase forge pieces of
narnre conservation land. Anocl,er potential problem is that once the land i, purchased from a
londholder, anod,cr bny« chat has an imcre,t in long-term Hoturc co!\scrvation hos to be
identified. 'll1is can hole! back the purchase of furd1cr conservation properties

,s

the fund, ore

ried in with the unsold propcny. Futtbermorc, there is the hkchhood of losing d,e benefits of
the long ac9nircd and speciruiee<l knowledge obout the property hd<l by the original owner
when iud, property is sold.
Placing a permanent covenant on a piece of lond is not n g4orantec of its long-term
conser>·ation. ,\ ~anser>•ntion area con be degraded through negative imp,cts from adjoining
srens thnt horbour pests, weeds or ,uffcr,; from erosjon and pollution processes. Coonlination
and collaboration with owners of such sdjoining propcriies cnn net to safeguard the
conscrvotiou gaols of a landholder therebr acring as ,n incentive 10 a pem,anent conuant
uptake. Simil,dr, creation of conserva1ion links wi~, sdjoining lands, ,, proposed by a few
landholders, can join fragmented conservation oreas thPrehy crcnting the desired size of the orea
that is neccssory for the visble conservation of porticulnr species.

3.3.6 Conclusion
The decision to rnke up " permanent covc!lont is chsracteriscd by several factors,
which con be gronped under four main factors th,t include o strong conservation ethic and
unJe,otonding of the value of conservation, minimal economic depeude!lce on tl,c land, and
!cost morivation br economic g:,in, and on undemanding and conridence in the covenont
mechanism.
L1ndholders point out the ~.eccl for various incentives at Slate ,nci locsl government
levels induiling the ptovision of b~ incenti,·es, strengthening of the review, am! monitoring
process of pennanent co,·enanta, nnd promotion of education and awareness of covenant,.
ThC)' also note the importance of consultation and collaborotion concerning the conservation
and covenant process, and pro,<ision of msnsgemcnt support and advice on d1e
implemenrnlion of nature conservation requi«rnents unde,, ptrmo11ent covensnt.

It has been aq,'lled tint ic, o,der for a permanent covcnont co succeed in achieving its
objective. various levels of collaborntion with adjoining landholders, between conservation
groups sctive in the arca/«gion and between government institutions ih~t have a role in
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conservation on pti,·atc bnd i, necessary. A monitoring regime of tl,c covenanted property is
particularly ncce,sory when tl,crc ;, change in land 011mcrship even where a new owner is
thought to be conscr1:stion minded.
The findings from this choptcr have policy implicaciono for promotion c,[ pennancnt
covenant, among landholders who do not ,how any intere,r in long-term nature con,eNaU:on,
those thot hove strong economic dependence on thcir properties, and those that arc unfamiliar
with pcm,onent covct1onts or unable to perceive tl,cir rele,•ancc and compatibility with their
goo!, st1d plans for d,e bnd. Further di,cu,siot1 on tl,csc policy implication, i, corricd om in
Chapter 6.

1110 chapter that follows pn,sents the fit1ding, of focd-tcrm sgrccmcnt and fixed-term
covensnt holders in Victoria and \Vcslem Austrnl.ia and thcir comparison witl, tl1e findings in
the present chspter.
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Section One: Result of !he Descriptive Analysis

Introduction
'Ilic two conscrvotion manogemcm •grcement mcchmism, :represented by tl,e two
coicgories of londhoklcrs ili,cus,cd in this chapter and dcmilcd in chapter 1, arc ,ignifiC1ntly
different in type and function,. '11,e C,,ed-tcrm covenant prnctised in \'l;'estcm Ausualia uncle,
the Remnant Vegetation Protection Scheme i, attached ro the land title an<l Linding on prescm
and future owners uf the bnd cl\'<r the fixed duration of the covenant. However, the fixcd-tenn
agrccmccu represented by the ,·olunt•rr consc.,-vation agreement under L1nd for Wildlife (FcovVictoria) lS !Hlll·bmdir,g and more info.,nal in its applicotion,
11it hrpothe,is in thi, ch:cpter is that there ,,re no markc<l difference, Lctwecn Victoria
and Western ,\umalia in respect to lmdhuldcrs' socio-demographic oituotion, socio-economic
situation, ,nd various altitudes to nacure conservation and permanent covenants. Further, there
ore no difference, on the innucncc of the ,·oriabks on bn<lhol<lcrs' attitude, to o penn,ncnt
co,·cnam uptake between the two ,1a1cs. '11,c •Ml)·,is

,,,ill estobli,h whether the possession of

d1hcr of 1hc two conscn·otion rnonagcrncnt .,grocmcnts in Victorfo and Western ,\ustral.ia has
rn,rked ,lifferenccs on landholder's at1i,udes towards pcnnonent covcnmt and tl1cir likelihood
of taking up • permanent cu1·en,nt. Furthermore, the analrsi, will hdp to cstobli,h the extent
to which the choractcristics of holders of the two different conservation ogreements ore simi!or
or differem from those nf the majnril)' of permanent co,·cnont holders in Victorio.
11,e dependent ,·ariahlc used to asses, lon<lholders' likelihood of toking up" pennoncnt
''"""""" is their auitudcs to a pen11ancnt covenant uptoke, which was messured by d,eir
response to the ,tatemcm "I wnul<l not c,m,i<ler a pcnnancnt covenant under my
circumstoncc." The Stoic gcwcrnmcnt policies rcgording nature conservotion on private bn<l arc
not mmkccllr different between Vic!oria and Western Aumalia in so far as both stares have
similar policies in place 1hi1 support d1e use of msnngcmcm agreements and incentives fo,
con,en•,1tion on private land. 1\s such, an assumption is made in the comparison between the
two Stales that any no1ed difference, in londhol<lers' attitudes 10 a pcrn\Onent covcnam uptake
is the result of differences in the ctrnnogement ogrcemcnt mechanism, in use rsther iban by
differences in the impoct of State or loc:tl gov1.mmcn t policies on Lsndhok\crs betv:cen the two
State!.

11,c methods used to coUect and ansly.sc the dat> reported in this chop tee ale contained
in Chapter 2.
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Table 2.3 in Chapter 2, shows that olmo;t 51 percent return r;1te was achieved in
Victorfo from 210 dispatched qu<:stiom,oirc, ond 34 percent in Western Austr:ilia from a larger
number (450) of dispatched questionnaires than Victuria.

4.11

Attitudes to permanent covenants uptake
Table 4.1 shows the proportion of respondents in Victoria 011d Western Au,ualia by

their attitude to a permanent c<>\"cnont uptake. Llndholdcrs' attitudes to a pem,onent covenant
up toke were used ,s the dcpendetll variable in a test of statistical signiCicancc of~,c rcl>lionship
with the independent variable, in the present smdy.

Tabk 4.1

Response on ,itimdes to covenant uptake •m<>ng fixcd-tcnn agreement (Victoria)
and fixed-tenn cow,uant (\'l/emm Australia) rcspond,•ni,

Western Australia

Vie
Resno,,.01

Count

St.Agn:e

w

.\g,cc

'"

Neutral

Dis,gtcc
St. Disogrec
D/Know

Count

/%)

5.3
9.5
21.l
19.0
27.4
17.9

190'

Total

'""

('/,\
21
13
32

""
"

139,

15.1
OA
23.0
25.2

17.3
10.1

,oo

Note: 'The difference between the f«qucncr counts •n<l 1h, total «tmne<l qumfonnairc i,

equal to number of non-re,pon,cs to lhc ,iuesiionnoirc item.

Only 15 percent of the respondents in Victoria compared to 25 percent in Western
Australia ag,ced they would not consider a permanent covenant under •ny circumstance.
Almost holf of the respondents in both States disogrced with the st,temcnt (sec Table 4.\).
Similarly, in bo1h States, slightly mo,c thnt 20 percent of respondents were neutnl in response
to d,c stotement.

4.1.2

Summary of results of descriptive Analysis
Tables 4.2 ond 4.3 rcspecti,·cly, show summaries of the similarities •nd differences in

9ucstionnoirc responses between fixed-term ogrcemcnt holders (Victorio) and fixed-term
covenont holder, (\'l'estcm .\ustralio). Sim1lsrities were asccnoincd where there wer.e o
comparable mojon'ty of response, inn p.ucicubr ,·orisblc category or variable measurement in
both Stote,. Differences,

OH

the other hand, were o,ccrtaincd where the pcoportions in a similar

variable response catcgmy or varioblc me,surem,nts between the two Stot<s were morkedly
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different. Surveyrc,uhs of the variobks presented in these summaries ore shown a, Appendices
4.3 to 4.28.
Similarities and dissirnilaritic, between the tw<l State, were observed in seventeen and
twelve variable, respective\)'. Sllmmary of the stotisncally ,ignificont relationships between the
independent varisble, ancl respondents' attitude, to a peunonent co,·cnant uptoke, and their
directional trends is pmvided in Tobk 4.4

4.1.3

Similarities in variable atuibutes between the States
TI,c as·eragc age of the respondents did not differ between Victoria and Wesicm

Australis. TI,erc w.,s also no ,rntisticolly significsnt relationship between age and attitudes to a
permoncrtt covenant uptake among respond cm, in either State.
Similarities were 110\cd between the two Stales in thtee exogenous variable,: land
tenure, conservation area ratio, anU conservation fcarnre l)1lCS. 11,e mojority of propenies in
both State, hod !om\ freehold tenure, con,erva1iot1 "'"~ tu totol lnnd arc, rntio greater tl,on ten
percent, and uarive Lush/forest ns one of tl1c conservation feature,. In both S,,tes also, most
of the responUcnts had n,m,c con,e"-""tion as tlie pritno')" reason for having retoined the
narnrc comcrvotion features c,n their propcrtic~ Neither land 1enure l}1'e nor cotiscrvaciot1 arc•
rntio nor the conservation feomrc, on the land hod a statistieo.lly significant relanomhip with
landholders' ottirudes t<l a permanent covenant uptake.
L~rge prnporti<lns of respondents in lioth States had not ma,le any inqniry about
pcm>0'1enl co~cnonls. Stoiistically significant relationship, were obscr1.•ed in Victorio and
Western Australio showing tl10se tlrnt h,d mode inqnil)' aliout pennanent covenant, os more
likely lo have a positive otti1udc too pcr'1lment coveoant up toke than those that had not made
enquirie~. Both States had equal proponions of respondents tl,at knew versus those tl,ot diU
uot know about a permanent covenant before 1aking up a fixed-tenn conservation scheme. A
significant rdotionship between le,·cl of knowledge about permanent covenants and attitude, to
a permanent co,•ct1ont upukc was onl)' observed i" Westen, Australis. Respondents "ith more
knowledge ,bout permanent covennnts were more likely to have a positive ottiru<le to a
pennanent covcuant up toke clrnn those with little knowlc<lgc ofit.
Both State, had rcl,tivdy ,inular proportion of respondents th.1t did not know or were
neutral on whether permnncm covenants ore more effccti,·c fo, long-term conservation over
other conser\'otion mcchani;ons. Similarly, bnth Stales hod rdath·cly si1ni!ar proportions of
those chat did not perceive the b'"nefits of a permanent covcnont. Neither of the two Smes had
a significant rclationsltip between respondents' perception of a permanent covcnnnt's
cffccriveness for long·tem> nature eomervation o,·cr other conservation mechmis1n, ,nd their
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1!titudes to • pennoncnt covenant uptake. However, o significant rdstionsltip wos obscn·ed in
both States beN.·cen respondents' perceptions of the benefits of a permanent covenant and
thcir attitudes to pcrmnnent co,·en:mt uptake. L1n<lholders that peruivcd 1hc benefit, of a
permnncnt cm·cnont were more likely to ha,·c a positive attitude to a pennsnent covenant
uptake than tlrnsc that did not perceive the bendi:.,
Large proportion, of mpondents in Victorio (58%) and Western Australia (49%) did
not mind restrictions on lond-usc. A significant rcladonship between the respondents' attitudes
ID rcstrictioos mi land-use and ottitudc, l<> a pem,,ncnt covenant uptake wao obSct':cd in brnh
States, sho,ving incrca,ing acceptance of rcstricrion, on land-use to correspond to incren,cd
likelihood of respondents' positi,·c attitude

(D

a pennoncn, covenant uptake.

Otl1er sintibcitics in ,he results show that majocity of respondent, in Victoria and
Westcm Australia did not rccci,·c any finoncial suppott for conservation work before raking up
a fixed·tcmi covenant or fixcd·lcrm agreement. In sddition, the majociiy of respondents in
both States intend to retain manogcmcnt and ownership of their properties in the family in the
fumrc. 11,crc w<re no significant relationships between respondents' attitudes

!D

a permanent

covenant uptake and their reception of financial support, or anticipation of retention of
management orownershi1> of property in the family in either State.

I.I,
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T~hlc 4.2

Sunun:uy of similarities in the results of the descriptive arrnlysi, between f1.~cd
term agreement holders in Victotfa and fixed tem, co,·cnant holders in \Vest cm
Australia
Variables

Auribute•

Victoria

Western
Au•tralia

i·'

'

A e dimibution in ,·cu,.
P,opcrty tenure type.

,\\•era e oge of respondent,
100 pc<ecnc freehold

l'ucentogc mio of consCf\'O!ion lu to,.,I
property ,izc.

Con,crvotion ratio gre>tcr 1ho"
!O percent

Types of con,crvacion fcoture., (Appendix

N,.;,., 1,,,,1,/ fore,.,

4.4l
Primory re"un for IC!>ll1Ulg 1u1urc
conscf\'>tjon feature, on proper!)'
_IAppon<lix 4.7)
KnowleJgc about per,noncnt c,wcmnt
~cforc en,c!Ulg • fi.od-term agreement nr
co,•cnant (,lppcndix 4.5)
Inquiry ,hou, permanent cm·en,nts
Attitudes to ttnpuscd rcwictjons of l,nduse l,\Mcndu 4.Bl
Effecti,•cne" of p,rm,nen, rn,·eo,,n,,
over olhei mechani,m, (Appcndjx 4.10)
l'c,ccplion, of the benefits of,
=rrmlncnt co,•cn,nt I, 1•--cndL, ·1.121.
Perception of a pcrmancm covcna,its
impact on Llnd ,•aloe (,lppcndix 4.9)
Reception of fin,nc,.tl suppott before
uptokc of fm<l-term agreement or
coven,nl IAoncmlix ,I.J 59\
Future mcnuon of prop«t)' ou'tlc«hjp 1n
famil, f,lnncndix 4.18\
Futme rctcouinn of prupcrtr m,n,gen1en!
Ul fomilo I:\ .,,.,·ndi, 4.1 S
,1,.oci,tjon with con,e"·,,ion groups
(Appendix 4.20)
Importance of in«c,sed publ,c
recognition o, prc·rcgw,Ote for pcnn,ncnt
I -"lvcn,nt un<,ke l.~nncndu; 4 22)
Impomncc of ongoing finanml suppor1
u n1c-r<~ni,itc for, penmncnt co,·enont
ur take (Apncmlix 4.24\
:ltmudc lo «iujty in cost of permoncm
covenant up10ke (1\ppcncfu 4.27).

To ,uppott wtlJhfc
rnnscn•,'10n
To suppn<! 1i,1t1·c \'cgmtion
K!,ew ,burn pcrmanc11t
co,•cn,nt before entering a
11>:cd,,erm ag,cc,ncn, or
co,·cn,nt
I !a,·e not mode inqu"l' about
I pen~'""'' co1·c,unc
Do i,o[ mrnd ,c,.tic!Lu11, on
l:md-usc
'Don'I know' or 'Neutral'
fCg,ordinr, cffecti,•cLlc" of
pcrm,ncnt co,·cnlOu

l\e,ults are in % trnlcss
ind,c,ocJ oll,e=L«
50.5
51.5 "''

""
'"
"'

70.1
27.l

"'

'"
"
;

'

"°

so

'"

"'s,

.,"'
.,

,o

"

Do no, pciccivc brncfa, of a
I pcrm,1ncnt rnvm,nt
fa•cnl}' di>lributed propo,.io,,s ,n ~o,l, States between 1hc
<e>ponsc rntcgorie,; '•srecd' (l /34, 'disagreed' (1 /34 ond
'nculral/dm>'t kna1V' 1/3'")
D,J not rccei,·e any finoncjol
n
,up port for conscrvalwn.

"'

"

"'

!nccnJeJ ,o ,e,,;n nwnmhip.

'"

I c\tendcd to fC[ain
m>m~cment.
1\ffili,ocd ,~ one or

67.4
!WO

gmup,

we

"'
'"

75.4

No, offll,,t!cd tu"')' grnup

N,S

:lnachcd • b-cl ofimpomncc

49.S

45.7

Amched a level ofirnpomnce

"

62.4

Agreed that pubhc should
cover cost of pcrmoncnt
covenant untakc.

62.5

B0.7
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Similarities between the two S\atcs were olso obscr•;cd in respect to ossoci,tion with
coc1sc1,::11im1 groups, most ttspondcnts in Wcscem Australia ond o\l respondents in Victorin
had on nssociation "ith at least one conservation group. Ne,·er1hclcss, individual respondents
in Victoria were a,sodatcd with more conscnwion group, than were the respondents in
Western Austrolia.
The rcbrionship between >ssociatioti with conscn·ation groups ond respondents'
attitudes to a permnncm co,•enont upcr,kc wos statistic:illy signific"m only in Victoria. TI,e more
conservation groups a subject was associated with, the greater was the likelihood ~\e)' had o
positive attitude to a pcrmoncnt covenant uptake.
Almost h,lf of the respondents in both Stales g,.,·e imporionce to increosed public
ttcognition as a pre-requisite fo,, a pcrmccnent covenant upL1kc. In addition, between a quarter
and a third of the respondents in both St.>tcs ,icwcd non-financial recognition of thcir
conservation efforts by State and Local Governments" a significam moti,·ator for ~,cir uptoke
of o pc,mnnent covenant. Clc:idy, trnn-financial incc·ntives had acceptance among a rclatfrdy
large proportion oflmdho!Jcrs in boch Stot<s, with Victoria hoving • slight!)' higher proportion
than We,tcm Ausua\ia. Nevcethclcss, there were no ,ignific.,nt rd,tionships between eithc, of
tlte ,·orfablcs ond attitudes to a pennancnt coven cent uptoke in either Stale,
·11,e large majority of the bndhnldcrs ill both States gave imponann· to pro,'ision of
ongoing finmda! suppmt for conscrntion work, thus confirming the greater popnbcity of
fin,ncial m·ce the non-financial incentives. Sirnihrly, most respomknls in botl, States agreed
!hot tl1e covcnantor ,hon!d co,·cr ,he cost of toking up a permanent coven,mL l-JowCl'er, of the
Nm

SL1tes, Wc~tem Australis hod• bigger proportion of respondents that held tliot view. There

were no ,1atistically significant rebtionship,; between respondents' attitudes to a pcnnanent
covenant uptake

p,r i, and their rcquiremcm for on-going fin,ncial support or theit attitudes to

th, covering ofcu,ts of taking up opcrmonent covenant in cithcr State.
,\ modcrntdy lorg~ p"'pmtion of respondents in Victoria and a large proportion in
Western ,\ustmlia guve importance to non-finonciol recognition and £nanci,I support as
incentives for co,·enant uptake. TilC proportions of 1espondenls that pcrccived a loss in !and,
did nor perceive a loss, and were ncotrol obout the pos,ible loss in loud value h,causc of ,
permanent coven,n~ were compar,i,\e between the State,. Staristically significant rehtionships
between respondents' perception of a perm,nent covenant's impact on land', v,iue and their
attitudes tc. a permanent covenant up,akc "'"" observed in Loth States. L,ndholders thac did
not perceive a loss in land value bccanse of pbcing a pennsnent co,·cnant

likely to have a positive Mtitudc

M

it were more

to • pcrmanom rovcnam uptake ~inn those tl,01 perceived a

loss iri lond value.
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4.1.4

Differences in variable attributes between the States
Significant differences Were observed between the two S1otes in respect to the

following exogenous vacinble,. ,\ veragc si7.e of properties in tbe

tv.'O

States <liffcred sif:nificomly

v.1th Western 1\ustralio having much lorger avcrnge size (2897 ha) compored to Victoria (185.6
ho). Despite tl,csc <lifferences, thctc wos no stolistically significant rclati,msbip between
property size and respondents' auitu de~ to .1 pennoncnt cm·enont uptake in either State.
L<ugth of time that the properties hod been in 1he family olso diffr,cd signilic"ndy
between the two States: the majority of respondents in Victoria bod propcny in the family
ownership for more thon 40 yc.trs compored lo on~· 14 1,s~~,,, of r<,spm>dents in Western
Australia m•cr. Difference bctwe,·u the two St,tes was also noted in the fam1 !)1'e,. ,\!though
'cropping/,hrep' wos the moin fann-!)1'C in the rnojori!j• of properties in \1;1estem Au,tn!ia, no
one farm-l)pe wos practised by a rn.,jority of respondents in Victoria. ,\g.in, in l;otl, States no
,ignilicanl ,to,islical rd,lionships were ob<ctved between length of property owne~hip in
family or fatm·t)1'CS nud respoc,dcnts' attituJes to a pcnnanem covenant uptake.
\'Vheteos mn,e than a third ofrespundcnts in Western ,\ustro\i• entered a fi~cd·tenn
co,·cnant on their property in order tu receive support or permit, onlr four percent of
respondents in Victocia did '" for a simibr rca,011. ,\ ,tntistirnll)' ,ii;nifican,! rcbtionship
between the reasons for hO\•iug entered a fixed term agreement

°' fi~ed

term ~oveuant and

attitudes to a pcrmancni covenant uptake was only observed in Western ,\usu..lia. 1110
relationship showed 1h•t tlwsc who entered into a fixcd-tenn co,·enant because it was ,1
requirement were more likel)' to have o negati,·c ,ittitude toword a pcumnent covenant uptake
tbon those 1h1t entered it ,·olunmtil)'.
Fout variables related to socio-economic d10roctcci,1ic, of the «spondem, illustrated
further con!rasts between the 1wo Srntes, 11,e majority of respondents in Victoria in conwst to
those in Wc,tcm ,\ustrn!ia hod significantly lower lorn! onuuol income, were !cs, eeonomicaU)'
dependent on their property, had no debt on the property, ond thcr had ~ luwcr labour
comnllum:ttt on the property.
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Tible 4,3

Summary of difference, in tl,e rcsul!s of th<: desctiptiw analysis between fixcd1crrn agreement holders in Victocia an<l fl:<cd·tcnn covenant holdc<s in Western

,\u,tr.tlfa
Voriohles

Property oizc in hcct,rcs

R,.,ons forhovingcntc«d, lixo<lterm aarecmcnt Of co,·cnont.
l.cngth of time property hos been in
fa,,,li,. fJ\nnondi:, 4,)\
Oo,i,c to know more ,bout
porm"1Cn! cnvcn,nts (:\ppcotd.,;
4.6\.

Anributcl

.-\ ,·cragc arc, of prnpe,c;c, in
hectare,
Propotllon of prnpertie, "1th less
than 1001,,or •rcoier than 1000 ho.
In order to ,cccivc suppor1 or
=rmil fru,n ou,•cm,ncnc
Over 40)~'"·

Victo<i~

Wtotom
Australia
Rcoulc, arc in % unless
indicaied othe<Wise
185.6 h,
2B97 ha

80%<
!OOha

Bl.5%
>1000h•

·•

;o

5"

"

Would li1c 10 know more ,Oou1
P""'""'"' cove!\>n!

"

Total annual tncome in l 999
(Appendi~ 4. \3)

_.\$i5,000otle,,

65.5

Morn ch>J1 i\$ 150,000

11.2

L•bouf com1ni1ment on propcrt)'
(Appendix 4, 14)

L:&bour commitment ,cm, U, poini,

6l.l% h,d
2 Of le"
noLJ\c,.

Dcht on property on 1·cor 2000
(Appcndi_~ 4.16)

No dchl on propC<'}'

Economic d..t>endencc <>n ptopcrc.,·
(.\ppcnd.,;4.17)
Intcrco! in lo,ig·te<m nature
con,en•,rion (Appell di< 4.2.l)
[nnuencc of oon·f1n1nci,t
i,tccnti,•e, on covenant upt,kc
/Ahncndiir 4.2',\
Compcn50tjon fo, non·oSC o( land
under a P"""ncnt co,•cnant

JB.5

"
"'

62.6% hid
9ormorc
noin"

35

No income from prop«ty

"
''

Ovor 90% income from piop<<l)'

ll.4

6H

:\11;dted o lcvcl ofimport,ncc to
pcrm,,icn ccovenant'• o,sur,oicc of
long,,cnn C0'1sctv>tion 1h,n other
mech,nLs,m.
01$,gicc non-fo10nci,l m«nlL\"c c,n
,;g.,;firn,t\)' moti,·110 p<nn,nent
covon,nl u ><•kc.
\>;\,uld C>ko·up prnnancn1 coven,nl
if thctc """ compcn,.,ion for nunuse u!bnd.

75.4

40.2

]0.2

46.8

;o

m

!'refor 'llotc than 40% of co,t to be
covcrod by the public.

'"

5'

Prob nil contribution by public to
COOi of private conso,,.,tion.

47.l

Debi of ,\IJ00,000-500.000

60.2

ll ,,

"'

(Appendix 4.26)
E"l'cclation of cquit)' ond lc\'e\ of
public rcopon!thilL<)' in J><i,·m
conservation ~~ppcndiir 4.28)
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The rntio of consc·n·otion ,rco 10 total area of the property also differed between
Victoris and Western Austrolh Approximstcly 13 percent of the respondents in Victuri, hod
their cntfre property under nature conservation, and ;ilinost 70 percent of 1he properties hod
more thon ten percent natmc consen·ation co,·er. In controst, only nine percent of respondents
in Western Australia had more 1hon "qu,rtcr of their property under nature conservation, while
51\ pc1cent of 1hem had less than ten percent of their property tmdcr notme conserv,tion.
Nevertheless, there were no stntisucal!)' significant rchtionships between the rntio of
conservation area to total ores of the propc,t)' and rcspomlcnts' attitudes to a pemunent
covenant uptskc in cither Seate.
\Vhcrcos tl,e majority uf rcspundents in Victoria eipresscd the desire to know more
about permanent covenants, most respondents in Western Austr:Uh did nor. Mmcover, the
majority of tespondcms in Victoria attached a level ofirnpomnce to tbe abil:ty of a permanent
covcnsnt to assure the long-!erm conscrvstion of nature over other mechanism, whereas less
than half of respondents in Western AustraLi, attached such importmcc, 11,e obvious re,son
landholders require such on assu<0ncc for long-term nsture conservation from a permnnen!
covenant is their interest lotig·tcrm nature conservation.
,\ re,·crsal in the popularity of non-financial incenti,•es and financial compensation for
covcn,nt uptake l,ctwcen Victoria and Western Ausl,atia wos ol,sen·cd in the stutly findings.
Almost half of the respondents in Western Au,troli, disogreed that non-financial incentives
could motivote their upt•ke of a permanent co,·cnant comp,red to ,light!)' less th.~n a third in
Victoria. However, in respect to eon,pcnsation, the majority of respondents in Western
Au,milia and ,light!)' over a third in Victoria stated 1hcy would 1,1«, up n permanent covenont if
compensation wete offered
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Table 4.4

Statistically significam rcbtionships between attitudes to pcrmoncn1 covenant
uptake and independent varilblcs for fixed-term agreement (Victoria) and f,xcd(cr:tn co,·c1i,n1 (\Vc~tcm ,\ustr.tli.t) res'jlondcnts

Variable/Probability ,ignilicancc
Victoria
Western
Australia
Ru,on• for entering a li~cd-tcnn
agreement o, rn,·cnan<
NS
p"0.022, d=-0.224
Knowledge abom pennancn< covcnan1,

~S

p=O.OlO,<l=0.143

De,if'O to know more about prrn,ancm
covenants
p"0.001, ,l: 0.260

p=0.025, d=0.229

Inquiry about permanent covcnanlB
P"0.002 d:0.3S

p"0.00!,d"0.4]1

Attltudc1 to imposed ,c,l<lction• on
land·u•c
P"0.000, d" 0.J50

p"0.000; d= 0.276

Eor,y into"Ji.wd,r,cn1 •J"'"''-1/ "'""""' I"'""" ii w,a
r,q•1rtm«1 "rn,poodJ I• l,k,l:\,,,J t, vo,~" •ti•H•~ t1lli1t,dt
lo•w-d at'""""'"I "'""""' •pl,rkt
/ncrrt1d•g }.,ow/,4,:, ofp1mwo<ol "'""""II '°m,p,,.J, lo inm,m,I
/ik,l,h,ot/ 10 hJr, "f01tli1t dllll•d, lo a pmnJO,nl '"'"""/ •Prah.
Dr,m lo 11100• m,rt aW,1 f''"'"·""I ""'"""" co,rr,pondt lo
iorrt<1J1d likd,h,l!d lo
ti pomi1< aflilud, lo ap,m1an«I

"""""I •pl.:l:,.

h.,,.,

Ha ..t<J inqm,d afu•I ro,enanlJ rom,pood.J lo io,TIJJd /iJ:,l,hood
of a f"'ln« t1llil•,i< lo a ptmrJnm/ "'""""/ •ptak,.

lm1w,i•~ ao,plJn.~ of)•o,an,n/ rttln'<lion, rom,pwit lo a,
iomasi•!, l,'l:,lih,.J ,; ap01ili1t atlil•dt t, a p,m1aoto/ co«oan/

uptakt.
lnma,1n~p,mph)n ef """""/ bm1fi/J rom ipondJ loan ioma,i•!,
/ihlih'"'1 ef a p,,silio< at/1/N.lt lo a ptrmantol '"""""I Npit1h.

Perception of the benefit, ofa
permanent covenants
p= 0.000,d= 0.226

Trend in tl,c vntiab!cs relationship

P" 0.001, d" 0.21 7

Pc,ceptions of the impact ur permanent
cove11ants
land value

m,

ln1;ru1i•Jf'tITTfli,o of h11 io hod ,du, "'1n,pondr lo"" inma,1n,l/iJ:,l,h1J1Jd cf a "'.!"Ii« allil11d, /o" p,..,,,an,ol roi,naat oplt1l:,

P"0.0l4,Jac.0.!36
Level offinancia! deb< on property
NS

p:0.038, doc -0.139

/"'mm'n!, ••mhtr ef dJJodatioo or aJjikati,n •;lh ro•11n•t1/i,n l!"lff
rormpo•ds to inma,inJ k'l:,/,lmod far a po,ilil< allil•dt lo a

Affiliation o, as,odation With
con,ervotion group,

j{'(5. noc\80)"' 1(,.250: p=0.006

NS

NS

AuirnJe to compenootion for pennonent
covcnont upta kc

p"'O.OO'i, Jae ·D.168

p,""""'"' rottnan/ •p1"1,

lmrraii•~ inlmJI in long-lmn n.Jtur, """"'olioo rorn,pondt lo
inmaiing Jl:.tklwod of a pa,ili,·, t1ltil11d, to a p,mrantol """""I

lnto,eot in long-term nature
conoervalion
pac0.000, U" 0.297

D1mt1,iog J,N on 1/i, prop,rry rom,pandJ lo a• iomario,i
!Jk,J/,.1t1dfar a pan'f•~ Mtilod, lo a pmnt1otol ro«na,t uptah

up1,,kt

t'"" lo rom)"'M"n rorrt,p,,niU lo i,man;,t
/ii:,l,IJ01JJ for a po,ilio• otlilu,I, lo o p,mr~ntol ro,,aao/ uptah

D,mt1,i•J imporl,mtt

NS

Nole: P"' olpho p-'r.lluo; daa Somm'O value; X' " Chi-,quate; NS= ,.,tistioUy non •ignilic•nt
rel,tionship; signilicont trend, in tho voriahlo rclotionships are shown in italic,
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Another contrsst between the States was that the m,jority of respondents in Western
Au,tt:ilia and Jes, than a third in Victoria preferred 1he public 10 cover more than 40 percent of
the nature consc.vation cost on private lsnd. In addition, n!most a hnlf of the respondents in
Victoria, and less thon a 9uartcr of tl,ose in \Vcstem Australia preferred the public not to
contribute, Evidently, tl,e expectation of public contribution to tl,e cost of conservation on
private bi,d, wns much less in Victocia tha" in Western Australia. Despite tl,e observed
contrast ber01eeu the 1wo States, tl,ere was no significant rd,tionship between expectotion of
pubUc contribution to conservation on pci,·ate fand and the respondents' attitude, to a
permanent coven mt uptake in either State.

4.1.5

Observations of other variables included in the descriptive analysis
More than a third of respondents in Victoria (46.5 %) and Western Australia (35.-1 %)

agreed it wos necessaty for the orgsni,ation that manages tl,e permanent covenant to be
independent of Government. 1-lalf of lhe respornknts in Victoria on<l close to hslf of those in
Western Australia were neutral or did not know thcit preference in relatio11 to the statement
(sec AppcndiK 4.11). No statistical!)" significant relationship was obser.·ed bem·ecn respondents'
prcfc..,ncc over a covcnonling agency's affJiation with government on<l their attitudes to •
pcrmsnem covenant uptake.
An assessment v,as carried out to establish thc relationship krwecn attitudes to
compensation for o permanent covenam uptake "' tl,e dependent variable on<l otl,er
independent voriobles in the study. Statisticaily significant relationships were esrnhlished in
Western Australia between the dependent variable an<l respondents' interest in !ong·tcrm
nature conservation (p=0.0--1. d=-0.126), and their icquirerncnt for on-going finaticinl suppon
as a pre-requisite for a permanent coven,nt uprnkc (p=0.01, <l=0.28\). Significant relationships
were established in Victoria hc\wccn the independent variables ':mociation/affi!iolion wit!,
conservation gronps' (p:-::0.0S, d=-0.129) and respondents' 'interest in long term nsrurc
conservation' (p=0.04, d=-0. 147).
Landholders that rcquirc<l financiol support as a prc·rcquisite for uptake -,f a
permanent covenant in Western Austrnlio were more likely to give importance to reception of
compensation for a covenOJH uptake than other, were. In a<ldition, londholdcrs who hod

.1

strong interest in long·tcnn narure con,crvation in Victoria and Western Austrolia were less
likc!y thon others were to give imporlsnce 10 the reception of camp emotion for uptake of"
covenant. L1Stl)', the greater the number of offiliations/sssociations with comer:ation groups
tliat landholders in Victoria had, the less likely they were to give importance to reception of
comp~nsation fo, a covenant uptake than we"' others.
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There was no conclusive evidence of the ir,fluencc of neighbours or friends on
landholders' attitudes to a pemiancnt covenant uptake. Ncvcrd,elcss, o proportion of
landholders who sto!cd the)' would be influenced lo take up o permanent covenant by
neighbours or friends iu both States c.,nfirmcd this factor's ro!e in influencing octuo!
permanent covcnantuptokc. Such influence w.", however, mo~widespread in Victorio dian in
Western Australia.
11,cre wss no conclusi,·c e,·idencc of on influence of perceptions of the dfectivencss
of permanent covenants over mechanisms on auitudcs to the uptake of a permanent covenant
an:ong fixed-term agreement holders and fi~cd-term covenant holders.

The rdotionshipo between sever:,\ indr:pcndent variable, included in the study and
londholdirs' .uirudcs to a permanent co,·enom uptake {the dependent variable) were not
statisticall)" significant, thus confirming bck of conclusive evidence of dicir influence on
attirudcs too pcnno<>cnt covenant. 'Oicsc variables ore shown in Tobie 4.5.

Table 4. 5 Independent variables with st.,tisticallr non·s;gtiificant ,clotionship with attitudes
lo a pcrrnatlcnt co,·~nant uptake (the dependent variable) among fixed-term

-v,a,,.,.,--''¥•"0',',m,•,"o',(Vc.ei•c•,•,c,,)cc•"cdccfie•,•de·o•,"cm.','"' '"c"c''"'0,v,·,.,,,,•mccAc,"e"e','",•slc•,•,sp,o,,,,d,,,",'' '-" ~ ,
Long ,crm goo\ for retention of owner>hip

Long lcrm go,\ for ,ctcn,ion of m,n,gommt
Attimcle, '" non financial recoL>nition
Influence of a5'oci,tin11 with ncighbou" or
friend, on perm,ncnl co,•enmt upi,ko
Influence of non-fmanci,I incentive, on
perm,ncnt cm·cnant up1.,ke
PcrccpUon of dfccti,·mc>S of pcmi,nml
covenant over other medm"'"'' for long-tern,
nature conscrv,tion
Nccc,.ity of fin,ncial suppon " incon•i,•c for
penn,neott caven,nl up,akc
Equi1y require men! in co" ofpcnmncnt
co,·cnmt uptake
Equily requirement in cost of prfrote
con,erntion.

4.1.6

Mcost>tcd attribute
Anticip1tion of ,01,nt10n of ownership of property in
famil·
An.,c,pation of ,clcrmon of mmag,mc.,t of property
in fa,ml'
Streng~, of occopllnce of non-Cui,nciol incentive, for
erm,ncnt co,•enan, u take
Lc,•el of influence of 11eii:J1bours or fnend, on
covc,,,nt opuke
,\ttitmlc to non.fioanci.1l 1ncontivc, a, rnotwaior, of,
pmnanent cnvcmnt upl,ke
Strength of og<ecmmt about permanent cove,,,nt",
effcui,·cnc>S for long·tcrm noture comm•,tion o,•er
n!hCI conservation mechmisms
Lc,•el ofimponancc gi,•en to finaoicial ,upport"
incenti,·e for permonent covenant uptoke
E,pcctatiou by mpondcnl> regarding covcr,ge of
cost by cov,,,,ntor, in pcnn.rncnt CmTnont uptokc
Expected level ofpuhlie contnbulmn to cost of
nature camcn•ouon on private fond,

Summaty and Conclusion
11,c purpose of Section I hos been to establish the similarities and differences between

fixcd-tcnn ogrcement ond fixed-tcnn covcnont holder. in Victoria ond Western Australia
respectively in terms of proportions of responses and the statistical significance of trends in tho
~lotionship between the assessed variables and londholdcrs' ittirude, to a permanent covenant
uptake.
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Chapter 4: Fixed-tenn Agreement and Covenant

Section Two: Results of Path Analysis

Introduction
This section presents the results of path 011a!y.i, for respondents W:tl, a fixed-tam
sgrecment in Victoria and those with a fixed·tcnn covenant in Western Anstrolia. TI,e
predictor and m,diator ,·nriables included in the h)pothesized path model arc ,hown in Figure
2.1 in Chapter 2 and ububtcd in Tables 2.4 ,md 2.5 rcsp,·ctivcly.

,\11,·orisbles were initially regressed from the output (dependent) vori1blc 'attitudes to
a perm,ncnt covenant uptake' to provide the ini1ial poth model. Subsc~uent regressions of the
predicted nri,ble on each of the meJ.iator vnriablcs retUned in the initial po~, mndd were
corried out. A final (output) path model ''"" conmucted from the rq;ression of oll variables
retained in the modd from pre,1ous regressions, on the ourput variable 'ottitudes to a
permanent covenant uptokc'. Dct,.il, of the method used in U,c path :tnlllysis are outlined in
Chapter 2.

4.2.t

Fixed-term conservation agreement, Victoria (Land for Wildlife Scheme)
Table 4.6 shows the path coefficients of the four variobles (predictors) reuined in the

path model after the i1Utial regression nf 20 variables (see Chapter 2: Table 24 and 2.5) ~,at
were hypothesised 10 have on effect on fixed·terrn og,ccrnent (Victoria) londholdcrS' attitudes
to• pcrmonent covenant uptake. 'll1e cxponsion of the abbreviations for oll nrioblcs used in
t!Us section is shown in Chopter 2.
Table 4.6

Coefficients of the preJ.ictor ,·aria bl es of altitudes lO a covenant uptake in the
f,rst regression ourput for fixed-term agreement (Victoria) respondents

Rel am v1riablo,

St>ndmli>cd
Cocflicicnt,
Std.
lleu
Error
1.754 .400
(Con,tant)
.197 .070
Con_imorcst.
.185
Mcml>cr,hjp
.166 .085
.!23
Rcmiction,.
.30~ .055
.376
.125 .048
.167
Ilene Gt,
depcndom ,.. rioblc: attitude, 10 a perm,ncnt ,ovcnmt uptoke.

"

'

Table

,,

.,g.
'

Unmnd1rdizcd
Coefficient,

shows

m,

coeffidems of

WO

4.382
2.800
l.946
5.544

.oso
.oo,

2m

00,

.00,

oo,

95% Confidence
JOtfC<Va\ fo, 11
Ulwor
lJppc<
llound
JJ0<111d
.%4
2.544
.058
.335
•. 002
.334
.4)2
.1%
,219
.031

vsriab\cs, Con_intercs1 (0.306),

,,d

Membership (0.173), which were rcbincd in the poth mode! ofter ugrcssing the h)l'Othesi,ed
predictor va'-'.•hlcs (see Figure 2.l) on ti,. mediotor variable 'restrictions'. The Bet•

@) values

presented in the stondardizcd coefficients column represent 1h~ srnndarJ.ised regression
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cocfr.cicnts between 'attirnde, to , perni,ncnt covenant uptake'. TI1e effect of 'Con_intcrcst'
on the dependent ,..,riabk wos siBnificonr big.ger than tlm of'Mcmbmhip'.
Table4.7

Coefficiem predictor, for attitudes to restrictions of n pcnnonent covenant
{fi<cd-tenn agreement· Victoria)

R,·,>in varhblc.,

Un"andardi,cd
Coefficient•

"

(Con'1,nl)

S1d. Error

Sig.

Stand.rdizcd
CooOici,n"
Beta

.on

.306

3.060
4.402

M,mbershi
.291
.\\7
,. dcpcndce1t ,.,riahle: attitude, lo «"riction• on lond-u,c.

.!73

2A89

1.325
..1M

Con_intcrm

.431

.oo,
.000
.014

Table 4.8 presents ,he coefficient of two varioble, (Knowledge ond Va!ue_loss) which
were retained in the p.11h model ofter regressing from die mediator vsriable 'Ilenefit,' d,e
hypothesized predictor nrinb\cs for 'perceptions of covenant benefits (sec l'i!l"rc 2.1). Of the
two variables, '\'olllc-loss' had the bigge, effect on respondents' perceptions of the benefits of
a pcnn,ncnt co,·enont
Table 4.8 Coefficient predictors for perception of benefits of a pem10ncnt covenant (fixed·
tenn •L=cmc11.t (Victot:i.1))
Stand,.dL,ed
Unmndordizcd
Coefficient,
Cncfficien"
B Std. Error
Bets
(Cot1,tanl)
2.893
.316
Kno,.-lc"Jlc
.227
.0%
.166
-.295
-.316
V.Juc_lo"
.065
dependent ,·,ri,blc: pcrccp1ion of pcn,,anrnt co,·cnant hcncfi1,.

l'-<:11in ,.,ri,bk•

1

Sig.

9.148
:!388
-4.543

.000
.OIS
.000

Two variables, 'Knowledge' snd 'ConRatio', Were predicted lo have an effect on
landholders' perceptions of impact of covenant on land value (sec figure 2.1). Both variables
were retained in the path nioJd as shown in Table 4.9, after regressing thern from the rncdi,tor

variable 'ValucJass'. 11,cir cocCficients show 'Conll.1tio' had a bigg« effect (0.205) on
respondents' perceptions of loss in lnnd value tl,an 'Knowledge' (·0.145).
T~ble 4.9

Coeffidmt predictors for perception of las, in land v;'Uue (fixcd-tcrrn agreement
(Victot:i•)

Rmin votiohles

llnmndardi,cd
Cocfficicni,

Std. Enor
(Conmnt)
3.697
.250
Knowledge
-.212
,\05
C.,nR,tio
9.7J6E·03
.003
o. dependent variable: p«ccprion of lo., 1n bnd voluc.

"

Standardi,ed
Coefficient•
Beta

Sig.

14.772
-.145
.205

-2.021
2.853

.000
.045

.oos

Figure .\.1 illustrntes the fino! p>th model for respondent, wid, a fixed·tcnn ag,:ccrnent
(Victoria) aft~r • rcgrcssiun of oil vru:iablc, rcrnined in the models of pr,:,.·ious regressions on
the output variable 'attitudes to a pennsncnt covenant uprnkc' (i.e. initial regression from the
output variable and ,ubsequent regressions from the retained mediator variables).
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Merrbersrip

Residua!~
(l'.?i~Restrictlons ~ O ""'- - Atlitu:les to

/

~

-

Krowla<lge

~ permaoont

0.176

Con. in:arem

§]'""';:___

Resld,al

_ 0.316

ConRati

0.205

cowrat

1..ptaka

rI
Residua!

Value_bss

~

Residua!

Predictor
wriables

Mediator
variables

Figure 4. t Final (Output) Path model for londholtlm with a fixed-term agreement (Victoria)
Note, Straight lino= vari.1b\e ,rr,m: ar,d curved linOJ= v,ri>blo com,l,11ions

105

Chapter 4: Fixed-term Agreement and Covenant
11,cestimaicd rcgmsion coefficients for the fin,l model and the correlations between the
vsri,blcs entered in the model arc ,hown in Appcnc!ice> 4.29 ond 4.30 respectively.
Foll, v,1ri,bles ha,·c a direct effect 011 lmdholders' ottirude to o permanent eovcnont
uptake:

'Restrictions',

'Con-intctest', 'Benefits',

snd 'Membership' (see

l'igmc 4.1).

'Mcmbers!tlp' and 'con-interest also ha,·e an indirect dfoet on sttirndcs to a pcnnancnt
covenant uptake, in both coses mediated through 'Restrictions'. Another thue vori,bb hove
only indire<:t effect: 'Valn~·loss', 'ConRatio', ond 'Knowledge'
,\ summary of the relative sucngtl,s ~[ the total effect of the variable ret:Uncd in the
final model is shown in Table 4 JO. Lsndholdm' attitudes to restriction, on land-u,e hove the
lnrgcst effe<:t, while the lC>·d of knowledge ohout pemunent covenants l,,s the ,m,llm total
effect.
Table 4. 10
Rdotivc strength of the total innuence ofpmlictm variables' in the output
p,th modcl, on attitudes to a permanent covcnont uptake among fixed-term agi-cem,m holders
in Victoria
Docrea,ing
mcng1hof
influcne<

'
•'
'

'

Victoria
\'ori,blc

,cstnctmn,
Con_in1crest
mcmbciahir
benefit,
VolueJo"
Corill,rlo
knm,1cd ,

Coefficient v:,luc

0.170
0.289
0.187
0.128
.Q.126
0.091

0.021

"11,c directions of the eocfficicms (sec Figure 4.1) inJicnte that the greater the number
of conservation org:misations to which a n· ·!''"'dent was affiliated (membership), or the
stronger d,e interest in long-term nature- c--•:ser,".tion (Con_int«est), the mote likely for
respondent 10 have a positive amrudc to pennsne.,t covenant uptake. In addition, the indirect
effect, of 'membership' and 'c,:,n interest' on attilu.1~, to • pennonent cm·cnant up.,kc shuw
that the greater the number of conseri;ation or1,smisatioos to •vhich a respondent W;tS affiliated,
or the stronger the interest in long-tcnn 11ature conservation the mo,e likely they were to ha,·e
a positive rnirndc to imposed mtrictions un lontl-use. '!bi, •vould lend lo inc,ca,cd likelihood
of, positive attitude ton permanent covenant uptake.
Increase in knowledge about pcnnoncm covonnnts corresponde<l to increased
likelihood of a gre,1cr perception of the benefits of a penmnent covenant and consecutlvdy to
an increased likelihood of o positive atcitude to a pennanent covenant uptake. In adJjcion, the
bigger the ratio of conservation area to total !and arc,, the less likely landholders were to
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perceive pennancnl CO"enant to !cad to loss in l,nd value, and con,ec:uti,·dy the m<>rc they
perceived

the benefits of a permanent rovenon~ Ths sequentially led to grcoter hkclihood of n

positive attitude 10 a permanent eo,·cnont uptake.
·11ic coefficient table (Appcmlix 4.29) shows that only tl,ree ,•ariob!es; 'Con_intmst'
'membership' nnd 'rcilrictions' were signiricant ,t p=0.05 in predicting d,c lsndholdc,-s'
attitudes to the uptnkc of a pcnnoncntcoven,m.
Table 4.1 l shows the ,omnt,ry of the lino! modd and the amount of variance thot was
shown in it. 32.7 percent of the vari,nce was cxplnincd in tl,c final patl, model. The outcome of

lit <>f the final model (,cc Table 4.12) confirm a

an analysis of variance carried out to test the
statistically ,ignific,m model fil

witl, an [' statistic of 13.401 at p:=0.01. Tiic independent

v,ri,bles thctcforc perform rcbtivc~·wdl in cxploinini; the v:,riacion in the dependent voriablc
'A1citudcs to a pcnn,ncnt covenant uprnke',
Table 4.11

Potl1 Model Summary (rtxcd·term agreement (Victoria))
A.Jju,i,,,I !l Si<l Euor of
tl,,E,timaoc

Change
Si,1iscic,
R Square FChange
ae Sig. f,
Change
Ch:1nge
.]5]
.]27
.594
.JSl
13.401
7
.00,
•· prcdic!Or ,·arial,l<,c (constant}, bcnofi1,, ConR01io, mcmhcr,llip, biowledge, Con__mtcre,!, Voluoj:,,
re,lriction,.
b. dependent ,•arial,lc: ,11itudes !u a porm,ncnt co,•onant up coke.

'

R Squm

s '"'"

""

·°'

Path Model ANOVA (fixed-term agreement {1/ictor:ia))

Sum of

s82.160
"""

"'

Mc,n

sI \.73'1
""'

'

Regression
7
13.401
,n
Re,idual
.876
ISO.MO
Toial
212.800
a. pro.Jiclm variable,: (constant), bcncfil!, Conl\atlo, ,ncmbcr,hip,
knowledge, Con_1111e1rn, V,lueJo", ic.irictiono.

"'

b. Jependcn! variable: ,ttitudcs to a p,rm,ncnt co,·enon! up toke.
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4.2.2 Fixed-term conservation covenant (Remnant Vegetation Protection
Scheme, Western A.istralia)
11,e variable rncfl:icient, of the first rog,cssion ano~sis for Uxcd-torm covtnruu
(\'Qestem Austnilia) rospondents using 'attitu<leo to a coveo.nt uptake' "' d,e dependent
vsrfabk arc shown iu Table 4.13. Onlr tl,rcc of the p«dictcd 1·ariables (sec Figure 2.1) were
rc~'lincd in the rnndd with n smi,tically signific,nt effect on the dependent 1·arioble.

Table 4.13
Coefficients rnblc for the first regression analysis for fo,c,J.1,nn covenant
(Westem Australia)
Rc1ai11 variables

Un>tanda«l,,,J
Cocfficjcnts

Sig.

Stondatdizcd
Codficicn1,

95'/,
Confidence

lnierval for B

'
'

(Constont)
Rcmiction,
Dencfir,
Vo!uc_los,
dependent varioble: atlitudc,

Octa

Std.

Lower Dound

E.no,
A\7

\.751

Upper
Dound

.072
.306
.071
.239
-.156
.060
-.201
10 pcnnoncnt covcn,nts "p1akc
.285
.222

4.195
3.915
3.113
-2608

.000

.000
.002
.010

.925
.143
.081
·.274

2.516
.427
.J64

.. ma

Table 4.14 ,hows the rogreosion output of three signiflcant voti,blcs, 'Con_interest'
<V,Jue_loss' and 'ConRatio', which were retained in the path model after regressing all vori,bles
that were pl'.t'dictcd to have ~n effect on h,sl!ictions' as the dcpcnJcnt vati.,b\c (sec Pigure.ll),

Table 4.14
Rcl,ined
,.,ri,ble•

Coefficient prcilictors for a1tituJ,, 10 restriction, of a pcnn,nem covenant
(fixed-1cnn covcn,nt {\Vcstcrn ,\um,Lia))
St:inrlrnli,cd
Coefficients

lln>1andardizcd
Coefficients

B Sid.Error
Beta
(Constant)
2.816
.3'17
Conjn1c,cst
.007
.J66
.315
V,lnc_lo,s
-.159
.OOG
-.190
ConRatio
-2.073E-O~
-.186
a. dependent v,n,blo: ,ttitudcs to rcsttictions oc, bud-u,c.

oo,

Sig, 95%Con!irlrncc lnteival for

n

7.474

4.719
-2.41)

-2370

.000
.000
.017
.019

Lower llound Upper Hound
.1.56]
2071
.447
.183
-.289
-'°29
,OlB
-.003

"The two ,·ati,bles shown in Table ,\.15 were retained in the path model after regressing
rrom 'benefits' as the dependent , ..,riablc the hypothesized predictor vati,blcs (sec l"igurcA.1)
from 'pcrc~'Prions of the benefits

or

a pennanent covenant'.

or

tbe retained variable,,

'Knowledge' (0.230) had the brgcr effect on mpondcnts' perception, of the benefit, of;
pcrm,ncnt coven,m.
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Tablc4.15

Coefficient predictor> for perception nf the benefit, of a perm,ncnt ccwcnont
(fixed-1crm covenant (Western ,\umali•))

Ro1,.i11cd
,·,n,btc,

Un,1,nJ,rdizcd

!I S1<I. farm

(Constant)
Kno,.]cdgc

J.063
.!76

Sig. %%Confidence lntcrv,!

Standmhzcd
Cocffidcn1,

Coofficicnt>

fodl

Low<r llound

Ueta

.396
.U6l
.071

.230

Con_in1erc"
.!47
.170
,. ,kp<n<lcnt v,ri,blc: perception cfpcm1,ncn1 co,·manl \,oncfil,.

5.211
2.7"14
2.05R

"'"

.oo,

.0-12

1.280
.050

""'

Upper

'"-"
2.R46
,301
.288

The final path model for fi:<ed-tcnn cove11ant (\"l;1cstcrn Austr,lis) respondents
illustrnted in Figure 4.2 wos derived from estimated regression cocffidcnts (sec Appendix 4.31)
and the corrdotion, between ,·arioblc, (sec ,\ppcmlix 4.32). Three nrialile< had• direct effect
on the lnndholders' attitude, to a permanent covenant upmkc: 'Benefits', 'Restrictions', and
'Value-loss', In addition, 'Value-loss' hod an imlirect effect on londholdm' al!itudcs !o a
pcrmsncm covenant uptake, which was mc,.liatcd thmugh 'Restriclioos'. 'l11rcc variables:
'ConRatio', 'Con-imacst' nnd 'Knowledge', onlr had indirect effect, on lsndholders' attitudes
to a pcm1011ent connant uptake (Figure 4.2).
The effect of respondents' interest in long·tenn nsmrc conservation on auirudcs to
restrictions on land-use (0.366) wn, bigger than it, effect on respondents' petccp,;ons of tl,c
benefits of a pem,anent c,wcnant, ond twice ss big ss that of the ratio of conservatlon aren to
total land area (0. \8Ci) on attirudes 10 restrictions on land-use.
'11,c directions of the rcg«ssion C<>efficicnts show tba! tl,c gre1tcr the interest in long·
term n•turc con,~rr.11ion d,c greater the likelihood of landholders to pcrcch·e covenants to
have bcadits, and the greater the likelihood that they do not mind resuicti@s on lond-usc. ln
rum, the greater the subjects pcrcci,·ed cu,·cnonts to have bcneli:a o, the more they did not
mind ,c,triction, of land-use, the more likely they were to hove• positlS'c ottitudc to d,e uptake
of a permanent cm·cn,m. Similarly, th~ greater tlic level of knowledi:c a landholder had obnm
permanent covcnonts, the more likely they were to percei,·e co,·cnartts to h,wc benefits over
other mechanisms and, in rum, the more like!)· they were to have a posili,·e attitude to o
covenant uptake.
As the rntio of conservation area to torn\ l,nd area increa,cs, landholders' perception
of loss in lond volue was more likdy to decccosc, snd they were likely to hove• more positive
attirude to restriction, on !ond-usc. In tum, decreasing perception of loss in l,nd value, ond
more positive attimde to restrictions were more likely lo lead to a positive tli,n negotive
attitude to a pcrmonenr covcnan, uptokc.
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Figure 4. 2 Finol (Output) Poth model for fi~cd-tcnn covenant landholders in Western

Australia
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A summary of the rclati,·e su:cngth of total effect of the varfob!e retained in the final

model is shown in Table 4 16. Similar to fixcd-tcm1 agreement holder, in Victoria, or the
explanatory nrisb!cs in the fin,! model, bndlwldc,s' attitudes to restrictions on land-use have
the largest dfec~ while the le,·d or knowledge about pcrm:u,ent covcnanu has the srmllest

total effect
Table 4. 16 Relative importance of pmlic\or variable,' total influence in the output
p•th models on suitu<k, to a permanent covenant uptake among fixed-term coven mt
and ni,otccment holdc,s in Victorio and Wc,tcm Austrn!i,.
Wcst<m Australia
\'ari1h1c
C<><ffid<nt nlu,

Dccreo,~,g mength of

influcnc~
rcOlric<inn,
\',La,
Con Ratio
Con_Ulterest
bonefilO

'
'

-"'"

0.275
-0.248
0.2.JO

knowlcd e

0.1911
0.158

'·"'

The 6nal model shown expfo.in, only 25 pmcnt of

~1e

vari,nee (fable 4.17).

Ncvcrthdess, there is a good mode! fit with an F st,ici,tlc of &52 that

WllS

significant at

p=0.001 despite the low explained vnri,ncc, as shown in Table 4.18.
Table 4,17

Path Model Su,nmn<y (fmcl·tcnn covenant (Western Aus tr.ilia))

Chong,
Stalistic,
R Squotc F Chango
an
Sig. F
Chang,
Cha11gc
.282
.282
.249
\.10
8.518
.000
.531
a. pu:tlktnr,, (cnns,anl), bcncrit;, restriction,, knowledge, \'.Juo_lo;s, Con_inter<S!, Con Ratio
b. dopcndwtvori,blc: ottin,de 10 pcrman,mcovc11mt up11kc.
R R Square 1\djumd R

S

UOIC

Std. Error of
the E,timotc

'"
""

'

Table 4.18

I's th Mode! ANOV ,\ (fixed-term co,·en,nt (\Vcstcm Australia))

,,

Mc,n Squorc
Sum of S9u,rcs
10.303
8.518
61.~18
Rosidua!
157.24-7
1.210
To111
219.0uG
a. predictors: (constant), benefit>, «srriction•, kno11,lcdgc, \'iluo_lo.,, Con_in1c«S1, Confutio
b. dcpcnd<nt ,.,ri,blc: ot1itudc to permanent ca~cnmt up1okc.
Rcgtos,ion

"
""
'"
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4.2,3

Summary and conclusions
11,e order of importance of indi,·idual variables, in tcnn, of their effect on

!ondholders' attitudes to uptolrc of a pennancnt covenant, shows thor t!,eir ;1ttitudcs to
,c,lrictions on land.use rated hjghcst and th cir lcvcl of knowledge about prnnanent covenant,
rated lowest in both Victorio nnd Western Austrn\ia.
The main differences bctwcen the two States were the order of strength of t!,e model
variable influences on attitudi:s to a permanent covenant nptakc. Although in both Stoics
!andho\dcri attitude, to restriction, were the factor with 1hc greatest inflncncc, "unit chsnge in
Sltitudes to restriction, yields a smaller change in animde, in Western Au,tniLia than in
Victoda. A unit change in interest in !ong-tcnn nature conservacio11 had a sigttir.cantly larger
magnitude of chonge '"' !sndholders' Sltitudc, to a pennancnt covenant up:ake in Victoria 1b,n
in Western ,\u,trn!ia. Conversely, " unit change in perception, of tl,e benefits of a pennanent
covcnsnt had a significantly lorgcr magnitnde of ch.1nge on lsndholdcrs' attitudes to a
pcnnancnt covenant uptokc in Westcm ,\u~trnlia thnn in Victoria.

1bc final pat!, mode! for fixed-1cnn agreement (Victoris) explained a rclati,·cly
moderate proponion of the vorinncc. "lbc path model for Victoria (R' sdj= 0.327) explained
more uf tl1e ,·sriancc than that ofWe,tem ,\u.<trol.ia (IV adj=0.249). Ncverlhc\e.s, ill mcruawr
varisb\cs in the ~no! poll, model for \Ve,tcm Aumalio were stotistically ,ii;nific:mt ss direct
predictors of landholders' attitude, to " covenant up rake at 95 percent confidence level.
Despite the explained relotions!tip, between the mediator v;riable, ond landho!<krs'
attitudes to " pcrm1nent CO\'cnsm uptske by the predictor variables, mnch of the ,·arisnce in
scs·cnl of the relationships wos unaccounted for ,s noted by the residuals. lbc section that
fo!lows contains the results of quolitati,·c infonnstion gathered from landholders. his aimed at
providing further explanation of the unaccounted variances in the pat!, model as wcl! as to
present the views of landholders on the necessary incentives from Local and Stole
Governments for cncouroging the upuke ofpennanent co,·cnants.
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Section Three: Results of Qualitative Analysis

lntioduction
llti, section contains a summary content analysis of wriucn comment, by the fixedrmn agreement (Victoria) sud the fixed-term c".vmant (\Vcstern Austr.ilia) respondents on the
actions and poLici0$ that tl,e State and local ~vemments should put in place to encourage
private fandholders to toke up " permanent co,·enant in Victoria and Western Australi,. ·11,e
procedure used in the qusLiLitivc anal pi, is reported in Chapter 2
The aim of this scctio!l is to csrnblish further the ncccsiary incentive measure, far
promoting rbc uptske of permanent covenants and to tease out further explanotions of t:,e
relationship, and unaccounted vsrfancc in the path onal)'sis model, for respondents in Victoria
and Western AustraLia. The detailed content on which these summaries were based is presented
in Appendices 4.33 to 4.37.
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Views ofFil<ed-tcnn agreement (Victoria) landholders on the State
Government policies or actions as incentives

4.3.1

Fixed-term ,grccment holders in Victoria (sec Toble 4.19 ond detailed table in
Appendix 4.33) for motivating landholders' vohmrary uptake of perm,nent covenants
recommended eight sctions and policy directions by St•te government The la,gest number of
respondents cited 'economic and financial assistoncc' followed by 'provision of information
ond ,worcncss obout pcmtoncnt covenants'.
Table 4.19 Views o( fixed-tcmt agreement (Victoria) rcspomlcnts 011 the State
Govcmment policies or action, as incenti,·c, for permanent covenant
uprnkc
Incentive group (fot~l number of

No. or

reopondent.o

Dedred action

•••pondento)
·------~-----~---------~-----Economic •nd Fin•nml inccnt1vco
52
Fin,nci>l ,,,,otance ond ,ub,idi.,
(69)
n
Tuinccn1ive
-,.-,-o-~-,o-,-.-w-,-,w-,-,-,.-,-.-.-o-,-,----,-.------,.-,-.-~-,,-,-.-••-,-,.-.-.-.-,-.-,-.-.-,-,-.-,.-,-.-..---

6

Tcchnical ouppo<t •nd od,'ice (29)

Enli,1 public p><Ucipation

14

A.Jsicc

8

Suppoll weed ond vermin ond fire control

4

,\,.,.t with rnotcri,l

Policy ond l.<:g,l ,r,.ngemcn!S (17)

17

L>.bour oupport
En,ct legi,htion ,nd cnfar« rcgulotions

Recognition (\I)

?

Rocognition ond encouragement

~c-,-m",-,-,-.,-,,-,~m-,-,-,-.".",-,-.,-,~~---.,

Financial compon,ation

t.<:adrnhip (BJ

B

!.<ad by <-<ample

O,g,nizotionol onJ ,dmini,1radvc
a,,.ngomonls (8)

5
2

Reduce bu«oucracy
/\"uramo ,b<iut co,•en:rnl
M,di,tion

4,3.2

Views ofFb.:cd-tcnn agreement (Victoria) landholders on the Local
Government policies or actions as incentives
Nine ,crions •nd policy directioos arc shown in Toole 4.20 (sec detailed table in

,\ppcnilix 4.34) and were dtcd b)' respondents on what local government., should do to
motivote

landholders'

volunt>'}'

upi1ke

of permanent

covenants. Similoc

to

the

«commendation, gi,·en by !snJholde,s on the approp!tltc action, by Smc Gm·emment, the
brgest number of «•pondcnts cited economic and finoncia' incentives in the form of nte
rebates and fin•ncial assisto.ncc. Technical support wos the second most popubr incentive
group. The support was requested for in respect to labour ond machinery, a, wcll os advice on
conservation issue,.
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Appendix 4.35 shows the rcosons ciicd by a ,mall cross-section of respondents for
their lock intcresc in pennoncnt covenants. 11,cy include o perception of bet!cr· altcnrntivcs to
permanent covenants, ,elf-confidence in their ability 10 conserve wid10ut a pennanent
covenant, ntistrust of tbc governments' intention,, and lack of confidence in !he effectiveness
of covenants, and perception of interference caused by the cm·cnanl on their future goo!, and
objectives for !he land.
Table 4.20 Views of fixed-term aircement holders (Victoria) on the ncccss:uy policies
or actions by Joe,] !;OVernmcnt as incentives for a permanent covenant
uptake
lnccmivc group (foial num' er of
,e,pondent,)

No of
tcapondcn!S

Desired action

Economic and l'iorn!lml lnccnti,•e, (69)

fu!to, «blte

Technical, labour support and ad,icc (36)

•"
w

"w

Ad,icc and tochnkal ,upport

lnfom,,iion and ..\w11cl\cs, (26)
Polig.• and Legal or~.ongemcn1> (23)

"

Educo1ion and aw:uer,e"

Con,ervali<>n lcodcrship ""d tn;nagcmcnt

Financial as,jstan«
Labour and macltlncty pro,i,ion
!nfom,auon on co,·cn,nt,

11

,\ppmpriate policies

12

Enfo,ccmonl ofreg,1btion,
Consen•,i,°" lcoder,hip

9

~''-'-'---------------:','------';'c",':":''c'c'upport for con,,rvalion
R<cognition and encour.,gemcnt (~)
9
Recognition of effort,
Organintion1l ond odmini,uati,·e
orrangement, (S)

Compen,,lory me'"'"' (5)

4.3.3

Pb,rning ond moni1on11g regime,
!nfrmrucnuc m:Untc.n,ncc
5

Compcmate or huy ~ack land

Vfows of Fixed-term covenant (Western Australia) landholders on the
State Govcmmenl policies or actions as incentives
Respondcnl!l in Westen, Austrnlio cited eight policy direction, !hat the State

government should use to motivate !he voluntary up1okc of pcnnnncnt covenant, (sec Table
4.21 nnd dctoilc<l table in Appendix 4.36). In concurrence with the views of respondents in
Victoria in terms of popularity, the largest number of respondents cited economic and financial
provisions as the desirable incentives for permanent covenant uptake. \'(ihile !he provision of
compensatory measures was the fifd, mo,t popular incentive for State Government action in
Victoria, ir wns the second most popular incentive mc,surc for p<rmanent covenant uptake in
Western Australia. Infonnotion and awareness a, an incentive for penn:tnent covenant uptake
by State Government was placed eigh!h in popularity.
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Table 4.21
View, of facd-tcrm covenant (Wcstcm AustraU•) respondents on the
State Go, cmmcnt policies or aci.ions ss incentives for petmancnt coveno111 uptake
Incentive group (total number
of respondents)

No or
respondent•

Economic oc,d fin,nciol inccnti•••
(69)

22

Compensation mcwm, (32)

"

O,goclizalional ond ad,nmistntl•e
,mngemcn1' (18)

'

'

Flo.<1ble ond sunplc covemn! proces, ,nJ
mochani,m
Smomlin, m,n,gemcnt ond coonlin,tlOnor
con,e,,.•Olion p1ogromo
l'rofco,ion,l ,d,ice and guidance
Removal ofbnruucracy

6

Buy orf!.nd
Vcmlin conttol

S
5

Pto,notion of covcnonts and con,uvotlon
Rccog,ution and appreciation

'I 3

Lond purcha,c (13)
Technical, labour support and oJ'<ice

'"

lnfonn,Uon and Aw:arcncn (5)
Re<ognition and oppredo1ion (5)

4.3.4

Fm,nCW support
Fencing cost,
Tu concmion,
Compcns,ti,m fo, \md taken out or
pro<luclion
Compcmolc local go,·ernmcnt,

26

Vkws ofFixcd-1cnn covenant (Western Australia) L'\ndholdcrs on the
Local Government policies or actions o.s incentives
Table 4.22 shows six brood policy direction, citct! by ninety-seven respondent, on the

incentive, thot the Loco! Government in Western ,\ustralia should put in pbec in order to
motivate the voluntary <iptal.:e of pcrmoncnt covcnoots.
T~blc 4.22 Views of fixcd-!<nn cnvcnant holders (\Xlcstem Au,tralio) on the Looi
Govcmrncnt policic, or octions os inccnU,·cs forpctmsncnt co,·cnont
uptake
Incentive group (total
number oftcspondcnts)

No of
respondent•

Dcsi(cd action

Economic ond financiol inccn1ivcs

57
8

Rateo «b.ie

"''

Technical, and ,d·,ice (15)

Adminimotion, m,nagcment, and
plmninB (7)
Jnformotion and owarenc" (6)

Variou, kind• of finandal support
Reduction in bnd tax ond tu incentive,
As,istoncc \\ith vermie1 md weed connol
Tcchnic,1,npport
Advice
Proactive role in m·an,gcmcnl ond pl,~ring

'•
'
'•

Coort!in,tion

'

Jnformotlon and puhlidty
Public recognition

Recognition ond approci11ion (4)
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Similar to the views of respondents in Vicwci,, economic ond linnncinl support was
the most populir inecntfrc measure cited by fixed-term covcnont (\Vesten, Auotralio)
respondents. 'The second most popular incentive measure cited
for local government

!O

by rc.,pondents wos the need

prm·idc technical and odvisor)-' support.

Other views presented b) fixed-term covenant holders (\X1cstcm Australia) on
permanent co,•cnants arc shown in Table 4.23 (sec de1ailcd table in Appendix 4.37). A crossscction of respondents vic,w there should be no role accorded to local !,'OVemmcnt in issue,
relating to pennancnt covenants no private land. Likewise, • segment of respondents was
npprehcnsivc or preferred not participate in ptnnanent c<>Ycnonts.
Table 4. 23 Rcasons for decline to take up a permanent coven,nt among fixed.term covenant
(Western Austr11io) rcspondenls
View,
catc oric,
No role for
Local
Go,·cmment

View
Non.
pottkipOIO')'
role for loco!
Gm·emment

'"

''"
Non·
invokcmcnt
covcn:1nt, (30)

•

Specific commrnts

•

~ttlo fu»nce O\'Otlahlc fnr this work

•

mponSLbihtyofLCDC,
not ,c,pom1ble enough with their mm conservation need,
thcii involvement likely to impoct ou rate l")'er,
fcder:il go,·emmont's responsilJLlity to provitlc funtl, Of IX<

•

i,,cen1i,•e,

Noto
covcn:lnt (27)

•

Cauriou,
about

•

olread1· hov,, a largo job coonlimling agdrultore
b<nefi1, of 11,e co1·rnoi,! not opp,rcn!
opprchon,ivc ab!mt a hkeW1ood of co,·cn,nts changing
cu«cnt inlOntion in furnte
une<rl,;niy ,bout the LU core which might nor fa-our
co,·cmnr,
remo,·,l of the abilicy 10 d,onge bnd-use over time if there i,
• need to di,nge
po,.ible chongc in p,rceplion, of conscr,•ation 1n foturn with
ch1nge in ownrnhip.
sec co,'Cn,ni,.,, form of extremism in conocrv,tion
•pprohcn,i,•, aboot lass in value md pmduc<ivity of property
eliminate n»nogcmc,,t op1ions tn the futut<
porceptio3 oflo,s of control owr Lind and therefore a
prof«cncc fork" <0<1trolli"g fo:cd-lotrn ogroemont,
p«ccp!ion of tnodcqu.,t< nature con,m-,cion ,·ol,ics on tl,e
propcr,y lo w..rr.lnt, permanent em·enaflt
lack of perception of the purpo>c of prc,erving na,ive
,·egetacion
landm<"Jl<JS ,re quile np,hle ofhmdlie1g their OU"J\ land in a
mpon,ihle m,nn0<
caution, bec,usc of disappoinling csporiencc with cuncnt
fo«d-tclm covenont 1\r;cncy

COV<filJ1"
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4,3,5

Summary and conclusion
Landholders in Victoria and Western Austrnlia sugge,ted nine incentive measUtcs and

actions for Stat~ ond Local governments to implement in order to motivate the uptake of
permanent covcnonts. These indude<l economic and financial incentives, informotion and
aworencss, technical support and ad,·ice, policy and legol arrangements, competlsatory
measure,,

recognition,

leadcuhip,

organiutional

and

administrnrive

orrangements,

conservation leadership 011d manaHement, on<l lond pll!drnse. OveraU, economic and financial
incentives by State an<l Local governments' were tl,e most popular among respondents.
Provisinn of information about covenants and th cir awarer~ss was rated higher in popularity in
Victoria than in Western Australia.
In both States, non-financial incetltives were highly popubr. These include provision
of infonnation ond awareness about covenoms, and recognition ond appreciation of t!1e
conservation efforts made by privote londowners on beholf of tl1e pnblic. It is olso evident
from tl1e res;,onses thot rcspondems viewed good odministntion ond rnanogcmcnt of
conservation programs by both Stale an<l locol gm·ernrnen!s as an important incentive for
promoting permanent covenants.
Compensatory mcm,ces "'""' cited in both States os incentives for promoting
permanent covenant uptake. These were panicula,ly in reference to the cove.:ing of the
foregone potentiel use of land for mcomc gcnerstion and the forfciture of rights of nse ofland
for other r,nrposcs. In Western Austrnlia specifically, a cross section of respondents viewed the
bu)·ing of area, v.ith high conservation values by the government and thcir subsequent sale to
interested conservotion minded individuols as the app,opriotc mechanism to accompany the
placement of permanent co,·cnants on private land,.
A large cross-secnon of respondents in Western ,\nslnllio ond a smolkr but relevant
cross section in Victocio did not \\ish to p>tticipotc in pemiancnt envenom,. Some of the
reason, cited by respondents for the lack of interest included a concem for loss of control over
their property and cconnmic disodv,ntages. Others iciduded the lock of adequate
encouragement from govemment, lack of eqnity, lack of flc,tlhility in

:1

covenant, and a view

that perma,ient covenants were a wrong apptoach to nature consc,vation on privote lands.
This section ha, summarized tl,e views oflandboldc<S on the actions and policies that
the State ond locol Governments con take co promote the upuke of permanent covenants on
private land. This information, together with other views presented on pennancnt covenants,
provides insight into conditions

~,at

landholders view •• necessary for the uptake of permanent

cm·enonts. It olso helps to explain much of the un,ccounted variance (u,siduals) on the effect
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of the jodcpcn,Jent variables on landholders' ottitutles to a permanent covenant nptokc
observed in the output patl, motlels for Victoria and Western Ausnolio. The infonnotion also
providco insight into reason.< behind sonic of the observed perceptions and attitude, to tl,c
up toke of• pennonent covenam expressed by a majority oflondholdcrs in both Srntrs.
11,c secrion that follows contains the p,climinacy discussion of the 6ndings presented
in this chapter.

Section Four: Brief discussion of the main findings

Iuuoduction
In this secrion, we provide an overview of tl,e main factors tl,at influence the
pe1ceptions ond attitude, of londholdcrs to the upt.ake of a pcmunent covenant, which
emerged from the preceding sections of this chapter. A eompori,on is matlc between Victot:i,
ond \Vcstcrn Australia and the possible explanations for the influences of cod, factor on
lamllrnldcrs' attimtlcs to the uptake of a permanent covenant. A more detailed discussion of
these findings with respect to findinb" eontoine<l in the previous and \atct chopters is pr•widcd
in Chapter(,.
"The h)1,otht:sis in thl< chapter~' thot there arc no ,na,kcd differences between Victori,
ond \l;'e,tcrn Australia in respect to lontlholden.' socio.demogr.1pltic and socio-economic
situations, and no diffcccncc in their nrious ottitudes to nature conservotion aud permoncnt
covenants. furthermore, 1herc arc no differences in the influence of these variables on the
attitudes to the uptake of, pcnnancnt covenant by Lwdholdcrs between the two States. 11,e
soid analysis will ,,w.blish whether the possession of either of the two conservation
monagcment n~reements in Victvrio and \l;/cstcrn Australia h,s marked difference, on
londholdc,'s otlitudcs pcrm,ncn1 covenant ond thcir likelihood of mking up a pcmuncnt
covcnont.
The tlependent nriable used to assess landholders' \ikclibood of toking up a p=•ncn\
covenant is their ottirudcs to tl1c uptake of a pcrmonent covenant, which was mea,urcd by 1h,ir
,csponsc to the ,t.atemem "l woultl not consider a permanent covenant , ·,dcr •nr
circnms1,m:e."
The output path models of both Victoria and We stem Austrnli.1 dcady dcmonstnro.J
that many factors that were hypothesized to influence !a11dholdcrs' artitutles to a pennancnt
covenant uptake directly or indirectly did not enter th~ model. This confirm, that tl,crc is no
conclusive evidence of th cir influence on londholdcrs' decisions on the up:okc of a pemuncnt
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covenant as is expL'l.ined by tl,e respective model~ The proportions of bndho!dcr$' respomcs
to specific inquiries about permanent covcn,nts and their comments on the desinble
incenti'lcs or actions for motivating their uprnke ofpcnrune,u covenant cl;i.rify or explain some
of the obsetved trends in the path models.

4.4.1

Attitudes to rcsuictions on land-use- Property rights
Restrictions on land-me arc primarily rclsted to the concept of property right,: They

arc the strongest dctenniaant oflar,dholdcrs' attitudes to the uptake of a p=nancnt covenant
in both States. Landholders that have negative a11itudcs on reduced property rights preferring
the non-imposition of limitation of use of th cir lond even for nature con.,cr,,ation, arc unlikely
to vi"'v pennanent covenants f.wounbly. Landholdci,;' interest in long-term natU<c
conservation is the ,inglc lar~cst factor witl, an influence on attitudes to the reduction of
propcny rights ir, both States. It occounts for a third of the tot;tl influence.
11,crefore, an inc,.,ase in landholders' interest in long-term nature conservation in
both States would h,we a significom change in bndholdct>' attitudes to reduced property rights
and in tum thcir attitudes w a pc.mancnt covenant uptake. Landholder$ that have an intere.t in
long-term nature conser,,ation arc of courSc more likely lO understood the need for a restriction
on the use of the land under nature consen·ation than those d10t do not have an interest. 11,e
former, therefore, would be more positive about taking up a consen•ation mechanism that
incotpontcs such reminions than the hue,.
In Victoria in addition

10

the influence of the lovd of interest in long-term nature

comervation, auitudc, to a reduction r,f property right, ore also influenced by the frequency of
the landholders' associ,tion or afftliotion with conservation groups. However, tl,e situ,tion is
different in Western Australia where the level of interest in long-term n•mrc conservation,
perception of loss in property value as a result of placing a permanent covenant on i~ ond !he
proportion of the conservation area to the total area of the property all influence lnndholdcrs'
attitude, to reduction of property rights. Landholder, that have bigger proportions of their
properly under conscrvotion arc more likely to bove a positive attitude to reduction of property
rights than other$ arc.
'11,e inOucnce coused by the affiliation with conservacion group, on attirudes to uptake
of pcrmsoent cm·cnant in Victmio is butl, direct ond indirect. The indirect influence mediated
through landholders' nttitudcs to the reducrion of prop my rights indicates that the greater the
number of consctvation org.mi,otions • landholder ha< membership, to, tl,e more that the
landholder is likely to hove a positive mtimdc to the reduction of propcrt)' rights. Association
with conservacion group,, therefore, cxplnins nttitudcs to tl,c reduction of property rights in
Victorio. A significant correlation between affiliation with conservation groups and interest in
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long·l<nn naru,e conservation suggesos thnt the nutnber of conservation group, thot a
landbo\dec ii associated wich is rebcod of their level of interest in long·tern, n,m,c
conservation. "llrns, interest in long-term nature conservation may inchrec~y occounts for port
of the innucnce of affiliation or assodotion with conocrvation group on auitudcs to the uptokc
ofo pcnnanc'lll covenant.
The correlation obser,,cd bctwcc11 larecr conscrvotion orc':ls ond interest in long-term
nature comcrvation in \Vcstctn Austrntia is the probable explanation of the innuencc of the
ratio of conservation area lo total land area on attitude< tu property right<. TI,e,e is a ,trong
suggestion that positi,·c attitude, to a reduction of propcrty rights witl, increasing rntio of
conscr,,ation arc• to the size of tl,e property is indirectly refoted to the degree of interest in
conseivotion. "lliis indirect rebtionship shows• greater interest in consctvation by fondholdc,s
who hove • bigger conservation arco to property size rntlo than those ,...;th a smaller
conservation arc• to property size ratio.

4.4.2

Perception of covenant benefits
l'erccprions of the benerit, of• permanent covenant over those of fixed-term scheme

arc the second and 1hird strotigcst detenn.inant of landholders' attitudes to the uptake of a
permincnt covenant in Virtorio ,nd Western Austrnlia, respectively. L:mdholders in Western
,\umolia were less convinced ,bout the benefits of a coven om over cl,cir fl~ed-tenn covenant
thon laodho\ders in Victori,1. Furthem,orc, a unit increase in tl,c level of knowledge about
permanent covenants has • much bigger inOuencc on perception of cl,c benefit< of a
pctrnmcm co,·enant in \Vcs tern AustrnLi, than in Victoria.
Con finning the added benefits of a permoncllt coven mt over the fixed term covenant
would lead to a bigger change in ottimdcs to a pcnnancnt connont uptake in Western Auslrnlia
thon in Victorio. This is possibly because !andholdc,s in Victoria arc more content witli tl,cir
fixed term agrcctnent, having entered it vo\untorily and in most instance, wicl, " choice
between it and a permanent envenom than lomlholdcrs in Western Au,trali• that mo,tly took
up• fixcd-:,m, covenorit under obligation from tl,e gov eminent.
Perception< uf los, in land ,·,lu" hove twice os greot an innuence on landholders'
perception of the benefits of o covenant in Vicloria dian level of knowledge about permanent
covecian1. Thu,, change in lontlholders' pcrcq,tions of the benefits of a permanent covenant in
Victoria would most i1nporrnntly rc9uirc one to address their perceptions of loss in land value
as result of placing• permanent covenant on i~ To do so, one would need to consider two
factors that influence the perception of loss in land value in Victoria namely the level of
knowledge obout permanent CO\'cnanlS and the rotio of comcrvotion ore• to total lond ..:ca.
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1l1e influence of the latte, is correlated to lantlholdc.,' interest in long-term nature
comc,vorion.
Lindholdcrs th,t have a high conscrntion orca r.uio and in effect a gr~,ater inte<0,t in
long-tenn nature conservation than those with a ,miller conscrvotion oreo ratio were lc,s ~kely

to pcn:oive a pennoncnt covenant to csuse • loss in lsnd value. 11,e issue of loss in lmd volue
has been recognized snd addressed recently through amendment to Feder.I Tux legislation

(forom, Ta.~· Assmmml Ad /997 p11rJ11a11I lo lh, Taxalio,1 LJ1ws A1.1111d,11ml Ari (l\1o. 8)
200)). furtl1cnnore, se,•cr:tl bes! authorities in ,\ustralio (e.g. 11,c Shire of Augusta-M,rg,ret
River in Western Austrslia, and Brisbane Municipal Council in Queensland) arc already
providing tax reha1es on land under a covenant. Increasing knowkdgc about pcnn,ncnt
covcn,nts in duding tl,c provision of new information such os availability of tax rebate, would
reduce tl,e perception of los, in bnd v.!ue cau.,cd by placing" permanent cm•cnant on it, and
in effect directly incrco,ing landholders' perception, of the benefits of a permanent covcnam.
In both States, landholders' perceptions oftl1c benefit, of covcnsnts have a signific,m
effect 01, thci, likelihood to take np a pcm,one"t covenant, which in both S1otcs is inOuene<d
by their kvcl of knowledge nbom pcnnancnt co,·cn,nts and their perception, of the impact of
a covenant on land value. The lcvd of interest in long-term notnre conscivalion also Im on
ioOucncc on the e~tcnt to which a l,ndholdcr pcrcci,·ed the betie~ts of a pemianent covcn,nt
in Western Australia. !n bo;h Stales, laodholdcrs who sho"'" li11lc or no inlcrcst in lotig-term
oaturc conservation, anJ/or those 11,oi perceived covcrmm to lead to loss in land value ore
more nnlikcly lo pcrc,1vc the bencfils of a perm,nent cm·ensnt, and in turn less Likely than
others toke up a pcrnm,ent cm·cn,nt.
111e effect of, unit cha11ge ie1 the perception of loss in l,nd value on perception ofihc
benefits of a covc11ont is almost r,,,ice as big in Vic1oria as Western ,\11s1rn~a. This difference
c:an be e,plaincd by difforcnccs in 1hc ratios of conserv,lion area to the total a,ea of 1he
properties. Evidently, tl,e majority of the prnp«ties in Victoria haw a higher conservation ,re,
ratio than in Wcitcm AustraLla. Pl,cing a covenant on a conservotion arcs witl1 a high rntio
would !cod to perception of o lsrger percentage loss of the torn! property v,luc than when a
covcnonl is placed on properties witl, o low con,er,.·acion area rncio. ,\ccordiogl)·, the import on
lsnd vilue is rnme Ekdy to be app,rcnt in Victoii, where tl,c percentage los, in ~uc «htivc
to totol value of the !and is !,,rester 1h,n in Western Auscrnli,.

4.4.3

Knowledge and Aw3rcncss of a pc1m3ncnt covcn3nt
Contrnry to expectation, the kvcl of knowledge about permanent coveoanls does not

have as l,rge an influence on londltoldcrs' atlitudes to uptske of a permanent covenant uptake
in eitl,e, Victoria or Western Australio as other factors retained in the p~th modcls. However, it
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ho, on in!bencc on the extent to which landholder., perceived th• bendirn of• permanent
covenant, with a grtator influence in Westem J\u.,w.,.lia than Victoria. Level of knowledge
about permanent covenants al,o has inlluence on Victorin landholders' perception, of loss in
!and value because of p!acinr; • permanent covcnont on it. However, this influence i,
,ignificontly smaller d»n tirnt b)· unesphine- factor.,.

TI,e wc<1kncss of the level of knowledge about permanent covenants rdacivc to other
variable, in explaining attitude, to a pcm,ancnt co,·emnt uptake can be onributed to the
$ignificontl)' large prnportion of londholdcrs who already know about permanent covemn!,.
The notion ii that an)' fnrther increase in knowledge about covenints would h,vc a limited
impoct on their attitudes to covenant uptake.

J\ difference is obsers·ed between the tvm States in respect to the desire to know more
about permanent covenont, - a large cross-sectio,i ofl,ndho\dets in \Vestem Ausu:ilia did not
desire to know more •bout permanent covcn,nis wh.ile in Victoria the mojotit)' desired lo
know more abom permanent covenonts. TI,e 1,ck of desire to know more about permanent
envenoms in \Vestem Au,tralio can be ottributcd co thcir ossoc:iotion of a permanent envenom
with fixed-term covenant, which is viewed negatively by some. 11,i, is bcc:m,e it is in moll)'

cases non-voluntary, but taken up a, a condition for receiving a peon.it to clear or to d~-vdap a
portion ti,eir land Such a conditionnl grant 1,,, the effect of genenting" dislike of other
mechmtisms resembling d,e dishkcd scheme or :igtccrnent. In controsl to We,tco, Austnlio,
the Land for Wildlife Scheme in Victoria, which is voluntary, i, ~kely to attract landholder.,
who hnv" a greater interest in nomre co11servation than would the coerced ,chcmcs, In effec~
this leod, to the observed desire to know more about a pcnnancnt covenont as o consetvMion
mechanism in Victoria.

4.4.4 Social economic factors
11,e sinall or no debt obsm·cd in the majority of landholders in Vic tori• compared to
Western Australia is parJy annbuted to diffcronccs in the overage size of the properties
betv,eon the two State, and the moin form types whicb were opemed. Conuncrci•lly oriented
nod brgcr farms in Western Ausmilia tl1an Victoria mean that landholder, in Wemm Austr,lio
were more like!)' to have om\ require brger finoncial outlar and more rnech•nized farm
op«ario11s, thus the larger lc,:cls of debt than Victoria. There i, evidence of the possible
influence of debt, osiessed os a single foctor, on landholders' ottirude, to perrn,nent covenant
in Wc,rem Austnli,, which show, increo,ing level of debt to coincide with dccm,sed
likelihood of o permanent covenant uptake. Nevertheless, such influence is not rcplicoted in
either Victoria or W<atcrn Au,trali, when the influence of debt loo cl on the likelihood to toke
up a permanent covenant uptake is assessed jointl)' with other foclOrs.
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These ob,erYations suggested that debt, conoidered scpnratcly from other varia~!~s. i,
likely to have an inOucncc on aninidcs to the uptake of a permanent covcmmt uptake only after
a cerr..in level of debt tlm is o!ready reached by a majority of landholders in Western Australia
but not in Victoria. However, this inOuence become, obscure in the presence of other
variables.

4.4.S

Equity in conservation covenants
Vogel (1996) points out th•t people ore unlikely to implement or toke up

ctll'ironmcntal can,er:ation mcnsurcs for a public good asset where an improvement in its
quality requires the concerted action b)' others rothcr thon tl,c individuols ocdon. This view also
holds where the cost and benefits from such assets were not perceived as distributed equitably
,mong the bencf,ctors oftl,e conscn•ation outcomes.
Equity concerns have an imporrnnt inOucnce on bndho!dcrs' decision on octuol uptake
of a permanent covenant despite their no1Mtatisrically significant relationship witl, landholders'
attitudes to upt,ke of n permanent co,·enant in Wcitem Austnlio. ,\ bigger proportion of
l..ndholdcrs in W'estem Aum,lia than Victori, gi,·e importance to compcnsotion for forfeiture
of property tights over arens of land undo,• permanent covcn,nt. TI,c bigger propo,cion also,
expects a public contribution to the cost of noture conservation on pri,·ate land. It al,o expect,
"covenanting •1:cncy to cover the cost of toking up a permanent co,·cnont. 11,e differences in
p1oportions between the two States suggest thot landholdcts in Western ,\ustralia were more
responsive to equity for uptake of pennancnt co,·enant !hon were those in Victoria.
Compcnsotion a, equity for the toking op of a permanent co~enont as a single factor
had a srntisticolly significant inOucncc on anitudc, to the uptake of a pennanent co,·cnant only
in Victoria. J~,ndholdcrs ~,at strongly vic•,,cd tbe necessity for compen,,tion for land under a
permanent covenont were also more likely to have a negative attitude to taking up a permanent
covenant than were others. The propartiou of landholders with a fixed-tcnn ogreemcnl in
Victoria that were likcly to fall under this group is 36 percent. However, the inOucncc of
compensation a, equity is mosked when mher factors arc introduccJ in tl,c amlrsis.
Compcm,tion as equity, dicrefore, has

,n

inOucncc nn attitudes on taking up a

permanent covcn,nt in Victoria only when it i, considered separntc of other facto.s. Although
compensation o, equity ha, no signifiont itiflucncc on tl,e likelihood of a pcrmanen! covenant
up toke in \Vest em ,\ust.oli,, it would, ne,·erthdcss ha,•e an influence on tl1e actual upt~kc on o
permanent covcn,nt in 54 percent of fixed-term covenant holders in Wc,tcm ,\ustrnli,.
The demand for compensation a, equity in the uptake of• permanent covenant is in
pm a function of the londlmlde.s' need for ongoing financial support to undertake tl,e
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requirements of a permanent covenant anti their !"'·cl of intere,1 in long-term nature
conservation. Landholders that cxprcs, o mong need for ongoing financial support and lhooc
that have litdc int~rest in long-term n,rurc conservation arc more likdy to demond
compensation as e<juity for a pemiancnt conmmt uprnkc than arc others. The more
widespread demand for compcnsoci011 as equity in Western ,\u,1r:11i, lhan Victoria suggests
there ls lesser interest in long-term nature cmrncrvation among fixed-term covcnant/a6"<<ment
landholders in Western Au,tr:tlia than in Victoria. It olso suggests a grcoter requirement in
Wcstm, ,\ustrnlia for on-going finonci:t! support for conscn·ation undrr a permanent covenant
than in Victoria.

4,4,6

Incentives and pre-rcqnisitcs for covenant uptake
Most londholdcrs in both State, give impomncc to provision of on-b"".'ling fin:.li,cial

,uppon a. a prc·re<Jui,ite for ta~.ing up a pem,ancnt covenant. TI1ere i, dcady'~ :o,·el of
aw:iren·css about the financi:t! requirements associated with the uptoke of o permanent
covcnsnt, and• lock ofprcporcdness or i,iability to meet these requirement,.
Non-financial incentives by State, and Loc:t! Government, in either Stote would not
atlr:!ct as many Jondholdcrs to the upt,ke of pcm,ancm covenont, as would fmoncial
incentives. The larger proportion of landholders in We stem Austnlia than Victoria that hold
tltis view signifies lower sensitivity to non-financial incentives in Western Austrn!ia than in
Victoria. As long "' lmdholders fed constrained 10 undertake conservation by finonci:t!
limitations, non-financial incentive, w:ill not p,ompt them to take up conservation under temis
thot rtquire them to appwpriatc their own finances.
One explanation for the lack of greater scmitivity towar<ls tum-financial incentives in
Western ,\ustrn!ia thon Victoria is the "'l"Lrcment for fuuncial supp mt by a bigger ma1ori1y of
Jondholders ;,, Western Australia thon Victoria, am! differences in the economic acti,itie, on
the properties between the two Stotcs. In Western Au,i...Ha properties have, on avcn1gc, much
lrucgcr nature conser•:otion areas tlrnn Victoria ru,d would d1erefme requi<e more finonciol input
for ,cti,·itics such as fencing and weed control. Landholders in \Xlcstern Austr.1Ha, 1herefo,e,
arc more att<actcd to financial incentives ind kss 10 non-fimmci:t! incentives.
Almost half of tbc landholders in both States give a measure of importance to the
ability of o covenant to le,d to increa,cd public ,ccognitlon as a pre-requisite for uptake of a
covenant. ,\lthongh this would not present a prime r<>son for tl,e uptake of a permonent
covenant, it suggests th«e is on aptitude for public recognition among a relatively l,rgc
proportion of landholdm in both St.ates, which should be considci:ed and incotpon11c<l when
designing covenont progrnms.
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'The importance given by londholdcr, 10 different incentives, os prerequisite for
covenam up1:1kc has no significant relationship with thcir attitudes to the uptake of a
permanent cm·enant These incentives, however, point out the missing inb,redient> that can
motivate actual up toke of pennanent covenant when there is a posilive attitude to thcir uptake.
Rcg,mlless of the State, economic and fir,ancial incentives provided b)' State and Local
governments arc h)' far the most popub, meons for motivating !sndho!dern' uptake o • a
permanent covenant. l'rovision of infonnation about ptirno .. ~r:: cove~onts and creation of
their awareness by Stale ond locol govemmmts was roted highe, in popularity in Victoria thon
in Western Austroha. lnfonnotion and awareness a<c most useful in sh.,ping the right attitude
to the uptake of permoncnt covenant through thcir indirect inOuence on vorious pe:ccptions
and attitudes to pcnnsnellt covcnsnts.
Although non-linoncia! inccnli,·cs rote high i:1 pupulnrity in both States, their
effectiveness in promoting the uptake of a permanent covenant is subject to a number of
factors including the interest in long-tcnn nature conscrvstion. Efficient administrotion ond
management of conservation programs by bot!, State and local governments were important
incentives for promoting pe,monent co,·cnonts.
Irrcspcccive of the Stote, bndholdcr,' <lccisinn for actual uptake of pennanent
covenant rcvo!ve<l around a complex ~ct of factorn. The clements lh:!t must be adWessed in
order to motinte a positive ottitndc and uptake of covi:nsnts include inculcating an interest in
long-term nature comcrvation, addressing the issue of property tights, equity, and provision of
cconornic snd financial support In addition, increasing knowledge about permanent covenonts,
and streamlining of the monagemcnt of administratlon of private lsnd conservaliou schemes
arc i,quall)' imporm1t. ·n,c,c clement, arc discussed furthc; in Chapter 6. 11,c Chapter th"t
follows provide, the findings on landho!de" without • covenant or ogrcemem in \'(lestcr:n
Austulio. and Victoria, following the some "Ppro,ch in formot as the pmcnt Chapter.
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This chapter ro11faiw th, ji11di11J!J 011 fa11dhc!d1rr iff Virlontl a11d IV'rst,m A11;1wfia that do not
hm~ t1'9' fam1 ef ro111efVl1li011 rott11a11/ or agmmml Oii !heir proptttils. Th, fir,! Strlion pmmt1 lh1
dw:ripth~ Ji11di11gs (fmpm,d,; and proporliom), which inc/1,J1 sodo-demogmphir, 1ro110111ir, a,,d
affi/J1d11 to 11a/11rr: cormnVJHOll a11d p1mum1,1/ to1t11,m/1, and prop1rry charart,rislirr. The Ji11ding1
an prm111,d ill /1m11 ef 1/i, si111ilan'tiu at1d di.ffermm btlwun Viaoria a11d 117<1/mt A11strulia.
Tult of assodatio11 b,tu,.m sdrrlrd indtpmdml variabf,s and r1spondmt1' oflitJ1dl! to a p1rma11tnf
rov,11011/ uptake as th1 dpuulmt mriah/1 an, ol,o npon,d.
Th, m011d mfion reporti 011 lh1 011tp11t of a 11111{/il'arialr path anafpil b,md 011 st/11/rd rvriabfu in
thi, Jlut!J, J,di1m lhrre ro11tai1u a q11a!ilatir~ !)'n!hul! of vi1w! and ro111mt11/J l!J mpcnden/J on th,
duirtd ir1,wti1~.r fer <l p1m,m1mf a1<t1wnl 11pt<1ke. A pnli111i11<1ry dimmio11 of /he ji11ding1 I!
pmwl.d i11 Su/ion./. fl foam; 011 th, kry ji,rtcr.r in !he dui;;o11 of landholders on th, llj)take of
pm11a11111/ rov,,11anl.r i11, a11d bdu~m /he /u<J J1<11e,.
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Scctior, one: Results of the descriptive analysis

,i'(;
'
i\
1

Introduction

[

l

Tiris chapter responds to the research questions posed to establish whether there is a f:,_

relationship between several exogenous variables measured in the study and landholders' ,'',
likelibood to toke up a permanent co,·enont, their motives for having retained nature
conservation areos on their properties, and their attirnde, to long·term narnre conservation.
The chapter also oddtcsse, the rescsrch qu~stions aimed at esrnblishing whether there is a
rdationship between !ondholders' knowledge and awareness, familiarity with permonent
covenant mechanisms and their like!)· uprnke of a p<:rmonent covenant.
Other rcseacch questions addressed in this chapter aim at csrnblishlng the perception,
ond attirndes of landholders to pcrmoncm covcnonts"' mechanisms for nature conservation in
te,ms of the covenonts' benefits, necessity for long·tenn nom,c conservation on private land,
impact on land value, effectiveness in a<ouring long-term nature conservation, and
effectiveness over other mechanisms. Other research questions aim at esrnblishing whether
friends/neighbours ond the level of affiliation with conscrvntion group; influence londholders
likelihood to take up a pem,ancnt covcn.1nt, an<l whether there is , rclationsltip between
landholders' soclo-ccoc,omic disposition nnd their likely uptake of a permanent covenant.
Other rcscatch questions whose ~ntling, arc reported in chi, chapter include whether
there

JS

n relationship bcr,:een londlrnldcr's long·tcrrn goals for d1eir property ond their

likelihood of them tnking up a perrna,icnt covcnan~ and whether there is • relationship
between landholders' attitudes to private property rights and their likely npt.1ke of a pcrrnonent
covcnom. 11,e results presented in tltis chapter slso rc~pond to tl1e following qucslions: whst
ore the ,peeific borriers to lo!ldholders' uptoke of a permanent covenant, and the incentives
measures that con be used dfcccivcly by Stace and locol government, and appointed covenant
agencies to motivate the uptake of permanent covcnonts

01>

private lands.

The results reported :il,o respond to questions aimed at establishing whether the« arc
equity concerns in nature conservation on private lsnds tl,at lmvc a bearing on pem10ncnt
covenant uptake by landholders, and whether there O<e similarities in the factors that
characterise permanent covenant holders and factors that characterise non-holders of a
covemuu or agreement.
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The hypotheses in thi, chapter arc that there ore no marked differences between
Victoria and Western Australia in respect to landholders' socio-dcmognph.ic and socioeconomic condilions, ond their vorious attitudes to nature conservation ond pcrm,ncnt
covenants: ond, there arc no differences in the inHucnce of these variable, on l:mdholders'
"ttirudes to an upt,ke of o permanem covenont between the two Stotes.
The methods used to collect ond :1nolysc the reported data arc outlined in Chapter 2
and the response ra!cs of the questionnaire surveys for the two categoric, of landholders arc
surnrnari2cd in Table 2.2. Moderately high response rates were ochievcd in both State,, with 32
pc.cent in Victoria on<l 39 percent in Western Aum,lia.
The exogenous ond endogenous variables reported in this chapter arc contained in
Appendices +.1 and -1.2 mpcctivcly.

5.1.1

Attitudes to the uptake of a permanent covenant
Table 5.1 shows the prnportions of responses to the st:nemcr.1 'I would not consider•

permanent coYcmmt under any circumstance'. Attirude tu • permanent co.-enant uptake wa,
also designated the dependent variable in tl,c dc,cripti.-c and pat!, analysi,.
·n,c«' were rd,tivdy equal proportions of respondents in Victoria tl,at agr<"cd (2!1.B
%} and those dis,grced (26.6 %) thot tl,cy would not take up a permanent covcnar.l under any

ci,cumstance. Half of the respondents in Western Aumolia agreed with tlic statement (sec
Table 5.1). However, 45 percent of respondents in Vicwria and 32 percent in Western
Aumalia did not know or were neutrol on whether they would consider• pcm,anent connont
under any circumstance.
,\n assessment of the rcbtionships ber,,.•cen the observed attitudes to a permanent
co.-cnant uptake and the independent variahlcs measured in the study arc explored in this
chapter in orde, to csrnblish !he reosons for the obsctved distribution in attitudes towards the
uptalr.c of permanent coven.nts.
Table 5.1

Response on attitude, to covcnsnt uptak~ among <espondents with
no covenont or agreement in Victoria and Western Australia

Stnlrmenl: 1 ;w11/d NOT mn,id,r ,ntuin· a ~·m,an,nl ro,~nn.,t undtr on" <immu/ant:t.
Rc,eoo,ea
Strongly Agtec

Agree

Ncu1nl
Ois,grce
Suongly Oi,og«c
0/Know
Total

Victoria
Count

""
""
"
"
"'

I'!,
18.0
I0.8

28.1
18.0

"·"

16.5

""
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Wc•Cem Au•UaLia
Count

"""

'"'
'"""

'%'
26.9

a,

,,.,

17.6

14.8
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5.L2

Summacy of results of descriptive analysis
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 respcctivclr, show summaries of the sinularitie, and differences in

variable responses of responden1~ with no covenant or agreement in Victoria and Western
Australia. Determination of 1he ,ignific:mt similarities and differences is as described in Scciion
4.2 of Chapicr 4. Tabula1cd survey results nf ihe nriab\cs pttsenlcd in these ,ummaric, ;uc
shown in Appendices 5.1 10 5.23. Summary of the statistic.illy significa!ll relationships beN'cen
15 indepcndem variables and respondents' mtitudes to a permanent covenant uptoke and their
directional trends is provided in Table 5.4.
5.1,2.1

Similarities and differences in variable attributes between Victoria and
Western Austl"alia
The average •ges of 1he res,,ondents in lhc 1wo Stales were compat.1tivcl1· similar at 50

and 53 yea,s in Victorin •nd Western Australfa rcspccti,·clr. However, 1hesc averages differed
with permanent covenant holders in Viciorio that ha<l on .-·crnge age of SB ycors.
TI,c a,·erage siie of properties in Western Australia is significant!)' larger tl,an in
Victoria; the large majority in both Smes were complete freehold tenure. ln addition, the
m"jority of the ptop<rtie, in bo1h Stales have been in the family for more thsn 31 year,.
The dominsm fo,m-lypes ,·ary in both Stales wit!, almost a 1hitd of the properties in
Vicwrio described"' mi~ of sheep wiih cottle or dairy, while half of <ltc properties in Western
Awtrili• have • mix of crop and sheep. No respondents from either of the States had
properties managed solely for conservation. The vssl majority of properties under pennoncnt
covenant holders in Vicloria, on the other hand, were managed prcdominsntly for noture
conservation.
The

mo,t

co1nmon

11'"'

of

con,crvation

features

in

Victoria

were

Stre,,ms/Crceks/Rivers, followed by Native bush/forest. In Western Australia, it ,,,,s n,cive
bush the most common, followed bf Streoms/Rivcrs. Three quarters of the properties in
Vic1oria and Western Austr.ilia had slightly m·er \.6 petccnt and 4 percent eo!\Serv:ition area
tatio respectively. A quarter of the ptopcnic• in Victoria and Western Australia hod •
conservation area to totol prop«!}' arc• rntio of 46 percent and slightly more than 18 percent
respectively. TI,e findings for Victoria dosdr compare with observation, of the large mojori!y
of properties of permanent covcnsnt holder, thst showed ther had over 50 perc<'llt oorure
conservation cover,
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Ute two most popular prima,y reasons for having retained the nature conservation
feature, on the properties in Victoria wc,c 'shade and sheher for stock' (17.9 %); and 'support
notivc vegetation' (16.6 %). In \Vcstcm Austrnlia 'support for nati,·e vegetation' (19.3 %) wa,
the most popul., primary reason followed by so~ s.1linit;• control (15.3 %),
The majority of respondent, in both States were apprehensive about entering a
conservation omngcmcnt thst would entail pcrmment rcslr'ttion• on some use of the
conscrvotion fand, and olmo,t half of the respondents in Victoria snd slightly over half

III

We,tcm Australia perceived placing a permanent connant on the land would most likdy cause
their properties to lose marker value.
The majority of respondents in Victoria cither were neutral or•lid not have an opinion
on whether" permanent covenant is an effective mechanism as a salinity cocitrol measure In
addition, the majority in both Smes did not perceive any apparent benefit, in a permanent
cn1·cnan1.
Mo,t respondents in Victorin and close to half in Western Australia wore neutr.1] or
did not know whether they would only toke up a perm,nent covennnt with an orgo.ni2ation
tlmt is independent of the Government. Moreover, most of the respondent, in both Stoic,
planned 10 rc!oin ownership and monsgement of their property in the family.
In respect to total income on the bod, most respondems in Victoria have a 101:1\
income of $150,000 or less, while the majority in Western Austrnlia Im a tot.J inrom~ lorgcr
than $150,000. Ncorly oU respondents in Victot'\a hove a !ow Jab~ur commitment compared to
Western Austri.lia, wbete most had signiSc;,nily higher labour commitment on the property.
Victoria', finding, were similor to those of permanent covenont holden in Victoria.

,,
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Table S. 2

Summary of ,imilorities between non·holdcr,; of a con'!lant or ogrcemcm in
Victoria and Wcs!em Aus!r.tlia in the results of the descriptive analysis
Vari•blc,

Attributes

Vic1eari•

w~

Resuh, ><C Ul %
uc,J,., ind!ootcd
o!l,cr,,.isc

so,......

:\ge di,tnbutioc> in )"CO"

A,·cnig,. age of respondents

Pmponv tenu<c I)']>•

Prnpc<tie, cornpl,1clr freehold
tenure

n

Length of time propelty l,15 been in
famil,· (,\~~endi,. 5. l

Prnp«tie, h>l'C been in the f.mily
for more th•n 31 ~e,i~

Attitudes to pre,cnt upt•kc of a
ncnmncnt eovenan!

Ptef« not to toke up• pcnc>lflent
covcn>nl ,rnre,cn1

Future ,rnnt!On of property ow,ietohip
in fornil • IAnncnilix 5.4\

lntem.icd 10 rmin owmr:ship Ul the
fotun:.

"
"
'"

"

,·cm

Futu,e <etention of prup«I)'
~~Bement in £,mil,· rA
ndix 5.4\

.

Kn, ,wledgc about pe<m:rncn1 covenant

,' (.~ppencli>< S.5)

:\ffiliation or ,.,odation '-"ith
con..,rv•tion Qroun, IAnnc"dix 5.6)
Attitude, to imposed mtrici,ons of
l:utd-u,e (;\ppendix S.9)

lotcndcd 10 retain management UI
the fotu«.
Little or m> knowk,lgc <>f
I nerm>ncn! co,•enrnts

--

Mcnibe" of, or suppmt one
COflOCr\'Olion
Not in fo•ourofpmnonent
rcitrictions on some use of the
conservation bnd

''°""

Pcrceplion• of the benefits in a
ncrm,ncnl covenm! (;\1menilix 5.11 \

Do 1101 perccwc benefits ill 1
notmo'1cnl cown11\t

Debt on property in year 2000
(,\ppcndi>< 5.16)

Derived ,noic th>t> 50 pciccnt of
their in«1me fron, 1he nronctt,
No d,:b1 on prupcrty

!mportonee of Ofl£Oi11g Jin,ndo\ ouppon
os pre·requisitc for a pcnn•nent
co,•cn,nt uptoko (Append!!< 5.20)

1\ttoched importance to ongoing
fin,nci,! ouppotl

fo1e<est in long,10nn nature
conmvoiion (Appendix 5.20)

Gi,•e level of unponance to
ponmncnl co,•cn,nt's ob1lity to
assu<C long-tcnn n11urc
conservation

inOuencc of non.finandol i,,crnti,·es on
covenant uptake (Appendix 5.21)

Do no! know or are neutral about
,igniliconcc of non.(!lloncial
inccnl!\'e fm the uptoke of a
nermmcnl covcnrnt

Compens.iion for non-use ofbnd
undo, • pcnn,ncn t covenant (Aprcndis

5.22\

Tiolic,•e there should be
cornpens,tion in pcrrmncnl
cm..:nant to, non-u,e of bnd.

Allitudes to eGuily in cost o( po<m:rncnt
covenant untake i,\Menili,: 5.2Jl

llclicvc covcn,ntec should C<>\'<r
cost of nc1rmncn1 covenant u toke.

Expcctotin" of c<jUily and b•ol of public
r<•ponsibilil)' in priv,tc c~n,e,.,.,1ion
(,\ppendi>< 5.24;

Prefc, ,r lo,st 40% of co,t to be
covered bv 1he uob~c.
Prefer nil wntnbution by public 10
co,t of pri,.,te conocr\'•rion.
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Table 5. l

Summary of ciiffrrencc, in the results of the descriptive analy,i, between

respondent< wi~1out any fonn of cm·enanl or •vccm,m in Victoria and
Wc.,tcrnAustroli,
V•rlabl.,

\>,ope tty ,izc in hectares
T)'pcs of conmV>lion fc,turos
l,\nncnJi,; s.21
Pcrccno,gc r,lioof conscrntian 10
total prnpc rt)'

,ii.,

Demo 10 know more ,bou!
nermanent co,·o,,ao,t, (1\nnc11,I« S.6\

Auri'>utcs

1hcragc are, ofproportic, in
hectare,
Nat;,.., b,.,1,/ forc,1,
Conservation ,rca ratio of a
'I""''" of tho proprnics in lhc
St:ote,
Dn not want to knn"' more ;l,out
: oerm,ncnt rnvenaiu,

Victoria

Western
Australia
Re,ult, ore in%
uitlm indLe>!cd
otho<Wisc
467 ha
2340 h1

.

"

"

J'ercept1<>n of, permanent cu,•cnant',
effecti,·er,cs, ", s;,J;,o;t)' contrnl
mechanism l;lnncndi< 5. 1()1

Neu1r,I or Jo not h.we an
opinion

Tota! am1u,1,.,rnme in 1999
(,lppcnd., 5.13)

i\$150,000 or ]e,s

Reception of fm,<tci.il ,uppo,c he fore
uptake of fixcd·lcnn ,grccmcnt or
co,·cmnt l,\n,,cnd1, 5. \ 'i\

lb\'c not recei,·cd "'Y financial
,upport/benofn, fur n,ture
con,msnwn work on 11,cir l:ind.

«

Fonnlfari1y "ith covcn:on! ptogums jn
1hc Stole

Nol fam.ili:ir"ilh thcpercnoncn1
co,·,n,nt n,oeram• in the Slate

so

Debt of more thon AS300,000

"
"
"

Dcbr on property;,,)''" WOO
I t,lnncnd,, 5.16)

"

""
'"
SS

'"

SS

Mute than,\$ 150.000

"w
"
"

Labou, commitme<11 o,i prnpctl)'
IAnncnJi;: 5.14\

l.ol>ou, comnn1m,nt ,co,e mo,e
11Lau 9 hOUU.

Perception of, pcnn,nent co,~,i,n I!
impact on l;nJ value (Append,. 5.17)

Pct«i,·c lo" t<> hml voluc "',
te,ult of pl.cing a pcnnonent
co,·en,nt on U

Effcc1i,·cno,s of pcrmauenl co,-cn,rnl•
o,-cr olhe< mcd,,,U,m, (,lppendix
5.18\

'Don't know' or 'Neutral'
rcg,ttling cffec11,·cncs, of
crui,nc,n cu,·cu,nt

;;

'"

Necessity nfpmnoncnt comunt for
long,rcm, n,iu,c con,orvation ;n ,,icw
of other mochoni,m

Do not potcci,·c the neccs,j\)' of a
permanent co,•cn,nt in ,•icw of
confidence,,. compclcl\t future
mon,,cm,nt

"

OS

Impottancc offrcc1ucnl ,.,J long-lcrm
man,gcmcnt odvkc "prc-rcqui,ilc
for pcrmanrn! co\'cnant upt,kc
{A,>pcndix 5.20

.~u,chcd o level of impomnoc

;s

"

'

'"
,s
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11,e majority of respondents in both States (• bigger majority in \'festern ,\ustr:dia)
dcri,·ed more than half of tl1eir income from the property. Overall, landholders in Western
Australia h,d a greater dependence on income from the property thou those in Vicmria. ·11,e
fin.Jin gs in b:ath States contrnst with those ofpcnnanent covenant holders, which showed th,t
die majority of diem hod li!de or no economic dependcn~c <>tl their properties.
Most respondents in Western Austr.1lia and a much smaller proportion in Victoria (44

%) had not received any finand,l support/benefits to undertake nature conservation work on
their land from any org;,ni.,1iun or go,·cmment. TI,esc findings comporc v.ith those of
pc~~nent cov~nant holders, which ohowed ihat d,e majority had not received ,,ny financiol
sup\>ort before toking up o pccmancnt co,·cnant.
Almost h,lf of d,c respondents in Western ,\umalia anJ most in Victori•, were
members of, or surported at least one conservation grol1p/org:mizatio11. Western Australia
had n much l,jgher proportioti (29.S %) d1.1n Victoria (8 %) of tho>c drnt were not members
and did not support to any consctvntion group/organiiation. In contrast to d,e two categories
of landholders, all pcrnianent covenam holders v,cre members of, or supported at least one
conservotion group.
lmspccti,·c of 11,cir c,prcsscd attitudes to pecman<nt covenant uptake, over half of
the respondents in each S1ate would gi,·c a level of importance to provision of on-going
financial support, on as,uronce of the long-temi nature conscn·arion, and frequent long-term
management odvicc on co.,s,'"''1ion, in their decision to toke up a perm.1"1ent cov,nnnL 'Ilic
difference in dicsc fin.Jing, and those of pcnn~nenl covenant holders arc in re5pcct to the
importa,icc given to d,c provision of on-going Unancial ,uppon, management advice. Less
than 20 percent of permanent covenant holders g:,.ve o level of importance to on-going
financial support a, a pre·rc9uisitc of to.king up , permonent covenant, and a ,n,ollcr
proportion of them (4·1 '/o) dion were non-holders of a covenant or an agreement g,.vc a le."<!
ofimpomncc to provision of mrnagcmcnt advice.
Close to a dtird of rcspontlc1n, in Victoria and Western Australi, ,. .>u!dgive a level of
importance to public recognition and appteci,tion of die conS<r\'ation values on their land
when taking a decision on taki11g up a permatient covenant. However, brgc, proportion, of
respondents (41 % in Victoria ,nd 46 % in Westen, ,\usmilia) were uncertain whether non·
finsnciol recognicion by State and Local Go,·ernmcnts of d,cir conservation efforts w,. a
significant ,tep in moti,·ating their uptake of• pcrmoncnt co,·emnt. In little contrast to these
finding,, 41 percent of pcnmnent coven,nt holders did not give importance to public
recognition a, a prc-rc9uisitc to the uptake of• pcnnancnt co,·enant
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Although the m,jorit}' of 1espondent, in cad, Smc cxprcs,ed the need for
compensation for fond placed under • coveoan~ 1he proportion of respondents in \~1cS!em
Australia that strongly espmsed this need was twice as large as that of Victoria. The mojorlty
of respondents in both Stotcs also ,greed that the cost of entering a pcrmsnent cm·cnont on
their b.nd should be cove«d by the co,'Cllontec In respect to public comribution to the cost of
conservation on private lond, the msjority nf ,cspondcnts in both State, ptefem,d the rublic to
contribute ot least 40 percent towards the conserv,tion com, This differed with observations
of permanent covenant holders whctc the majority of permanent covenant holders preferred
either uo contnbution from the public or less than 20pcrcent contribution from thcpublir.
A ,ummory of the statisticnlly ,ignificant relationships between the independent
variables in the descnptive onalysi, ond attitudes to• pcm,,nent covcnont uptokc is presented
in Table 5. 4.
Of die relationships n"cmd, only three independent variables were statistically
significant in both Stotes: rcspotidcms' attitude, to imposed restrictions on land.use,
perceptions of the benefits in a pcm,ancnt co,·cn,nt, and perception, of the irnpoct of a
permanent covenant o" lond voluc. Five of the• va,i,bles were only smti,cica!ly significant in
Victorioc the ratio of conservation arco to the totol lond arc•, the respondents' oge, and thcir
desire to know more about permanent covenants, their interest iu long-tcrm noturc
conservation, and ~,cir attimdcs to compensotion for permanent covcnnnt uptake.
11,c length of time of the propert)' in the family, the respondents' perceptions of a
pcnnancnt covenant ,, , n,cchanism for solinity control, ,nd their association with
conservation (l<OUJ'I were only statistically significant in Western ,\ustrolio.
The rcbtion,hip between scvc,a! other independent voriabks assessed in this study
and rcspondcm,' nttimdes to taking up a pennancnt covenant were stoti,tically not significant
in citherVictotio or Western Amtrili,.

u
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Table 5. 4

Summary of the statistically significant bi-variate rd,tionships between
attitudes to pcrmoncn, covenant up toke and independent variables for
respondents with no covenant or agr<cmcnt in Victoria and Wcstcm
Australia

Variable/Probability significance

Westem

Victoria

Austr~lia
Propcrty•l.ength nftime h the family
X
d=-0.206 p=0.010

Dm,'1fixg /mg!b of lim, th.I prop,'!)· has/,,,, in th, fam1!,
rorrr,po•Jm/J /o incr,on'ng !ik,!,hood ofd porib,. allilHd, t, o

Ratio or conservation to to,al land orea
d=0.231 p=0.00-1
X

lnm'diinJ rati, of ,001<m11i,n ""'' lo tor.I f.md """
,om.tp/Jn.linl, lo in'7wing 1,1,§lmod of" f"Jlili« atti1,,d, to !hi
II /Jh ofd lrmdn<n/ tmnan/
Dmra1inJ 'W ro,mpon.it 1, an ;.,cr,a1ing /ih/ib,od ef a p,n~·.,
allil11d1 lo" p,m,antrlt ""''"'' upra1,
De,irt lo ka,w mor, olm•I p11m,nmf ro,en,inf, rom,pondt to
inm.,ml /,'k,fr'hood of o p,1ili,. aflllud, 1, pm,wnml ro,•manl
11pt11h• /h,n ,1/i,r,

A,,

d=-0.!60, p=0.04
x
Dc,i« 10 know more about pcmionem
covcnan!S

X

;i:2(5,n=137)=ll.57,
=0.041

Attitudeo to lmpo,od rc,triction• on
fand•\ISC
d= 0.313. =0.001
d= 0.234. =0.01
Pc,ception of<hc bencr.1, or a
pcrm,ncnt cm·cnan1,
d= 0.333, =0.00!

d= 0.265, =0.001

Perception• of the impact of
pcnn•nent co,·cnan1a on fand value
d=-0.202, p=0.003

d=-0.222.
,=0.011
Perception of3 permanent covenant a,
a mechanl,m for ,alinity control
X
J=0.312,p=O.OOI
Affiliation or a"ociotion with

con,crvatlon group,
X

):2(5,n=110)=12.66;
~0.027

lntereot in long,tcrm nature
comervation

d = 0.236, = O.OOI
Altitude to compcn,a1ian for
permanent covenant uptake

X

Attitude• to cuvcnan1illg
organization'• affi~arion wilh
Government

x

lnITT"1ingpm·,ption of ,111,n,n/ bm,f,11 rom,pondt to an
im:,wing 1,1,/ihr,oJ of a poJ1!11, dllilllll, 1, a
ro,,.m,,/
up!alt.

f'""'""''

foma,i~lf<rrtftiM •/ h11 in /Jnd ,•a,'·,, .,,,,-,pa,d, lo ""
inma,i11J, l,ldihood of a ,11gali1< d/11/ud, I, d {""'""'"' '"""""'
i,pia1t
lnm'1fi•gpmtplia11 ofp1rmam•I ror¥nanl artjflili,~ m,cha,it"'
far tali<i!J ,Miro! romif"J•dt r, "" inITTan'•g lik,l,hood ofa
po,ilii< allil,J, lo a pr,ma,10/ e,i,nanl •,'ldkt
lnm,JJiog ,umb,r of am,i,;ti,. or afliliali'" ,,.th "nm·vab'o•
gro•p rom.tp/Jnd, la inman'•g /il:.,lihaod fat a po1iti1t am't•d1 to•
P,mTd•,nt (IJ1<na11/ "Pldl:.t
ln.-rra.ii,g inl,rtJI in lon.r;·/m,r .,/Urt romm,m·,. ""',po,rh t,
immHinJ /,1,/ihooJ of a p,1ili1< attitudr la a p,,m,m,nl
uptdh

ro1<•••'

X

d '°-0.145. =003(,

lnman'ng a,,,ptanr, ofprrma,ml r,,tli,Nom oo 1.,,J.,.-,.--rom.tp/Jmh lo an illcrra,in.i 1,1,/ib,od ef a po,iti,, a/lituJ, lo•
p,rmm,m/ ra,.,anl uptah.

d=0.189, =0.014

Dtma,ing im1,.rloncr gi1'n 1' r,mp,malion rorrt.tp/Jnds lo
inma,iog l,'l:,EJ0<1d ef opo,i/ic, atlituJ, to" p,,manml «>le1111,1
"Ptdh
lnITT"1ing •grttabih/y lo enl1ri,.! op,m,a,w ro, ..anl ••it!, a
'"'""""/" /hdl i, a.ffeliattd la!/!"'""''"' emr,pondm/1 I• "11
i11m1J.1ing /,1:,/i/,oad of apo1ilitt attit,,,I, to ap,manm: '""'""''
uptah

Note X non srnti,itcnlly significant; d- Somers' d test
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5.1.3

Summary
Similarities and dissimilorities were observed in seventeen and fourteen varioblc

attributes rc,pectively between the two Stotcs. '11,e simila, variable ortributes were mainly in
respect to demogrophic,, long tem, gaols for the propcrlies, ortirudinal factors snd prerequisites for " take up of a permsnent covenon~ TI,e differences observed between the two
States arc ml.inly in respect to exogenous varioblc attributes psrticubrly the socio-economic
ones such as level of debt on the property, total income, and fabour commitmml, and
endogenous variables auributc, including respondents' perception of the effectiveness of a
permoncnt covenant ,md perception of it, impact on the land volue. Ocher endogenous
vsriables thot show <liffercnces arc respondents' perception of tl,e ncccssiiy of• permanent·
covenant for long-ienn nature conservation and its effectiveness over otl,er conser,:ation
mechanism,.
Stotistica!ly significant rclotionships were observed in botl, States in respect to
responden1s' perceptions of• permanent covenont's benefits and impact on bnd value, ond on
thcir ottitudc, towards restrictions on land·usc. fo the three vadables, there is a likehhood of a
positive attitude to a permanent covenant uptake witb incrcosing perception of the benefits of

a pcnnanent co,·cnant, decreasing perception of loss in land vsluc because cf placing a
permanent covcnont on i~ and incrcssing positive attimdc, to restriction, m, lond u,c under o
permanent coven~nt.
TI,e sgc of respondents slld onitudes to compensation wcr" some of the imporisnt
m.tisticolly significant ,·arioblc, only in Victoris, while association with conservation group,,
and percepcion of" pennancnt covcnom os a mechanism for sstinity control were ,ignificant
only in Western Australia.
11,c section tl,at follows rcpotts on the mlllti,·ociatc relationships betw<en several
variables tl,at hove been described in the present section and londholdcrs' ottitudcs to a
pennonent covenant Lprnke using path analysis models. The purpose of tl,c section is to
establish the collective influence of tl,c independent variobles in this study on the dependent
voriablc and to dctennine tl,e strength of the rclotionship, between tl,c vari,bles wained in a
path model.
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Section two: Results Of Path Analysis

Intmdu~tion
'This section contoin, the result, of m11ltiplc rei;ressions in fonn of path ana!y,is for
non·holders of a covcnont or agrcemen~ 11,c conccptu,1 model tcstc<l in this anoly,is is shown
in Chapter 2, l'ii;urc 2.1. The procedures used in the path ona!)·,i, to conslnlct the fin,J output
model arc described in the study methods in Chapter 2.
An ad<litionol independent variable coded 'State' was included in the path onaly,i> of
i;·

the combined categories of norl·ho!dcrs of o covenant or agreement rcspondcms from Victoria

'\ and Western Anstulio (sec sub-scc1ion labelled, Path ano!ysi,·non-holdcrs of covenant or

f

agreement in combined Wesiern ,\,mrolia and Victoria). Indus ion of the extra variable in the
analysis w;,, done to tc,t o relationship between the Stale in which a respondent i, based on<l
their atritudcs to a pcrm,ncnt covenant upmke. In odditinn, the v;ufable 'Stote' wa> set a, •
predictor variable of all mediator 011d output variables ,,..,d h)Tnd,esizcd to be correlated wi~,

all predictor voriablc~ in the conceptual path model. Table 5.5 prc,cm, an ove1,,icw of the
hypolCu.,isc<l predictor ,·.,ri,bks (extracted from Figure 4. 1) of the mediator vori,blc~ in the
conceptual psih model.
Table 5. 5

Hypothesized prc<lictor"ariob!cs of the depcndrnt variables in the conccptuol
path model, for non-holders of covcnont or agreement in Victoria and \Vcstem
,\ustroLia

Dependent (mcdiato1) variables

llypothcdzcd predktor (cxplonato,y) varfablc•

Va\uc_\oos- (Perception of imp,ct of cov"""'
on market value of nrooc11\'l.

Stole', Knowlcdg<, ConRotio, Age

Necc,si1y. (Peiecplion of the neccs,itr uf o
I =tml!lcnt co,·enan,\

State•,,\ge, Length, Knowledge, Mcmbcr,hip.

Rcmktioos (attitude, 10 rc>1cictioo, on bnd
use).

Statc•,.~R•, Knowledge, Coojntcrest, Con Ratio,
Lsbour, L<ngth, Effccii\•e, Membership,
Econ_clcpend, Tie0tcfi1>, Ou'!lership, M:umgcmcnt,
Value_lo.,, Dehl

Silinity- {Pcrccptio11 of (>Cm»nent cuven>111',
df«cti,·encs, for solinit · control\.

State' ,Knowlcclge,Age, Membership, Length

Compcns,iion- (AnituJcson equity)
(expectalion for compens,1ton for a eoven:uit
urtakc).

State', Knowledge, 1\gc, Con_intcrc,1, Conlutio,
Debt, E<on_dcpcnJ. L<,ngth, Rc.,cictlon,,
\'alue_los,, llenrfu,.

Nonfm_rccog- (Attiiude, !O non-r.n,nci,l
rcco '1ioo\.

$1210•, Knowledgc, ,lgc, Mombcr,hjp,
Conjnle<<st.

Tiencf,t,- (l'crcci,•cJ bcnefi'5 of a permanent
coven,nt).

Statc',Age, Knowledge. Conjnlerest, ConR,tio,
Ecun_clcpcnJ, Ou"ncroh,p, Manogemcot, SaJinjty,
Voluc lo", Debi, Effect1,e, Nccc,sjh,.
nole. TilC v.oahle Seate " used as a predictor voruble onlr in the construcuon of a p,th model for
the combined eatogoric, oftcspoodc111S;,, Vktoci, •nd Wc,tcm Au,mlia.

.

.
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5.2.1 Path analysis -Non-holdc1s of covcn~nl or ag,ccmcnt (Victoria)
Table 5.6 shows the five vari,b\e, retained in the path model aftc, regressing all 20
iniciol variables in the conceptuol model (Chapter 2: Tobie 22 and 23), with the exception of
the predictor variable 'State', from the output vorioble 'Anirudc, to o pcnnanenr rov~nant
upt•kc'. The rctoincd variable, were significanr predictors of 'onirudcs to a penn•nent
cownant uptokc' 01 0.05 lcvcl of significance. The ,·oriable 'Rcstricdons' (0.308) has strongest
and 1nost positive effect of the rctoincd variob\cs on the dependent ,·oriablc,.
Tabk, 5. 6

Path coefficients for the first regression an;aly,is for respondents with nu
covenant or agreement in Victorio
Un,1,nd,itlizcd
Cocfficienl>

Sundardi:«d
Coerfidrn1,

D Sid. Emir

Beta

.oo,

2136
.oo,
-5.7J9E-03
.231
.076
-2.554E·02
.oos
Restriction,
.240
.057
D<nefit,
.243
.069
• dependent variable, ,uitude, too perm,nml co,•en,nt
(Constont)
Eoon_depcnd
Con__intereot

Sig.

,,,

3.516
-2.325
3.036
-.227 -3.098
.30B 4.227
.261 3.504
upi,ke.

-.17!

'"

.on
.022

oo,

'"'

.ooo
00<

95%
Cor.fidcne<
Interval for ll
Lower Bound
.933
.·.Ol 1

ow

-.042
.121
.106

Upper
Bound
3.339
-.001
.382.
-.009
.~52
.381

Table 5,7 ,how, the resuhs of the second paih 011,lp,is derived from o regression of 14
hypothesized predictor ,·ariables (sec Table 5.5) from the mediator nriable 'Restrictions' as the
dependent varioblc. Only two vorioblc, 'Valuc_loss' (·0,226) and 'Knowledge (0.231) were
rotaii,cd in the path model with• significant effect on 'Restrictions'.
Table 5. 7

Coefficients of predictors for attitudes to rcurictions of a permanent
covenant (Respondent, with no covcnont or ,g,cemcnt in Victoria)
llnmnd,.tlizcd
Coefficients

'

Standm!iml
Cocffidenu·
Std. Enor

Sig.

lle11

.rn
7.784
(Constant)
3.357
Voluc_lo,s
-.240
·2.590
.093
.no
2657
Knawled c
.337
.127
a dopcnden! voti,blo: ottlmdc, <o pcrm•nent covenant re!lriciion,.

··"'

·""
oo,
.0]1

95~.
Confidence
ln1etvol for D
l.01<·er Bound Uppe,
Bound
2.504
4.210
-.42.l
-.057
.SB?

.,.

The output of the third nno!)'nis that regressed twelve predictor variabks (,cc Table
5.5) from the mediator variable 'Benefits' a, the dependent varioblc 1,re reported in Table 5.B.
Only the voriable1 ',\gc' (-0.198) and 'Vo.luc_los,' (·O,?~l) were retained in the model.
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Table 5. 8

Codficicm, for predictor variables fo, perceptions ofbm<frs of•
permanent co,·cnam (Respondents "1th no covcn,nt or agreement in
Victoria)
Umiandor<lilcd
Cocfficicni,

,,.

"

Stondardized
Cocfficicnt!
Std. Errot

tlcto

Sig. 95% Contidc11cc
lo1cn"'l for B
UlwcrBo""d

.5%
2.8\7 .oo,
-2.449E-02
.010
-.198 ·2.421 .017
V,luc_lo"
-.265
.074
-.291 ·3.567 .oo,
a dependent variable: perception of the bcncfilO of~ permanent r.o,·cnonr.
(Constom)

l.(,80

.soo

UJ>p«
BoUlld
2.859

-.045
-.412

-.IIB

··""'

Figure 5.1 pres en lo the final path model for non-holders of a covenant or agreement
in Victorio. Thi, was derived from a regression nf all ,·nrfable, retained in the three previous
rcb,rcssion, models from the output ,·nriable 'attitudes to a permanent co,·cnant uptoke' a, the
dependent varioblc. Seven variables were rclained in tl,i, finol model with five of them having a
direct effect on the output variable:. The correbrions between the ,·oriobles in the model and
their coefficients arc shown in Appendices 5.2+ ,.,d 5.25 respectively.
Five variables in the finol path model hod• direct effect on landholders' attitudes to a
pcnmnent covcnont uptake: economic dcpct1dence on the property, level of interest in long·
term nature consen·otion, age of the respondent, auitudc, to restrictions on land-use, and
['c.tcg,tion, of the benefits of a pcrmoncnt co,·«>ant. The direction of the codficient values
•ht1w tl,~t the less economically dependent tl,c respondents arc on their properties or the
greater thcir interest in long-term nature conservation, the grc,ter is ~,cir likelihood to have a
positive attitude 10 • permanent covenant uptake. T1,c di,cction of coefficient volucs also show
that incmtses in positive attitude to restriction, on lalld-usc and positive perception, of
benefits in• permanent covenant arc likely to lead to a greater likelihood of a positive attitude
towards toking "Pa pennonent covenant
In addition to the direct effect, the age of the resprn,dent also had an indirect effect on
attitudes to the uptake of a pcnnoncnt covenant, which was mediated through pe,ception, of
the benefits of a pcimancot covenant. TI,c direction of the coefficient voluc< for the direct
effect of oge on attitudes to taking up • permanent covenant ,bow that younger landlrnldcrs
are more likely to take up a permanent co,•cnanr wmpared to older landholders. "The indirect
effect also shows that )'OUn~r landholders arc more likdy to perceive permanent covenants to
h,we benefits compued to older landholders.
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Econ_ depend

...

·,.,.,

-0.21 8

Benell la

/
RHldual

cov,ul
uptako

I··'"'

I

Value_toH

'"'~ j,,,,.

Rnldu1I

Reotrlcllon1

Knowlodgo

Con_ln1eft!1!

Figure 5.1 Output (final) p•th model for bndholders with no covenant or agr~ment in
Victori•

Landholders' perceptions of the impact a covenant on land vi.Jue and the level of
knowledge about a pennoncnt covenant had only an indirect effect on the output variable. The
effect of the fonncr is :ncdiatcd through landholders' perceptions of the benefits of a
pcnnanent covenant (-0.291) and their attitudes to restrictions on land·we (-0.226). The effect
of Knowledge, on the olher hand, i, only mediated through landholder,,' atti!Udcs to
restrictions on fand-usc. Although landholders' prJCccptiom of lo,s in bnd vi.Jue i, a mediotor
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variable, none of its hypothesized predictor vatiabk, were retoined in the model ofter lhc
regression anolysis.
The decree.sing orders of direct and totol influences of the retained varfables in the final
model on ~ttitudcs too permanent covenant upta~c arc shown in Table 5.9. Of tl,e seven
variables retained in the final pat!, model, landlioldcrs' attitudes to restrictions on land-use hod
die biggc,t direct and totol effects on attitudes to n permanent co,·cnant uptake. AM,ough
economic tlcpcndcncc on the land hos " direct effect on attitude, to a permanent covenant
uprnke,. it nevcnhclc,s hod tl,c S"l;illcst total effect of all variables in the model. Furdier
explaMtion of L!i.e observed trends in motld variable relotionships is given in Section four of
diis chapter.

Table 5. 9

Decrcaoing order of influence on ortirudcs to a pcnnanem covenant uptake
of variables in the lin,l model thci.t for rcspondc·ts without ony coven mt or
agreement in Victoria
Decreasing order of voriahk influence

Variable,

ltcstriccions
\"•luc_los,

Bono fin

A~
Knowkdgc
Con_intc,cst
Econ_dcpond

•S1andardizcd beta coefficient
,oluco of dlfcCt effect

'Totol mndordizcd b<,r, cocflidcnt value,
(Sum of direct ond indfrm effect,)

.309
-.140
.2?1
-.218
.153
.2\J
.,]81

0.30!I
-0.WS
0.291
-0.276
0.224

Nole': The hii:l;er oh, ,t,nJor,h"'l beu «><ffici,nt «~! v.lu,, the g=lct"' influence of the

v;,i,.blc un onitudcs 10 ,

!"'""""'"' '"'''"""' upuh·
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A summary of the finol model including the rxplaincd variance fo shown in T,i.ble 5,\0.
Thirty-seven percent of vuisnce in the output variable is accounted for by the predictor
variables in !he model,"' shown by the odj11,ted Rl for the regression model voluc.
Table 5.10 Mod<! summsry for rcspondi:,m with no covenant or agreement in Victorio
R Squ01c

S1J. Eaorof

Change
Statistic,
R Squue JI Ch:,nge dfl
dO
Siz, F
Change
Chong•
.639
.409
.J'IJ
.409
11.545
.ooo
m
•. p,cclicto,o: (conmnt), benefit,, rcotriction,, age, conse""tlon intc«,t, economic deprndencc,
kn~wlcdge, value_lo.,.
b. dependent v.tiable: anitndo to permanent co,·cnant uptake

'

AdJu"cd R
Squaic

11,e s,run...

'

"

The outcome of the nns!ysis of nrisncc to test the fit of the model ,ho\t.'11 in Tobie

5.11 confirms.~ significom F ststiotics ((F(7,70)=! 1.545, p<.01) which indicate, a goodness of

fit of the model It also confirms ~»t the set of ,·orinb!es in the finol rnodd is a good p<edictm
of attitudes to a pcnnanenr covcn"nt uptak.
Table 5. 11 Anolysis of variance (ANOVA) for l>ath model fo, respondents with no
covenant or agreement in Victoria
SurnofSqu><CS
Mo,nSqu"c
Sig.
Reg,e>,ion
70.059
10.008
11.545
.ooo
,A67
Ru;dual
101.429
Toi;!
171.488
a. predicto1S: (constont), bcncCn,, 1c,1ricbo1,s, oge, conservotlon interest, economic dcpendrnco,
knowledge. vo\uc_los,,
b Jepcnclent v;riablc: 11titudc, to pcnn,nont covenant uptake:

'

"''"

//
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5.2.2 Path analysis-Respondent,; with no covenant or agreement in
\'\1estcm Australia
lhc hypothesized input path mmld for non-holders of a covenant or agreement in
holders in Western Austt.lia i, shown in Chapter 2: Figure ~.1. TI1e seven voriables retained in
the first path model wi1h • 0.01 k-vel of significance are shown in Tobie 5.12. These vere
obtained from a rcgrcs,ion of all preilictor variable, of d,c m .1ut varfab!e (see chapter 2:
Tables 2.2 and 23) from the dependent variable 'ottimdcs to a permanent covenant uptake'.
Table 5.12 Coefficients rnble for the first path an:tlysis mo<'!c! for respondents wi~, nc
covenont or agreement in Western Austr:tlfa
Stand,rdized
Cocfficie,11,

Un,undordized
Coefficient,

Bee;
S!d. Ertor
2 874
.572
5.uill
(Con"'1nt)
.072
.194
2.554
Con_intere,r
.183
-.251
-3.204
Fin_support
-.44--1
.136
-.219
-2.917
-.169
.058
L<ngth
3.B\4
Membcr,hip
.429
.1!2
.292
3.379
Rcslrictjon<
.187
.055
.05]
2.5B6
.137
.119
Solinity
4.857
.371
.076
.355
Ilene fits
1
• dependent v:ufable: oe1i1ude, to a permanent cm·on,nc upt, <0

"

~·

s;g.

95% Confidence lntcrv•l
for B
l.ou'Cr Bound Ul.'eer Bound
4.008
1.740
.041
-.169
-.718
-.283
-.054
.206
.652
.2%
.077
.242
.032
.523
.219

,~

.000

.012

"'"

.OM

.000

.001
.Oil

"""

Of the ,c,·cn variables, ~,e ouly mediator ,·ariaLlcs retained in the model ore
'Restrictions', 'Benefits', '\lo!uc-loas' and 'S:ilinity'. Esch of tl,csc mcdiamr variables wos token
•• the depcn'dmt vari:iblcs in the subsequent pad, analysis with ,.heir bypotl,csised prcilictor
variables (sec Table S.5) regressed fram tbc respective mediator vorisb!e.
Table 5.13 show, two predictor varioble, «mined in the second path model after
regressing tl,e ten hypothesized preilictors (sec Table 5.5) from 'Attitudes to restrictions' as tl,e
dependent varisble. 11,e,e two variables shaw moder:udy strong bctu coefficients ,nd
statistically significont relationships wi~, die dependent variable m 95 percent level of
confidence.
Table 5, 13 Coefficient of predictor variables of 'attitudes to restrictions of a permanent
coven am' (rcipandcnts with no covenant or agreement in Western Australis)
Standmlizcd
Coefficient,

Unslandardiz,d
Coefficient,

"

Std. Enor

Sig.

Beto

6.612
3.638
.558
(Const:lftl)
.212 2.290
2.038E-02
.009
ConRario
2.451
.135
Benefit,
-.330
a dependent votiable; ,1titudcs to permO!tenteovcnwt rcolrictiono.

.,,,
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95%

Confidence
Jntcrv.J for ll
Lower Dound
.000
.024

2.582

.016

.063

oo,

Upper
Bound
4.794
.038
.597
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Table 5.15 shows the onl)' predictor variabk, 'Value_loss' (0.297), which was ,etained
in the

third

path model ofter regressing the hypothesi,.ed predictor variobles (see Tobie 5.5)

from 'Benefits' as the dependent variable.
Tible 5.14 Predictor variables for londholdcrs' pcrceprions ofbcnelits of a permanent
covcnont (Respondents with no covcnont or ogrcemet!t in Western Anstr:ilia)
Un,tandmfoed
Co,rficicnt,

"

Stondardi,od
Cocrficicnl.<
Std. Enor
llcta

2.951
.32'i
9.074
(Constant)
Valuo_los,
·.246
.076
·.297 -3.235
~ dependent v,d,blc: p«ccption of permanent co;·«'>•11 bcn<fos.

S;g. 95% Con6dcncc
!ntm1,I far B
Lower Bound

Upper

.000
.002

Bound
3.595
..095

2.306

-.1?7

Oulr the variable 'lc11gtl,' (-0.214), shown in Table 5,15, "'"' retained in tl,e fourth
path model after tcgccssing the three hypothesized predictor voriobk• (see Tobie S.5) from
'Perception~ of a covet1ont cffccti,..,ness for ,rnlinit)' cot1t<o\'.
Table 5.15 Prcdictorvoriobks for perceptions of a pennoncnt covct1ont's effectiveness
for salinity cont<ol (llcspontleclls wid, no co,·cnant or og<eemcm in Western
Au,1rnlio)
Unmndudi,ed
S1onJ,,J,,ed
Coefficient,
Coefficients
lJ Std. E,rn,
Ueia

s,,

?5% Confidence
Interval for B
!.Qwct Bound

(Constont)
4.528
.634
7.H2 .000
3.271
Leo ,,h
-.239
.!05
-.214 -2.273 .025
·.-147
• depen<l<nt v:irfab\e: pe<ccJ>lion of porm:rncnt eovcnonl'• effcctivcnes, for s,\uuty rnnl10\.

Upper
Uowtd
5.785
•.031

figure 5.2 represents the li,i,\ path model for non-holders of a cm•enant or 0!7Cfment
in \'l;'cstcm Aust<ol10. TI1c co«clo1iom between the variobks enterctl in the lino! mode! and tl,e
cstimoted regression cocf!iciems of the vori.1ble, in the model

;tre

showt1 in Appendices 5.27

and 5.26 rcspccti,·dy.
All voriahlcs in the final p•th model, e~ccpt 'Value \os,' ond 'ConRatio', have a direct
ef&,ct on nrtimdcs towards the UJ>take of a pennoncnt covenant. 'The direction of the v,rioble,'
beta coefficients show that 1he more positive the attitudes are towards :cstrictions of land-me
(0.264), or !he g,coter the perceptions of ihe dfecti,..,ness of a perrnnnem covenant for salinity
cont<ol (0,204) or perceptions of the benci\ts in a perceived co,:enont (0.336), the g<eatcr is •
subject's likelihood to have a positive anitude to toking up a permanent covenant

In addition, tl,e directions of the beta coefficient, for. 'membership' (0.279),
'Fin_support' (-0.256), 'leni;tli' (-0.213), and 'Conjllterest' (0.194), suggest th•t the larger tl,e
numbe, of conservstion groups to which subjects s<e ossodotcd, or tJ,c lowct the frequency of
reception of fina11ciil suppor~ the gre,ter the subjects' Likelihood to have a positive ;lttitude
towards the uptokc of a permonent covenont Likewise the ,hone, the kngth of time tl,e
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property has been in the fomil)' or the greater the interest in long-tcnn nature con,ec,;ation, the
greater the su~ccts' likelihood to have" positive attitude to taking up a p=anent coven,nt.

The dccrc:,<sing order of influence of the varioblcs in the modcl on landholdm'
attitudes to a permanent covenant uptake is shown in Table 5.16. Of the nine variables rcW!!ed
in the linal model, landholders' perceptions of the benefits of a pcnnanent covenant (0.396)
have the largest direct and total effects on landholders' attitudes to a permanent covenant
uptake. The ntio of conser•rntion nrea to totill property size (0.077) hos the smallest tornl effect
on landholJcrs' attitudes to a permanent covenant among the vnriablcs retained in tlie mode!.

Table 5.16 Decreasing order oftoto! influence of individual v.uinblcs on attitudes to a
permanent envenom uptake among respondents without any covenant or
ag,cemcnt in Western Austr.llia
Decre1Sing order of ,·oriable inf!LICl\ee
Vari,b\c,

•Siondardi,cd beta codficion, •Totol •1andordiw:I beta coefficient value,
,.,luc, of di,ect effect
(Sum of dir<ct ond indirect effew)

Bene~t,
Membcr,h;p
Re,tricriono

.336
.279

Length
Fin_,uppon

-.213
-.256

Solinity

Con.Jnie«n
Value_los,
ConRotio

·'M

.w,

.192

-.051
.021

Noto*: 11,e bi!',8et the ,tandanbed bcto coefficient real value, the greater is inOueoce
of the voriable on otlitude, to a permanent covenant uptake
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0.396
0.279

'"'

-0.257
-0.256
0.204
0.194
-0.151
0.077
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,,

......

Figure 5. 2

Output Pach Model for landholder, with no covcoantor11grecmcnt in Wc,1em
Austrilia
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The results of the model ,11,run.ry (Table 5. li) ,how that the finol modcl accounts for

44.5 percent of the vnrionce (R'). ·n,e analysis of vorimcc w test the fit of the n,odcl (Table
5.!B) shows that the cntr)' of the ,ct of pr<·d1c1or voriable, in the model yields a significant
prediecion L'JUOtion, s b own br • ,ii,'"Tllficont F ,wi,tic (FrJ, 78)= 10.7) at p<0.01.
Table 5, 17 Path Model Summ,ry for respondents with no co,·cnont or sgrccment in
\Vestcm Aum,li,

'

R Square .~dj.,,tcd !\ Sod. E,ror of
s um the Estimm

Change
Scotistics
RS,tuafc F Ch,ngo
Sig. I'
Chmgc
Clung,
.70]
.49]
.491
-·~15
00
10.708
.000.
a. predictocs, (cnn,rant), benefit,. mlriclinn•, age, con_intcrc,t, ccon_dcpcnd, ,·,lue_lo",
kngth, fin_supf>O<I, conr.,io, o,\U1ioy, mom hen hip,
b. dcreudcnt ,·,ri,bk: attitude, !O a pcm,,nenl cn,·onmt upta\:.o

'"

'

,a
,oo

Table 5. 18 Anal)'si, ofv,ri,ncc (ANOV,\) for rcsponJents with no
covcnont or agreement in Western ,".ustrn~,
lkgtessioo,

Jk,iJual

To"I

Sum ofSqu>!<!

~km Squm

78.276
81.22-1

8.697
.812

159.500

,oo"

,,

Sig.

I0.708

.000

'®

,. predictor,: (con,t>nt), l,cncfn,, «!tnc1jon, ogc, can_nueto,1, econ_Jcpcnd,
,-.Jue Jo", lcnglh, fin_,uppotl, conlllio, s,hnily, mcml>cnhip,
b. dcpclldcnt v,ri,blo: ~lritu<lc, lu, pcm,,ncnt co,en1<>t up tole,
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5.2.3

of Covenant or Agreement

Path analysis· combined non-holders of covenant oc agreement in
Western Ausualia and Victoria

The predicted poth model for the combined group, of respondents with no cm·cnont
or ogrccmcnt in lat1dholdcrs i11 Victoria and Western Austrnlio i, shown in Figure 219 (Chapter
2). The eight variobles rcrnincd in the initiol path model ofter rcgrcs,ing 21 predictor voriobles
that indudc the vori,b!c 'SL,te' (Choptcr 2: T,Ule 2.2 ond 2.3) froJU the dependent vnri,blc
'ottltudcs to a perm>ncnt covenant uptokc' ore shown in Ta\Jle 5.19.
Table 5.19 Coefficients 1oble for the 6tstp,,th •Ml)'sis modd for combined respondents
"~th no covenant m agreement in holders in Western Amtr.tb, ond Victorio
Un,tandorilizctl
Coefficient,

(Con,tont)
St.te
l'in_ouppott
Con_intcnc,t
Length
Mcmbe,.hip
Re,triction,

St,ndordized
Coofr.cients

"

Sid. Error

Bet,

.%7
.1-18

-.145

.090

-.139

.054
.039
.088
.042
.041

.211
-.lH
,222

3.013
•. 349

..,oo

,m

-9.420E·02

s,linity
llcncfito
•· dependent vari,~lc: ,uitudos

.349
.179

.124
.332
10 ,

.m

.171
.054
.341
pormanen t ru,·~l'nt up like

Si~.

95%
Conr.dcnce
lntcr,;<1] for B
Lower Bound

5.3\:l
.2.151,
-:2-214
3.812
-2.437
3.%1
4.261
l.061
6.15~

~

Upper
Bound

.ooo

1.895

.019

·.64]

4.131
-.057

.028

·.378

-.022

.0!6

·.170
.176
.0%

.ooo

.ooo

~.w

oo;
.ooo

.,oo

.315
•. O!B

.m
.262

·"'
.~, '"
.438

Tab\~ 5.20 shows the rct,incd von,b\es of the i«on d path model M 0.05 lrvd of
signifaancc. 'll,csc wc,c rwincd ,ftcr regressing eight predictor vW;\ilc, (>cc Table 5.5) from
'Restrictions' as tl,e dependent ,·oriablc. Oftbc two ,·~!"Ulblc~ 'Valudos,' bod the bigger effect
on dependent variable 'Rrstri~bons',
T~ble 5. 20 P«dictor variables for attitudes 10 restriction, on land nsc (R<Spondcnt,
with no covenant o, ngreemcnt in Western ,\uslmlia and Victorin)
Unnand,rdL,od
Cccffidcnn
Std. Error
(Con,tom)
2.957
.431
Con_inte,c,i
,\W
.OElO
\'olue_loss
·,214
.070
•· dependent v,ri,blc: ottitude, I<> pcnn~;,~n°t <<>1•co,nt r<miclit>n,.

"

Sig.

$0,,,do,di,od

Cocffidcn"

u,1,

.132
·.191

6.759
2.120
-3.072

.ooo
.035
.002

The onl)' ,igniJicant pn·dictm vm,h\c 'Voluc_los,' (·0.286) retained in the thi1d path
model after rcgrc,sing eleven hypmhesizcd p,edictor, variable, from 'Benefit>' •• the
<lcpendcm variable, is shown in Table 5.21.
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Table 5. 21 Predictor vori,blcs for l,ndholders' perception• of benefits of 3 permanent
covenant {combined respondents ...~ui no co,·en,nt or agreement in Victorio
and Western Austr;l~a}
Umtand01diz,d
Coefficient>
JI Std.Ettor

Sig 95% Confidence
Intc,val for ll
Lowe< Bound

Stond,rdizcd
Cocfficien"
Bet,

(Constmt)
2.957
.216
13.670 .ooo
-.247
•. 2£6 -4.686 000
Voluc lo"
.051
dependent .,ci,hle: petception of pcimanent coven,nt bencfi1>,

UpJ>C<
Bound
J.38J
-.143

2.m
-.351

•

Of rl,e five vari,blcs prcdietcd to have ,n effect on i,ndholdcrs' perceptions of o
cown,m's cffecti,·,ncss for salinity rnntrol (fable 5.5), only 1hc ,·ori3b]e, 'Stlte' {-0.195), "''"
rcl;tincd in the founh path modd ,, shown in Table 5.22.
Table 5. 22 Predict cir v:1riablcs for bi,dholdcrs' pcrccprirn,s of a pcnnancm covenant's
effccti,·encss for s,linity control (respondents wi1h no covenant or
agreement it1 Vic tori, ,nd \\;1cstern Australia)
Un<l,r.~ardi>od
Coefficici,ts

'

Scand,rdizcd
CocfficienlS
S•<l.
lleco

Sig %% Confidence
lnternl for ll
Lower lloundUpper Bound

Ei,or

(Con,t,nt)
4.4JS
.Jtl
\W03 .coo
3.B!I
.J.059
Stoic
-.6!9
.ws
·.195 .J.123
a. dep<ndcnt ,·aciabl,•: perception of perrrnment c<,vena,it"• effccU,enm fur salinit;• conlrol,

m,

T~ble

5.z:,

5.059
·.240

shows the two predictor variable, ('Su,te' and 'Knowledge? for tho:

dependent vori3bie 'V oluc_loss', which were retained in the fifth path model
four h)1iothcsizcd predictor v,ti,b\cs (fable 5.5) from ' V,luc loss'.

,r· :r regressing

·n,c coefficient vdues

show <Juitc dearly that 'km,wkdgc' hos the bi&,"'' effect (0.243) of the two vari,bks on
landholders' perceptions of the impact of o pcnnanent coven,nt on land viluc. Increase iti
knowledge ,bout pcnnoncnt co,·cnmts is associated with an increase in perception of loss in
!3nd volue because of taking up, permanent covcn,nt.
Table 5. 23 l'redicto, variable, forpcrccptiom of a perrn,ncnt covenant's lo.ss in ]3nd
value (respondent> with no covenant or ngrccrncnt in Victoria and Western
Australia)
Sig. 95% Conf,<lcnce
lnlcf'lalforB
Lower llaund

Un,.and,tdizcd
Stand,r<liml
Coefficients
Cocffoci,nts
ll Std. Error
llm
(Coo,tont)

3.650

.278

13.1\8

000

.175
·2.157
·.D~
.OBJ
Knowledge
.330
.m J.%5 .ooo
o. d,pcndcnt van,blc, perception, nf a permoncnl cov,n,n<'• lo5' rn l,nJ value.
S111e

-.378

'"

3.l02
-.723
.166

Uppct
Jlaund
4.19S
-.033
.494

The fin,lpoth model of the combined Victoria ond Western Australi• for respondents

with no covenant or ogreernent is illustrated in Figure <J. The estimated coefficients used to
derive the final path model and tl,e correlations between the variables entcrtd in the model ate
shown in Appendices 5.29 and 5.30 respectively.
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Momb<rshlp

\I

\'.

·o.,1

Ruldual

1

~

Ii

Ii

-0.243

I···.

)(nowlod11e-• Value_ Ion

/

))

11e1ldual

·'.,,

Fln..,,uppcrl

llene!lt,......_
RUldu1I

FigurcS.l Fin3\ output path model for combined non-holders of covenant or'i
agreement in Victoti• and Wcsti:m Au,trafu.
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Eight of the v.riab!es re:aincd in the final path mode! have a direct effect on the
fondho!dcrs' altitudes to • permanent covenant uptake (Figure 5.Jj. Two of these v,riab!es
namely, 'State' •nd 'Con_intcrcst' have, in odditi~n, indirect effects. L:mdholdcrs' perceptions
of the impact of a pcnnonent covensnt on land vsluc hove on!r indirect effects on attitndes to
permanent covenant uptake med~ tcd through lnndho!dcrs' rnimdcs

lO

rcsuicti<,ns on l,nd-usc

and their perceptions of tl,c benefits of a permanent co,•cn,tll. 'Knowledge' a!so hos only an
indirect effect on attitudes to a permanent cm-ctrnnt uptake thst i, completely mediated through
perceptions of loss in bod value.
The dU,ections of the regression coefficients ~' Figu,c 5.3 suggest that the lnfJ,er the
number of conservation grnups a landholder is associated u1th, or the shorter the period that
the property ha, been in the famil)' ownership, the more Likdy she/he is to hS\·c a positive
,ttitudc to a permanent covenant upwkc cumpored to others. SimiLir~-, the grentcr the interc,t
in long-term conscn·ation, or tbc fewer the numbc. of times o landholclcr hos rccefrcd financin!
support, or the more a landholder knows ab<>ut permanent cm·cnan!, ~,c more likel)' she/he is
lo lm·c a positive attitude ton pmnsncnl cm·cnant uptske compared to others. In adclition, the
direction of the regression codficicnt for 'Swc' indicates th,t landholclcrs in Victorin ore more
like!)' to have a positive attitude to

:i

perm,ncnt co,·enant upt,ke comporcd to those in \Vcsrcrn

Australia with stronger direct effect (-0.lSS) than the sum of the indirect effects (0.054).
Table 5.24 show, the predictor variables retained in the fmal path model in th~;,
decreasing order of influence on landholders' attitudes to a pennanent covenant uptake.
Perceptions of lhc benefits of a permanent co,•enant have the grc.

St effect on the attitudes of

landholders to a permanent covenant up1,kc (0.349).
Table 5. 24 Decreasing order of total influence (sum of direct and indirect influences and
non-significant inllucnccs where there ism> direct influoricc) of individu,l
variables on aitirndcs 10 a permanent covcno!lt uptake among combined
Victoria and Westen, Aumalia respondents with no covenant or agreement
\'•riah\e,
!lencfi!

R<Slriclions
Con_interesl
Membe"hip
S,ote
\'olue_loss
Salinity

Fin__,11pport
Lcngoh
Knowle

•Standardi,ed beta coeffceient
vo\uo, of,liicct effec,

•Toi,I ,1,nd>1dized beu coeffictent \',lues
(Sum of tlirect and indirect cffm•)

.349
.237
.205

.149

.m

-.042

.205
.213
•• JSB
-.187

.176
-.147

-.147

.213
-.]58

-.14]

.086

Note•, '!be b,gger tho stonda<dized beta coefficient ab,o\utc v,lu,, the grc,tor i,
influence of ll>< ,.,,iablc on attituJc, to • pcrm,neot rnvcn~nt up'1ke
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"Ibc cff~ct of fandholdcrs' otdtudcs to rrstrictions on land-use on their ot1i1ud"'

w

permanent covenant up toke is r:tnkcd ,econd in dcc,e1Sing order of mength of the ,·,riablcs
rctoined in the final p,th modd. Despite its significant effect on landholders' perception of the
impm of a permanent covcnsnt on l,nd nluc, 'Km,wkdgc' l,,s die smallest toU!l effect on
attitude, to a pcm,smnt covcn,nt uptake, of the nriablcs in the final p,th model (!"able 5.24).
"The mode! tmmmarr (l"oblc 5.15) ,hows the fin,! psth mode! accounts for 41.5 percent
of the variance (adjusted R2). A ,ignilic,nt F statistic of 15.846 at p"0,01 shown in the mults
ofthcANOVA (fsble 5.26) dcmonm,tcs a good fit of the output pa~l model.

Table 5. 25 Path Model Summa<)' for cmnbinco.l respondents with no co,·cnant or
sgrccmcnt in Victoria and Western Au,tr,lia

R R SquorcAdjuotcd R Std. Error of
Square the Estimate

.n

Change
Statistics
R Sq.,,rc
Chong<

DnrhinW~tson
!' Change

'" an
'" "' "'
Sig.F
Ch,nge

15.846
.443
.415
.M6
.443
;. p«.-.lktm,: (Consto,u). f,n_sup1><><!, con_intmcft. kn~1b. knu~l,d~,. b<ncfir, . .,1;nity. '"""bc"h,p,
rc,trirtion,. v,lu,_I,""• ""'·
b. depc·ode,it ,·,riabkc o1'i"«les t", l"tn"ncnt CO\'C11>nt upe,<,

1.999

Table 5. 26 ,\NOVA test of the model fit for combined Victoril iod Western ,\ustntfu.
n,spondcms ··,,ith n<> covcn,nt or agreement

Sip;.
Mcon Square
F
SurnofS'lua,cs
.,oo
15.B46
ll.526
R,g,e,sion
135.260
.B54
1(,9.864
1~9
Re,jJual
Total
305.124
;. pr«li,1""' (.rnn>tant), fin_,upf'""' rnn...in1em1, leni:cl>. k,rnwleJgi,, bcncfi1'. OOity. 111<mkr.<hip, n:olnction,,

"''"

''"

nlue_l0>,,St11,.
b. d,·pc"n<lcnt"-,ri,bk: ,uitu<le, t'l o pemi,nt"nt rnvm,nt upt>.kc
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Section Three: Results of Qualitative analysis -Respondents with no
covenant or agreement in Victoria and Western Australia

5.3.1

Views in Victoria on State and Local government policies or ae1ions as
incentives for a permanent covenant uptake
,\ summary of the specific issues or

vicv,s

held

by

non-holders of

a

covenant or

sgrccmcnt in Victoria on policy actions thst State gm·crnment con implement to motivate the
upmkc of a pcmuncnt covcnsnt ore shown in Toble 5.27. Financial incentive, ond technicol
support in the form of mansgerncnt assisiancc and ""ct.! control progrnms were the two mo>!
popubr incentives cited.

Table 5. 27 Vic"' of respondent, with no cm·enant or agreement in Victoria on the
State Government policies or ,ctions as incentives
Incentive g,oup

No of

Incentive ,ubgmup

(Numhcrofcaoc,)

re op on dents

F1nanci:tl lnccnti,·cs
(28)

l9

Financial a,sistancc/ 1nccnrivcs

17

P,m;s,'on of ,up port and ad,ico on m,n,gcment ond
pbnning

Technical support ,nd
services (25)

9

4

To,; c«mpoion am! subsidies

.~""''-"e wi1h weed and ,·cunin control
Supp-Ott rn landc,rc groups

Equi1y mponsc (20)
Man'llemcntand
odminlstrotion (13)

Compensation

'

FlcxiLiLty of permanent co,·cnont ogrccmcl)t
Restrue!ure/ Sncamlinc fonding pr<><<"

Le,J b)' example
3

llduc,rion,
inforr,,,rion ond
,warcnc" (8)

Policy is,uc, (5)

Coordination md m,n,gement

2

Rcmm·c buro,ucr,cy ond in"c"c conscr,,,tion intc«ot

2

Stop coercion

•

Educotion, '"",rcncs, ,nd inform>tion on <ons«vounn
and co,•cn,nts

'

!luy L,ck bnd

Fmrnuloic p-0licy onJ land ,·,lu•tion critcn,

Respondents cite five policf ,ctions which they view the loco! government should put
in plocc in order to motivotc the voluntary uptake of permanent covenants a, shown in Table
5.28. l'inonciol incentives and technkal support arc the moot pCl[lular incentives cited for loco!
government action, as i, the case ot State government level.
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Table 5. 28 Views of rcspontlcnts with no cow,n,m or agreement in Victoria on tl,c locol
g,,vcinrncnt policies or ictions •• incentives

Numb« of
re,pooden<s

~:floup
{Number of ca•••)

27

Frnanci:d incentive, (31)

lnceo1ive oubgroup
Rate «bate,
['1nanci,\ suppon

Technjc,\ oupporr ,c,,.;cc,
(20)

'

Supp<><! rnntfo! of weed ond ,·crmio

2

lnfra'lmctur,l ,upp<>rt

Prov:ioion of equipment and \•hour
Policr, L<gi,htio" ond
enforcement (!O)

Conservation policy support

Control md Enfoiccmem ofcon,cneation leg isl.non

E,Jucation, inforrn1tjon and
OW';rcnc,, (10)

Publicit)' and infomiati!Jn

Mor.1! encomogemcnt (G)

Encou,.gemcnt

Educa1ton ,nd awarenes,

s~veral issues contained in Tobie 5.29 were raisctl by the respondents to cluif)' the
reason, for tl,cir lack of interest in pennanclll covcn.1nts. 'll,e msin ones weic lontlholdcrs'
ic,crvotions about the ncccssil)' and effectiveness of pennanent covenants, ,pprchc11sion about
the lm, of control over the land, and their t!csire to cxclotlc oll government i11volvcmcnt in
consernlion on pnvatc lontl.
Table S. 29 Ress om odvonccd fot bck of interest in pennon cm cO>'cnsms by
respondent, without a covenant or •grecmcm in Victorio

lo,ueo oboul
covcn~n'1
u take
Rcoe,v,iions
obout co<en,nt
nccc .. ity and
effcctivrneo,

Nomb<rof

Commen<s by re,ponden"

1c•pondcnto

w

<m1'n,nts might nor ho ohc nght conscr,;.ition m11cgie, in the
fu1me just like P"t \,nd c]o,ring policic,
•
na1u,c co1ac"·a1ion i, Lomg o,·erly cxocndcd in co,•cnant,
puhLic ,,,,.«ne» and hndholde, p.rtjcip,cjon "" ,ufficknt
CIJ!lSCr,.';ltion !lrate~ie,
covena1110 m,y not he r,cccmry a mo« people
lo
oppreciatc the need for cmam•o11on on thoir prnperl)'
opprehcn,i1·c about rir,idj1y of, co,•en,nl. prefer mu1u,\ trust
ogtecments a, cun,cr,.·,iinn onoy pnwc l''""hk to w-exi!I v.ith
,ome 01hcr fonn of «m1mcrml cnleTri,e
,pptohen,we about lhc pc,osthlc lo" of rnnuol m·er proper!)'
conn;ni, ore •n infnngemcnl of prnr,<rl)• righ"

,.,rt

Apprehension
,bout lou o(
contiol
Keep off
l,ndholdcu

'
'

•
•

come1votiun on prinoe botd ,, o per,un,I mrner
restnction on clconn~ oflond >re w,ju,t
con,e"•"inn ,lrnultl he """""KeJ ,,,itlmut impo,ing
CO\'Cl)OnlS

enough lond ahc,d)' \ockod up Co, con,crn,ion bf
• Go,•cmmcnl
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5.3.2

Views in Western A1,utralia on State and Local government policies or
actiom as incentives for a pem1ancnt covenant uptake
TI,e views of non-holders of a covenant or agreement in Western Au,traiia on tl,c

actions or policic, thot State government should implement in order to motivate londho!ders Co
take up a pennonent covcnont ore outlined in Table 5.JO. Eduntion and awareness on nature
con,en<ation and cnvcnoncs h,d the highest citing by !he respondent,, followed by a
requirement for equity in fom, of cnmpensmo,y measures.

Table 5. 30 Views of respondents with no covenant or agreement in Wcotcrn Australia
on the Srntc Government policies or actions,., incentives
lnccnd•e group (Nu,nbot or
cue,)

Number of
«opondcn"

lncenti.o ,ubwuup

Educotion and pub~c au<arcnc,s
(!6)

16

Edu,,.ion, infonnoMn and pubhc ou•:uencss

Equity (12)

12

Et1uity on fom, of compens,tion

founci,l inccnti,·c, (11)

1

Fin,nci,l ,uppo<I

4

Su1>po<1 /compcn»tc ,hire•

;

,\!an•gemen t ocrnuni,bili~·

'

H.c<luco/ Remo,·e burcaucr,cpnd invoke
landowner,

M,n,gcmcnt and ,drninjmatjan
(10)

Policy oetion (9)

Doll« govemfficc\t policr

Tecb,Uo,1,upport ,ct\ioe, (6)

Pro,•ision or ];l,aur onJ m,ied,l

bnJ putchase

i'our actions that the respondent> in Western ,\usirolia suggc,1cd for implementation

b)' local government as moti,·ation for landholders' up1akc of a permanent covcnlnt in Western
,\ustralia ore outlined in Table 5.31. l'inancinl inccn1ivc, in form of rntes rebate and diffcmu
forms of finsncia! support, followed bi" the need for better m,magcment ond administration
were the two most popular cited inccnti,·e,.

Table 5. 31 Views of respondents wit!, no covenant or agreement in Western Australia
on the loco! govcmmcnt policies or actions a, incentives
Incentive grnup
(Number of ca,co)

Number of
«:•pon<lenu

Fin,ncial incenti,•es (25)

w

M,n,gcmcnt and ,Jministr>tion
(14)

;

Incentive oubgroup
!late rebal«
Fm,nci,1,u mt
Brn<I pb,,mng, rohms and m,n,gcmc'!_I
Con,ult fanncr,
F,cilit•tion and coutdjn,t;on role
,ld,ice ,nd dcm~nstruion
Support infoi,tructwc
Suppmt with m,nu,\ v.o,k
Don't in,·al,·e local go•eroment

;

'

Tcchnic,l ,uppott s«viccs (12)
Non pmicipation of go,·eromcnt
or l,ndholJcrs 9
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Respondents provided five additional isrnes in other comments on pcnnoncm
covenants nnd no1urc conservation as follows:
(1) Mechanism• for delivery of financial incentives:

(a) funding only large conscrvuion areos, "Smill atc:ts of bush c•n be a costly nuisance
ond only large oreas should rccei,·c public money and support";

(b) funding for fencing, tree planting, Lucerne mablishmcot, regeneration, :md
earthworks, as "income tnx concession do not •lw•)'ll help tanners that have hod a
poor sesson. e.g., rust, drought, poor price, fuel fertilisers etc":
(c) iorgcting avail~! Jc gov.rnmcnt funds on conscn·otion out in the country and not on
office work:
(d)

t01<

deduction (100%) in the fim ycaroo any land on which conservation wmk done;

{e) removal or concession on the p.1yment ofrntes on on area under a covenant;

(Q provision of financial help for consen·.,tion but without the underlying restriclions.
(2) Compen•ation: Some of the rcos<>m gi,·cn by rr.spondents on why and under what
circumstonces cotnpcm11ion ,Jmuld be provided were as follows:

"If a /andh~fJ,r iku" ,ign!/r'rant amo1111/

ef rrmnt1nl •~gpt1fit;n and is not affo,,,.d lo drt1r ii, 1h1n ti'!)'

,hrm/J h mmpmMitd an,! a p,rmanml roNnanl pfa11d on ii,"
"["' the h{{~"I im,.,"' '""1p,n,(l/io11. Som, fam,m dtaml t1!! their kmJ .Jii1,
arras

ef b,m,fanJ hru11t1

o/~rt

J/M /ifi h'lf

th;y ha,t morr famighl art now blin.g p,naliZ!d and Md lhrJ ,vi// mti,~

nolhlng,"
"It i, in th.• p,,blir in/mr/ 1/iar thm arta, h, ron,m~d but lo M1, farmm ha,~ lakm an th b11nltn

ftnanci,1//y and th, work /rkJd..• "

'.,'(l) Public'• role in con,crvation: Six respondents argued that die public should contribute to
~onscrvation on private lands. The main reason cited !o ju,tify ihe nccc,sity for such

"contribution i, d10t society demands the conservation and benefits fron, it, and society should
therefore contribute cquitabl)' to its protection.

'
'

(4) No to covenants: 'fwcnty·follr re,pondcn1, stated their reservation or outright opposition
to pcrrn•ncnt covenant up1nke. 'll1e details of responses arc containcJ in Appendix 5.36.

Briefly, the various reason, cited were th1t landholders should be left to make their own
dedsions, a concern for loss of control of land, and a vkw that covenants were not a good
comcrvation policy. In addition, respondents stated that cm·enants were not cconoMically
viable and fle><iblc enough; and lack of sufficient encouragement and example to t.ike up a
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permanent covenant. Further, covcnams were viewed ss economkaUy ~,equitoble and
unnecessary for personal conservation needs.

(5) Examples of useful covenant mcd,anism and arrangement•: Eleven landholders
pmvidcd insight on some covenant mechanisms and arrnngements that

c..11

encourage

lsndholders to take up a covcnont. These include the incorporation of a mechanism for review
if circum,tsnccs chongc, and issi,ancc of scporotc title deeds for nature conservation aroos.
Otl,er mechanism< included educ;1tion and cncour:,gemcnt in the ,.,.Jue of p,escrvingnoturc for
nature's cnjoymen~ and simplifo:otion of covenant funding mcchonism.

5.3.3

Summary
11,e similoritics observed between the two States were in respect to the level of

knowledge about pcnnancnt covenants, long-term goals of the pmpcrtic,, interest in long-term
nature conservation, outlook on property rights, and equity concerns in conservotion. 11,e
differences were moinlr in respect to property charoctcri,tics, economic factors, and
perceptions and attirudes to pennnncnt co,..enont.
Several reasons were cited for non·approvol of permoncnt covcmnts: a view of
pcnmncnt covenants os

unnecessary for conservation on tl1eir pa:.timlac proptll)',

opprehension about loss of control of tl,eir pmperty, perception of coven:rnts os a non-viob!e
conservation tool ond opprooch. Other rca<ons for non·app,ovnl of permanent covenants
included inequitoble financial implication, of taking up a co,·enant, the view tJ,ar covcn,nts as
lacked flexibility, and the lack of good cxomplcs in conservotion and cnconrngement from
governments to take up o coven,nt.
Eight categories of policies ond actions b)' Stotc and local go,·cmmcnt for encouraging
tl,e uptake of permanent covcnonts were identified by respondents: provision of financi,l
incentives and various technical support ond services, management and odministntive
restrucruring o[ ~onscrvotion support mechanism,, and assurance of cquit)' in the ,haring of
various conservation com, Other categories included non-financial recognition oflondholdcrs'
contribution to conse,vation, inclusion of education, infonnation and aw.reness prognms on
covensnts in various forums, articulation of clear policy on lond valuation cntcria, mcchoni,m
for purchase of land of high conservation va!uc where the landholder w., unwilling to ploce a
covenant on it. The last cotcgory i, the need for non-involvement of govemrncnt in the
co,·enant orrangements.

Chapter 5: Non-holders ofCoven~nt or Agreement
The three most popu!u of the eight category issues r.iised by the respondents in
decreasing order were requirement fur fin~ncial incentives, addressing of equity conecms, and
provision of technical support and services.
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Section Four: Brief Discussion of Main Findings

The following discussion focuses on the ,imilocities and differences between the two
categories of non-holders of a covenant ond agreement in Victoria and Western Australia. A
brief explanation is also gi,·cn on the important trends obscC\'cd in the study in «spc~t to
landholders' attiti,dcs and likclihoo<l of o pennancnt covenant uptake. An introduction to !he
concepts that emerge from the findings i, made.

5.4.1

Knowledge and awareness about a permanent covenant
A luge cross-section of landholders in both States hod never heard about~ permanent

eovenont before this study. Moreover, mony were not ov,are of the covenont programs in thcir
~:Ote. This is despite the fact ~,at covenant progrnms or schemes (i.e. Trust for Namre in
Victoria and Remnant Vegetation Protection Scheme in Western AustroLia) have existed over
scvcrnl years in both Stntes.
Although there w:,s no stotisticolly sigiiificont relationship between the level of
knowledge about permanent covenants and landholders' ottirudes to taking up o permoncnt
covenant in either States, !ondholder.' level of knowledge hod on indirect influence on their
attitudes to a permanent covenant uptake in Victori• though its influence on landholders'
attitudes to a covcnont's restriction, on land-use. As landholders' knowledge about pcnnonent
covenant in Victoria increases, their likelihood that they hove o positive nttirudc to restrictions
on fond-use also increases. This in tum lc.ds to increased likelihood of toking up a permonem
covenant.
Evidently. th" lack of fomiliority with coven,nt programs W.J mc,re pronounced
among londholders who were associated witl, a few conseNotion gwups than among those that
wcie associated with many conservation groups. It con be concluded that a, the number of
assod,tions witl1 conservation groups increased, the greater the c!ionce, of o loodholdcr to
know about pcnnanom covenants and programs. Secondly, on association with a large number
of comcrvation J;<OUj)J is a likely result of g,eatc, interest in long-tenn comcrvation than nonnssociation or essociation with a smoll number conseC\'ation groups. Landholders that hove a
grcot ime,cst in long-term nature conscrv,uion arc more likdy to look out for infonnotion on
conservation mechanisms than those with little or no interest in notuIC conscC\'ation. There is a
need for covenanting organization,' to enlist more ~onscr.ation groups in publicity and
aw,ircncss activities <>n covenant mechanisms and progommr.s ,mong landholders with whom

they work.
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Comments by sc,•cral l.tnc.lholdct< recognise thJ! an increase in ec.lucati<>n, iwarencss
and information on pcmlanent covenants anJ 1hc importance of eonse"·aurm arc neccssaty
approachc~ for encout1lgin!( the uptake nf pcrn,ancn! cm•cnmts. 11,ese findings •re consistenl
u1th similar ,·icws of other li11c.lholdcrS reporlod in Chapter one (e.g. Jenkins. 1998: Mil1.1r,
1998), ['sidcntly, any measure, aimed at croatill!\ 11realcr owsrcness of permanent cnwnmt,
paniculody 111 Western 1\ustr,iLia sh<>uld seek to con!inn the ability of pcnnanent cm•cnams lo
assmc long·1cnn 11atme cunscrvauon, md clarifr the nature and 1crons of rc.strictions on land
use that apply tn cm·,nrnts. ·n,c studr findi"J\S pnint ouc that educanon and awa«ness of
cu,•enonls am] nnturc CO<\Serntion ,·alue< along ,,_.;,h other incentives for promoting lhe uptake
ol pcnmncnt rn,·cnants rnch

a,

non.moneW)" recognition of c<>Vcnant holders ore necessary

for motl\'ali11g the up toke of pcnnan"n! Co\"ennnts.

5.4.2

Attitudes to imposed (cstrictions
Landholder, in both 1hc >!Otes <>f Victori~ ond Wcstem ,\i;stralia showcc.l strong

rdotio11sh1ps bctwecl! ottitudcs tu imposed rcstrictinns ,.1d likcLihood to to.kc up a permanent
eo,•cnant. l·!o\\"cvcr, 1ho twu cat<•gorics of lmdhuldcrs diffcrc•d in the fae1nrs tlc1t influenced
their attitudes t<> rc.11,ictions on lnnd·usc. Altho\lgh there is similamr in the strcn11th and
cfaection of 1hc in!1ucnce nflandholder,' ,11lituJc, 10 rcsmc,ions nn bml·use on their uptake of
pcrmoncn! C(J\"Cnant;, the siudy findings puitlt out the need for a different approach in each
State lo nddrcss landholders' nllitudcs to rcsirictions <>n land·mc. In Victoria, landhnlders'

attitudes 1n rcstr,ction, "n land·usc """'" pan!)" jn(luenccd hr their pe'<ccptions of tbe irnpoct of
a perm.,ncnl co,·cn,m on 1he \ar,d nfoe, aitd their le,·cl of knowledge about permonent
cu,·cnants. In contrsst to \'ictori.1, l,ndl,older,' attitude, lo rcsmctiun, on l.,nd·use in Western
Ausl"1\i., were pordy innueneed by their perceptions of the benefits nf, permanent covenant
and the proportion of crmscrv,lion arc,
II,

In

total ore.1 of the propeny.

the combined categoric< of lmJholders in Victorio md Western Australia,

landh,~!ders' atlimdes 1n restrictions on loml,usc were portly attributed to their level of interest
in long·term nature conservatinn and by their perception of lnss in ,·ahn, of land because of
placing a permanent co,·cnat1t on it. Of the 1wo cspbnatocy val1oblcs, interest in long·tenn
natorc conservation \i,d the bigger effect rm bndho\dcrs' attimc.lcs

In

restriction on bnd-use.

11,e attitudes c,cprcssec.l b)' landholders on the ,·cstrictions imposed on lond use
conecpmall)· rcbtc to tlicb, perceptions of what constitute, their private property nghts snd
their level of wilLingness to forfeit some nf tl,o,e rights. In cncaps11\ating d,e apprehension
about entering a conservation ,rr:mgemcnl bec~usc of los< of property right,, one of the
landbo!ders noted thot landholder, view such restrictions as " . .. a mo,~ f:>· gowmm,nlt lo wntrof
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thtir land in"" a/iuef)' 01·,r:~mrmd Sia/,". Another landholder dar:ir.ed that the opprchcnsion
among landholders of government n:Mi,•cs in covenant> was the result of mistrust, which ha,
developed m·er time. 11,i, and other simibr comment, by the londholders illustrate the
attachment monr bndholders have to their prupcrtie, ,nd their •pprehemion lo • permanent
covenant uplakL". The comments olso show hndholders'pcr,pcctivcs on private property rights
as it affects norure cunscrvotion a,cas on private land.

5.4.3

Perception of covenant impact on land value
The large proportion of respondents in both States thot perceived a permanent

covenant to leod to loss in morkct ,·aluc of their p,.;pcrty con be atttibutcd to their aw;irene" of
the actual propeny nmket price<, which prcsen~y (2003) indicate octuol loss in mark~t value for
properties that ore encumbered '>'ilh a cm·cnant in parts of Australia. In che combined
categories of landholders in V1ctorio ,nd Western Australia, the State in ·a·hich , landholder is
hosed has an cffrct on their pcrccptiom of the impact of a penna11ent co,·cnant on Ltnd v:tluc.
Landholders in Victoria arc less likely to pcrcci,·e pcnmnent co,·cnont, to lead to loss in land
value compared to landholders in We>tcm Australia. further dis,;u,sion on landholders'
pcrcepriom of the impact of, permanent covenant on lond value i, present in chapter 6.

5.4.4

Benefits of a covenant
A lack of perception nf the bcnelits of a pertrancnt covenant w" L"Vidcnt among the

m,jority ofbndho\dcrs in b'ltli State,. bndholders' perceptions of the benefits of a permanent
covcnont in Western Ausmli., and in the combined categories of londholders from both States
we,e panl)' attributed to their perceptiotls of loss in ,·aluc of land because of plocing a
permanctlt covenant on it. "11,e direction of th~ codficienc for the effect of 'ValueJoss' on
'benefits' showed 1hot bndholdcrs who perceive permanent covenants to \cod to ]o,s in land
value were less likely to perceive the benefit, of pcrmru1cnt covenant covenants conipo<ed to
tho>C that did not perceive such loss in land value.
·n,e indi,·ect effect of age mcW,tcd tluough l,ndholdern' perceptions of the benefils o[
a pennanent co,·enant in Victoria suggests that younger l,ndholders were more likely to
percdve the l,cnefits of a permanent covenant comporcd to older landholders. Landholders'
perception, of the benefits that c,n be derived from a permoncnt covenant conceptually
inHuence their confalence in th<: penn,ncnt covenant mecha,U,m. 11,i, i, particularly ,o when
the benefit, are not dear (Guerin, 19?9; Ho\Li,k, 1990) or when they connot be rcali:,ed within
the bndholders' timefrome for achieving the go:tls of the l,nd.
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The sigllificont relationship between perceptions of benefits and attitudes co the upu,kc
of• permanent covenant in both States strongly points out !he need !o explain the• prO\•i.sions
in a permoncnt co,·enant to l•lldholdcr<. lbcsc include measures that arc bcing developed ,nd
those that have ,lready rnk~n by government, ouchn.s the Tax offset of loss in volue of land thot

ha, a permanent cowmnl (Income Ta~ ,\ssessmcnt Act 1997 purrnant to the Toxotion Law,
Amendmc1tt ,\ct (No. B) 2003)). Follmvit1g the a'tlemlmcnt, landowners can now claim
deductions

in

relation to

""Y

tlccrcase in land value, camctl by entering a con,e.vo~on

covenant in perpetuity with the Commonwealth, State/Territory or local gon,mrnent,.
ln addition to providing inforn,otion on cm·rMnts, informotion and awom,ess
programmes nc<d ta point out the typC', and levels of benefit avillable in placing a covenant on
tl,e land ond how landholder< can access such benefits.

5.4.5

Other variables
Although the majority of londhoklcr, in botl, State, wcr,:, more than 50 percent

cconomicolly tlependent on their properties, the depcndcn~c was more pronounced in West cm
,\umali, than Victori,. 'D,c greater remoteness of farm-holdings in Western Austrolia from
u,ban centre, compored to tl,o,e in Victoria makes it mote difficult for londholdcr< in Western
Austrnlio to engoge in other forms of cmplo)'ment n,vay from the forni. l 'hcrc fo tr., londholders
i1, Victoria wecc more similar, in respect 10 economic dcpc11dcncc on 1he land, to pcrmoncnt
covenant holders than were !and]rnldcrs in Western Australia.
L,ndholdcrs' perception, of the effectiveness of pcnnanent co,·c,rnnts a, solinity
control mcosurcs in Western ,\ustralio ore partl)· attributed to the lcng1h of tirr.c that the
propctty has been in a bndhoklct's famil)·. The longer that landholders ha,·e lml their
properties in the furni~·. the les, like!)' they ore to perceive permanent cm·enants os effective
measures for solinity control than those that ha,·c hnd the properties in the fomily over a shorter
pcriotl. However, the direct effect of the length of time that, property hos been i" the family
on attitudes to permoncnt covenant was stronger tha11 it, indirect effect.
In the combined categories of londholdcrs m Victori, and \Ve stem Australia, tl,c effect
of londho!dcrs' perception' of o permanent covenant's effectiveness " a salinity control
measure on tlieir onitudes to a pcrmonent cavcnanr uptake was pa,tly amibuted to tlie State in
which landholders ore bised. J.011dholdcrs in Western Aumalfa arc less likely to perccive
permanent envenoms as effective salinity control mcosurc,, compared 10 hndho\ders in
Victoria. 'The gteotcr negativity ta permanent covenants in Western Australio compared to
Victoci:i ma)' account for the greater sccptici,m of• permanent covenant's ability to oc•. as a
solinity control meosurc, nmnng landho\tler< in \','e.stem Australia than in Vic1ori,.
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'11,e kngth of time that the property hos been in the family, nnd the number of
org.rni2otions that a londholder is associated with, hod an effect on ,heir attitudes to a
permanent covenant uptake only in \\'eslcm Austrnlia. The pos;iblc cxplanolion fo, this
obse.votion is the lesser att,chment to the property by landholders with the shorter length of
property ownership in the fo,uily thon the ,utochmcnl of landholders ,..;th longer period of
fomily ownership of property. Lesser attachm~nt to property is associatc<l with gre,Her
acceptance and opcnnc.s to new concepts or changes to land management, while stronger
Wochmcnt is associ,t,d with established way of managing properties, and le" tolcroncc to new
ideos of managing land.
Lrndholdcrs in Western 1\ustulia ~,at were associ>tcd "ith a lar!(C number of
COt>serv,lion groups were more likely to hove a posi!ivc ;ittitude to uptake of o permnnenl
covenant compared to those that were ossoc!ntcd with fewer or with no conservation group~ It
io likely that the number of coo,~rvotion groups that a landlrnl,ler is ossodoted with is a pro<y
mcosure of their level of inlerest in ,~1ture crn,scn·otio11. '11,i, is strongly sugg,·stcd by o
significant positfrc correlation between membership of associ,tions and interest in long·tcnn
ooture consc.v.1tion in the p.uh model The increasing number of con,cn·ation groups to which
a subject is associated is cortdatcd with on incrcaie in !nlcrest in nature consc.votion.
Age had a direct and indirect influence on bndholders' .1ttimdes to • pcrmoncm
covenant uptake in Victoria, sug;;csting younger rcspondcms were mme likely to have a
positive ottitndc to pcrmnnent co,·enant uptake comp,rcd to older ones. Cary (2001) found age
to have little influc11ce on indfridual adoption of management proctices ond concluded that
e,·en where a rdation,hip occ,,rs it is unlikely to be linear.

He further observed that :unm,g

older landholders appronching rttircmcot the tcbtionship between age and adoption of
innovotion thot require large int•estmen!, is mediated by income.
,\ possible e~plnnation for younger i,ndl,oldcrs' gre,1,,r likelihood to hove a positive
ottirude to perrmncn! covennol uptokc is rclntcd lo a significant correbtion cstnb~shed be1,vcen
familiarity with co,·enant program, ot>d age, which showed younger landholder, as more likely
to be familiar witl, the covenant prngnm, in their Stnte comp,red to older respm,dents. ln tl,is
cose, familiarity with covenaol prognms in the Stace among l,ndholders is linked to clc,rer and
greater undet'-tnnding of p<rmanen! covcnnnts and their benefits, resulting in lesser
oppreher· :On abom a pennancnt covei,ant uptnkc.
Another e,planation of the obsc.ved relationships between landholder's age, the !cngtl,
of time tl,at the propeny has been in tl,e family and ,ttitudes to pcnnaneut covenant uptoke, i,
the influence of post behaviour. Social Information 11,cory mointain. tlm past behaviour
affects the construction of attitudes and present behaviours (Go!dmon, 2001), ln tl1is conteu,
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post government policies in AumJtia <lucctly or indirectly discouraged nature conser,,ation on
private land that had potential for ogriculturc.

I

:c\ure rnnsct\•ntion w,s therefore \"icwcd by

londholJcrs as a government domain, to be restricicd to protected arc.,s such a, nations] parks
and n,turc rcsct\·e, (fairicr, 19%).
Past practices and a mindse! created among older l.,ndholdcrs for non.inrnlvcmcnt in
nuurr conservation un the farm, suggest that older landholders who lived in the old
gm·cmment policy era, and those that have hnd proptrtic, in t!,c farni!y m·u a longer period arc
more likely to ho,·e a negative attitude towards the uptake of, pcmrnnent covenant compared
!<I

others. However, it is unclear why age is only signific,nt in influencing attitu,b

(O

uptake of

n perm,nent covcn,m among landholders without nnr covcnont or agreement in Victorio and
not among other landholdc,· ca1egorics. But this lock of clarity is not unique to 1hi, study as
litcrnture shaw, contrndic1ory r.mling, on the rcl,tlon,hip betv,ecn ogc and odoption of
ogriculrurol innovation, (Cory, 2001).

5.4.6

Economic incentives
Landholde"' recommended several economic incenti,·e measure, for encouraging the

uptake of permanent c,wcnan(s: fu·1ding fr<>m the Siatc Gm·crnmcnt to cover the costs of
covenot1! title search, lc1,Sll cost of er tering s covenant, ond cost <>f mainl.1.ining d1e area under a
covcn,nt. rinancial assistance from tbe State Go,·ernment was also needed to cover the cost of
fencing, assistance will, weed and ,·crmin control, and assistance with labour to c:ury out
required consct\·atioci work undo, a covenant. L1mlhoklers arc quite clear on bow nnd why
they c,p,ct the deli,·cry of thc,c incenti,·cs. Three of 11,e ways that they recommended on how
tl,c incentives could be deli,·crcd in both States were direct funding, tax rebate and reduction in
land toxcs. 11,c ju,tificotion for tl,c incentive, wns summarised in comment, by two
landholders,

.. Th, Go,.mmm/1 ,hould /,ai, a /oqh. al 11,cm,jid and ~~lf-m,mayd crmm:vtion an:.u and
dcknowl1ds/ 1/,. human and.finao,M ,on1rib111ion nq11ind far m,h partnmhip amio!fmM/t bilwtM
th1 /,mdboldm und go,emmmt', ,,.,d
"Th, on!)· ~''9' l ran "' ,.,,/11n1,ro ,m~na,w •~rh.ing ii :o ef!ir.finanrial in<1nlin1 far !hi! to om,r. I
JJ)(J/1/d Im~ lo J..a1·11/1,famt looking Iii:., a p,irh. ~·ilh k!J offtnml '!/fNglulion bu/ I r.,nnol bir.,uu
mry !JtrlarutJ11n/1 •-itb todaf, mrrrnl tight ma1J,in,."
,\ c,oss-section of landholders were contem to rccei,·e fencing rnsts to cover onlr the
m,tcri,l, while others ,·iewed it necessary to also include the cost of erecting the fence. 11,c
types of lmandnl incentiYc, cited by the rcspondcn!S concur with those of other l,.ndhnldcrs
reported hy Jenkins (1998) and (Productivity Commission., 2001). Even when financial
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incentives such as tu dcduclibWty for conscrvolion work were ,lrc,dy in pbcc, some
landholders felt this wos not sufficient in meeting the rin,ncial need, for conservation for some
landholders. To amplify this, one !ondhoidcr stated " .. .!hi; 11 no/ ,ujjin'rnt h,!p i,•h,n a grrar

p,mn1ag1 offi1rmm al 1h1 mamwt 11r:n'I making mo11gh ,r.onry lo p;,y /4.,''.
Evidcn~)", the view of landholders that pennonent covcnonts haYc a cost imp~"cation
that is beyond whot tber arc \\illing to bear is • deterrent to the upukc of covenant. Futthcr
discussion on incentive measures for pcnninent cm·cnant uptake i, provided in chapt« 6.

5.4.7

Compensation as equity
Irrcspccti,•c of their ,tt.itudes to a pcrmoncnt coven.out uptake, ihc m,jority of

landholders dearly point c.ut the need for inccnti,·c, and compensatory measure, to cncoutagc
np1akc of pcnnanent co,·cmum. Some nf the compcnsitory mca,urcs on<l rhcir j11,Lification
dted b)' landholder, include the pro,·i,ion of annual management fees to cover the cost of
working ond maintoining the"'""' under• covcn,nt, and !he w.ii,·cr of siamp <luty on the land
under a covenant to cnmpcnsotc for lo,s in market val11c of the property because of• covcn,nt.
Reduction in land tncs by the Stole Gm·ernmcnt to cnmpensotc for bn<l token out of
production or ploccd under grsaing restrictions is al,o cited. Further discussion, on equiry
issue, in pcnnancnt cnvcnont uprnkc a<e prescmcd in chopter 6.
'!be next chaptcrprcseuts a dlsc11,sion on the kc)' fames that h,vr. emerged from 1hc
findings of 1his chapter and the previous two chapters.
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Tht r,laliomhip brflWm ptap/1 mu/ l,mdm1ptt is aboJJ/ ro111m11nilits and lhlir imlilllliot/f; 1h1 l.1111,
tCUIIOP{J, so.it!)', 01;gm1fraliom, poliriu a11d sod11/ ,.,/urs, it1 olhm, and how Ihm rtfalionships impafl
1ipo11 a,1d drtrrmi11r 011r11sr of mo11rm. Charles WiUcocks, Lmd & U:'atrr A11s!mlia, J11fy 2001

ef!hr mer.,//ji111/i,w ojthr 1!111/y. At1 inlrod11cfion 11nd
ef ro,1,ip/11,il modds //,11/ nm ro,u/mc/11//1111.1 //,1 mmrrh Ji11di1w, 1bouing th, fador
rrMionships i11 " mmum! 1,ptah ,m pmr,1/rd i,1 srrliM onr. Thr strand m1ion ef 1h, rbapter
diwmrs !hr ro11upt11,1/ modrl i11 r,/alion to fl,~ <rJ11S!mcfl, .rbo11i11g !hr simifariliu {11/d diffe1?11m
i11 //Jrir i11jl11m,11 011 !hr J1p!11kr ef 11 prm1a11111/ crmn,ml 011,ong /1!1 dijft1r11f Cllltgorirs 011
This chap!erpmmls ,, dimmio11

dulriplio11

l,111d/10/drr1•

.AlfmliOII is dr,111111 to 1hr ,'Oluisftll(Y

ef //,1 ,Ms/ruc/1 unil olh1r.fi1dorJ mu/ poli;y tool!

rrpmmt,d i11 //i, modd uilh rrlmml lhlDI)' {l.~d film1/11rr. /lrg11111m/ is 11111& far 1h, i11rorporaliM

ojlhm romtmdJ i11 poliry ,,,,d pro.~filt1JS 11i111,d ,1/ Jllpportillg 1iaf11rr ronsrm1tion 011 pn'mtr {a11d
and th111j!lt1h '!fp111111111mt ,~i.11,ml i11 p11rti,·11!11r. Di1mssio11 011 imwlir~ 111tt1s11m far 11ptak.r of
p11111,111ml rom1,111f ,mdj1uttfimtio11 for thrir "" i, 11ho pmm!ed.
Stctio11 /hm <"011tai11s ro11</t1,io111 of /Ii, th.1pl1r, and of /ht lh11is.
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Section one; Overview of findings and discussion setting

..

·

hluoductlon
This thesis sets out to invescigatc snd further the und=tanding of facwrs that ha,·c
influenced and o.rc likely to influence decision, of landholders «garding the uptake of
pcnnanem covenants, om.I the incentive measure, neccsssry for encouroging the uptake of
pennanent covensnt in ,\u,m,lia. "11,e ,cud)' wo., cxplorntory and large!)" guiJcd bl' the research
data, and supported by thcor)' ond literature on adoption of ogricuhur.l conservation practices
ond innovations on private land, economic dcci,ion·tnoking, motintion and social poliC}'
thcori,~. 'lbe,e thc<irics ,wd empirical lit<rntmc were also the basis for the selection of several
variable, that were hrpothcsiied in Chapter I

!O

undcrlsy the decision of bndholdcrs on the

uptake af a pennonent cov,,n,nt,
Research questions were sot in this stud)" tn cs1abli,h,
•

whethc. the« arc factors that t)"(lLCally characterise bndli<,ldcrs who ha,·c • pcnnoncnl
covenant 011d whe1hcr there ore relationships between hndholdcrs' likelihood of llptakc
of

O

pcnnonml cm·cnant and se,·cnl ext1genous •mi endogenous factors of

landholders/ properties included in the study.
•

the specific b1rricrs to landholders' uptokc of a permanent covcnont, and inccnti,·c
measures that can be used cffccti,·ely by stoic ~nd local governments and appointed
co,•cnarot agencies to motinte tbc uptake of permanent coven aim on private land.
This chapter contoins • discussion of the research finding, c0n1aincd in the pre"ious

three chapters and their implications for poliC}· and pro~ms for nature comcr;ation on
private land. ,\ comparntivc oppro,ch showing the simil1ritics and d.iffcrenccs between all tbc
different landholder categories is used in the d!.scussion.

6.1.2

General likelihood of, and policy ~ctting for, conscrvatin'l. covenant
uptake
Pennoncnt covcn1nts arc essentially ,·o!unmy regulatory mcchmioms !hat '""'" ••

altem•ti,·es to govcmment·irnpo«d rcgulatioM. '11,eir use i, politie>!ly expedient as they help
government to achie,·c the desired conscrnuon strategy on pri,·otc land "'ithm11 the
appear.nee of imposition of rules and cund.itions or change of bnd o·~ncrsh1'p, and in a cost
effccti,·c and efficient W"OJ". l lowc,·cr, permanent cm·cnon11 ho,·c not attracted ,;.idc,prc•d
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uptake because among other factors landholders ,·icw them v.oth suspicion os they sec them

o,

a

disguised fonn of government rch,ulstion.
'11,c observations made from landholder rc,pnns<s 10 pem1an<m covcn,nt uptake in
this study hoYc som,· potential implicJ1ion, for n1tional poticic, for ccm«n·a1inn on prinle
lam.I. For cnmplc, th,·rc were l.ugcr proporti,ms of focd-lcm\ co,•cnant and fixcd-tcnn
ag«:cmcnt huldcr,; in both Victono oud \\'cstcm ,\ustroho 1h,r we«· positive Ww>rds the uptokc
of pcnnsncnt co,·enanls lhsn thc1c were non-holder, r,f cm·cna<\1 or agcccmcnt. "llu, trend
rc,·cols and dcmonstrotcs a hithcm, unrecDgni,cd 1rnnslli<ln ,,£ increasing likchhood of
pcnn;mem co,•cn.1nt llptokc, from nnn·hol,krs of • co,·,·nant or agrecmcm tu facd-tcnn
lwldcrs of Ct>Vcnant '" ogrccmcnt. ln that rc,pccl pnhc)" measur,·, 01med at cncr,uragmg non·
holders of a c,wcnnnt

<lr

ngrccmct\t lo toke up pcnn>nent ccwcnont, >re likely to mokc is•ini if

1hcy cnmur:igcd the use of fixcd-u·,m cm·,·nants or fix<'d-term ,gr<·,·mem, "' tr:,nsition,
towards uptokc uf JH,nl\otletlt C<>\"cnan1,. In sud, • transiti,m, landh<>ldcrs u·ould ha\"c the
opportunity ID !com about, and c,plorc sfrr:ibr mributcs lo those of pcnna11cnt CCJ\"enom in •
less cncurnl>erinii nnd 'threa1ming' cm·ironment.
A com1>0ri.son between St.1tes ,howcJ 11101 \'iclt>ris hod on ,wcraU larger proportiou of
lo11dholdcrs "ith • likdih,"'d of tnkm~ "P a pcrmnncnl rnwn><\I 1lrnn \X'cstcrn Allmaha. ·11,e
diffcrmce Lmn•cn th,·

iu·c,

States rn,1}' b-i :111riliutcd I<> widcsp«·ad awarcne,s nf pcnna,m>t

covcmnlS i11 Victorin rcsultini~ from • longer pcrioJ of acti1·dy operationol rn,·cnonting
progr:um under the Trnst for Nan,re 1han m Western ,\u,1r:il,.1 under the Dcpartmcn1 of
Agriculture, the D,·panmcm nf Cc,nscn·annu and Land Management (C,\!..M), and the
Notion,\ Trust of Wcstc,n .\u,trnlio. 'Ilic ncgali\"c altitudes to pcnnnnent C<J\"cti,nt, by a
sci,~nent of landholders in \X',·,tem Austr-h., thnt were dmatisficd v.1th its rnnd,tion,d tenm
mar al,n h:l\·c pmmotcd m·1;at11·e scn1imcnts t<Jward,· covenant.< m \\"cs!em ,\uma~a. ·n,i,
lotter likelihood highlight.< 11,c potcnti.,1 imp.1ct of dnsclr rcl.11ed ag«cmr:m, or co,·c,um
mechanisms on c.1eh n1her and c,11, for care

1<>

mimmise such nch,ati,·c impacts d<lring planning

and setting up of mon.1iscmcnt ogrcemr:nts. ,\n imp,c, a«crnncm uf ,he ,ctirms proposed
under the ogrccment ptogr>m before its bunch m,y pre-empt such ncgati,·c impact, on other
closely «·lotcd nnlurc conscn·.uion programs.
The Jcci,1ons of hndhuldcr, ot\ the uptnh of permanent ccwcn•nts >re innucnced
dirccdy ,ml/or indirectly by ,c,·enl interocti,·c factors (represented by individu,1 or collecti•;e
,·ariable,}. ·n,i, confinm the hn10thcsi, of tbe ,cud)· sci m dup1cr one. ·n,c,c factors Jiffcr in
compos!tinn OCLording lo diffcrrnl c,1cgurics of l.mdhnldcn (for cumplc, c1tci;orics bo,ed on
the 1)1'" of consen·ation ogrccment held or the Smc or Territory of opcn1ion). llowcver, the
factors cm bi, brood!)" da,sifir:d into fi,·e pnnc1pal cnn<1nic1, that mdude,
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suength of namrc conservation ethic,
]~cl of confidence in the pennancnt cm•cnant mrchonism,,
]~cl of economic dependence on the property,

view on property rights regime, and
narurc con,etvati.:m c,11my.
Although the influence of multiple f,c,ors on bndholdcrs' ilecisi<ms to adopt or accept
consctvation programs i, wiilely recogniicil ss stated in Choptcr 1, the influence of collective
factor on the uptake ofpcnna11ent coven,nt and tlicir rdotive individual strength have not been
discussed nor dorificd adequately.
Conceptual model, arc often used to describe complex system pmcesscs to polic)·
maker, and die public. Although they do not represent the c<>r,,plctc system, they provide
opportunity ilw they be Ue,·clopcd further or revised with a,·oilability of more infonnation and
they al,o help to derive universal principles, which con be applied to a variety of sir.,atiom
(Hcemskerk, Wil,on, & Povno·Zuckern,.m, 2003)
The following discussion in Section 2 centres on a series of conceprual models (Figure

6.1 m 6.4) derived frrnn the findings of this study, which expound on the principles thot
~ndcrpin the optakc of nomrc conserv>lion Cr>\"cnont, on private land. Description of cod, of
the model components i, carried out for cod, of the fa·c con,tructs outlined obo,·c. Some of
the policy and program mcasul'eS thst hove the potenti.,1 to 1mpport tl,e upt,.I., of pe,moncnt
covcnonts ond dcli,·cry oflong-tcnn conserntion ootcomcs on printc land arc olso discussed.

1:
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Section 2: Conservation covenant decision constructs and their policy
implication

Inuoduetion
In tl,is section, it is argued thot the fi>•c principol constructs i.e., notu,c conseevotion
ethic, confidence in o covcnont mcchou.isms, property right,, consc,ntion equity, ond
economic situation ore key foctors for tl,e adticvcmcnt of nature con,cevation on private land
and in influencing landholders' uptake of a pcrrn1ncnt covenants. It is pointed out that despite
the scknowlcdgcmenl by g,,vemmcnt of the important role of the so.id constructs, conservation
policies and strategics to support ibis importance l,a.·c not been tron,!otcd into concerte<l and
com<linotcd actions th.1t .1rc cap.1blc of ddinring major chongc to the conscevation behaviour
in \ondholdc,,., ·n,c ncccssny tool> and action, for proinoting nature conservation on private
lands aml building a noturc con,e"·ation ethic in landholders and the public ore discussed

6.2.t Nature conservation ethic
Nature cunseevation ethic is one of the five principal constructs in the decision on the
uptake of a perrn•ncnt cm·enant. ,\ conceptual mode! illustrating the in1eraction of factors thot
influence nature conseevation ethic is ,hown in Figure 6.1.
l..andholdees in thfa study pointed out three nmHnutually c~clu,ive c,scntials for
building o conscevation ethic:
•

incrco,cd 3warcncss ,nd undcrstaniling of the relationship hcN.'CCn the natur,il
environment •nd hwnans,
increased aw,rcness ond unders!•nding of the importance of bioW\,crsity on
individual properties for mainta.ining ond enhancing biodiversity objccti,·cs •I
local, regional and n•tiana\ scales,
•tressing the value of each specific landholder's contribution to consceving
biodivcnity.

,,
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These uc represented in the conccprua! model as 'links to human well bcing' and
'perceptions of benefits'

Human
Wellbeing

Knowledge

"'

Awareness

Value and
Appreciation
for Nature
Shared
Costs

Nature

Conservation
Etlde

Effective

"'

Perception
of Shared
Problem

Efficient

Support

Figure 6. 1 Conccpru.,l Model showing the intcraclions of factors in influencing nmirc
conservation ethic
Note: The dhction of •nows paint, from innuencing fac1on

tu

tl1c innucncod focto'5.

Some of the other component, of o noturc conservation ethic in thi, study are
dcmonstroblc interest in, a"d value occonlcd to, norurc os evidenced by permonent covenant
holdcrs.11,cse component, arc illomoccd in the conccprual modd (figure 6.1) os 'Viluc ond
Appreciation for Nature'. ·n,ey conform with findings by lkcdcll & Rehman (2CKXl) which
showed tint formers witl, strong environmental awareness were more Likely to have positive
attitudc5 towards hedge management" a conscl"\·arion mcosurc tlian were those who possessed
lesser environmental awareness.
Landholders tl,at ha\·c " prcdominontl)· utilitorian objective fo, land m,nagcmcnt arc
unlikdy to appreci,tc the conservation voloes on thcir properties. Although this may be
changing with tl,c emergence of ecological ~griculrure, po,t detachment of a "techno-scientific"
perspective of commerciil agriculture from an r,,hics perspective (Lindholm, 1997) mean, tl,at
mon)· londholders stiU do not see the value of conservation. 11tis is expressed in two examples
of comments br laodholders in the stud)"
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''Ptopl, nlld lo m Jh, 1'11/Ut of rrinurving, naliV< tro{)''''"'' on thrir land, wli,th,r thdl """"' a bm!fil
lo lh,ir UJ!,rimlturol mtupriu or an gppmiation of thr "'")'Jt,m itulf. If na/11re ronmwtion ronnanft
art lo inm11tt,

b,g dforti n"J 11 I" made to imp.art lhit sort of 11ndmtan£ng whi<h I 1,11m m,an,

•mpl~irll, mort p,op!, to <W that."
'1f /andnwnm art no/ ronvinnd of rhr ,,,f,i, ef na/urol hll,h (burh/ •~!land artat on thrir ho/dirt!)
th,rr will""~' b, "'!>' ,11/u, in "'!>' agrrtmml..
Dcvc!opme,u of an appreciation of the nlues of narnrc in landholders can be achieved
by improving !heir undemanding of the link between !heir wellbeing and die heallhy
maintensnce of !he environment {USAlD, 2001). Landholders also need to be convinced dw
the public snd go·,tlllment opp,eciate ond ore willing to support them morally and financi:illy to
add,c,. the complex issues faced in conserving noturc on their prope,tie,. A lon<lholder in the
present stud)' underlines this:
", .. /ht .ff!l<r11m1nl nr,11/ not "" ro,tnantor; IIJ' an

<:.Cl(Jt

/o !men thrir rommitm,nl lo ronJtrt'l11ion

of pub!ir prop,rtJ. Thit is a ronc,m that actualfy pm~nll p,oplt 1 k.now from rommuni{y to
ro1tnantinJ1, tb,ir nmnanl bmhland "
Another measme also shown in !he conceptual model for building or ,ustsining
landholders' nature conse,vation ethic i, 'Perccptior: of Shared Problem' In !his study,
landholders expressed the view that go,·emmcnt and public do not give diem the necessary
support to cnoble them to ochie,·e the desired conservation outcomes. Jl.iillar (1998) stresses
that dmse working with lmdholdas ought to recognise the socio!, historical and fin,ncial
enviromncnt in wbkh the landholders live, as weU as factors that could influence d1eir full
particip•tion in cunrcrvation. Burcaucrncy ,nd inefficiency, which are barriers to conservation,
need 10 be adillessed in go,·cmment conservstion administration. Furthermore, !he
development of ,c,ponsi,·e mechanisms thot facilitate prompt and ulevant support to
landholders in narn,e conservation needs to be emphosised in policy sctung.
Increased knowledge and awareness of the cn,·ironment through cducstion and od,e,
means can build landholders' v,lue ond appreciation for nature. Two permanent covenant
holders in !he pusent study illustrate the impact and ability of these meosu.cs to lead
lsndholdcrs toward, dicir uprnke of pcrman~11t covenants:

'1 bilim ,,bm1lion ft !he A'!): Wt sfo11/d b, made II! k mor, mmrr ofo11ro111n diminithin.g "'l.'lab'on
and .,!,at thit is dclnJ!, to th, m,ironmtnt'; and ''. .. furot,nition of ,nd,,ng,md sp,rits it dijfirnlt far

U!J p,op/1. I Jl'(}JJ/d nor hdw gppmiat,d /he,, pkmtr lmd "!Y d,,11ght,r not h,m a biolo1j,t, inlmtt,d in
nati,~ g,wm anJ h,rbr. "
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Funhermore, knowledge and ~warenrss of nature con increase landholders' perceptions
of the benefits of conserving narure (depicted in the conceptual model os 'Perceptions of
Benefits1 directly oe indirectly, and in effect building tl,cir nature consecvotion ethic. 11,e
indirect effect is through linking d1e sme of norure and cm,ironmemwith hum•n weUbcing (,~
Pigute 6.1).
The ANZECC Wmking Group on Norure Conservation has identified some bestprnctice initiatives and principles for building ownership and steward,hip of !amlho!ders in
nature conservation on private !and on Privste Land (1997). They include building relationships
with landholders and incorporating best procticc nature conse[Votion into existing extension
and planning prognuns (J\.li!br, 1998).
Despite the globo! and Australian recognition of the importance of promoting nature
conservation ethic, cills by many bndholders in this study for meosutts tll promote education
and aworeness in narure consecvation on private land indic:ue thot this eecognition has not
t:nns\:ued into implementation ,ctio.,,. The requi.cemem, foe building a co11,e.vation ethic
often compete with similar other narure conservation approaches such as policy advocacy or
compensotion scheme, for the limited financial resources availed by governments to
conse"'ation.
Lmdholders' perceptions of the benefits of conserving noruw can also help to build a
nature conservation ethic indirccdy through increasing thci.c value and appteciation of natutt.
Current covenant programs tend to focus and ta:gct bndholders who olrcsdy display strong
consen'ation ethic2. These pro>,,rnms, because of limited resources, la.rg.Jy neglect the mote
'difficult to rcoch and change' class of landholders despite evidence that significant nature
con,e=tion values that arc most ot ri,k "tt owned ond manogcd by landholders who do not
have a high nature conservation ethic or value for nature. Effecti,·c and efficient support to
hndholders in their conservation cffom c~,1 build their pecception of benefits in conse"'ing
narure, thus promoting a narucc conservation ethic among hndholders.
TI,e ability of noture conscr,:otion ethic to influence landholders' decision on the
adoption of con,ers·ation measures is recognised in litrnrure (Dcedell & Rchmsn, 2000; Ga,.on
& Pone,,, 1988) and in natutt conse[Vation policies. In !he lmer, for exomp!c, ~,c National

Strategy for the Conservation of AuscrnUa's Biological Diversity (Environmen, Australia, 2000)
supports the development of information programs to impro,·c the level of knowledge and

2 One eKccption to this i, a woodlands conservation program by \XIWF in Western Auatralio,
which purposcly targets monagcmenl ~gm,ments at Lmdholders who hove important
woodlands foe conscrs·ation rnther than. those that are interested in covenooting thcic
properties.
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aw:m:ncso of the values of retaining n,ti,·c vcgctotian as measures of inculcating a cansc<Vation
ethic.
l'mm a gk,bal perspective, the \Var!d Conser,,otion Str.1tcgy (1980) mcognizcd
e1wironmental ethic, a, • mal!er of unequivocal importance to the international community,
l»scd on fi<·c components: interdependence of aU living thii,g, (reciprocity), halism, respect for
future gcncrntian, and a principle of snstaionb!c dc,·clopmcnt (de Sika, 1997). Several of these
components can be ab,Cr,,ed in the responses by bndholdcrs in this srudy. !'or example, a
respect for future generations is demonstrated iu response by

Oil~

landholder. ''Conm,.,,tion on

pri,,,11 l,md mm/ b, ,nro11ruJ1d. P,op/r mull b, madt a11·art ef //;, ad,.,,nla,(lf ef hating land tel atidt for Ihm
pmpom and will /1111¥ //i,m in a p1rmanrnl ,1a11forJ11t11n J!nm,lian''. 11,c concept of halism is olsa
dcmanstntcd by another response bra fondholdcr:

I;

''.E,~ry atp,cl eftt~ry ism, nml! 10 b, addnmd 111J,tnl!J•from; mtytalion, indlidiaggr,,,m, grounJ

ro1~r.r.

{o,,,

b1iil1 a, ,n!l m Im< land1111 ind,1dingfom,m rHIU/Calion aboul.farmin.g l«lmiqurs,

ron1<m1lion import<1n«, ch,milal 11/fflion and ""

ef waltr

manaymen/, 1N1tabli1bmml

rndanJ!nd 1pui<1, anli talinity rd!lmrl, 11"al1r "" and a//l)(IJ/ion r,appraital for //,, who/1

ef
ef

Amtm!ia••• far 011r land h,alih':
Manning cl al. (1999) observe that l>ndowncrs with a ,uong cnvironment"1 ethic arc
more suongly motivated

ta

adopt good conservation and e,wironmcntal practices thon others.

Simifody, Clearfield & Osgood (198~) cite positive associations between the prco<ncc of a moral
obligation in farmers for the protection of nsrural resoucccs and the use of conscn·stion
practices.
Anotl,cr ri:a,on for building a nsturc cooscrvotion ethic in landholdeu i, given by
Farrier (1995) - thst lmdowncrs who have• weak nature conservation ethic arc likclf ta look
for loopholes in regulation, in an attempt circumvent the high cost of implementation, or only
implement conservation regulation when they arc sure the,c is a realistic tlueat of vigorous
enforcement. '!be rcalil)' ;, caprurcd in a comment b)' one of the landholders in the srudp
"F,1rmm 111 1ht Gom7'mtnl

(1J

being mpMtib/1 far ron11n11lion a,ml: and an ui/1 dtaring "~" though

,alini!J• it obvio11,."
TI,e oaru,c conscn·otion ethic con cause bndholders to make canscrvstian decision,
based an long-term ,acictal benefit, n,thcr than short-term profitability, and to achieve
conservation outcomes more efficicntl)· than \ommand and control' opproaches such as
regulations and legislation. It al,o has the potential of genernting positive ~ctions that may be
ncccsssry for improved cat,<etvotion outcome,, psrticu!arly witl, scientific uncertainties obout
cansc<Vacian i,f biodiversity (Farrier, 1995), Fmthermarc, bccsuse active man,gcrncnt i,
necessary for the integrity of most conservation areas on fannland, the need for a <11tuce
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conscivotlon ethic among landholders becomes more appuent with change in property
ownership as new owner, may be<eome disunccd from the conseivation intentions and zest of
the origin,! covcnantori: over time.

6.2.2 Confidence in permanent covenant mechanisms
Landholders ,re more likely to have confidence in • permanent covenant if they
understand it wcl~ if they view its comparnti,·c ability over other mechanisms to secure longterm conscr:stion, if they perceive its necc.,ity ond bcncllts, ond if they view it to be

ca,y

to

implement and compotiblc with their go,ls and objectives. Confidence in the pcrmonent
covenont mechanism came second, ofter a concern for nature conservation, in tl,e facton that
innuenccd landholders' deci,ion to ukc up a permanent covenant in Victoria. Similarly,
londholder, demonstrated tl,eir confidence in the permanent covenant mechanism in their
decision to use a pcrmonent co<'enont to manage their concern, about a likelihood of alteration
of d,c conservation areas by future owner, or manogcrs, and their conviction that there were no
other e<JUoUy effective mccbanism1 for long-term nature conservation.
Fi>,,ure 6,2 shows a conceptual model of the factor int~.rnction leading to confidence in

a permanent covenant mechanism. Five factors arc ,hown

to hove

a direct influence on

landholders' confidence in a covenant as a mechanism for long-term nature con,civation. The
factor interactions presented in the conceptual model ore discuued in the text that follows.

Perceptions
of Benefits
of,
Covenant

Compatibility of
Covenant with
Land Goals
Effectiveness
ofaCoveo!'.Itt

I:

Confidence In
Covenunt

Necessity of o
Covenant

Koowledge and
Awareness

Flgu ... ~. 2

Conceptual modd sbowing the interaction of factor, in influencing londho!der
confidence in permanent covenant mcch,nisms

Nole: The dir~tion of ar,ows polflt, from inOuet1dng facton 10 d1e inOuenecd factor,.
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6.2.2.1

Informa1ion, knowledge ~nd awareness
Informotioci and education ore motivational spproaches tl,at c•n influence behaviour in

favour of biouivmity conscn•ation (Gunningham, 2001). The ~oncepru.J model (l'igurc 6.2)
shows that infonnotion, knowledge and awarcncs, have a direct and inilittct influence on
landholders' confidence in a covenant. 11,e Nm indirect influences are through landholders'
perception, of the benefits and necessity of• covenant (depicted in the model as 'Benefits of a
Covensnt' sod Necessity of a Covensnt', respectively). Evidently, in all lsndholdcr categoric,,
incrcosc in the bid of knowledge •bout pennsncnt covcna~t mechanisms was ossociotcd witl,
on increased likelihood of • permanent co,·en,nt uptake. Furthermore, level of knowledge
obout a permanent co,·ennnt in most landholder cMcgoric, had an indirect influence on their
Likelihood to take up• permanent covenant.
An absent or ineffective publicity of permanent covensnts in bod, S1,tes was evident
in landholder. from their display of little or no knowlc<l,,'<l about a permanent covenont and its
accompanying mechanisms ,nd their lack of awareness about the covenont prog..un,. Titis is
despite the presence of long running covcnmts progrmts in Vicrori, and Western Austr.1lia.
J.ack of ndequate knowledge and awareness about covenants is one of the reaoons for
landholders' lock of cm,fidcnce in them and their negative perception, about the purpose,
intentions, and ability of a pcrmonent covenant mechanism to deliver tl,e desired outcomes.
The indirect influence of tl,e level of knowledge about a permanent covenant on their
up rake by landholders amplifies the importance of assessing both direct and indirect imp,ct of
interventions such as education and awarcne" program, on permanent covenant uptokc.
Fanner, in Australia ha,•c recommended the u,e of informotion and education programs os
mco.sures to increase the protection of n>turc on pri,•atc land e.g. (e.g. Haw ct al., 2000:Jenkin,,
1998: Safstrom, \993). This is consistent with findings ol a positive ,elationship between the

level of conservstion awareness and biodivcnity conservation and adoption of conservation
technologies e.g. (Brotherton, 1989; Brouwer ct ol., 1996: L A. Cu,ti,, 1997; Vondoy &
Lav.~cncc, 1995).
Hollick (1990) points out th,t decisions of fannen rcg,irding the odoption of a
program can change from the objective situation to the perception of it because of lack of
infonnation and understonding. Increased knowledge and ow,ir,ncss can potentially inctcase
landholders' understanding about penn,nent covenant ond in the process scuttle
misconceptions and doubts about the purpose, components and opcr.Hion, of permanent
covenants.
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6.2.2.2

Benefits 0£ a pennanent covenant
Mosl non-holden of covcnom, ot agrccrnenls in both Stzlc,, with the bigger mojority

being in Weslcm Ausiralia, did nm perceive covenants to hove benefit,. This w.is similar in
dose to half of fixed-tem1 agreement ond fixed-tem1 covenant holUen in both Stotes. The
benefits of a covcnont alluded to by landholder, ore mainlr economic. For example, except for
fixed-tcnn covenant holden in Western Austrnlia, die perception, of die benefits of •
pem1anen1 covcnont in oll other categories of landholder, were attributed in part to their
pcr,'cption, of the impoctof.1 permanent covenant on lond value.
Even where iodi,iduol chor:ictetistic, of landholder, such"' oge were on influence on
the pereeption on benefits of a pem1oncn1 covenant, landholders' perceptions of a permanent
covenant's impact on land value were the higger of these influences. This finding is consi.tent
with Tisdell', (1998) osscrtion !Im local commu,titie, ar~ less likely to conserve biodivenity
where ther appropriate little or no economic benefit from its conscrvotion.
Norris & Shabman (1988) point out it is impmtom for landholders to perecivc the
direct an<l tangible benefits of mcchonisms or programs thot they are being a,kcd to adopt
Stronger perceptions of the benefi!s of a permonent covcnom were as,odatcd with an increased
likelihood for • pem1anent covenant uptake in all landholder cotegories in tl,e present study.
Ncvertheles,, thc,e wa, "vorioncc in perceptions of the,benefit. of a pennancm covenant
among the different cucgories oflandholdel"o.
Recent Tax legislation amendment to cover for loss in vo!uc of property that hos a
permanent covcnam is Likely to have a reloti,·dy sinular level of improvement in pcm:ptions of
the benefits of a pennancnt covenant omong the different categories oflondholden, However,
measures aimed at improving the perceptions of fixcd-tenn ,grecmcnt holders in Victoria on
the benefit, of a pem1anent coveuaot would hove mininul impact on tl,cit likelihood to take up
pem1ancnt covenants compared to other landholder categoric,. Thi. i, pos,ibly because fo:cdtem1 agreement holden in Victoria (Land for Wildlife, 2000) ore a!rcody aw.ire ond well
inf~~cd obout pcnn•nent covrnoms and do not sec any odditional benefit• to dr:tw from a
pem1anent cuvenant so os tu achieve their conservation gools.

'

O,eraU, rncosurel to increose landholden' pcrceptfons of the benefit, of a pcm1oncnt

covenant arc likely to have stronger in,poct on landholder,' uptake of" pem1anent covenant in
non-holders of covenants or ogrecmen!s than in fixcd-tcm1 covcnont and fixed-tem1 agre=ent
holden, with the grcace,1 impact in non-holden of covenants or •grecments in Westcm
Austrnlio. Similarly, in Victoria older non·ho\dm of coven,nt, or ogrecmcnts arc less likely to

c;:,,, take up a permanent covenant tlian arc younger landholder, because they do not perceive it,

"

benefits. Therefore, measures to increase the perception, of the benefits of a pcm1anent
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covenant would have a po,iti,·c effect on uprnkc of pcnnoncnt covenants if they were targeted
at older rothc, than ot )'Ollnger londholders. In fixcJ.tenn agrccment ,n<l fixc<l-tenn covenant
holders in Victoria and Western Australia, respectively, incmised knowledge about pennoncnt
covenants would bd 1ll increased positive perception, of the bencfic, of a pennoncnt
covenant.
Ahbough it would be expected that possession of a fixed-tenn covenant would
na111ra!ly be the result of •n intc,est in !ong·term nature conservation, the reality as shown in
the study findings is that thi, is not the case. A cross-section of landholder, wit!, • fixed-term
covenant arc unlikely to have taken up a fixed·term covenant if it were not conditional for
ocquiring a permit from government to dC'-'dop or c\c,t some part of their property - 'a tied
gont'. Consequcntlr, interest in long-term noru.c consetv,tion w,,o not the primaq motive for
fixed-tcnn covenant upial<.,. "These observ.1tions have implicstions for the future protection of
nature conservation area• currentlr under a fixed-term covenant on expiq of the agreement to
rcsetvc, psrticu!orly among lsndholders who feel they were coerced to take up the fixed-term
covenant.
There is " risk that the requirer.! lc.·c! of protection of conscrvatio<> fearu.c on such
l•nd under a fixed-term C<l\"enant moy not be •ssun:<l upon expiry of tl,c coven on\ particularly
where there is no other form of moti,·otion for long-term noturc consctvation. Current review
of the Rcnmsnt Vcgct•tion Protection Scheme under which the fi~cd-term covenant is entered
needs to build incentive measure, trot wi!l iuppolt conservation be)'Ond th• 30-yc:ir fixed-term
period by moving away from coerced uptake of man,gemcm •gtc<ments to od,cr incentive
bam:1 progrnmmes thot hO\•c • community input into the ,cccptablc con,ctvation mcch•ni,m
sod policy mix.

6.2.2.3 Ncet:eeity and dfoctlvcncse ofa permanent covenant
bndho!dcn< arc unlikely to toke up a permanent covenant if they do not perceive a
need for ii or its effectiveness in meeting their goal for their land, including the control of
saUnity. Figure 6.'.! ,how, the two factors nomel)", 'necessity of• covenant' •nd 'effcctivcnc.s of
• covenant' to have a direct infiuence on landholders' confidence in co,·cnonts. L:mdholden<'
percepti•>n• of the necenit)" of • covcn,nt ore partly • function of their knowledge and
~warcnc" about pem,ancm co,-cnon~ a., ,hown in the cnnccptuol model.
The majority of non-holders oi cm·cnanl• or agreement, in Wc,1cm ,\ustrnlia and less
than half in Victoria were confident that future managers nf their pmpcrtics would ensure the
.. continuation of conscrvotion on their lond. fonhcrmorc, tJ,c mojority of farmer:, in both St,tes
were uncertain obout the effccti,•cncss of pcnnoncnt r.ovenonts for loll!l·tcrm noturc
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conservation over od,er mechanisms. In this respect, lhcrefo,c, !hey did not perceive tl,c
necc,.ity of a binding conservation mechanism. 11,e conccpruol mode] show, that the Lock of
perceptions oft he need of covenants csn be attributed partly to lack of awareness ond sdequatc
knowledge about pennancnt covenants, prev:tlent in the mnjority of landholders, p:uticut..rly
those "'ithout .my forn, of a covenant or agreement.
Salinity has n ~igniftcnnt impact on fo;....fand.< and most J,ndholdcn in Australia arc
;,
:tl., 2000). However, the extent to which

swarc of its threat on fann production (How

\,i

landholder perccived a pcnnancnt covenant as " mechani•m for curbing the cncroochment of
salinity differed in differ,nt fandho!dc1 categories. For example, the uptake of pennancnt
covenonts by d,e majority of pcm,anent covenant holders wos due to reasons other than their
perceptions of the necessity of covenants os snlinitr control mechanism,. Thi', of course, could
mc;,n that they did not have or anticipotc h.-·ing ,olinity problems on their land or they did not
perceive covenants as effective mechanisms for salinit;· control.
Lli,dholm (1997) points out that the outcome of peoples' choices and 1ctiom is
dependent on the way 1hey comprehend «ality and their rclationsltip to 1hcir environment. In
~espect to salinity, soil s.11ini1y control wos more pop•ll.r os a reason for having retained narure
conservation fcoturcs on the properties omong non·holdcrs of o covenant or •gtc('mcnt in
Western Australia thsn among londholdcrs in Victoria. A stati,ticaUy significant rdotionship
between perception of• covenonts' effectiveness "' a mecho.nism fur salinil)· control and the
likclihnod of a pcnnnncnt c,weno!Jt uptake wos only observed in non.holders of covenant or
agreement in Western Australis.
Lcngtl, of time a family had owned• property had an influence on the perceptions of
non·holde,s of covenants or agreements in Western Australio on 1he cffcctivcne" of a
permanent covcnsnt .,. a sslinity control rneosurc. Studies by Abd.EIJo, Uoiberg, & \'iarrcn
(1981) show that the number of ycm fanning has • po;itive snd significant relationship with
tl,e use of conservation practices at lcost in the earlier yc'l\rs. Longer duration of property
ownership in the fomily was associotcd with a lower Hkdihood of bndho!den tn perceive
permanent covenants as cffoctive mechanisms for ulinity conuol than wos than wer.,
fandholdcrs with a shorter sssociation to their land. This therefore confirms the prediction
made in Choptcr \.
Haw ct al. (2000) rclatctl length of family association with the pmperty with a r~btivdy
high level of awareness and response to environmental degradation. It i, like!)· that those
landholders in Wcst=i Austr:tlia with propertie, chat had been in the famil)' over a long period
of time arc sceptics! about the ability of pcnnanent covenants to curb salinity· because the)"
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ha,·c pcrh•ps witnessed and c~pcrimcntcd unsucce,sfully with vat:iam nlinity-control
techniques compared to other lsndholders,

l'ercq,tions of the effectiveness of a permanent covcn:mt u a salinity control measure
were associated with the Ststc, smong non-holder> of covenants or agreements. Victoria
landholders v;crc m0<c likely

!O

perceive permanent covenants as effective mechanism, for

salinity control than those in Western Australia. Rickson, Saffigna, Vondoy, & McTainsh (1987)
suggests tl,at landholders' perception, of risks of degradotion of a comcrvation area in the
long-term may contribut~ to their decision towa<ds adoption of con,uvotion mc.,ur,s.

,\ccording!y, the observed greater likd'110od for londholders in Victoria than Western Austrn\ia
to view pcmiancnt covenants os ef(i,ctive mechanism, for salinity conuol i, pos,ib!y attributed

m more publidtr in Victoria, than in \'{1c,tcm ,\mtntli• of the potential risk of snlinity on
properties.

6.2.2.4 Compatibility of permanent eovenanl
lncompalibility of permonent covcna1u, with du: go.~\, and objective, of the bnd
(Drost ct al., 1996; Guerin, 1999; Jlarringmo ct al., 1985) hos !he pmential to affect
bndholdcrs' confidence in pcrm•ncnt cm·cnonlS "'iUu,trotcd in conceptual model (Figure 6.2).
Londholdcrs take up a permoncnt covenant wh<n d1cy view it co,y to implement and
compatible with d,eir goals and objccti,·cs of the bnd (llmlngton ct al., 1985: Nowak, \987).

!n this ,tudy, howc,:cr, there wm: no smti,ticolly ,ignificon! relationship, between bnt!holdcrs'
goal, for !he property in tcnns of rc1cn1ion of future man,gcmcnt or ownership and likelihood
of taking up" p~nnancnt rn,,cnon~ Our, o wide range of other comments made by landholders'

in rhc study show that mall)', particularly non-holders of a coven,nts or ngrecmcn!S, held the
opinion th,u" permanent covenont would prc•:cnt them from managing and using tl,e property
"' they desired • in effect poinling out i1, incompntibility wid, their gos! of unhindered use of
tl,c land.
Wide acceptance of pennancnt co,·cnant, among landholders entail, !heir de,ign and
promotion in the context of a whole farm plan, thns reducing tl,c chance, of lhcir
incompaubilit)' with landholders' goals of the land The possible implication of uptake of a
permoncnt covenant on prcscm and futnre plons foe tl,c land olso ought to be highlighted in
promotionol materials and events.

'!'.

'

/'
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6.2.3 Level of economic dependence on the property
It wa, anticip,tc<l in 1his stuJy that landholders who ;1re more commercially oriented,
or full-lllne on the hnd, ond in effect cconomicolly dq,endent on the property, were less likely
to take up a pennan<:nt covenant than those less economic,Uy dependent on the property,
l'ermoncnt covenant holden; in Victori, hod lit1lc or no economic dependence on their
property before taking up a p,·m,ancnt cm·enant. Similarly, tl,e majority of fixed-tenn
"!l''"'ment holders in Victoria ilid not deri,·e an)' income from their property. 'ibc nujority of
londholde,-,; in all other categories dcri,·ed more than half of their totol incmne from their
propertks, signifying their strong economic dcpct1dcncc on the fond. A ,ignificot1t relotion,hip
between le,·e\ of it1cnme dependence on the proper!)' and landholders' likelihood of a
permanent covenant uptake"'" only present among non.holden; of covenonts or agreements
in Victorfo. In this co1ego,y, greater economic dependence on tbe properties was attributed to a
ksscr likelihood to take up a permanent covenant.
Tiic obovc findings establish a link betwem a landholders' level of dcpmclct1ce ot\
income from the proper!)• and their uptake of ,·oluntary nature crmservotion .chemes, such os
bnd for wildlife and pcrmonent co,·cnants, 11,is link suggeHs that the upt>ke 11£ voluntory
monagemet\t ,grccments omacts mo•liy those 1hat bove the lcnst depcndcuce, economically, on
their property. Purthc=orc, it can be deduced from the findings th,t landholdees who do not
Ii.we any fonn of a cm•cnont or agreement and ore highly dependent 01, incotnc from thcir
ptopcrty ore unlikcl)" tri take up a pcrrnonem covenant. Gosson & Pone, (!988) obser.·cd a
similor ,dotion,hip showing the le,st finnncinll)" constr;iined and most conservation-oriented
fam,c,-,; took up n conservation scheme on their l,nd with relatively little compensotiot\. TI,c
kvd of economic dependence Ot\ the property i, a better predictor of likelihood of taking up a
pennonent covet1ont it1 non-holders of covcnont or ogrccmcnt in Victoria tl,on in other
landholder categories.
Londboldcrs arc more concerned about possible economic loss because of odopting a
conservation progmm tl~,n ony other reoson ond ore unwilling to incur costs in program, that

;;
.•,'

bove onl)' long-term economic returns (Norris & Shobmon, \9BS), 11msc that ore largely
dq,endcnt on tl,cir property for income ate likely to avoid volut1taty mc.,llre, that have
potet1ti•l cost implicotions or the l1keh'hoodof restricting the expansion of tl,eir productive lond
arcs (fnm fo, Nature, 19%, 1998). In the p,cscnt study, these landholders cited financiol
inability for tlicir lock ofupt,kc of a permanent envenom. They attributed the need for finondal
support to o decline in fann economic output and uncettainty about the furure fmm outpul
Reduced re\ionce on the primary it1dustry sector in Aumalia hos led too decline in farm output
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and profP..1biliry over the post thirty ye:irs (Commonweal~, of Austrnlio, 2002) portic:ul,r\y in
smoll ant! medium size landholdings.
The cost implications of taking up • pcrmoncm covenant are apparent

10

most

londholt!er... Apart from initial cost of toki:ig up a covenant, further costs nrc incurred in
pcq>ctuity in meeting monogcmem obligotion,. Even landholders who arc initially enthusiastic
about toking up• permanent envenom can find such enthusiasm

tJ

wane with time (Dinning &

Young, 1997) when cKpec1otio1ls arc not met or when the required resources for maintaining
the lond under a cm·cnont arc diminished, or when the landholder is physically unoblc to attend
to the obligotions due to oge o, sicknes,.

11,e link bctwcc1, uptake of nature conservotion schemes and \C\·d of economic
dependence on tbe property has implicntions on policy for nature conservation on private land.
Grcotcr recognition o:" the prc,•oiling socio! and economic situoiians of rum! lantlholdcti in
policy setting for nature conservation on prince bnd is required. Policy statements ought to be
sp edfic .1ud measure, and implcmelllation strategics to address specific neet!s such as financial
resources ond a,sisrnnce with lobour ,hould be odequatc nod efficient. l'inanda! incentive, to
cove, pos,ib!c economic loss .1rising from up toke of a permanent covenant would in porticula,
have significant influence on non-ho!dc" of a covenant or agreement in the uptake of •
pcrmnncnt covenant.

6.2.4 Pmperty rigl1ts regime
Pri,·ate proper!}'. rights arc on institutional factor (Hollick, 1990), which hove an
influence on landholders decisions on the up toke of o permanent covenant, This was e,cprcsscd
in bndholdcrs' .1ttitudcs to restrictions imposed by a permanent covenant on land·usc and in
their comments citing what they p«cci,·ed as an intention of government to mkc av,,y their
power and control their land through use of permanent covenants, These findings confum the
expectation po,tulotcd in Chapter I of the likely influence of landholder.' perceptions of d,c
impact of" permanent covenant on theirprivnte property rights.
Figure G.3 shows a conccptun! mode! of intcrnction of foctms in influencing
lant!holdcrs' outlook on property rights in rclntion to uptake of• permanent covcnont. 11uce
factor, ore depicted

10

have on influence on londholdcrs' outlook on property rights:

perceptions of loss of control over tl,cir lond, availability and !eve\ of compcnsotion for ios,cs,
~nd the p,c,ence or absence of a noturc conscrvntion ethic in landholders. 'The model show, an
indirect influence of nature conscrvotion ethic on landholders' outlook on property rights
through landholdeti' perceptions of loss of control of their loud. The implication is that
l,mlholdcrs who have a strong nature conservation ethic are unlikely to view covenonts as •
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tl,reat to tlieir control of the lond. In turn, tl,er arc unlikely to atud, much signific,ncc to tl,e
is,uc of property rights in deciding on !he upioke of a permanent covenam. Londholders'
perceptions of loss of control of their land are n!so shown to hsve indirect influence on their
outlook on property rights t],rough !.ndholdcrs' ,ttitude, to compensation.
11,e study finding, showed a positive relationship between landholders' outlook on
property rights and their likelihood to rnkc up a pcrm,nent covenan~ However, the strength of
the different factor, noted in the model in influencing bndholders' outlook on property rights
differed frc,m one cstcgory of landholder to another. These differences and ,imiloritie, between

the different landholder atcgories and Sto.tc, and their implication on nature conserntion
policies arc discussed below.

Nature
Conservation

Pen:.:eptionof
Loss of

Ethic

Control

Property Rights
Compensatory
measures
Figure 6. l Conceptual model showing the intcmtion of facto,s in influencing landholders'
outlook on priva!e property rights
Na,e: 11,e dirc<!ion of arrow, points from inOuencing factorS

!O

1!,c influenced facto",

Attitudes to restrictions were reliable predictors of tl,c likelihood of uptake of •
perm,nont covenant in all categories of lsndholdcr,. Policy measures aimed ot promoting the
upto.kc of permoneot covenant, by compensating landholders for restrictions on \ond-usc are
more Likely to attract greater uptskc of permanent connms in Victoria than Western Austraba.
Overall, these pw-covonont policy measures ore !ikdy m cau>e the greatest covcoont uptake by
fixed-tcnn ogrccmcnt holdc,s in Victorio and the least up toke in non-holders of a covenant or
agreement in Western Australia.
11,e difference in policy response between the two States cm be ottribut<d to
diffe,ences in the set of factors that influenced tl1e attitude, of individual landholder categorks
m restrictions on land-use. l'ot example, • notable stronger interest in long-term nature
conservation by fixed·tenn agreement holders in Victoria compared to other ategorie1 of
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landholder is d,e likely cause for a slfongcr and positi,·e response to pro·covcnant policy in the
fmmer th,n in other otegorics of lnndholders. 'll,e former volnmarily took up a fixed-term
agre;,mcnt in preference to the more land.use restrictive permanent covenant and because of
their interest in consctvation. In controst, as stotcd mm)' times already, d1e uptake of a fixed·
teml covenant by mony landholde,s in duded in the study in \1;1estem t\u,trnlia w:is involuntory
and therefore not necessarily motivated by a strnng interest to coc,scrve natu,e. A combination
of increase in long·temi interest in nature conscrvntion ond compensatory policy mcosures for
rc~trictiot!S on land·use hy a permanent rn,·enont is likely to yid,J grcot<r uptake of pennanent
coven~nts in fixed-tcnn agreement holders thon in od,er categories ofbn.Jholtlers.
Some reaions adv.need by landholders for apprehension to covenant uptake in
relation to prope1ty rights included the possible loss of conttol of th cir land, uodue restrictions
imposed by a co,•cnanl, and foregone use of the land. ,\ldrnugh these reasons may not
neccssaril)· reflect the rea\it)' rcg:mling ,he restriction, in a covcnint, they nevertheless amplify
tl,e perceptions of lnndholtlers on the restrictions that tl,ey cnvisogc occu, under a covenant: "/

Jrar I will Iott rontrol

ef m)'

•~·n land o·nd b, /11mbm:d will, 11 who/1 Int mor, r,J

/(JP,

from .fpt?mmml

,ftp.,rtvunl,." ·n,is comment not only expresses the concern ,eg:irding las, of property rights but

also a concern ahout o perceived or anticipated bure,ucracy in the operations of a covenont
Another reoson ior apprehension of covenant uptake was tl,ot cm·enant rcsrrictions
have a cost in terms of forcgo"c use of the lond, which omount to uncompcnsa!ed raking of
private property. 1be question whether tl,esc expressions hove suppmt in theory or prncticc is
the subject of the di,cussion that follows.

6.2.4.1 Defining what rights and whose rights
!..lisconccption• and misunderstandings abound on il,c rights provided to private
property, and the rdotionship between these rights ,nd permanent covenant. Ir has been noted
earlier tlmt landholders ore apprehcc,sive of taking up o pcmiancnt covenant for fear of lo,ing
the rights to 1hcir propcrti·· 11,c notion that Go,·em.1,ent intcntls to remove control of land
from tl1e lantlholder through the 'back door' was expressed. Incongruence of property right,
and permanent coven oms was expressed in relation to compensation- ~mt where ,uch rights to
property use were taken away compensation i, imperative.
Voluntary uptake of a permanent covenant by londholders implies occeptonce of
attenuation of property right,, in particulor, limitation of some u,c of the conser,ation arco a,
set out in the terms of the coven nm ogreemcnt. It is supposed, therefore, that landholder, "t,o
rnke up a permanent covenant volnntar:ily do not mind such onenuation. However, one gcnornl
diiagrcement of fondhc,ltlers' concem;ng the uptoke of a pemioncnt covenant is that the
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gm·cm,ncnt wants to take pri,·ate property for pubLic use without just compensation. llccousc o
properiy right has a utility function, lanciholders can be said to have been denied their property
rights when attenuation of those rights hos deprived them of use of fond for its economicoUy
product,vc nlue.
Farrier (1995) art,'1.les that bj· lcgal definition, this notion is misleading,,, all land in
1\ustrnlia is :tlrcody in public service under the crown· government i, lhc trustee of ill natur:il
resource,

a,

comrnan propc,·ty, accoriling to tbc public ttust doctrine ro prnrcct aU vital natur.il

resource, for the public and the fun,rc gencr.itions. 11,e argument advanced by Partier is tl,ot
landholders cannot claim rights ro that which they do nor own, and thM government,
O\\'IlCIS

o,

tho

of all bnd ho, the right to detemlll,c the extent of the use of land.
Property rights arc social con,ttucts (nor tl,c dictates of 'narure1, Utiliwian

considerations have heel! used to presume that ownership, on moral b";'unds, accord, an
individual that ncquircd an object the right to enjoy it undisturbed (A. Ryari, 1987) insofar as
their use doc, not affect neighbouring areas (Meyer, 2000). lloth Meyer and Ryan choUcnge tl,i,
notion as a misconceived thcoty of property rights, with Ryon (1987) pointing out tl,ot thi,
presumption is attributed to how the law on property is undcrstoo<l. Furthermore, !"'artier
(1995) poims aut that historical actions by govemmc!l.ts snd couris suggest that the propeny
rights of private owners are shored with the public, tlmugh the notion of unlimited enjoyment
Limits the ability of • govemmem lO regulate octivity on priv,te land for the ,.kc of
cnnse.vation.
Private ownership of land is recognised, ncvcrthcles;, a, the possession of o bundle of
rights over the property, which can be increased or rcduccrl by the government Government
on the other hand hos o moral duty to protect bestowed p.Opcrty rights and accordingly to
monoge its

O\\'Il

affairs so cnvirm.mental liabilities arc not imposed on present and future

citi;,,cns. A permanent co,·enam entails the transfer of rights over the conscn·ation arcos from
private to common property. It, in essence, removes specific rights from lhc bundle of rights
vested Uctder priv~tc property on tl,c 0\\1ler of the lands at1d c~tenJ, rights to other memben
(pubLic) who have a stako in the conservation area. Laurcnce(l994) points Onl the inevitability
of shared rights bctu•ccn tl,c landholder and the pubLic

"... FHrm"1 drt on!)· 011, .iroup of 1/akrh,ldm in lh control
".('~nal!J ba,~I rons,,mm, not

~J ndturol moumr.

Urban and

••.6· offeod, b111 11/so ofl<is«rt, mr,ab'on and land,r,,p,r, inr:m,,ing!y

d,t,nnin, whal tl1f! u•an~ in, """ from, lh, A«!ln,lian roHntryid,. Tl,ry Jfrt fik,/J to rtjrrl pruclictr
whirl, dmud, ,oils""'·: bu1h!Hn1lt dnd p"mp ,hrmicalI ieto fa,.f.l, n,~r {Jll,m,. "
;',
The increasing u,di of permanent cm·enams in AustraEa indie:ttes a shift in lhc

traditions! notions by landh,\Jers pointed out by Farti« (1995) in which there i1 expectation of

186

LSI

puno, uo l! 8u1"q 'p>ie,on• ><\ o\ a,e ,a,moia, 1e.m1,u U! •nt'J!-1.(uod<>Jd

•.P!'+" uo sJ!)![Upow

po• sa1dpuud :q\l!''JlS 10, pu• suomh:;ums[W aip pds![> 01 '! kinod JO >]OJ "1,Jl •,,u,sta

"! ·1uu1a.<oa 111.u,uuad e JO o~e)dn a1p u; ""Pl°'lP""! Aq pa;un.:,u! aq 01 lip~•] a,n 1,41

'"""!

·(oooz

•,1dum<:1 '"d

UO!J"u,duma JO oaunµodm1 >I{\ 1no pau~od .{pnis 0111 "! snp1m1pue1 l""'·'"'

ap.uouma

JOJ

'iannJ} llu1ua,, ,b11ml u1 nmma• <>lLIJ ''"'l"l ''l 1'1""\J' suor1,n11• 1•1,0,

pu• l"""l]!IJ '" ,pns ,1,ada. Ja<J1" ':l!rnouo,a

aq .\eur si~:!u ,{i,.,do,d \l1m1s_qqo1sa ,oJ OA)JOW

.(:mupd ,,p 11:lnoq11v ·uonc:,ono J!>tjl '") e1m!,l> uo1w,11q,. ,,p ias pu• •,o,inoso, 0111 01 ,u1ll!'

p>u'!•pun pun p>WJ"P a111 a• 1u01prnJ >qi 01 ilupq '<.1;;<110 8uou1e 'Pl'""'' ,iscpp .bnod • JO
asodmd ·"U ·en1:.11,ny UJ 01,qop lianod 112nollp paWJOJll! ,itaiml»pu u,aq 1nu "'I put[ aJ"A!,1<1
uo arn1•u ,,,,o •lll'"'!'[J iluuwc .\im<J!"'"d':>J

·.{)JOdOJd al".\TJd

I''"

uo '"""' UUIJC,\IOSlH>' Jlt\)Ull

<>)

sll\~!l J" uurJiJunc •J11uaunJ
D.,d,a,

"'ll -'cl!'"P put Pl!"'I 01 poau at(l ,lJU>t>I suo,..11 "'"'ll. ,.·,,,,
fo.Ciu,u"liil'J,. 'unmppu

ll! ,.

"! .iuadu,d .,1e.,pd JO UO!J01!1"'!

".w~• '"'·'' J>t 11 ,of 1u,111,;S,, .(i,,,

pu"J ,,(1:1,ji, 1011ua• .(i,, n,011w JIU// 1u,111,Jl,rui1' .Gm tp,1,n '!1"µoj1110, /OU"'"

L, :J>p10•1puq • .{q P"'J'1durn s, 'aJUe]S!'"'

Jl\l \\JIM

l'""'

OJ

.ip,m '! "01 paq,eue .ITP""'" lSOWjC

,,., s..iap10•1pu•1 'P!'(A\ u1 iua<l,ml 01 sw1ep 'P"'"" '"11 samo,p aae1d <a~e1 uo!lc.uasuoa
JJ!l)CU J)Mlld 'P!'l·" llO 3lJ!1l>S 1'~'" a1Jl JU

"!tu••uJp P""

JJn]Jn.J1S J)lUOllo;)J

pu, 1urn11na

'(l'!JOS "'ll 'a,ouua'lll",T ·(ooO~ 'l,>l]nJ) ,{t'l'"!"l'"' waq1 a3euew put aawosa, 0111 U) lSOAU!
Ol

'"·'!l"''"! '11!'"• SJljilµ JSal[l JO ""Pl°'I "'11 '"P),\OJ<l .{1,;do,d ,11U,\l"d '(S66 I •ud1r ··1) '"I"·'

pue Al!l!l" JO JJuasa,d aql SJJOUllOJ saJJmJSOJ pu•I uo >H18p .{ua.lo,d JO aJuaJ>)Xtl
·.(n:puo,,, ".b11od u1,w.11dw1 01 (s1urnJ.10J m,u,uuad ,o m111e1tt\l>J '" 1pns} smou11UJSU) JO
JJ!o<p tJilnoJtp ,h)·"l'" >1[) :luiu!1'.ll5UOJ 'll'P' 'a1cqap ,{;,Hod JO"""! 1ernam,pu11J a•p sawmaq

'lll!"P s1113u
l!

illl!Jl!!JUOJ fu!·'\OSJl '.{11,,!l'"

"""'!"' l'l[l

palJ)'j,'JJUn ·~'""!·"''d

t

l)"'l Ol ·""""''" ,OlUOJO<j

~u!l""'"''" 1, P""'!' '! l! ""'!-'' .\Jcss»au

,an,9,s (S(,(,[) "'1A ''Hqnd 01 ,uue'I,

aq "'"' JJUJlOJlOll'! '"'!l pa\lp,1"'""~'" 'l l! ''"·'"·""II "(5661 '"!"",!) J>1{101'" 0) OSOJ JUO

WOlJ ,\lu puo UOUl\l!)SUOJ atjl ll) plll!PP JP·" lou
JO Sl!"'!] aspo,d ''ll ·poo\l llOUl'1)0J

"!

lSfl'J

Jl{l

,>Jo

JnJ P"'l

pll<I J)U!Jd ll<>

aJUJIOJlJlU! 1uawun.,o;l

J)e.,!'d uo ""''"

J"

1101]0,\JJSUUJ

Jl[l

10,p •11{\lfl .{Jladrud 'H'l"d puc "l'-'!'d uaa,'!\l,'l<) ,d1•1suune1a, ;o .(1pca1dwoa .,qi ll"!J"'

.lp1,nhap• lOll op Pl'°·" Jl(l punOJO SllO!JtU '"'IIO )SOUi ut st "H"""'"V lll <lhC{ lll,"Ulf\J

s11i~fl ,\JJJdo,d ,011lun1:1s k>nou z·i,·z·9

"P"'".PP ''I
o) paau 1•1{1 s,a,nosaJ pue P""l

,.uo "'i\l!! ilun,!xa·oJ Jt[l ?"'

'a:n:J

J"

.{1np pa1aadsa '''1/'!'l

puo.bq an1oa1no uo!ln.uosuoa P"'!"'P "'ll 01 in tlu1 ,s,ap1011pu•1 ;o a;;u~uodw! ''I 1 !pah.larno,
\lu!aq JJJOUS~J atp JO "''1'·' ~111 JO ""~!u~OJOJ 01jl '! "'"'!l "Hdll~ 0>1, 11 "UO!Jt.UJSUOO JOJ
.{imqJSuod,,, pu~ poo11u•~mttl!' oq1

'""! 01 'sa1Juo\lo 1uawruao\l .{q pa1uos»do, ';;Hqnd aq1

UO!SSUJS!G lr,U!:1 :9 JJJdUIJ:)

Chapter 6: Finl\ Discussion

understan,l.mg of constitutiom!, legol, economic, social ond cultur:il ,tructurc, and drnamics of
the stake J><;;1rers and the res ounces to be conserved.
O,·er time, nc,,, infomianon m•r necessitate changes to the criteria nsed to ;allocate
righl•, kodinll' to a tr:in,fcr of rights bcro.·cen c,tlsling holders ond perhaps with new claimants
lo the rights. In ,uch circumstonces, it m•)' be necessary on moral and equity grounds to
comrcnsote thn,c 111"1 arc adl'cr,dr affoctcd by reduction of their ollocatcd bundle of right,, a,
is the case "'ith the restrictions set by the Auslr.llian govcn,mcnt on native ,·egctadon !1nd
c)c,ring.
Policy moy also suppon the tra11sfcr of ri~hts from one holder to another part)' in
respect to prin1c lond by ot\c buying ccrt;un or o\l property rights from tl,c londholder, or the
landhohkr do.-11ing th,• rights, for e~omple to the public. In either case, tlic tax owing on thot
piece of land is cqui,·olcnt to lhe •mounl nf ri1;hts remo,•cd from the londh,:,ldc, to be
tr:imfcmd to the pubk I-lodges (19R2), for exsmplc, has suggested the use or u:msfcrable
clearing rights ,s a me,ns ofprcscrvi11~ remn•nt vcgetoiion snd couuolling ,olinity. 11\e s<lling
of right, cmitlc, the hndholder to compens,uion to the value of the rights. In tl1e case of
donstion, tl,c landholder forfeits the right, wi1hout an)' eKj'ectcd compcnsaiion.
The pnyrnent made wcr om! above compcnsadon ought co cover management costs
over and above the cost, of the duty of core. F,nier {1995) srgucs tbot landowners con be
ordered Ii:,· ~~vcmment to prcvc!lt h>nn, but not to pro,·ide benefits- the lauer must be paid
for. 11,c mona1:•mcnt co.,ts over nnd shove the duty of core olso 1,o,·e to be apportioned
•ppropriatdy between the hndholdcr, the go,·crnment, and die public as the beneficiary of tbe
conserved «source. Hanno & Munssinghe (1995) al}_,uc thot propcnr rights m·er biological
resources should not neccs,orily stop st thcie provision of economic incentives; they must also
foster ,ustainab!c management snd cc1uitoblc distrihution of the benefits st local, Stote, ,,.tional
and intcmo1i<>nal lc,·d,,
Permanent covenants "" as politic,liy e•p«licot mcchonisms for resolving coonicts of
claims of rights tn re.sources on private prnpcrty between londholdcrs ond the public. 11,ey
fac11itatc landholders to pl.cc ,·"luntacy rcgulotion, on their 11,e of !and that hos ovedopping
claim, over resource use with the puhhc, ood in effect avoid the appcsrnnce of go,·emmcnt
interference i1no pri,·otc property a, rc,gul,tor. lfowc"cr, their increased uptoke depends on o
dorificstion of the di,tribi,tion of rights ond rcspon,ib~it)' ovcc the oalllral resource.
,\nempts to define and enforce property rights, involve moral ond political cbokcs,
which bring, with tbcm distributional consequences as not all claimant, or the rights can win
(Vira, 1995). Hill (2001) points nut tlm sometime, property rights arc deficient. TI,i, is
p,rticul.ady c,1idcnt in co,e, such as tbe environment, where government inteNention i,
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ncccssory for improvement of accollmobility (e.g., through regulation or definition and
allocation of rights) when existing systems of rnlcs arc Wenk. The choice between the level of
rcgulowry nnd voluntary mecbanisms to use on private land cm affrct tho u,sourcc flows, and
thus impinge~ upon political, economic, snd socisl rclotions. Govemmem hos an important rnle
to ploy in providing the fnrncwork on which iS>U<s of allocation of prop«ty rights ovi,r oot1ml"
resources on privotc property among the stakeholders can be addressed.

6.2.5 Equiiy and its impctativcs
A lsrgc cro,s-5ection of landholders in chi, stud)· sought incentives that :,re targeted to
removing inequity in n•ture wnscn·otion. Most landholders cxpr<sscd the need for •
compensatory mechanism for loss of future productive u,c of th<eir land under a permanent
covenant. Of sll the lnndho!der categories, fixcd·tcrm covenant holders in Western Auotralis
hod s bigger mojority of those tlrnt held this view. In addition, •n overall larger pmportlon of
1.sndholders in Western Aumalia tlml Victoria tlm held tl,is vic-w. In the non-holders of
covenant o, ,g,cen,ent in Victorin, those that perceived 1hc necessity for compcnsstion show«!
a lcssc, ~kdihood of takillg up o permsncnt covcnont thnn tl10,sc tl10t did nnt perceive the

necessity. Figure 6.4 dq1icts the intenction of three factors influence on landholdcrn' outlook
on equity in norurc conservation. E.och of the three factors cnprutes tl,e view, expressed by
!andho!dcrs on the influence of equity issues in their decision on a coven•nt upt•ke.

Shnred

Nature

Problems

conserv11tion

Shared Cost

Equity

Shared

benefits

figure 6. 4 Conceptual model ,hawing lhe interaction of factors in influencing landholders'
outlook on nature conseivstion equity
Note: The direction of,now, points from inf\ucnci{ factoro !O lhc influence~ facton.
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J\lost landholders c,;presscd the view thst it wns neccssory for the govcmmcnt to
address inequity in conservation. Reconc1lin11 the disparities p0<ticular!y brtween the com
incurred and benefits gnincd in conservation on private land i, necessary. ,\ brge number of
permanent covenant holders suggested tat conce,sions on equity grounds os o measure to
offset loss of use ,:,f th.cir lond.
,\ second vie"-" of conservation equity c~prcssed b)· londholdcrs relates to loss of other
opportunities caused b)• the uptake of o permonent covcnont. The view is that there is a need
for compensation for tbe denied opportllnity of use of their land, and as a fair way for
encouraging the uprnkc of permanent covenants among landholders. 11,csc views gi•ing
jmtification for compcn,otion a,c summ:trised by one fandholder: "I t,1 th, bi'1S.1,1 i1m1 a,

rompmsa/ipn. So11:,farmm c!,aml a// 1/,dr /11od whil, otbm 1!Ja1 lifi hw llrtM ef h11Jh!and hua,m 1/,9· /Jud
mort fort,ighl art now b,i1cip,n11/iud on,/ told thry ,;ill mli1• nothing."
11,e percei,·ed conscr,,ation inequity Cxprcssed b)" the landholder is in re,pcct to the
action, of other landholders. 1'he pc~cq,tion is tbat those th.~t toke up • pcrmancm covenant
ate di,advontased while gr.mting societal bec,cfito from them (depicted in Figure 6.4 as benefit
sharing). Tilis is consistent witl, the Adorn, equity theory (1%3) - that people in octing to ml,fy
their needs, cvaluotc the c,1uit;• or fmmcss of the outcome tr;ey expected. Furthcnnmc, they
compare their outputs ond inputs in relation to other people's, "ith tl,c cl('ect~tion thot an
cquiioblc situation will result in a similnr quaLity ond quantity of outputs for similar inputs
between individ,,,I,. It is clear tlmt this nou"on of inequity underscore, landholders' pm;cfl'tion
of greater vs!ue to economic outcrnncs of doored !anti than to land left under conse,vation. It
also highlights the need to promote the v,!uc of nature conservation to landholders.
Perceived disad,·antoge, and loss incurred b)' londho!de,s by mking up a pcnn,ncm
covenant without compensation ore dioinccnti,·cs to their uptake. One form of perceived
conservation incq1tity expressed by landholders is the loss of «1rncd ownership and rights to
the bnd "itlwut compensation. A londholde, stated " .•. ii !Jo1 t,,km a lo/ ,ifhard i.'Ork and ,noo9• lo

obJain ow11mbip efm)' l.1n,l I am not al·oul lo rrlinq11irl, ,vn/ro/ onr iJfar !,'ti/1 or no rompm1111ion." Apart
from not,tb!c misunderstanding of the functioning and potp<'se of a permanent covenant, die
notion presented in tl,c example i, tl,c right to, ond cxpectatim, of compensation for costs
incurred in purcho,ing the cnioYmcnt of tl,ose right,. Pcnnoncnt covenant is thus viewed os
taking aw.iy proPctty right, in on ineqni~•blc manner.
Jodha ,nd Russel! (1997) point out tlut the imp,ct of odoptio11 o, uptokc of
conservation program, con differ from one lnndholder to anotl,er ond it rn•y create m
accentuate social and economic inequalities. ,\ reward system that recognizes those who
con1<rvc nature, often ot tl,c expense of short-term gains and in wider community's interest i,
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in the in!erclt of gm·emrncnt, a, it spread, the cost of conserntlon (depicted os 'shared costs'
in figure 6.5) betw,:cn the individual lmdholdcr and the wider community (Skitch, 2000).
Na(urc con,erv•tion on priv:11e bnd is • private production of public good, and
~e"·ice, on printe proper!)" from in economic and market perspecri,·e, tl,c,e good, cannot be
c~clu,frcl)" allocated to benefit or 10 be enjoyed by those that finance their production (Hoppe,
l'J<J3). On thot occuunt, the market cannot produce such good, and service, in sufficient
9uontity and qua lit)" in the absence of compensation. Fai1urc to compensate for tl,e prnduction
(mon,gemcm) of these goods could lead to tl1eir demise, a, wos the case in Queen.land where
landholders tuok to clearing their !ond before the introduction of a native v~gctation ban on
cbring (I hmgerfor<l, 199'.l).
It c.,n be argued from on equity themy ,·iewpoint tl,at without compon,arion in the

shorHcrm economic pcrspectis-c, the norms of equity •nd reciptocity arc often discounted
without paymenr Ly tho,e 1h•1 c,rry out ond finance their producdon, fur those that consume
goods nntl ,avicc, ,frrinJ from na1ure consm·otion. Ncvctthdcss, economics aside, the
majority of permanent covo,nan\ holders in the stud)· did r:.ot c.prc.s the feeling of being
disodvan~,g~J I>)· their action of placing o permanent covenant on tl,cir land. 11 cm be orgutd
that this is lsrgel)' because of their high ,·aluc for, ,nd in,crcst in, nature conser1ation octs to
cou1ucrbabmcc the discount of equity mode to the public. The chollengc in tcJucing the need
for compens,lion i, therefore to identif)' the appropriate tools for promoting, strong value for
nnrurc that counterbahnc., any sense of being disodvautaged due to cng,gir.g in norurc
conmvation.
Irrespective of their likc~hood to take up a permanent covenant, the ,ealit>• is that the
majorit>• of landholders dc.rly point out the neetl for incentiYcs and compcnsatury mca,urc, to
encourage the uptake uf permanent covcnnnts and the implcmcntotion of requir<d
comervatlon actions under it. In respect to the ,1,0,·e, compensation ought to be viewed os
trnmitiona! until their counterbalmcc in form of improved conservation ethic can be reached.
Proposals were mode b)' landholdcr,i on how to counter di,pa,ity between cost incurred in
conscrv~tion and 1hc dcri~cd benefits. Provision of

,n

annual management fee to cover the

cost of working and maintaining the areas under a covenant, r:ue rebate at loc:.i! government
level, and reduction in land taxes by t:1c St.>.te Government to compensate for lond taken out of
u~e. ond provision of low interest loan facility were cited .
.Another viewpoint 011 comcrvation e9uity presented in this •tudy on conservation
equity is in respect to tl,e bcarc, of responsibility for compcnsocion. Sor.!C bndho!dcrs argue
that the burden of compensation ruts with government, because it i.! r<:spon,ible for lond
degradation that culmin,ml in the need for perrnoncnt covenant, while others ar;.'1..lcd that the
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public should shore in tlrn cost of conservation ,,,ith landholders on 1hc 6,round that there are
shared benefi!,. StiU, other fandholdcrs view 1hat those tl1at agitate for permanent covenants
should pay th, r.ompcm1uinn ,u co,·er losses incurred b7 landowners through the imposed
restrictions hy a co,·enant. llowcvet, there was also the acl.nowlcd,:crnent that compensation
schemes ought to target spcdfically oress of high conservation value:" .. .co,,,pentalii!n sbo:dd b1
,p,cijic lo pmp,rlits with 1ig11!Jfoml 111110/INlt

ef r<mnalll

ny/alfo11 whm c/1,mi,g hm btm d,r.,(d a11d a

rom1a11/ p!ai:rd '" 1h,m lbmef!,r."
11,c suggested proportion, of public contribution to the cost of conservation on
pnvate land differed between the different categoric, on lamlholdc,s. However, :molysi,
showed that most landholders coulr.l be split bet'-''CC!l tliosc that thought that no compensatioti
was ncccsso'l' ond those tlm W:l!ltcd ot lca,t a 40 percent puhlic conuibutirn, to the cost of
private lond conscrvotion.
There was much less expectation for public comributio!l to cost of conscrvatio!l
among voluniory agreement or covcnont holders in Victoria, than ,mong non-holders of •
co,·cnont or agreement ill Victoria and aU landho!dcts in \Vestcm Australia. Comments by
11ndholdcrs distinguished th,ee classes of bndhn!dcrs according to their ~icv.~ on equity in
nature conscevation. The fost doss 1-,,s the majority of landholders, m,'.ny of whom ha,·c
pcrmanc!lt co,·cnonts in Victoria aml they felt that conservation costs on private land arc solely
the rcspom1b11ity nf the bnJowncr. This class of hndholdcrs "1so h.sd a Strol"G nature
comerntinn ethic. TI,cy took up a pcrmanc!lt covenant solely to ensure the pmtcction of
!laturc from what they comidcred an unccmin conservation in tl,c honds of future managers,
and they toqnired the services of a covcnon!or.
TI,c second class of landholders did !lot view the public to hove a role in contributing
towatds tl,c cost of conser,,1tio11 on priYO!e londs hccousc thef felt tltls would (in theory)
amount to surrendering tlieir property rights. T1ti.s doss comprised predominontly offi:,;cd-tcrm
agreement holders. The third is tlic el,ss of aU other landl,oldcrs who bdievcd in principle that
tl,e public should con01bute towatds the cost of consen·,tion on priv,tc bnd
lrn,,pcctive of tl,cir views ,cgmling who should bear the cost of conserration, oU
landholder, ncknow!edgc that a covenant's uptake and maintenance has cost implication, which
landholder, arc unable to cover because of tlic financial hardship presently experienced in
farmi!lg, even whet! they arc willing to do so. Finand.,l support to aid landholders' inobility to
finance the attainmc!lt of conservation goals is therefore necessary, and mar he availed even
when compensation for comcrvstion inc9ualitics have been provided. TI,e economic incentives
(depicted in the conceptuol model Figure 6.t) can he provided depending on landholder,'
inability tu finance conserva!ion activities under a stewardship agreement.
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6.2.5,1 Equity and policy
Stoke, in nature cons,rvotion extend from priv,tc !ands to local, ,ti.tc, national and
intcmotional level,. An undcm:m<ling of the bmeficiatits of the conserved resource ond the
levels of their stakes is important in the ollocotion of conservation com aod responsibilities.
for example, lhe Pedcrol Go,·emmcnt i, responsible for, and expected to undertake, its
international oblig,tions for nature conscrvatioi,. In this cosc, the Federal Government would
be ,iewed "' the heoref of the cost on beholf of the intcm,tio11al ond nationo! public where the
n,tme of the resource h1ng conserved hos international or national signillcancc. On the other
hand, costs of man:1gint;' resources that arc only of loco\ importance would entoil tl,c locol
government lo ,hare the cost ,,,it!, the lamlholder on beho!f of the local community. For the
cost of rnnservation to be bumc by the lnndholder beyond the c~p«ted cost under the duty of
core, it hao to be evident in theory that some of tl1e benefits of cmiserving tl,e land nccrue to
tl,e landholder. This calls for improved instruments fm identifying tl,e strrnn of b,~1cfit, thst
now from privately conserved areas, as well a, ol who share in these benefit~
Demand for compensation by londholJers for con,crvation might be 1'icwcd wrongly
as absolving themselves from nature· conservation rc~,on,ibility, a, explained by one
L,ndholdcr: ",lfo'!,v !.indholdtrt rt!}lrd c,,11,rn11tion "' ti;, mp~111ibili!J ef 1h, Gm,mmflll and not rbrirr •. , "
(lbis draws out the ,eason fo, their lack of will to take up a pcnnancnt covenant). 11,e fact that
such compensation for l,,nd under a permanent covenant docs not exist at present, accoun1, in
port for the ncg,tive rractions hy a cross-section of landholders to the notio11 ofbeiug osked to
rnke up a pcm,ancnt covenant.
Government is the custodian of the rights of future generations a11d ha, tl,c role of
safeguarding their interests through inter-generational <quity. In tl,i, role, r:ovemmcut has the
responsibility to ensure that as fo, as possible present policies and action, do not tr:insfor ham,
and costs to future generations. Measures tbat cause tl,e decline or degr,dation of biodiversity
such as lond clearing of high ,·aluc natural vegetation on private property can be said lo be
in«juitable to future gcncrntions because it denies them the enjoyment and benefit that is
available to the pre,cm generation "1thout on equivalent snbstitutc. 11,is orgurncnt give,
Government the right tri limit harmful rnking from ,uch conservation areas on pri,·atc land.
ifo,,.,.ver, it nlso strengthen, landowners' demand of payment for management of tl,c
conser1atiou atca on behslf, and for the benCllts of pttsmt ond future gencrntion,
Equity is the last of the five construct, in the co,·cnant uptake model oddmsed in this
Chopter. 11,c deci,io11 to address c9uity on moral m economic ground, depends on societal
orientation ,nd the society', ability to oddrcss tl,e con"ms of the different landholJcrs on the
achievement ofthcir gaol of the l~nd.
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6.2.6The covenant conceptual model

The relationships between 1hc five con1trucl:I di,cu.,od obovc and ~,cir rol,tionships
to mh,r model component, ,ucl, os cconmnic incentives, extension policy and program,
stcwatd,hip, and duty of ca,c are shown in the conccpiu,1 model fo, permanent covenant
upt:tkc (Fignrc 6.5).
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Conceptual model showing the necessary factors and policy tools in

coordinated framework for promoting landholders' uptake
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Model descn"pdon key
'Inc bold rectangular boxes in the model represent the fi,·c principal con,.ructs in the
upukc ofpermanem covenant.

•

'nie lines with an arrowhe.ld dcpkt the modd processes, witl, the arrow pointing to the
output that is the results of• givc1> intervention.
·n,e 1hin-bot<lercd rectangle, denote other interventions and fartor,; tl1at have an effect on
the principal constructs. Other 1hin-bordcrcd rcctongle, denote model outcomes, apou
from a permanent covcnont uptake, which arc affected by one or more constructs. For
example, t.'tc strength of a landholder's M\Utc cot>scrvation ethic has an influence on their
stewardship role.

•

The area enclosed by the dotted rectangle, depict• the area of influence of n policy
intervention (depicted in light sh,dcd rectangles). For cxsmplc, knowledge and awareness
of permnnelll covenant mcchaniims is • pre-requisite for a pcrmanem co,·ena"lt upuke
even when nature conscrntion O<JUit;• or property rights concern, arc met or where o
strong noturc conservation ethic exists. Furtl,cr, cxtcn,ion policy anti program, arc
sugge,tcd in the model as the overoll operative tools for facilitsting th~ ochk'Vcmcnt of tl,c
up toke of pcrm,ncm covcnsnt go,!s.
As the model indicates, the criteria for awarding economic incentives ore hascd on

entitlement omi the inability offandholdcrs. Economic incentives arc awarded to landholders as
cntitlcn,cnt on equity ground, to compcnsote for los, of private property tights, and os the
puhlic', contribution to cost shoring in narnre conscrs•ation for actions beyond the of duty of
care. Economic inccnti,·e, arc aw,rded based on landholders' inability to CO"}' out stewordship
accion,. 11,i, is particubrly the c•se ,,,here there is "'·idcncc that

;>

landholder i, willing but

unable to cover tl,e cost of conservation under a pem10nelll covcn,m.
Duty of care lies outside tl,e model but it is depicted in mder to iUum,uc its
,clationship with tl,c construrt, and factors of tl1e mode!. ·n,e quality of duty of care is
inlluenecd by quality of stewardship ond the anitude, of landholders to property rights.
Command and control rcgubtion should operate to enforce the duty of care, while
payments arc made for stewsrdship and on equity ground,. "11,e go,! of the conceptual model i,
to encourage the uptake of pcnnoncnt covenants by removing barriers to their uptake, while

concurrently building a nature conservation ethic, sound undermnding of long·t= notutc
conservation mechanisms and pro,·iding management support.
The discussion that follows focuses on oilier clements of the conceptual mode~ apart
from the fi,·e factor constructs discu,sod carlicr, and their rclotionship with the five construct,.
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6.2.7 Justifying incentive measures
L:mdholdcrs cite three

WS)'S

to carry out natitrc conservation could be accomplished

more effectively under inccnti<·e-bo,cd system rnthsf\han command-and-control mcchsnisms:
di.eel funding, tsx reb,tc, and reduction in !ond laxes. 1bcy justify provision uf such incentives
on two main grounds: that conservation is expensive ond untenob!e under the prevailing poor
ogriculrurnl price mar1,~ns, and <>n equity gromid, in recognition thot conservation benefits are
,hared b)" aU snd chettfore costs of conservation should equally be ,hared between the public
and landholder. This was stressed in a comment hy one landholder: "fh,,ivnomirrh'ma/1 prmU/ing

,ho,,. //,;, as
,,in sr1 J'Ol11n/ary ro1•non1, ,,..,king is lo ef!,rjinanriol inr:nhi~1

"" ht;g,r-Ira/1 agn'mflnn,I prodJ,rtion mran, 1<!)' li!tlr m,pl,lf i, .r,mrat,d. Long-/rm, Jrtnd.r
ronlin11ing to om,r infi1111r1. Th, nnb· "'9' f

far/hi, lo om,r. f nu/J /01< lo ha,,, 11.,fam, !ll'!hn.r, lik a park w,'/h M, offtnrtd ~"<gl/dh'on bu/ 1 ran no/
btralf" ll't!:)' hrrlart ro11n/t 11·i1b /oday'1 a,mnr ti.r,hi '""'J/n,."
Even where finand,l incenti>-es such a, ta.~ deductibility for conservation work ore
already in pbcc, fondho!den arc deterred from taking up permanent covenant> bec-.iusc they
view them to have auached financial costs attached thst arc beyond thci, willingness to bc,r.
One !sndholdcr in this ,rndy points this out the foUows:

'1f"e ,,,. "'0' k"n Jo crm/in111 lo ronmi,1/ion pkm on ourlandjindng, r1mnanl v,gp,1/ion,phnting 1m,,

and p111tfog in dwint lo ,lm,au wlinil)•, J-lowMr, oi~r Jh, /a,i ftw yarr "" /um had no ,,,.,ilab!, J11nd.r
lo «mlin11,, Mn though 1hi1 i, of high imponan,~ lo 11,. T/,r onfy fi11anni,/ inr1nli1~ ""
111 i, lh,

ha,,, 11"11ilab!I lo

/a:<dlliu,ribilif)' of ron1m11lioh 11~rk. This i,- 110 l,1/p whmgrtal ptrnnl,,g, offannm it r.ow no/

making 1no11.r,b monr, lo pa;· /a:<."
In circumstances os il!ustrntcd by tl,e landholder, provision of econonlic incentives i,
provided bosed on landholders' financial inability to cart)" out the necessary conservation
sctivitie,. "ll,is is depicted in the model as '!n,bility'. Acco1ding to the modd, provision of such
support c,in have a positive influence of enhancing the lmdholdcrs' stcwsrdship role. Some
landholders in the study were contented with minimal financial incentive, such a, fencing co,ts
tl10t only covered tl,c mstcri,ls, wlli!st otl,ers saw it neccsury that the cost of erecting tl,e fence
should be covered. 11,crc was consi,cency in the types o rincen ti,·cs cited by the landholders for
promoting nature conscrv,tion on print, land°""' the lost decade (sec for example, Coates,
1987; Jenkin,, \99B; Productivity Commis.sion, 2001). These include financiru, technical,
manusl, and moral support snd reco6~1ilion fo, comcrvstion effom under a permanent
covemUIL Ongoing financial suppor1, in particulsr, was noted by the m,jority of landholders a,
importsnt in their decision on the uptake ofa permanent covenant.
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The United Notions Convention on Biological Dil'ersity coils on member notions to
adopt "cconomicolly and socially sound mensmcs that act as incentives for the conservation of
biodiversity." Current policies in Australia aimed at tl,e conservation of biodiversity do not
address comprehensively tl,e nce<l for incentive measures for nature conservation on private
lond, anti fnrthcr only dismallr address the use of management ,grecmcnts as mechanisms for
long-tenn namre conservation. llcgo.rdless of category or State of locoti,m, all landholders
co: ;idcr inr.cntive.< important for motivoting the uptake of a permanent covenant.
In nrguing for incentives to lnndowner,, Skitch (2000) supported by Jodha & Russell

(1997), points out there is a !law in the argument thst landholders should not be rewarded for
undertaking their respor,sibilicy for nature conservation under a duty of core on the premise
tl,at they actually receive financial bcnerits in the long-tcnn. 11,e two argue that conservation
initiotives moy cousc a signiricant reduction in the productive potential of the property and an
uneven sprcnd of cost> ond benefas over spoce ond time due to changes in the panem of
resource access and use. Furthcnnorc, the impact of such changes, which can differ from one
lnndholder to another, may creote o, occentuotc social and economic ine<juaLitic,, which need to
be addwssed.
Further justirication for provision of support, particululy lahour, to lmdholdm for
nnrure conservotiot1 ncti,-ities is the decreasing ability, ,,.;th age, of some landholders to carry
out physicnUy demanding conservation work. There has been a decreased recruiunent of
younger people in ogricultnrc in Austnilio over the past decade owing to changing technologies
and markets in agricultnre (Grenon & S,hna, 1996). This had led to a concomitant increase in
tbe average oge of londholdcrs who fonn or manage sixty percent of land in Austr.,lia tl,at is
principal!)· under ogriculture or pasrurc (Commonwealth of Aum;ilio, 2002). Provision of
support decision, ought to rcHect the necessary adjustments to respond to the cbanging rural
landholding scenario.
A notable disincenti,·e to retention of conservation arcos on private land is tl1e
relativdy high valuation placed on such 'undeveloped' areis, resulting in high nnnual land rat<:<
that arc calculated based on the land's potential for urban development and not on current
lond-nsc. Arguably, this m•y lead to conversion of conservation oreos to mom 'development
oriented/higher income generating' uses, or their total neglect in order to ovoid incurring
additional cost of tl,cir retention. Removal or reduction of ,ates through reduced valuation to
encourage the retention of land under conservation, and provision of financial support to
maintain tlu:se areos, porticufarly tliose under pressure for urban development, ore justified in
thi1 case.
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6.2.8 Ex1cnsion programs and permanent covenants
The proposol to use extension programs ., the delivery tool for the mechanisms that
support the uptake of pennonent coven•nts is inspired by the relative and wide successes of
extension in the adoption of ai,icultural pnictices. It i, also inspired by the need for • holistic
11.pprooch to the delivery of services to landholders, sensitisation oftl,c government and gcncrol
public on the how snd where to support nature conservation on private bnd. TI,e desired
ct.tension program, therefore, should seek to be multi-targeted - to fandholders, public al!!!
government.
Robust extension policies ond progrnms fomm!otcd from lesson, and experience
g,ined in tl,c application of extension policy relating to tl,e adoption of land or agriculturol
conservation practices, hove the potcntio! to promote the occeptancc of pcrn,anent covenart,.
At the landholder level, extension programs go beyond provision of infonnotion • they also
involve provision of the necessary support for ensuring the desired outcomes. Financi:tl
incentives and actual collabor:,tion between different sectors witl, interest in privote land hove
been cited a, csscntiol component< for tl,e success of extension policies in nature conservation
on pri,·ote lond (United Swes Deparnncnt of Agriculture, 1999).
Pcnnoncnt covcnont uptoke, as with the adoption of conservation technologies, h,s
costs attached to it. Acknowledgment of this to londholders by rooking provisions to defray
these costs c;u1 increase landholders' appreciation of tl,cir noture conservation fcotu,es. Some
support is already bcing provided to co,·cr tl,c cost of uptake of pcnnonent covenant in mo,t
States. Government ond public co11cern and interest in noturc conservation on priv,tc lond
needs to move beyond the demand that conservation be undertaken on private property, to
provision of the necessary ond adequate inputs for ochieving the expected outcome.
lbere i, at present lack of a wholesome ond comprehensive government policy for
provision of finoncial and other support to the management ofpri,·atc land under a pcnrument
cm·cnanL TI,is means tl10t where support is provided to covenantce for onward tr:insmission to
londholders, it is often insufficient and on an ad bo, basi,. As one londholdct confirms '1 nm 1i1
fJndaifr!. ThuadJacl is ,,,ry littfr ofpromi.ud maniu "~' hit th, 1,rrmml. It is 11ud up in rmy olh,r "'"Y· l'aµr
i.'IJrk rte..• " Vandoy (1994) points out sumc of tl,c consequences of inadequate funds for

extension programs in sgriculturc • extension agencies tend to target a narrow client hose
through client hose segmentation, removal of free service to fanncrs to a user-pay basis for
services, and adoption of approaches tliat pl,cc responsibility of tl,e problem on the farmers.
Insufficient support by government to conservation ogencies and to landholders is ineffective
for promoting natu,e conservotion ethic ond the up toke of pcnnonent covenant as highlighted
by a landholder in tlic study:
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'1 fad Iha/ Ihm Im btut inmffit:iml r<IX!J,"1lion

of u•h.11 i11Ji,-idi1al fam1m h,m dont ,,·i1ho111 "'!Y

g,,,.mm<nf or sot:ial ,misldn". I IMP< t:frd lo ,git gpi,mmtnl auislanu on a n11mb,r of o«ation, bJII ha,~ nnyr
h<rn t11r<r1.if11!. It i, "'!)' rotlfy 10 do 1/Jir no11-pro@ctiN

,.,.,k. L,,bour and mar,rial txp,nm ar< n,m,ary..."

Ther,, is on ossumption that londholdcrs are best placed to manage the conservation
v;tlues on their pmpet1)" bmmse the)" have the prncu'col knowledge of the are, ;md possibly the
management issues to be cn,ountered. Despite land occupancy, landhold= moy not 11've the
tcchnic,1 knowledge on how to manage the conseivation areas to achieve the desired outcomes.
Even where this knowledge ex.i,ts, some 1nay not feel confident that they have it It has been
shown corlier thot a cross-section oflsndholderS, cven among those that have a sttong interest
in long-term nature conservotion, still r«[Uire conservation management advice. Several
landholders in this study expressed tl,c importance and need for c~tension (outreach) officers
that arc converssnt wid, proctical con>cn••tion ns well a, d,cory.
Creation of conscivotion ond covenant awareness requires the use of credible
profossional expcm Qfollick, 1990) with the capacity to target tlie ri3ht oudie,ices, be
understood, and r.cnent~ the interest in landholders in the midst of• b.nagc of competing
information. In addition to c.~rcnsion officers, HoUick (1990) note, that inspecto,s, contrActors,
bank managers, and neighbouring farmer, (McGuire, 191l1) ore effective in crcnting information
nw:ircnes, among landholder. 11,c status quo (ineffecti,·eness) would hove to be maintained
without odequatc fundin11 to recruit such office<S. Currently, for csamplc, Trust for Natur,, in
Victoria i, inadequately resourced; it only has one extension officer Qlegion,1 coordinator) for
every 47 covenants in their program.
11,c Notional Trust Covenant Progrom in \'t1estern Australia presently has one
extension officer for every eight covenon1,, though tl,e number of covenants per officer i,
ce,tain to inc,e,se over time. Establishing the optimal number oflondhnlder. who an extension
officer can ,uppntt effectively in the diffe<cnt States and regions may help to justify an incrcssc
in funding by government for nddition;tl extension officers and for ncru;I} manogement of areas
under a covenant.
'TI,e wetlond policy of 1hc Commonweahh Government is one of the most
comprehensive naru,c resour<:c policies that specifically incoq,orntc private landholders. One of
its guiding principles of particulor relevance to private lond is its support for the cmpowemicnt
of private landholders in their role as long-term custodians of wetland,, and tl,c development
of a cooperntivc partnership approach with them. Prevention of further loss of high voluc
nature conservation areas con only be achieved by working wit!, landholders, encournging ond
facilitnting them (through focussed and infomied polidc, and program,) to ,etoin high
conservation volue oreas and manage other o«,as sustainably (Millar, 1998).

199

Clrnpter 6: Final Discussion

6.2.9 Limitations of the study
This stud)' ha, se\·cral funirntions that moy influence tl,e eitent to which its findings
can be applied. TI,c samples of landholders we,e dr.,wn from Victoria and Western Australia,
meaning that ma<,y geographical areos of the Austrslia were left out thereby limiting or eliciting
caution on the application of the findings outside tl,e two Sutes.
Path model, wore used to duw several conclusions in the study. Nevertheless, it is
clear thst !he use of mu\tipk regression in poth models limits the variables that can be cntc,c<l,
thus <esulting in the path midcls being non-uhoustivc of oll possible factors that influence
landholders' attitudes lO uptake of a pennancnt covenant. Sunilorlr, although attitudes to a
permanent covenont may be positive, there w.,.s ,,,idcnce in the study acrual uptokc of a
pennancnt co,·enant mor not be assured in landholders due to other constraints cited by
landholders such a, lack of inecntive, for upi..ke of covenants. Furtl,crmorc, path model, "'"
non·,cplicable, meaning that different ,csc0<chcts arc likely to dr.iw different conclusions on
v11riablc relationship, in the model. ·n,e findings and conclusion, based solely on path models
depend on the strcngih of 1he argument, of the individual ,esearcber on the hypotheses set
The conceptuo! models prescn!cd iu this chopter are necessarily simplified for clnrit,· of
1he interoctlon of diffeicm factors in the uptake of permanent coven om,. In .,ddition, they""
not eshaustivc, a, 1hey do not include variable, tha< wore ncitl1er considered in the study nor
articubted in literature. In addition, the global application of lbc model is untested, as it was
intended for use regariling privote latid coclServation in Aumalfa. 'The purpose of tl,e models,
1hercfore, is to constrnct and depict the main finilings of tl,e smdy in graphical form with a
view to explain the complelUties of the observed relationships between factors,

6.2,10 Summary, conc\u9ion, and rccom1nendations
The factors that influence i,ndholders' decisions regarding the uptake of a pcnnonent
covenant arc multi-faceted. Of the range of factors investigated, several smod out acro,s the
diffc<ent categories of landliolders to influence the decision for the uptake of penn•ncnt
covenants.
Among pcnnanent co11enant holders, the said factors arc categorized inm fom main
groups, comprising a strong nam,c conseivation etl,ic, minimal economic dependence on the
land, confidence i,, the pcnnonent covcnaot mechanism, and non.financial motivation for their
decision.
Across the other ca1egories of landholders, decisions ond the likelihood of taking up

;1

permanent covenant arc alio • function of several mreractivc facton, These include the
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landhoh.lcrs' level of confidence i11 the permanent cm·enants mechanism, their ethic, and ,·aloes
with rcspec.t 10 noturc consen·ation. and the impact of social polirical. and economic
mvironmcm~. and in,tirutiono! arnngcmenc,, in which 1hcy oper:ue ond make land
manogcment decision,.
Difference, in bnd management decisions ,uc to be envisaged between the primarily
consen·stinn minded pcrm•11mt cnvmont holders and landholders who manage their
properties predmninantl)' for agricuhun\ production, ao well as those tlm arc economically
dependent on lheir property, Importantly. the decision to t.>kc up • permanent covenant is
part!)' aided b)' tl,e suppression or lack of on economic impcmi"c in land management among
eco-ccntric landholders. 11ms, permanent covenants ore likely to attract drnsc tlm 1,.,.e little or
no economic dependence on their properties and those tho! have a slrong nature conset"Valion
ethic. Eco-cemrism is invanabty the m·cnid.ing factor in d"' land manngemcnt decision of
permanent covenant holders. In comnst, economic impenllive,, often with a utilitrufan
approoch to man,gemcnt, arc tl,c principal factor in the land management decision of
londholdcrs who arc economically dependent on their land
11,c n,rure comervotion .src,s under most immediate threat and risk of being
destroyed arc on prnpcnics whose nwnee,; ore llkcl)· to be cconomicolly dependent on the lond
and with a poor nature conscn,otion ethic and tlrnsc tl,at arc dose to major urban areas. In the
absence of a nature con,ervotion ed1ic, these bndholtlers are llkcly to avoid a pemunent
covenant for fcor of cu,truling funuc expm,ion of the agriculturnl land on which they
economic:ill)' depend or its subdivision for urban dcvelopmc,u.
\VondOn (1997) dtc< three important ,cquircmcnt.s in dccisirn,-maker, for the
distribution o[ responsibility in cnvironmento! politics; sufficient insighi into complex
ecological and soci.1\ rdotionships; ability to n,okc ethically <ea,onable judgement!, in particubr
concerning the ploce of humans in nature: and efficiency in dccision-moking. Protection of
M!Ure conscn':ltion areos that arc m,dcr iiruncdiote thrcnt require,. among mhcrs, policy and
programs th•t support compensatory economic incentive, to counter the pcreci,·cd or real loss
of income by !andlmldcr, who arc cconomicoll)' tlcpcndent on their land, it also requires the
provision of resources to programs tl101 promote a strong nature conscn,alion ethic. Such
provisions even when tl,ey otiginatc from government ore more 1;kc!)· to ha"c a positive effect
if carried out hy local!)' bo,cd bodies or private organisations that ore able to distance
themselves from a govcmme,a thot is incvitobl)' associated witl, 1hc iinposition ond policing of
the n,rurc consc<Vation rules and rcgubtion,(Farricr, 199~).
Although curr<nt londowncrs may ha\'C a high con,crvation ethic, furore landowners
m,y not have a similar ethic and respect for the terms of the covcnont that they did not initi1tc.
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11,is m•)' lead to minim•l compliance ancl neglect of volont.,.ry oncl positive ongoing
m,nogcmcm of the couscrvccl nreas. ·n,e target of uarnrc conser1aLion ethic programs,
thcrefo,~. ought lo go berood <;Utrcnt l;mdownc<"> to include potential future 1.uclowno:s in
view of the \to!\sfcnbility ofbnd v.ithin and across gener•Lion,. Specific measures to eumorage
pubbc dis<;Ussion arc nccc"Ssary iu the development of a narnre conservation policy and
clarification of tl,c m!e and !c:,·el of im·olvemcnt of tl,c public in nature conscNaLion on private
1,,nd, •swell os aiding a suonger conservation ethic among Ltndhold= and the public.
Effccti,·e use of financial and other economic incentives in motivating landholders to
akc up a prnnmcnt cove11ont requires tl10t economic conditions prevailing in the rural setting
be focmrecl in determining the appropriate levels of incentives for different lo11dho!dcrs. Such
measure, rcquirt increased a•.1,arcncss atnong lncal, state nnd fcclcro! go,•enL. !ents of the short
and long-tcnn rmanci,•1 and economic impact of full odoption of the required nature
conservation measures on priv,te !ands hy landholder,. '11,c roots of cnvironmem,I problems
have •n t,bviou, political content bocanse they ore not merely ecological, but olso social,
economic ond co!rnr:d (\VondCn, 1997). Stn1tegic action to remove irnpeiliments and streamline
dcli,·ery of ,,..,,ices to landholders, as well as increased occoumability in their conduct towords
nature consen•atioo can help !o address the concern, roi,ed hy landholders abouc neglect by
govemrnem of ihcir welfare om! cffom in noturc consen·atio11.
Federal, Stote and local govcmmcm, need to explore mechanisms, methocls and
forums for opiimi~ing die co-opcrotion between <liffurent actors in ogricu!tmc and nature
con,crv,tion on privote laud in order to promote coordination and consistency in tl1e delivery
of inform:ition and resources to lmclhol<lers. 11,ey con also scr.e to minimise suspicion of
gnvemmcnt by landholders and conllict in ogriculturn\ production, development of
infrostnJcrure, ond conservation of namre,
Policies that arc hrood\)" targeted at fondholders for nature comcNation on priva!e
land, •uch os a provision of ta~ incentive, for conservation ore likely to have unc•:en impact on
different categories of londho!dcrs. It is imperative, tlicrefor,,, that recognition be made in
policy implementation of tl,e segmentation of laudho!ders and the need for a policy impact
study on the different bndholders according to grouping by region, socio-economic s1:1rn, or
by the types of conscNatioti mechanism, they have experienced.
"!be design ,nd implcrncn~1tion of a parti""lar nornrc con,eNation mochoni,m on
priv:1tc land can affect pooiLivdy ar negstivcly the uptake of other closely rcloted conservation
mechanism,. For example, in Western An,tralia, landholders who were compelled to take up a
fixcd·1crm cm·enont

a,

a p1c-re9uisitc for grant of pmnit to clear or develop other parl5 of

their property arc unwilling to take up o pem,inent covenant. This, as peeviously argued in this
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thesis, is because they as,ocistc it "'li"tivdy with the involuntary fixed-term rnvcmmt. It is
impow.nt therefore; that the design and implememstion of private lai,d con,ervotion
mechani,m, be preceded by o risk and impact assessment on landholders and other potentio.lly
related conservation mccha,ti,m,.
A not,ble incressc in likelihood of cl,e uptake of ;i p~rmanent envenom from nonholdecs of a cm•ensm or sgrccrncnt to fiud-term agreement holder, confirms the possibility of
using fixed-term ogrccmcnts such a, L:md for Wildhfo Scheme as a trnnsition for bringing nonholdcrs of covenants or ag,cetnent• to take up • pe=~nent coven;int. his dear through, that
the ability of, and sc"°c to which fixed-term agreement or covenant can act as • tnmsirioi,
depends on the c~tent to which their prognms promote ideals that attrnct permrnem covenont
holders. This is e,ident fror:, tl,e c'>ore pwnounced tmnsitioi, to permonent covenant
demomtrnted through lnnd,o[ wildlifC fixed-term sgrccment io Victoria than through the

'

Remnant Vegetation Pmtccti.'~n Scheme fixed-term covenant in \Vestem Austrnlia.
lt i, sdvisabk for the J;cmMnt Vcget,tion Protection Scheme to rcs.icw and pos,ibly
,cmovc the compulsion for lnlldholdcro to place a li.,ed-term envenom on thcir land"' a prerequisite for grant ofpcnnit to deor or dcvdop another part of their prop my. This would hove
the doJb!e effect of removing the distaste for other closely related conscrvotion mechanisms
among lsndho\dccs, and strengthen tbe scheme's role os a tramit point for non-bolder, of a
covenant toword, full permanent cMenant uptake.

It is presumptuous to a,k people who have limited resources to change fron, an
established farn, practice to another pe.cci,·ed more ri,\..1", or more labour or capitol intensive,
unless some real benefits from the new practice con be demonstrated. l:.xtcnsion policies and
prognms ought to nrticubte the bcnefl•~ of permanent rove nan ts and to clarify and emph.,izc
t~ connection between biodiversity on private lond and landowners' goals snd "'pimtions.
11,ey ,l,o need to be t:u:geted at the public with a view to promoting an understanding of
nature consc"'ation principles and values, and clarifying the expected public contributlon to the
cost of nature conservation on private property. The ob,.jous l.,ck of adeqw,tc public
information on the benefits of pcrmoncm covenants a~o needs to be addressed by outreach
p1ogr:,ms thot rnrgct i~crca,cd covcnsnt uprnke.
Econo,nic incentives lo support land stew:trdship and to addres, deficiencic, in nature
conseNation equity ,nd prope<ty rights csn increase the uptake of permanent covenants in all
cstegories oflanrlholders. Extension programs pwvide a viable con1<,xt for delivery of financial
incentiv~, to lsndholdm brcausc of their potenci,I to incorporate• whole farm plm approach.
111c success of nature conservation mechanism~ on private land d~pends on their
effective incorporotion into, •nd addrcs, in, landholdcrs' economic, sim,tion,, environments!
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r"<iuirtmcnts, and social structure of the rural bndscapc and its inhobitants. A wholesome
private lond con,c.vation policy and strong policy interventions arc ncccssuy for improving
noturc conservation on private land and the uptake ofpcm>ancnt covenants. Such intervention,
include the following mc,surcs: incuk,ting an interest in long-tcml nature conservation in
landhold,..n, nddrt,sing ond clarifying prnpcrty rights and equity in rcopect to nature
conservation, prm·iding "'cl!-torgcted economic and financial supp on, increasing awareness and
knowledge about permanent covenant mechanisms, incrcnsing the tr;insparcncy and efficiency
of government ond private land consc"'ntion schemes by streamlining the management and
odministr:nion.
Further research and collation of information on the socia!-culturnl and economic
impact of adoption of different nature conservation approaches by fandholdcrs is ncccs,ary for
streamlining ond guiding polic)· fonnulation and implementation. Covenanting organi,otio,is
and their psrtner organisotioos can play •n impon,mt role in cncouragmg such reseorch. Other
opponuititics for further rescsrch in the use of management ogrccmcm mcchsnism on private
land cidst particularly on the impact of different mechanisms on c.,.ch otl,er, and evaluation of
the impact of curicnt ond potential govemmcnt policies on tl,c up~~ke of ~pecific monsgcmem
agreements for noture conservation.
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Appendices

Appendix 2. 1

Cho.r,g,,s rn:ide ro thequesrionnai,e instrumrnts

Coluntn 1

Column 2

Column 3

!soco=n,nt
I. \,;'h,t type offarm do )-.,u rn,nag,:?

F"ed-t=n """""'"'
!. \\;'hat 'l'P" of fwn do )-Uu rnw,g,:?

Perm>n<n•c=.ts
1. Wh>-< 'l1"' of fann do you m=,g,,?

);. Wh•t ;, the total """ of)""' P,Op,:r<)" in h«<=>
o,a.cr<>?

Ji. Wh,, 1< the co<>I """ of )<>Ur prop,:!tf io hm:iro, o,
,mo?

Ji. \l,1,,c ;. the tot.! arc, of )'Our prop,:rtpn h,cwcs or
,_,

)ii.\\1", propa,-tion oa you• p - · is: •

3ii. Wh>t propartlon on j'Ou, propcny IS:· O=,ed
(Fn..d,old)? R<nce~ or l=ed

.Jii_ \,;'h,:

No~
made

%

Col !Clunged
'me' for"><<•-'-

Owned (Frtehold). Rented ode><ed
%
J,ii. \l;'h>t ,pprorim,tc
of =--.,ed prop=)"
(freehold) is Wor~ed'
Andf,llos,?

,,,

•=

Jill. \\'h" approximate,;,. of <n-ned propeny (fmhuld) i,
Worked_'

propnrtlmt on rout pcoprny ;,; • Cha-ned

(Fn,eho!cl)'. Rented o, l=«l (From Go¥et<>ff"'"~
cornp:cav or indi1·idu,T]i' - %
Jue Wh.t >ppro,imotc nze of )'OUr property q,.:OT l=ed
l,nd) ;, Wocked>

AnJ f,ll=·

Ar.d fallow

=

Jj,·_ How rn>.")" h,c,.,., of )-.>Ur prop,:rty
under •
em coeem.m for"""'' <on>err,onn' H•
4 PJ,,.., pro,ade inform,cion on ,ll con><rv>Oon

,g=mc,,,, (~- !.=d for "'JdUfe, "'"" acchment
pro«ecion) on you, Wld by fillu,g ;,. the c,b!c, b,k,..·
4, N>nt< of ,greem,nt
4b o,g,ru.,.cion =pa"-'ibt,
4d Totol
io hca,re, fo, e,ch conserv,tion fe>ture
co=ed-H..Kum
~ Duration of ,~«ment.
~ Type, of conscrv:cOon fe,~-'"'' co1·<t<d

=

Col 1 Ch=i;ed
'"'""'"
from
',,.·tu.,

4c \Tiuclt of the foilawing 'consen-,tion' fean,re,
an you property?

;u,:

4ii_ IfYES, wh>t carucrnation or n,>ut>l heriug,,

5;;_ IfYES, ,.-1,,t t;1'es ofcon"""1tio-n o, n>,c,r>l !,aio,ge

«>rucrv>tiono,
"""'t>lh<rit,g,,
f01ture, ... '

f.,nrn,,.,. they? (>rldition,J con,m·,tiM =
4;;_ \Th,t proportion of your property (NOT l=ed
Wld) do th= <=rion o, n>tuod hcri<>g< fnn=,
C>C<Up)1
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""on 1= prnpe!tf?

fwure>
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cndix 2.t continued

•p= from ihooe

5;_ A,c thcf< o,h., •""-' of yo,,, Md, •p= from those

4L A<c thcrr oth« ....,, of ;our Md,

mscml urukr ,he fi=l-tmn >g=,mott<> o, <=en=t,

cove=! unda ,he pam>n<nt <o«nll>t th>< you oo"'1d«

which Yo" con,;der to h,t·e n>tut< ronscm.rion or ,utur:il

ha1-iog n,tut< cons<l'\">tioo o, n,turil hai,.go features?

herlug,,fe>ru=?

Yes-No

Yes-No
5i!C 1).1:,, ,octl ,,.,, of p,ur r"'P"rtf (NOT k.,.:J l,nd)
do th= con,en•otion o, n,1u ril bmc,g< fe>tUr<ss o,ccup)·?
H,

S. \liluch of th, following ,utcmcnto bcl""' (l,belled an) bc>t de,ffib< i·our pcirn,r;· «»on ,rul soconCW}'
,...._,= for h,ving ,euined , = of J'ou, P'°r='l' U'I
<heir n•tunl "'"''

11> Wh,t ocn,,cie<, if ,ny, did l"u cmy out ,o m;;nc,in
or rnhoncc,he >rc,5 of your prnprny ;n thci, o>tur,l

""e?
Ncwfollowup
qu"tion on Col2

,lb,
IF YES, ,pp<O>int>tcl)' how much money
"'d omo did l"u sp,:nd on d,, n>tu« '°""'""tion
or=, io th, Im

""° i='

Hou" ,.,d dollm

6 .. Do ,ou .,,cicip,to ro..:rut:g=n=h;p of pur

P">P"'Y ..;thin the
Ycs-No,Notsuro

family in the fu"'""

6. P~m,r;· wd =con<'><y ,.,,on, fo, h"'"!: r=,ned =

of your property jn their ,urur:il mte a!:FORE rou
rnte«d > fised-t<'"ffl COnsct'\'l!>nn ,gtt<m<Ot or cm-<cur:t?

~ui. ~"h,t10W "'""" in l,<ctan,O do theS< ,ddition>l (NOT
io,,.ed Md) con""'"tion or n•runl h<riuge fc,rurc,

occu~{' H,
6. P ~ - ,nd •ccond,ry ''"'°'' fm h>.,ing <Ct>lned "''"
of.1-..ur pnipcrty in ihcir n..truril st>1e DEFORE )""
rnt=d , pc,m;,;rnt co,·,mnt?

7. In ihe p,:tio.l UHORE )""' cnto=I , f,>ed-tcm>
'"""'""'tion •greern=t or ca,.,,,nt "'h.t .ai.itic;, Lf .nr,
cJjJ )"U c,rry oui '° rn""'uin o, ',"h>nco ,he ,re,o of your
pn,p,:rty io their r,;tur,I '""

~._ In tho p,:nOO 11c:ro1rn1ou .r.,o=! ,,xrm.nent
cm-cOl.Ot v.fat "';,-.rics, if anr. ilid ynu c,rry out to
m,int>.in Of cnh,nco tho ><= of !'OU< prupcrt: 1" thdr
n,rur.t! '1atc'

Tu.IF YES, >pprn<irn>tcly how much mon'T "'~ T,me did
)"" ,pend on the nature eomorntion or= io the Im N'O

"b. !F Yl'.S, •ppn>=n>lolr bow muoh mono:·' .;,d ,ou

'''"'' and doll,r,
!{ours
l lg. I ,nticip>tc ,...,,;~•n;: o~..cer,hip of my prop,:ny \lithin
the f,rttilf U'I tho furun,,
Ye,-No-Noc ,ure

•rend on ,he Uj>-ke<p of the rut<,ne ron,ono.tion '"" in
ihe Im ,.,,o J<>r> b<fo.c )'OU enc««! , <m~r"-"t on !""'
Wld' Hour, ,nd do~m
7>. Jkfo« you entmd ,he p,:munc.st ro ..crn,,u on your
l,r,J, <hd you ,.,Cap.to <rtommg """°"hip of>"""'
pmpcrty .,,;uu·n ,h< ranui,- m <he furu""

Yes-No-Nol suro

6b). Do

)'<>u ,,nici["t<

Rc,;muig the man,gcment of

,out prop,:rty in In• &mily U'I the futur<?
Yes-No-Not <Ur<

8. !kforoyou ent=d the f,;eJ-=rn «m=•••ti<m
,g,<<mODt or ,0,-.,,,01 o~ I""' Wld, dJd )"" ><lticl[""'
m>i!lli>g o,,..a,r,tup of)""' plOp,:<')'"'-ithin iho f,rru!y in
ih, focmc?YcH,.'o-N01 ,.,,.
9. Jkforo rou entered ,he fo:ed-t= con,a<>rion
,gr=nent or <o"°n"'t on you, Md, djd )'OU ,ntiap'1e
re<>irnng ,he m;n,gcmcn1 of ,our P'°l""'Y in 1hc f><nil)· ;n
th• f,,,u,.>Yes-No-No, '""'
1 lh. ! ,nticlplte rct>inin~ ,he """1,gm'te11t of my ptop<t<!'
,..;,h;n ihe fam~r U'I ,he furu.e.
Yoo-No-Not•uro
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Th. Jkfo« )'OU cnt<r<d th•

P""""'""-' ro,·enu\t on )"U<

land, did )"U anticip,to rc<>ining ,he ~ " " ' of you,

prop,:rt)' "iihin the l.wuly in iho futu«1
Yu-No-Not,.,,.

Appendices

A-~ endix

2.1 rontinw,d
7. A,., you• m<rnl><f Of do you ,uppon onJ' of the
followi,,g <l>lUr<: C<>M=>tion group</orgmi>,tioo,?

JD. Are you • mcmbcr or do y,,u ,upport ""f of ch,
foUowing "''""' rorncr,,,ti"'> group</orgmi,,Oon,
Numbu of org,,u,.tion,

lO(i). Plc,,e Ttck or circle 'fruc' or 'F;l,c' Of 'Not

II. Ple»e cinle 'Yr,,' or 'No'"' 'Not Sure' for e:ceh of the

Sur<' for =h of th, foU,,,,,:ing '"''""'"'"

following ,.,cement.

Nodungc•

HJi-• I h»< NEVER hc=d >hcs,c • pcmaa,ncr"
'"'""""' for n,tur<: con,=cion bcfoto. T·F

I h. i\t ,he time I cm<=! on ,g«<m<nt or faod-i=
ccwen.m I w,..s ,...,,.,, of the option nf eot<rinl( •
""ntco,·cn=1. T·F

Noch,ngcs

10cb. I h>S"< heard ,!,out fu:cd·mm co,·cn,n1$ (11,o
<>llcd flllcd·tenn rn,n, " mt,
,ncs\ T·F

Noch,ngc,

m••

~.

ma,

9. In the pcnc.l l><torc you erue,cd • p=n,,,.,n, rocen,n,
on rou, bnd, '''"" you , member Of did )"OU ,uppon
oft."' following ru,urc cM,crs·,tion
group</otg>-si;>tlono?

a.nr

lib.! ent<=l the fixed-tern\ >g,«mcnu Of facd-tenn

cm--.na.n, on

I h»c m.de inquin« ,bout permoncnt
tor n,nrn, con,cnt'.tlon io the p»< T·F.

!(f.c.

'°"°""'"

lOid. l om hmili,rw.th the ,--.il,bic pcrnunent
co•en>n< prngnm, fo, n,curc cotl>e<nMn in the

,tatc.T-F
ft<mo=l '-·
procc,,cs' in
Col3 ,epbced
..,.;th• rocedurc'
Col2 l\<movcd
..,.-0«1 'genuinely'

'I""""""''

!(lie, I know the procedure, for entering
n,turccono<f'cttlonco>cn=t on my lmd

T-F

See ch,,,ge, h,ve

](J;f. I would like 10 know mor<: >bout pcrtn:mcnt
n>n= con,crr.noo covcru..~t<
T-F-N,
l l. Wb>t UDport>nce "-ould you give 10 c,.dt of the

been mode

follm>ing i,,uos noted below in d<ridini:whcthc< to

10

9""'tlor.,po!Cd
Coll
0,,ngcd

"-otd!ngto

erct« • volum,ry p=nan,nt co,·ena.nt for rc>turc
ronscr,.-,,tlon on yow: bnd?
1 la. \,;'}.,,h<r I ,,.-ill «ooi,e &-<quen, """'S"f"=t
><lvice on con,=rion.

mr 1.tnJ l.cau,c ;, ""-' • =iu;n=cnt for

tet«nD~,u
rtfrom,n
c,.T·F
! le. I h,,·, ,=de inqU!fles •bou< pcr.n.n<nt CQ'<clllllt.s for
""""' con,enc.tlo~ ,rncc entering tl,e ,g,=ent or faodt«m roccn:tnl T·F.
I Id. l om fa.'Ttili>< .,,;,h the ,vWblo pc,m>n«c< ccwc<llllt

p,ogr,.mooffered in the <Ute. T-F

! le. I :,,ow the p,oceducc fm <:1cc,ing, perma."<nt
e,,«n:rnt for cururc: con«rs·,tion on my land. T·F

11 f. I v,ould like to kno..,.· mor<: about rtt=cnt
co,·c,,=« for n•cu"' cnn<=>cion T·F•
12. Wh11 i,npomncc ,rnuld )'OU gi"" to each of the
foUoo,;ng "5,ue, noted b<low in d,dding ,.bother 10 enter
• ,-otun""Y pcrn=e,,t a»cn>nt fa, rcocme c"",c"·•rlon
onyourlmd'
JZ,. Wheth« J

,,,,,uk] =<>... mo,c ITT<("en< m>n,g«n=t

,,Mee on coo,=,tion th:rn >t p,escnt.

'f=iue,,t in
column 1 ,nd 3.
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10. How UDport>nt were tho following coosid«>tion> to
l"" ..,.·hen you were making, decision oo whether to enter
, P'""''""'' <<>=<=< fo, n,nm, con=->ri= fur ,he fa,t

"""'-'

10,. Wheth<t l would =ei,·c f=iu=t m,rugcmern ad~
on ron,cr,.S<tion.
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endU: 2.1 continued

Rcmo,-cd 'be'
column l 1nd

chmgc,in
"-'Ording in Co] 2

Jlb. Whether• cm=.nt ,,,ill bcing public =cogniW>n
,nd opproo,<ion of ,he eonser,ation ;·,Jue, on my
lmd.

~

Col 2 'of '"'"""'
of'fo~ :ind
'-rnrule'
No clung<>

ma,

1lc. Wheohe, • r=•nent eo,·.,,,~,

long-

term"'"'"' ron=•;acion

"-ill"'""' the
=

1ld \\:'!tether by «t<crinl( • pcrm,ncm co,·en,n, l
receive ,ome on,going firumci:tl ,uppon 10 ctrry o"t
L\e n=my conmnrinn ,..o,k.

12. H=· ,.,ong!y do )'OU >gt« or ili"'-grt< ,..;ti, the
follo,,.·ing mtemcru, (•·h) in 1!,e <:tble Wow on fi,ed"'"' ro1·eru.m,; o, ;gm:menu and
co,,:n,nn?
1:!b. I am con«mccl ,bout cntmng '-~Y con,enc,tion
amrngcmcnt th,t would p!acc ,ome f'C"'"'O<Ot
=1'icoon, nn ,he u"' of the conser,..,1;on >tc».

pcm,,,,.,nt

Chutg<d rol I·

n...-scn«nce.
Alte=I
,nd 3
Sec clung,, in col
3 '! felt'
And in col 2- !
h•= amincd '!
felt'
Coll·no11bho<
h=n omitted .nd
re!>=lbn

\2,_ lhrre arc '"'"" cffc,;ti,·e rne<l<>ru.sm, other th,n
pcmuncnt '"'''""'" for promoting ,he fong·tetm
r.anm, conson-.oon an pci,.,tc W\ds.

12b. Wbe,her • pemunoot ro,·enant would bcing ina=«!
public r«og,,,tion ,nd •pp,COotion of eon><=ition v,luc,
on ffl)•land.
·

1:.:C. Whcthc, , pcmun«>t coven>m ""ould £"'0"'dC g=te,

a,,autlltcc offong-t=n ,utun, con>Cf'':lOon th,n undor the
,-ccm,nr or ftxed,cmn ro1·en""'t
!Zd. W!,cthc, by entering, pcmuncn! co,·cnan, l "'ould
n,ce;., ,ili!;tion>l on-going founci:tl ,uppoct to carry out
the ncce,my COO><f'l'1UOO ,.-o,k.
13. Haw ,trnngly do )-.OU ,g,cc or d.Ls'W"' ,.i,h the

"''
lDc. \l/hcthc,, pmn.ncnt ""'"'"nt ""old pros'Ule g,=ter
=u=ce fo, Jong-t<m, mm« conmv,tion ti= under
,he other con=·,tion,
enc,
lad. Whcthe, by cntmng • pcrnuncnt co,·cn,nt I would
'"'""" ,omc on-ga;ng founo,l ouppoct to cmy out the
n«css,,y conscr,·,rion "'otk.

13._ I om concerned ,bnu, c,<<<ring >O)' ron,cn--.tion
orrang,:rnem L~lt =uld place some pcm,,nent =<tncoQn,
on the u,c of the ron!c<Vation ,m.s.

11 How <trnr.gly do you ,gr<< o, di,ag,cc "i,h <>eh of 1he
foll<raing ot>Cemcnc, (a-i) on }'OU<'""~ ,bout pcrmancm
cm·cn:mt> ia the pcriOO before you en,ered •
ro>cn,mt on mu, !,,,di'
11._ IruriaJ!i· I "'"" conccm«I ,hnu1 cn,eri,i~ ,ny
con>ef'·ation unnga,t«tl th.t would p!acc ,omc
pcrnuncnt r,o:riction, on the use of the cnn>en-.non

Db. Tnm a.re mh« more effecci,., mccl,>ru,01, thon
pcrm11t<nt co,,en,nu for prnmotu>g tho long-term namte
e<m,cr,'>Oon on p<i•>to l>nd~

"'"'"' CT>ft<Cl"'O~OO

follm1ir.g ,cu,rnenc, (•-h) in the ublc below on fix«J.,errn
,grc,:mcnti and pcnn,mn, cm'«unt<'

12i.Pl.cing • pcm,:uicm coven:tnt on my Wld would

lJc.Pi:u:inr, a pcmunent co,·cn>nt on my land "'""Id c,use

au« it to lo« in market nluc.

it to lo,= in m>!kct ,.,Jue.

12h. l ""uld be inclined 10 enccr, pttm"-sem nm,r<
conmnrion ro,"at.ant on my land jf neighbouring
:ndho1d: oC:,'.;'.'.,",'!'thaving ,imibr natunl
,,,ith
1

13<l. I .,.-ou]d be lm'.li.~ed ta cntc, pc,rn,,acnt non,«
con,crv,rion co.cmm on my land if neighbouring
W\dholdcrs frieod, h>.,'illg ,imil,,- n,tur:il
"'th
>n<Ot CO'<COOO!.

=

!Ob. Wbeohe, a pemuncn, ro,,,,,.n, ,.,,.ould bring publ,c
«cognioon .nd appreci.oon of conservation ,-.Ju,,, O<! mr

•=•

°'

I''""'""""'

-·

"'=

llb. I felt thrn:
other equ>11r cffccnvs mc,;luru""'
th,n pcm,,nent eo>en>nts fo, promo,;;'!: ,he fong,1crm
on pci,--,te 1.....:~

1 k. I,,,,, con=ned >bout 1 po,s1b!c lo» in ma.rkct rilue
of my peop«,y" > «suit of c,,1cring • pcrrn,ncnt
<O...,n.nt en m, W\d
l l<l.l ,....., inclined to enter• pcrnuncnt coo«>>m on o,;
l,,,d in p=. due rn the ptelO<lC< of n,;ghbours or friend,
haring ,imil;r n.ttut.!
"ith pcm,,ncnt co,·<mnL

=

~i•. How Ions b»o )-Ou h,d , pcrrn,ncnt co,·enmt on
?
\'c,n
month,.
18, I could h»'< placed mo«= of my W\d un~er •
pc,m,,,.,m
if there""' some compensation for
the limiutlon< of u>e of the l,nd or= co,·e=I under>

,·o,.,r
I WQuld be incltncd to place, pc=,.ncnt co;-cn,.~t on
my W\d if there""' some cornpen,.tlon for the
limiutions of u.,e of the Wld ""'-' w,·c=! under ,
\)e_

"'"""'"t

CO•."COan~
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Aooendix 2.1 continued
No d,.,..g,,,

ma,

_,,

No ch,,,~

13f. I would pi>« mo:c °""" of my l,nd undor a f,,:edterm WV<11ant jf then: wen: ,ome oompen<•tion fur tho
li,,,;ution, of u>e of the = <==I uoder • con,UOL
13g. It;. UNUKF.LYI v,ould h•...: p!a<ed • foi«l-terrn

~- '

<°""'''" on mr bnd if the =ttiction, on cle,,rir,g of
nati,·e husW.Od did not cxi!I.

ma,

No change,
m,de

12. H= ottongly do you ,gr= or dio,g,= "ith the
fuU"""-ing ,u,ernrnt, (,-!) in ,he table below oo
perm=ent co...:,,.,,,.>

Nocl=g.:;

12< I
prefer to di,-ido =d ,-.JJ off <he,=.., of
mr lar,d -.,th eonse,v,tion 0< ,,.ru,,i h<n,"ll" n!ues <o
, '"""""'don-mind,d imUridual or o,g,ru.,uon
r.,,he,: t~an to per,ooal!y =age it uMer, perm=rnt
coven.ttlt
!9d.Pre!.Cotly, I pn,fe,: 10 maiol>in <he ""tu!"O
roo,cr,,,rion >re,, on my land WITHOt.rr th, use of•
ent<=cn=L
12d The""""" consc.-.--arion fean,r.e, on my l=d -.ill
b< """'"""d by di< m=,g,rnent ,h;t will "'"' o,e,:
front me =n \\'"IT!-IOt.rf p!ocing • perm=ent
co,en,ntooit
12g.l would <ot:>«l<= • pe,m,,,.,n, roven,nt ju« prio,
to ,ci!u,g mr I,.,,d to prm«t =-<tiog n1turc
<oooer=tion fe,,u,-,,,.

ma,

Noch=!!<•

-a,

Nochwg"'

m~

Reino...:wotd
•,eriously'

_,,

""'i!d

14. !-law •=nr.ly do )""" agree o, w,,gree ,.;th the
futlov.-ing ,mcmen<s (•·Q in the table below " .. n«ting
present ,;,,.,,, oo pe,nur,rnt C(><er»nts =d fUrutc
<C>fl>e,v;tion on pciv.,e J,nd?
14._ I "'ould prekr to dh-i<k '""d <cl! off the """ of mr
l=d with coe<<l'-,.rion oc n..111,,l heritage ,-,.Jue, to,
eooscrv.oon·minded it,dj,i,;1.,.J o, ,,,g,nj.,tion t.ther th>n
10 penon,lly m,n,,;c it under , perm=ent c,;n·erunt
14b. Pri,,entl)". ! ptt!a to m.h,uin n,ture coo,cmp.tion on
"'!"!and und<r 1 fi1ed-t<rm ,grecmer:! 10 cntcriog a
anentco,e,.,rnt.
,·oluntartllj. I .,.,. concerned •bout, ~kchhood oftl,o eonse,vatioo
being ,lt=ed by futu!"O
or nuoagcn

=

"""'°"

14<:. l ""'u!d consider a p<m1,ncnt ro1·rn:mt jun prioc to
,cl[it,g my lar,d to prot<ct ""i,ting n,tu<e eon,=,-,.rion
features.

II[ It i, UNLlKELYJwould lu•epb=l a pcm,=<n<
roven>nt on my bnd ,fthe p=ent coos.,.,..<ion """ lud
a high« f>O«:ntl.>l for agcicultur,J production dun o<he<
of<hebnd.

No change,

No,ecl,=g,, to
",ppa=t• irutoad
of "ident' io
coll

'

! !g. It;:, UNUKELY h."OU!d h>!.,e plw:d •p=naneo<
co,-ai.,,, on my l>nd if ttgW>to,y tt<tti<tioos on cl=ring
of oati<e bushland did oot cit

No ch10g<>

l9e. The b=•lits of• pcm,a.n"" =•=< no my 1=~
uc NOT apparcot tD me.

\4d. The benefit< o f , = = • ''"""""'"""' the
cu=t f,,,ed-te,m o:>r,=tion ,g,=ent o, a.vm>fll on
my l,nd "" NOT 'PP=L
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bring fo«ol l

w-.«hang«l to
S)"tlcuSd, the
Oth«twO.

lZf.!t;,

"=">!)" 1h>< the mgwi,..,ion M<h whl<h

°"'"" • p«m,nen< cov<n>rlt on my WOd ,o be

I

independcor afGo1-crnm,n1

12j. PemtIDC!lt C<l'"Cll:tnt»<e ,n effc-ctiv, mechanism
for ,upporting ,.Jinicy control on priV>te W,d~

- ..

14c. !t I> "="=Y that the o,gani>,tion ui<h winch ! """"
a p=n;nen, cov=ton my bnd to be independent of

! le.It wa, 1<i;CF.5SARY for ,he o'H"""mirn, ,..;,h which I
re,m=ent
to be ind<p<ndcnt of

u·,s to"'"''•

Go,emment

c"'''"'""

w.,.-a1 perm,,""'"""""""" to

l lj. I
be an cffea,,..,
mech,ni<m for u!inity control mc»uro M pri.,.tc lands
I lb. I felt ,l=c """"' cc,mon= g<Un,"' bc =1,=I ,n ,he
forurc by u,ing • pcmw,cnt co,=•nt o< o long·cerm
n:mc,c cnn=s·,rion me<hor.i,m on mv WOd.

Noci,ang,,<
m,dc

on )'OUrpmp<rty on

14f. I would con~der cnt<ring • pem=t co,,on•n< on
WOd when the cu=nt
of mr consen,,rion
iu,r<c,i,cnt o, fu«l·<«m conrtant = ires.
1S. How mon)" prople ~nclu&ng umilJ') ,...,,k for p>J" on
)'OUr property on:

14. \l;'hi,h of the following wcgories besr dtscrib<<
)-OUr >rrrorinucc tot>l ;nrnme bcfo« t,,.e,. dcriw,I
[.,,,.-., j'Our ptoperty (mcluding l=•d = ) in 19"Di'

16. \\'l,;<h of the foU,,..ing e>tcgori,:; best dc,rnbe, 1our
>pprorinutc tot>! income bcfo,e U><>. dcri,·cd from )-our
property (,nclu,fog ko=I
in ]')'Jg>

15. \t'hicl, of ,he follo-.ing categories best do><ril.cs
youc >pproxioutc rnt;cl ,,.,ome befo<e =es, d,,i,~
from=«<> our.;mi; l""' propc.-r, in 1?98?

17. \t"l,,ci, of ,he foUO"-ing cotcgon<> bes, descnb<S )'our
opprorinutc ,oci] inoomc before me,. dcris«l from
>Qu«os 0U1$!0E JOU< propcrt\' in 1998>

16. ',l;'hich of the following hen de>mbe, the
opp<orimm tocil oxpcn<lirun: .,,.,o.,tc,1 ,,_;,h you,
propcrtj· (mcludir:g le,sc,J = ) in 1998'

IH. Which of tho rou.,..;ng brn dc,c:nbc, ,he •pproxim,1,
too,! <>pcndin,<e on }DU< property (mcluding [c,sed ""'•)
in l?'JB>

17(b) !fYES. in wh;ch of chc follouing c:t<'W"'" Joe,
,
•, cu=t debt omounr fall?
!7(,). Conoider the gro" income of )"Our !"Ol"'rtJ" in
the lost lin,nci,1 ye,,r. W"lu, P""P"'tion ofit rud )-OU
d ,o "" mu, dcbdn tru,
"odi'
I

19[b) lfYE5, ;.~ -.-~jc.~ of cl,c folk,,.-ing c:occgori<> de.<,
,-our C\lr<Ctll debt ,mount f,lll
!9(e). Con,ider the gro" mcomc of),><lr prop,:,rt)· in ,he
!,.,t fin>nel,1 ye,r. Wh<r p<Dportion of it <lid rou ,pend ,o
""' ,-our debt U, ,h,i
' >

mr

13. Hmv m,r.y people (tncludmg family) -.·o,k for p•r

Cn,ngc dace, to
1999,ioco

questlomu=
was to b< «nt
Dulin 2000.
O,ong,, dace co

1999,;nce
quesrion<tlll'c
Nodunges

-'•

=

•=)

19(>). Do you h>,c •

<Ur=,t

debt on )'OU< property'

12. At tho time you rnto=l , p=n,nent """"'""~ 1,.,,..

m:tn)' pcople (including f,nulr) ,.-orkcd an i·our property

""
13. ltludt of the foll°"''"& c,ccgnne< be" dc>enbc, rou<
,pprosin11tc tot>! income before tax,o, dcri,·cd from }'Our
P"'P'rtJ" (mclud,ng l=cd ore.>) in <he~"" you ente,,:d
• p=,unent ro,..,,.,., on )'OUT W,d>
14. 1,>;1,kh of ,he foll=,ng ,;,tcgonc, hen Jmnbcs

,,mn:<> OUl~!Dli }-our pror=i· irt ohe )'"" 1-ou cntorod ,
I -=<1>< '"""''"" on ,-our l>n&
15. Which ofth< lil!h-,,.Sng be<t <hcnbe, the ,pproxim,ce
rot>' <>pcn.!inm: on"''" property (,nclud"'g ko,c,J ore>)
;:',,'~' y= l"" cn1Cf'Cd , pcmw,rn, co""'"'' on yeur
16(,). D,d you h.,·, • debt on your P"'F"Y '1 <he time
""'""""'"en,n1 on \'OUf l,nd?
16(b) If YES, In .,.,hJch of ,he folio,,..,,,~ <>«gori<> did your
d,b, amount fall'
16(e) At the rime you cnt=d a pc,rr.,nont co~cc,nt on
)'""' WOd • .,.·h,.t proportion of ,ho debt
by
<r=to< deti,·cd from tho
·?

'"" <"«<cJ •
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A--endix 2.1 conrinll"d
lB. H•v< )"OU<= =<ived fi=oci,J suppon/1,en,:fit<
rn undott,Ju, ,,..,.,.., co=v>tioo ,,,,,k on your lmd
from u,y o'Jli"l;»tioo "'dq=tment?

Nod,~,
m,dc
Clung,, rrud< to
coll n«d ,imil.r
<h=g" 10 col 2

;nJ 3

No chonge,

m,d,

Jteo.-rite
quo,rion, ,o ..rJy
.,-;th the
pcrn<oncnt

19;i. P<tm>.nont "'""'""" ,hould come "ith ,
m,d,oni<m fo, compe,,s>tlog fo, lo« of futm<
~roducti,•e u,e of m · iecc of l,nd.
19b. Nnn-fin,no>I rrcogo;tim, br '""' >nd lo,;,!
gm=.mer.t of mr effort, to «>mcrro n><U,e ,rnuld be
• ,;gruf,c,m stop ;n mori,.,rin~ me to m<e< 1
~'""'t roven>11<on m1· l:uid.
1 ~f. The cost of rntorinr., pem:onen, co,·on,nt on my
l,nd should be amoro,I la)· the >g,,nc,/o,g,oi,,rion
issuing th<: co,en>n<
l9c. I "-"Ould KOT can,aclcr onrcri,,g, permanent
co,·rn.n: under >M circum,=ce~
12. Pb,e ock 'True" 01" 'F,J,c' a, "Not 5uro' ilioul

,.,.1,,

17. D,J )"U =rt =e!'"< oar fin1no.il '"Pl""'fbonofit, to
a1ndernh n><ure con!tt\<a,jon wmk on you, hr.d from
o,pru,a,ioo or d=p,nment before ym, enior<d •
ent C0\'01!><!! on ·our l;u,d.'
18. How srroagly do )OU :,grcc or diugcec U'ith ti,,
fulk,,,,ing ""cm""" (•-f) in the nblc below "" ttflecting
<he opmi~n You hdd ,bout the neod !D srtk >»istan«
,...hen cntorin 1 -"""'""' "'''"''"'·

anr

lSb ! could ho,c lud more cnthu,i»oc to cn«ring •
p=nonent ,o""'""' on mr i,nd if th=,.-., ,omc NONfinanci,J n,cq;ru,ion b)· st>.te md lo,;,! go,·.,,,ment of m;
effort<

,o "'""""' "-""""

!Sc [ bclic,1:d ,he cmt of on1<nng , permanent co1·cn:uit
on m; Wld should be <<>'"e=l b)" the ,w,c-,·/ o,g,nlmion
is>Ulll.g the cos-en.nc

20f. l_,..ould NOT con!ider • perm,non, coYen>n< rndo,
on,· <lfcum•ur.cc,

Ocm>'-"'"' co,1:n>n1>.
20,._ Con,m-;rion of n>turo on your prop=y h»
b<:nofits to\'"" and to ,he pubbc. Do you con,id« thc
peblic to h,oe ,ny ,c,pon,ibility for the co,t ineu=d
in conserv.cion on )"our pmpert;?

21>- Con,c"-,cion of n,rurc on you< property h>< boncfits
to pcm ,nd to the publl·.. Th> yo., cnruider the public to
h,.n: ony ro,poruibWr,· for the co,t mcu=d;,,

19,. Consc=Oon of n>turc on
prop«ty ha, ben<fi<>
)'OU ,nd to tho pubk Do )VU con<kkr ,he public to
h>~e =r =pons,hili<, lo,
in,:u,red in
coruen--.Oon on)""' prnp<rl)1

20b. If YES,.,.;.,, percentage of ,he cost of""'""'
consc=Oon on)""' l:md do }'OU ooru;d« ,hould bo
,;<,s<r<d br th, publ,,'

2lb. !fYl'..S. what p«<=tog,, of the =st of''"'"'
con=tion M J'Oor 1,nd do )"" con<ider should be
co,"CtOO br the pubLc?

21. fo your opiruon. wlut ,orioru o, policies c,n ,he
,ate g<,.emmon, pu, in pl>c< to rnoke i< m:,n,
r,,.~=bk fcr< !ondhold= to '"'"' pctm>no:nt
cos=onto fur "''""' con=-.tlon nn their 1,nd>

o, In you, opiruon. "·hat ,a,an, or pofo« ,hould th<
Sr,t< go,,-.emrnent ;,, "'ho« 1ucl.dictlon )""' propcny lie>
pu< in pbcc to nuke it mort0 favounblo fo, !2.sdhold<n to

l >b. !fYES. "·hot!"""""£< oftOO cost of n,ourc
rnn=rion on roor !..,cl do you con;ider ,hould be
•.<r<crcd br the public If )"U "'""' to rn,cr a pemunrnt
oo,·en:int on ""' l,nd tod,s.
W. In j'OUf op,,,;on, "'"" ,ction, or poi.:,« "'1 the ""'
f,m"emmon! put m pl= '" rn,~e it mo"' fO\-ou,,J,k for
Jmdholde<S IO <nt<r pc,=rnl CO<en:tnt< for n>Nr<
can>«nrion on their bnd?

co«nmt

""

20. D; )'OU ""' m:<i,1: "")" financi,J ,uppon/b<:n,fa co
undorukc n..tur< «>ns«;'>rion wmk on JOU< !ond from "".'"
of!l"ll',tion <M"dcp,rtrne,,t befor,: )"" entered a f=dl<ffll "''""''"' or fuod-mrn c011:n,nt on \'Our Tmd'
21). How ,rrong!r do )VU agree or Jis,gw:: "'-ith the
f<,U.,..ing '"'""'"'' (>·fJ in the <>bk bdow >< rtne<ting
j'OUf opiruon about the n=I ro seek »,.i•t=cc .,-1,c,,
"""rin" •
ont ""'"''""'t
20c. Prnn,nent con:n.nts ,hould cornc '>>th , rncoharu,rn
foe cornpens,ting fo, Jo» of funm: producci,·, u,e of mr
,cco of 1,nd.
20d. Noo-fim..oci>l n:cogrutlon bntoto and locd
g,,vommcnt of mr dfort, 10 ..,.;..,...., ""'"e "'"uld b< •
»grufieu,, "=F' rn moo,--,tinp; me ,o =tor• p=n=«lt
coven=• on m,· hnd.
20e. Tho cost af <ntering • pcrrn,non, co,·rno.~, on mr
Wld >hould bo cooe,od by ,he ,gcncy/org,ru.,,Uon is>Ulll.g
the co,·on.nc

""°'"""'°"" on rou, prnp=y?

cc,cr pcnruul<n< '"'""""" for ,utur< <ons..,..tlon on
th,fr!,rul>
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22. In your opinion. wh>t octlon, o, policie< ,hould the
loc,l go,emn,.,,,. ;,. whoS< juri>d,a,;,o your propeny
li<> put in pbc< 10 m>ke it"'°"' f,,,ouroble fo,
bndholdcn ro <fll<f permom,,r m,-.nam> fllturt
roll>CfV2Don on thcir !mil?

:1.3. In you, "F;ruon, what actlom °' policie, ,hould the
!oalg,n·=unent in who,e iurisru<non your propcny hes
put in p!:tce o, ,=ke it more fa<ou"2ble for lmdholdcr, to
enlfi p<mU!l«lt c,;,scn>nll for IU<Uf< con=tion on
their bnd?

:1.3. !n wh;.t yarwere 1-ou bom?
Z4. Arc !hen: ony comment> you "'""kl !Jke to make
about ""f oilier ;,.,.,,,. «hcing na:ure coru<tv:1tion on
I ~ci ...10!.nd,>M/o,
anen1co=.artto?
!O.. Do J-OU atttt0tly h;.vc a =ag<m<nt ;gttent<nt
O< ""'""""'

21. In your opm;oo, o,fa, action, or policico ,hould the
Joa! go=cnt U, "'ho>< jurudiccion )'OU< pmpcrt)' lie>
pui in p!,ce to m>ke it more fa<our.tble for J,ndholders ro
em..-pemun<nt co,·«unt> na,ur,: conse<\"'-tion on thci,
land?
22. In ,.,,h,t f="=' )'OU born?

:15. Ar< thrn: "')" """'''"""' )-OU "-ould bk< 10 ma< ,bout
""}' mha jo,ue,; rilitittg n>Nrc con=>">tloo on private

land,,

on,n, '"'"""""· U>Cencivcs and/or

,.;,h """""' party >imed "'"-'"""

ron><r>"'-tlon on your prop<nj~

ll!lY<> 11
12\No 11
ll(li) If p>u h;.ve m>d<: u,qwrk> abour pernunen1

-,..

23. ,\,e there '-"Y comment> )-OU "-oold like t<> rnalo: about
anr oiha ;,..,.,. ,ilinng nature <on="'-tion
pn,ate
land,.
en, roo<n>n", m,enti,es and/a,
·r,?
Sa. Bcfon: J"" en,ened , p,:nn,ncr11 co,·c,iant on ynur land
dtd )-OU"'"' h>,-c • fix«l·l<rm con,er,-,,tion >gre<m<nt o,
fucd-<= CO\'cn,nt on ynu, bndf (Pb,e Tick o, circ!e
the
rn1,cia1e,o,,w,n,e
5,_
llefore fD'' <n<<r<d ,
co,,:,,,m Of\
J"l>Uf land. did you hace ony fixed-,=n ~ " ' '
,g,=nent mc<o1,:nu,t ._.;rn >nothe:, p,ny ,Urned ot """'"'
<0>=<'-"'-tion on -,,ur nro
~

°"

i''""'""""'

ro,-=aou for notm< conservotion. to who=> the
inquir,· di=tcd?

5b.

IF YES, Pl=c pro,-idethe following

mfomutlon bdow:
N,me of Ag<=mcnt L<ngth of time "!l"'<fflfflt""" to Wt
'"'""' Areaoflan4cav<ettdb1·d,e
ent
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Appendix 2. 2 S:unpk letter m.iilcd with the final questionn:tlre instrument

-'

C[Nt1\[

fOR

,coav,,,.,

"'""""'"'"'
Dote

Edith Cowsn University.
100 Joonda.lup Drive.
Joondalup,
Western Austrslio, (,027.
Dear Londholder,

RE: You• view• and opinion on nature conservation Cov,,nants on Private lands
Timnk you for taking the time to rc,d this letter.
The Centre for Ecosyitcm M,nogcmcnt ot Edith Cowan University (:If/A) with the assistance of-·(nam1 efmp~nin!, 011,anitalian)---, ore conducting a quc,tionn,ia,, survey w,i.h the "1lTI of collecting
the view• and op!nlon• of private landholdero about nature conservation covenants and
incentive, for norurc conservation.
You have been ,elected randomly ,unong m.~ny prit•atc landholdcrs in Victoria and Western
Australia for porticipotion in this ,rudy, which L• aimed at providing a better undcrstaJ\ding to policy
m.>kcrs, of the views of private lmdholdcr, on consef\·ation and covellllnts as mechanisms for
nature conscf\•alion. These arc alrcody in use in most StO!cs in Australia.

This srudy is ~lso the bosis of o PhD project being conducted by Mr. Thoma, Kabii under the
supervision of Dr. Pierre 1-toNilZ, Professor Al:m B!sck ond Dr. Jackie Alder of Edi!h Cowan
Univcr,ity.
I kindly rc9uest you 10 onswer ;all 9uestions in the eodoscd quesUonnoire. On completion of the
questionnaire, kindly mail it to me in Ilic enclosed pro pa.id, self.addressed envelop.
Please feel free to contoct me (Timmas Kabll) on collect coll Tel. OB- 9400 5861, or 10 contact Dr.
Pierre Horwitz on Tel 08 94005558 fo, any dorificotion or conunents on the qu<stionn,iire or the
ovcr.U srudy.
I wish to d1ank yau once ogain for your onlicipated suppo,~
Yours sincerely,

Thonu, Kabii.
Centre for Ecosystem Man•gemcl\l.
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Apl'('ndix 2. 3 S1mple letter mailed ~s a reminder to those th•t h•d not responded or returned the
mailed <.mt qucstionm1.ire instrument

Date

Edith CoWllll University.
100 Joondolup Drive.
Joondolup,
Westem Austflllia, 6027.

Dear Landholder/Proprietor,
RE: Your views and opinion on natur,:, conservation Covenant• on Priva«: lands
'n,i. lcttcr is a gentle reminder that we are otill lntcrcltcd In yourviewo that we uqucsted for in
the anached questionnoirc, which wo, mailed to you in Moy 2000.

·n,;, questionnoirc survey relates to

a nature comervation shldy which I om conducting with the
support of (nam, ef sNppurting •'lf'ni!alio11), and the Centre for Ecosystem Manogement st Edith
Cowan Univcraity (:Y,'A).

11,e aim of tbe survey is to collect the views and opinions of private landholders obout nature
conservmion covenant~ and incentives for nature comervation. In the pos.ibility thnt the
questionnaire did nor get to )'OU, ur has heen mispb.ccd, we have enclosed a copy of the same
qucstionn:tirc for your attention. If you have completed tl1io qucsrlonnalre before, p\eaoc do
not complete this one, bm ,end !t back to me with a note to t1,a1 cffcc1.
It is hoped the study with proviJc a better understandiug to policy m,kcrs, of the views of private
lanJho!ders on conservstion mechanisms for nature cunscrvatioo.11,cse arc olreody in use in most

States in Awn;ilia. it is also the bosis of a Ph.D. project being conducted by myself under the
supervision of Dr. Pierre Horwitz, Professor ,\fan Ill.ck ond Dr. Jockie Alder of E<lid, Cowan
Uni,·ersity.
Kindly complete the enclosed questionnaire and mail it to me in the enclosed prepaid, sclfaddrcsscd envelope by 20"' November 2000.
Please feel free to contact me (Ilmmss K.1biQ on collect call Tel. 08- 9400 5861, or to contact Dr.
Pierre Horwitz on Td. 08 94005558 for ony clarification or comments oo the questionrutire or the
overnll study.

I wish to thank you once agoin for yam snticipatcd support.
Yoms sincerely,
Thomas Kahii.
Centre for Ecosystem Management.
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Appendix 2. 4 Final Qucstionnoitc- Landholders with a porn,:mcnt covenant
Questionnaire Smvey on Penn anent Nature Conservation Covenants on Private
Land in
\Vestcm Anstmlh and Victoria
2000
For loodbolclc<S with a Pcrmoncnt Covcn,nl

Thls ourvoy i, to find out you, P"'t and p,e,cnt vie"" on n,n= con,orv:itioo, ,nd pcnn•ncn, co"°nmt> u
mech:inisnu fo, noturc conscrv,tion on your 1,nd. It ol,o ,eeks your vicu~ about incentilrc, ,nd cquiiy "
is,uco for cncouroging th< pbciog of pcrmonont n11urc conso,..,tion coveruints on your bnd.

Declaration ofConfidentiruity
The infonnation that you provide in thie questionnaire will be used
for lhe sole purpose of the Slated objectives of the study and WILL
NOT be given to any othct party. You will not be identified in the
study.
By completing the que~lioDDallc, you will be giving consent to the
researcher 10 use the information you provide fot the sole putpose of
the stud .
Ddinitioos of key tcnns used iu this questionnaire
11,c term 'pcrmoncnt covcn,nt' i, used 10 mean , volunc,,:y m,n,goment og«cmcnt in pc'l'ctuity thot i,
,n,ci,ed to oho bod title. blncl10g current ,nd fo,ur, ownm of 1ho bnd.
Fi"<d·tcrm cono«vation covon,..,I for n,curc con,crvatjon «fc,s to bindlng coo1u,·oilon ugroomcnt,
cnto,ed inco volun,.n]y by , bndholJer .,,d ,nocher porty fm • ,pccificd period time. A lixcd-torm
cov,n,nt i• att:ichod to thc lond tido.

or

Fixed-term coos<,..•ilon agree men! rcfm to • non-bjnding og;ocmcnl l>cnvocn • bndholdcr ,ncl mother
party fo, • spocif,cd period of time. It is ba,ed on mutual t=t to CO")" out th< Wm• of tho ,grcomcnt,
11" tcrm 'natu,c con,c,vation' '"" rcfc<> 10 '"" set .,;de ln their notuul condition on ;out lo.ncl to
coo,crvc ,omc notuul footurc, ,uch a, wcdonds, bushhnd, n.:,tivc vegmtion, 1Utivc g<o!!bnJ. They m.ty ,bo
be "'"" th>t ore • hobitot for r.LI<, cn<longercd or ,11lncrohlc pbnt ~' ,nimol ,pcci<s, ,rc,s ch,t ore u,;od "
transit rou!c by some nati,..: onim,ls, o, ""' 1h>t servo an impO<!>nt cnvimnmonto.l piotoctivc ,olo or'""
th•t scr•1e on important woe« 1,,1,ncc funccion, 10 the region. m ...ca, d,,r hO\'C other functions you might
con,jd« «lcv,n! fm hcdo,gc u,po,cs.
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j@i)iil, ...........................

foa10:orsiirvffi. /-·

/-2000

R?l-

To fill in the sur.ey:
Some questions rcqui,e wrincn responses, some tl,c circling of a number m pl>cingof" tirk in a
box next to the number thst conesponds to the smcment or listed comment with which you ~g-rcc.
Por most questions the ,equired ,espouse will be ,roted.
Plcsse answer all tl,e questions.

='="=•=·'='=="=·=T=hi='="="='='•=·'='=='"='='='="='='='="='sPc•='s'='="',=u=d=i=•==m='='='s'='=m=~='~----:=J

,I

fil. Whot type of farm do you m:m•gc?

(Pft<11t tit!. /ht ,rpproptfiJt, ~o.'<).

(') Cropping

LI

(5) Hobby farming

(:]

(2) Cropping/Sheep

LI

(6) Conservation pU<pOse

n

(l) Cropping/Sheep/Cottle {'_CJ
(4) Sheep/Conic

§

(7) Othm - Please specify

m

I .J

How long has this property been in your family?

(I) Undcr2yca,s

(I

(3) 6. 10 yc:us
(4) 11 . 20 years

lTl

(5) 21 • 30 year,

n

(2) 2. 5 years

(6) 31 • 40 years

(7) More th,in 4-0 years

II

tJ
r:J

II

~ What i, the total ,irca of your propcny in hec!'1res or acres? f;:~~cre, /

~-=~:.

'.Hectares

~ What proponion on your property is;
• Owned (P<ccholtl)? ~~%
- Rented or leoscd (f.,om Go,·ernrncnt, company orindiYldu,JJ? ..

!@. What "pproximatc si;c of your property (NOT leaJcd l:md) is

- Worked?

• Fallow?

i;..__)

~;==~
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Q How many hec13res of )"our property o.re under" permanent conservation covenant?
,-··so3 Ha
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§

A,e there other lilt"' of your bnd, ,i.pan from those covered under tl,c permanent covcn,.nt,

which you consider having n•rure comerv•tion ornatunl b<:ritogc features?
(1) Yes

(J __.....

(GotoQueslion4b)

(2) No

'[} __.....

(GotoQucstion4d)

(3) Not sure [ } __.....

(Go to Question

4dJ

(!3. lfYES, who.I conservation or ru.tunl hcritogc fcorurc, a.re on you prnpertyl(Pko,;e tick or
circle the •pprop,fatc response)

,,,

5mom/river

(2)

Wetlands

(4) Noufi'l<,>tass\ands

ll

(5) Othecrs (Pleo,;c Sp<:cify)

(]

(3) Noti,·cbu,h!and [-.l
f!g. \l~iot size of your propcny (NOT lc ..cd l,.nd) do tl,e,e n1tunl features occupy?

Q Did your lond have• permanent covenontwhenyou acquired i!?
(\)Ye,

lJ

(2)No

i'I -

(GotoQ11cslion6)

llii}. How long have you had• pcnruncnt cownonton your property? :.~years
montl,s.

1§1.. Defore you placed• permanent covenont on your bnd, did you hove any other conservation
ogn:emcnt or a Ji,:cd-te,:m covcnont on it? (l'l,an Tirl: or rirrle 1!11 appropria/1 mp,,m btlow).
(I) Yes
(2) No "[ }__.....
GotoQucstion6

Li

~ JfYea, please give the following infum11lion.
Nome of Agreement or
Covenant {eg. Lllnd fo<
Wtldlife,\grccment or
llcmnont Vegetation.
P,otcction Scheme)

Nome of department or
organisotion withwhlch
the agreement was held

Length of time
ogtecment w;is to Wt
(Years)

A,ea of

""'
••

covered by
og:rccment

'"·'
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~· Ploosc tick 'I'rue', 'False' or 'Nm•=' to the follo ...ing sl<ltements (o-f) below.

o). Before I ploced • ponnancmcovonomon my land I anticipotcd retaining
ownership ofmy p,opcny in the family in the future?

Tru,

Fsdso

b). Before I placed a pcrmooent co,·cnnnt on my land I anticip,tcd ,ctainlng
the management of my property with.in the family in the future?

Tru,

Fsdsc

,). Before I placed a pcnnancnt covenant on my land l was aware of the

Tru,

FsJsc

d).] would ,ijll have placed a pcrmonc11t covcnont on mf lond if regulatory
restriction, on clearing of native vcgctntion did nu c:cist.

Tru,

F"1u

,). I would NOT have placed o permanent covenant on the conservation=•

Tru,

False

,Nru

N,,
'""

option of entering a fucd·tenn conservation ogrccment insteod.

Nru

•=

of my land if! wos convinced thlt oltcring them for•gricultuntl production
would bring greater economic ,ctunis than they cu,,cntly do.

Q. I bclic,·cd the cost of entering o pcrmoncnt covcn,nt on my land should be

Nru
sure

Tru,

['olsc

covered by the •gency /organisation issuing the covenont.

------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------·13,, \'Vhich oftl,c followitlg statements bclo,v (labelled a,m) best describe 7our one primary and two
occo11dary reasons for having retained ~,e prcocnt conservation ,rras onrourpropcny BEFORE
you pbced a pcrnmncnt covcnont? (l'l,as,indirolt one primary rrasM f:i wn'h'n.i (I) in th, boxntxf /o tb,
1/alrmmt, and writ, (2) in olh<r boxu lo indiM•yom .,ccond;,ry rc;,so!'s.

(a) !'or seasonal b>razing.

n

~) For scenic roa<ons

(b) For .cucotionol use.

[l

(•) For soil sol.inity control

{c) Fo, future agriculturn! use.

0
C1
[. i
I.I

UI

(d) To suppon wildlife conscrvction.

(e) l"o preserve native vegetation.

(D To oct as wind break or buffer.
(Jl) To oc, os a wildLife corridor

u

u

n

Co,, of clearing for cropping or
pasture was not cconomicol

fr]

0) For shade and shelter fo, stock

El

0

l'rnvi,ion of fresh w.itcr.

n

(m) Othe,s {please specify).------------[)

------------------------------···- -····------ ····-----· ---------------------------

Q In tlic period DEFORE you placed a pumo.nem covenant, did you carry om OJ>y activity to
maintain'" enhance the conservation"'"' prc,c,,ton your land? (P/,m, tirk 1btnpproprial1
mj,on11 b,/,,u}
(1)

Yes [ 1 (Please stote the m:lln activities carried out)
(i) .•

(ii).
(2) Nonel']

-+

Go to Question 9

'§l IF YE5, opproxiinately how much money and time did you spend on the up·kcq) of the
nature conservation :ueos in the last two years before you entered a covenant on your
land?
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B, 1n the period before you pbc<d a permanent covenant on yow: land, were )'OU a member or did
you support any of 111• following or other ruiture conscrv:nion gmups/organi,;u!ons?
(Pf,,,,, tirk all /be rilnur,f onu).

(')

Lind Conserv,Lion Group.

(2)

G,ccmng Australia.

Il
II

(')

Land for \Vildlife.

IJ

(')

Nature consei;·oLion group (eg. IVi,\if,'ou~rso~'r!Y, Bird! Au,/n,/i,1, N11!J1rolist

(5)

Othm- (Pl,.,,, SpmJ,).

(6)

I wos not a member ond I did not support ,ny comcNaLion group/organisation [·)

(/,,b, Amtru!,',10 Con11n,i1iort Foundation. Con,m'<llion Co11nd~.

Section B : This aection seek,;; your 011inioo on lhc use ofpcrmaocot covenants for
D-'tnrc coD>1c1Vatioo on private lands,

fill DefoN" you entered a voluntary permanent covenant on your land, how importmt
was the following issues (•-•) in dmnnining your decision lo pbce a pcrrn:m<nt
covenant orr your UIT<ll (U1t th, fa/1,,i;ing Na!, 1-6 k!,w to m,,I:,J~J/r rulinjJ.
I, /Jefi,ii1,t, r,.·or l"'f>"rl,1"1.
4. Proba/,fy i,.p.naat
2. Pr,ba/,fy 1"0rl1,1portanl.
f. Defi•il,!J rmf~r1anJ
6. Dr:! no/ amn:1/r ii
J.1"Mr11/

•

Whether I w<>uld receive !ong-tcrrn manag,,mml advice on conservation.

b

\X1,cthc. thc,o would be inca,ased public recognition and appreciation of
con,cNOlion ,·aluc, on my bnd.

'

•

"'

5

•
•

''

2

Whether" pcrmancm cove rum would provide gte1'cr 1ssur;u,rc for longtrnn nature conmvaLion th:m under the orhcrconsc<Vation
agr<cmcnts.

'

2

3

d

\X11ether by cmcrinr, s permanent co,•cnonl I would recei1•e some Ot\·
going fmoncial support W cany out the ncccssory conscNaLion work.

'

2

3

" '

'

The nrg-.utis>Lion with which I place a pcrmmentcovcnom should be
mclependcnt of Govunment.

'

2

3

'

231

2

3

5

• •
5

5

5
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@I. How much did the following st,itcd 1eoson, {a-Q influence your decision to place a permanent
covenant onyourbnd?

I.
2.
J.

Mud,

Very mu1h.

4. A /ill/,
J. Nola1all

Af•ir<1111ou•I

6.

1iCk or tin:!,

0/lt

rdllilf,

on t/,, sraft

Don '1 know

of /.6 far ,arb of th ,tatemmts

bt!ow.
a

b

Ir,,mvinccd tbere wcre nootbcr equollycffectivc mechanism, tban
If

1

'

l

4

5

'

1

'
'

l

4

5

'

;

4

5

'

penrumcnt covcnom, for promoting tbe lonr:-tcrm nature
conservation onpti,·ote land,.

The presence ofndghbours or friends hsving a perm.anent
covenant on ,imilsr nature conservatic,n srcos os mine.

'

l'clt tho.le wtre economic gnicis to be rcilised in the future by
using a permanent co,-.:nant as a long·to.10> n.,turc
conscrvotion mcch,nism on my bnd.

1

<l

Convinced n permanent rnvenont w,s an effective mechanism for
present or fnture s,hnity conuol mcasur, on my land.

1

'

;

4

5

'

'

Viewed pemiancnt covenant., os an opponunityto ilemon,ttntc
to other, die impotL111cc oflong.tenn nature conse,v:,.Uon Oil
private l,nJ.

1

2 l

4

5

'

r

Conccmcd about a likelihood of tbe conservation ore as being
:iltcrcd by future owners or managecs of!his land.

1

'

l

'

5

'

filB. Place the obovc slJtcd rcnsons (•·Qin tl1cir order ofimpo,tance hyv;riting 'l-6'for the
highest impomncc to die lowest impo<Uncc in tl1e boxes,

1£1. To what extent did the following concerns (a-b) influence the si%e of
the conscNation area on which you pbccd a pcnnancntcovenant?
I.

4. Ali1tl,

Vto-M.,,h

2. M•d,
J. Afdiramnun/

Ti<k ~r drrfl om roting,

5. Noto/all
6.
011

Don'IKl!ow

IIM trait of/ .(jfar tad, of lb, 1/a/1111tnl1 btfow

a

Conccmed about ~ po"iblc lose in m.ukct value of my property as
• ,csult of cnt~g a permanent covenant on my land.

'

3

4

5 6

b

Concerned about cmetirig any con,ervation arraogcment that
would pl,cc some pcrmancnt ruttictiom on the use of the
conservation ..,ca,.

2

3

4

5

6

"=::==.==-=···=··-=·····=···=--·=·--=··========;;;;;;:~;;;;;;-~~~~
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Section C: Thie section is about social and economic issues relating to the
management of your property.

~ At the time you ploced a pennarn:nt covenant, how nuny people (includttg family) worked on
your propeny on;

(•). Salaried full cirru, basis?

(b) contro.ct worker,?

(c). Salaried pm time basis?

(d) non·paid workers?

IBJ. Whlchof the followingelltcgori,i best describes your approximate tot.ol inoomc bdmc mu,
derived from your property (including lcoscd
covc,unt on yo11r land? (Tirk ONE only).

=••) in the year you ploccd a pmruwent

fl
fJ

(1) None

( ,J

(5) $100,001 m $200,000

(2) 525,000 odcss

l.I
l1

(6) $200,001 to $300,000

(T) $300,001 and more

n

[ ]

(8) Wi~ihold/Don't know

L'.}

(3) $25,001 to

sso,ooo

(4) $50,001 to 5100.000

@. Whkb of the following eategorios beat describes your approxim,tc toblinoorne bofo,c t:nes,
derived from ,011rces OUTSIDE i·our p,ope,ty in the year you placed a pemmncnt covenant
on yo11r land? (Tirk.ONE only).

(I} SJO,OOOodcs,

LI

(4) S50,001 to$70,000

\2) $10,00J to $20,000

[I
[ .J

(5) 570,001 and more

(6) Wi1hhold/Don't know [.I
-----··-----·-.. ----- -- -Which of the following best describes the approxim.otc total expenditure on your prnpcrry
(including leased auco) in the yeau before you pbccd a pemianent covenant on rour bnd? (Ttrk
ONE only).
(3) $20,001 to $50,000

§

u

n

---··-·

,,,

ll

(5) $50,001 to$100,000

$10,000 or less

II

(0) $100,001 ;111d mmc

l'l

$10,00\ to $30,000

ll

(7) Withhold/Don't know

(\) None

(<) $30,001

(0

550,000

- --·--·-·-

LI

LI

u
u

-- --·------ ·---------

~ - Did )'OU have a debt on your proputy at the time you p!,.ccd a permanent cov=r oo yow:
Lw\1
(!)Yes

l:J

(2) No

"'

(J-(Go to Qucslioo 18)

Appendices

ffig lfYES, In which of the following categories did your debtwount fall?
(') $10,000 or less
(2) $10,001 to SS0,000

El

{b)

$300,001 to $400,000 [)
(7) $400,001 to $500,000 I l
(S) $500,000 and more
Il
(9) Withhold/Don't know I l

n

(3) $50,001 to $100,000

t'l

(<) SI00,001 to $200,000

[)

(5) $200,001 to $300,000

Ll

~ At die time you placed a penruu1cnt covenant on your l:md, what proportion of the debt
was ,crviccd by revenue derived from the ptopeny? (!'/"'" lirl:. or<irrf, ONE on!>).
(l) None

(iJ

(4) between 51% snd 75%

(2) between 1% nnd 25%

CJ
GI

(5) between 76% to 100%

(3) ,,~,., ,,, ~d

so%

H1
lfil

,,,•.
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Section D =lhle Bcction lo an \bout yout views on the neceB•ary ani•tance 10 enter
Pcnnanent Covenanlll

§

Did you ever receive any financinl supp<>rl/bencfits to undcrt..kc n•turc comervalion wo,k on
your land from any oigonisalion m dcp,nment before you pl.aced a pcrm:tnent covcruint on
your land?
(1) Yes,oncc [J
(2) Ycsmmcth,noncc
No
t:{

r1

(~)

1!2]. How ,uongly do you ag,ce o, disagree "~th the following s1atcment, ~~-b) about how
you felt obout assistonce for entering• permanent covenant. Choose your ,cspon,c
fmm the list of ~~cw, provided in numbcis 1-6.ond lirk or r,"rc/, Jh, nNmb,r in /bi ba.v

wbilh trJ1Wjnml, raJWlf opinion.
I.SlrrmJf>'ag,,,
2.Agm
J. N<t1/J,rag,,, nor (Oia,;m

5. SJron!J!,· di,"!!''

6. Undecided/don't
know

4. Di,"!."''

The statcmcnta arc, In the neriod before I o!oce d a ncrmancnt covenant;

•

I could have placed more :l<Cal of my land under• pcim:mcnt

b

I could h,vc pbced more land under • pennanenl covcnont if

covenant if there ms some compcn,at.ion forthe lirnh::ulons of
use of the lond orcas covered unde, a covcnont.
ih«ewas some NON-finandolrecognitio11 by St<tc and Locol
Governments of my efforts to conserve n,iure.

'

2

;

4

5

'

'

2

;

'

5

6

§3. Conscivation of n,ture on )"Our property hos benefits to you ond to the public. Do
you consider the public to have ony responsibility fo~ the cost inc'1<ted in
conservation on )"Ora property?

(I) Yes

[]

(2)No

[}

0) Not Sure ["}

~ lfYES, wbot pc,ccnl:lgc of die cost of n1t11<c conscrv:>tion on your bnd do you
consider should be covered by the public if)"ou were to place a pc<rn:u,cnt covenant
onyo11< land today?

(Pf1au lirk ordr./, !Pr q,prripria/1 mpom1)
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~- In your opinion, what actions or policies can the State go,·crnmcnt put in plalcc to make it
more favourable for l.andholde<S to p!acc a permanent coveru.nt fo, nature conservation on tl,r.ir

..,.,

··"'

§

In your opinion, what accions or policies shcukl the Local govcmrnent in your
jurisdiction put in place to m.ske it mo"' fovourab!c for hmdho!den; to enter permanent
covc=1ts nature conservation on their land?

Section E: This section is for information aboui you and your comments
~- !n wt,r year were you l>om? ,•- - ~ ~

------------------------------··------ ----·····------------------------------·----(El.Arc thcte i.ny comments you Mc encouraged to make ab<,ut ruiyothcrissues relating nature
conservation on priv:itc lands, pcrrn:mcnt co,,en.mts, incentives am.I/ or equity?

Thank you vci:y much for your valuable time,
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Appendix 2. 5

Fin;.] Questlonnilic- LandholdotS without any covcnmt or agreement

Queslionnalf~ Sutvcy on Permanent Natmc Coosetvation Covenants on
Priva1ciLand in Wcsteni Australia and Victoria

"""
For Laodbolders WITHOUT any fonn of agreement or covenan1
This survey is to llnd out your past and prescm views on noture conservation, and permoncnt
covcnonts as mechanisms for nature con,e=tion on your land. It also ,eelcs your vie"''' obout
incentives ond eqllity as issue, for encnuroging the placing of permment natuie conmvotion
mvcnonts on )'OU< land.
Declaration of Confidentiality
11,e infonnation that you provide in this qumionnoir,, will be used for the sok
purpose of the ,tate,l objectives of the study ~nd \VIU.. NO"f l,e given to ,n)"
other party. You will not be identified in 1hc ,1udy.

By completing the qucsrionmi,c you will be glvlng consent to the researcher to we the
infonnatlon you provide for the 1olc purpo~c of the B1udy.

[\t,~\~ous of key terms used in this qucstimmairc
The term 'pcnnarn:nt cove11am' is used 10 mean a .-oluotary m,nagcmcnt ogreemem in perpetuity
!hat i, Mt•dml to J,c lond title, binding current ond future owners o(the lond.
Fixed-term conservation covenam for noturc consc"·ation refers m binding conservation
agreements cmcr<d into voluntarily bra landholder ,nd another pany for a specified pcciod of
time. ,\ focd-term covenant i., anach,d to the bnd title.
Fixed-term conservation agreement refers to• non.binding agreement between 11 lantlholdcr
ond another porty for a specified period of time. It i, blscd on mutual trust to ca.rry out the terms
of the ogreemcm.
11,e term 'nature eon,crvation' .,.,, refers 10 a!C>S ,ct o,idc in their ~•rural condition on your
L,nd to cmi,crvc some nam,;il feotures such as wetbnd,, bushlond, native v,gernu"on, n,tive
gnssland. 11,ey may ;ilso be area, thot arc a habitat for rare, endangered or wlnerablc pL,nt or
onimol specics, are,s d1at arc used o, transit mule by some native mimal,, or areas thor ,e1\"c an
importoot environmental protccti\-e role or arcss th:u serve an imp<>rtant "'"ater balance functions to
the ,cgion, or a<cas that h.wc other functions you lruj\ht consider rolovant for heritage pruposcs.
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11§§1 ..................

@ate·orsU§l--/----/-2000

~~L

To fill io the survey:
Some questions aq,Utc written ttsponse,, some !he circling of• number or placing of a lkk in a
box next to the number thor corresponds to the siaccmcm o, listed comment with which you ,g,cc.
f.or most questions lhc requittd ,cspon,e will be stared.
Please answer all the questions.

I Sectionk Thia section ia about you[ ptoperty and its managem~nt.
1. What type of farm do you manage? (Pka,, iirdt flit ,rppmprial• an,~rr

(. I

1. Cropping
2.

3. Cropping/Sheep/Cattle
4.

fl

5. Hobby f;11ming

n

C1oppi11g/Sheop

'7.

[·.1

Otl,ers - Please specify

.. .(

[I

Shcep/Caltfo

lJ

Comervation purpose

~ How long has this property been in yom family?
(!) Under2yc.~rs

t:1

Ll

(6) 31-40yc=

LI

(3) 6-lOycm

rn

(5) 21 - 30 years

t:J

(2} 2 - 5 years

(7) More than 40 years

tiJ

Li
-------------·------------------- ---------------------------------

(4) 11-20ycars

s -----------------

What i., the total area ofyoor propcny in hectom orncm?

r.-~.

-~:'Acre,

I F::'_)Icctam

eQ. What proponion ofymu: propeny is;

- Owned (Freehold)? ;.........;%
- Reined or leased (F,om G~vcmmcnt, comp,n)" or indi,.1duo!)? ..~ %

!E1- Wliot approximate size of)·oor property (NOT leased !and) is

- Wotked?

'.::."~'.,'. Ha

- Fallow?

'.,~:"~:.Ha

1!3- What consentation fe,tores arc on you propcrtyl{Pka,, tfrk OR ri,rl, lbt. appropriat, rr,po,m)
(5) 011,crs (Please ,pccify)

(>) Strc•rn/rivcr

[)

Weiland,

LI

!O

[3) Native bu,h land

I]

[4) N,tlve grasslands

iJ
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l!H, What 1ize of yow: property (NOT leased land) do these conserv:11ion fe:itures occupy?

~· Which of the following statements below O•b<Ucd tJ·m) best describe yom primacy ,u.son ,md
sccond:uy reason, for having reuincd these conservatio;i oreu of your property to d:ltc,' (P/,as,
i,rdkol, one primary muon f:I wrilir.g (I) in th, hox noxl lo t/>1 Jfa/'111tnl, a11d .,,;1, (2) in ollxr' boX<I to
,iidkat, yourm,mddry "1JJ0111, For seasonal gmzing.
[,j
o) For rccmtions! use.[:J

i)

Cost of clcMllg for e<opping
or pasture wos not
economical

j)

As shsdc ond shelter for ,mckt;'}

b) For future sgricultuml uic.[.]
c) To 1;upport wildlife conservation. [.]
d) To preserve nativcvegetotion{}

k) Provi!ion of fresh wau:r.0

e} To oct ~,•wind brc,ks or buffer.(.]

l)

g}

Oth<!rs (ple,se specify).---

-·----------·- m

!) To oct ns" wildlife corridor.[•.]
For scenic rcasonsLJ
h) For soil salinity conuol(:'.J

(I
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S file you a mcmbei ot do you suppo<t ony of tlie following n:irurc consetVlltion
groups/ 01g,misations? (Pk= lklc or drrk ,r/J tht n/m,nt ants).
(1) L~nd Conmvation Group.
[']
(2) GmningAustrali:L
rJ
(3) Land for WildLifc.
(J
(4) Non11e conscivation group (cg. !Vilifj!1JJvtr Sadt!J, Bird,A11Jlmlin, N11/11rr,/i,1 Cillb,
A111/r,;/i11n Con,rn'<llion Foundation, r:omrn'<llion Cound~.

rJ

(5) Othm -Pt,as, ,p,rifr~---------------

(6) lam not a mcmbc, and ! do not ,uppon MY conscivation eroup/organisotion.
~ Have you carried out any activity m maintain o< enhance the consc,vation arco.s of your

property in the last two yearn? (Pltill, Tirk or Grrk :he r:rppmpriaft mpons, bt/o:Jlj.
(2)

Yes

tJ

(P!r<J1t1lal,IIMmalna,ti,iri,rn,m"•d1J11~.

(i) ...
(ii) ....
(2) None l:ii--J,.

Go to Question 8A

I'I

IF YES, approximately how much money and time did you sperul on the nature
consew.1tlon are,,, in the last two ycntS?
·

{if.".';·.<.~'-.'.

''

oUars

(ii)timc;::·~~::;

h:..

Q

Do you currently
a marugemcnt ogrcemcnt o, covc!Wlt with anothc, party aimed at
nature conservation on your property?
(2) No
[]
(1) Yes
U
IF YF.S, plc>Sc provide the following inform:11ion below:
Sizcofland covered by
Period of the
Name of Agreement
Agreement (Yem) ;\greement (H1l)
(Per exampl,: Lmdfar ltli~ft, Rmmanl
v.~ /a/ion Prollltion S,btme

............ -·-

-

-··-·-···· -··-

-

,_

-
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.S.l!ctio_n·B:

:··Thl1 iicctfon ~~ell:,;·your _opln!On: oti tJi.i,. U!c' of v01.;'ntiuy p<'_rmari~.\_lt
·1·
1
COvcnanta f::.i-'o~tutc ,;o11.1cm>.ti11119U.Pii~le:'J;,,iiao .--- · ' -'. -

-, -, · · ·-'::

WHAT IS A PERMANENT COVENANT?
The following io a broad definition of a covenant for nature consefl'atlon.
A p«m:mont covm,nt for cu,ure conmv,tlon is o m:inog«:im, ,grmne,.t =tued volun1:1rily by
a bndhol<l« ond another party (,.c pciv>tc org,ni'1tion or govemm<nt department), It i,
perm:,nently ,mched to the bnd title ,nd i, therefore bindmg on culfent on<l fu!llf" owner, of that
l>nd. Dy entc1ing a co,•cn,nt the bndholdcr Undett:,.kes to con,e.-,..c and protect natuoo (qi. rurive
,•egctotion or wctl,n<l•) in a spocificd o«• oflond, in occordancc ,.ith ,n og«cd m,n,gcmmt pion.
The party with whom the covrn,nt i, ent<«d often pro,ide some support for carrying out ond
nuintaining the con,crv,tion ,,,o,k.

ihl. Please ufkor nnfr 'True' or 'Fn!se' or 'Not Sure' fo,coch of the foUowing st,tement
'

-Statcm~r.u

True

Fabe

I hove heard about fixcd-tcrm covenants (:ilso c.illed fuccd-tcnn
man.a<>P,nent a
ments\.

"!'rue

F,l,o

I have inquired about permanent covct1ants for nature consefl'otion in the

Truo

Fol,e

1'rue

>ilio

Nm
Sur<

Truo

False

Nm
Sure

Truo

Folse

Nm
Sure

'!'rue

Fol«

A

I have NEVE!t hc.1ttl about o permanent covenant for nature consetvation

•

bcf0<e now.

c

,,st.

D I :unfamiliar with the awilablc pcnnancnt covenant progrnm, for nature
conse.,,ation in the State.

E I know the procedures for entering a permonent notur~ conselVotion
covenant on mv !and.

F

l would like lo know mo,c about penn>nent nature conselVation
coven.nts.

G

I plan to ,crnin ownership of my property within the fiunily in the future.

H I plan w retain the management of mypropcrrywithin the family in the
future.·

Nm
Sure

True

F,l,c

Not

Su«

~ If you have inquired .,bout pennan<nt coven.wts for o.oture conselVlltion, to who~ the
inquky directed?-----···-·-··-----------If you have sr:ued tbot you arc familiar with pcrm:incm coverumt progr:un,i in your Sto.to,
please list the pcrmanent covenant prngr,nns with which arc you familiar.
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ffi'j. How strongly do you ogrcc or disogree with the foUowing ,tatements (•·i) in the table
bi.:low on penmncnt covcnmts? Chooseyouciespon,e from

the List of views provided

in numbLts 1-6.
l.

2.

l

Stmngl)' J,.,~rcc
Dis,g:rc,
Neith« ,grcc n.;, J1Sagrce

4. Agr<c
5. St<ongly •gr<c
G. Don't knou•

For each st.1tement please 1ick,r cirdc t/Je number t/,at coacsponds w your opinion.

A. There arc more effective mech:mis,ns otlicr thm voluntary

123456

perm.anent covenants fo, prnmocing the long-term norure
conserv,uion on privntc bi,d,.

B, I do not mind cnteringo comcrvolion omingemcnt thot would

123456

cnm,l pcrmoncnt restriction, on ,omc uses of the conservotion
land.

C. PJ.cing o pumanent c.oVCru!lll on my land would mo>t likely cou.c

l

2 3 4 5 6

1

2

3

4

S 6

1

2

3

4

5 6

it to lose in mukct vo\ue.
D. The norurc coruervot.ion feotures on my land ,,,ill be conserved
by the management thot "ill toke over from me even
WITHOU1' plocmg • vo!unmy pcrmon:m cuvcnmt on it.

E. I would prefer to divide ond sdl offchc arcos ofmy land witl,
conservation ,.,Jucs w • conscrv:ition·rnindcJ individual m
org:mi.sotion thon 10 personolly rru.n,gc it under• pcnn:inent
covenant.

F.

mr

I would only plocc a permanent covenant on
land with on
organisotion thst is independent of the Government.

G. I would ,eriou.slf consider a voluntory pcrm,.ncat cove.n,1nt just

123456

'

3

4

5

6

prior to sclling my l;111d to protect existing nature conservation
vnlues.
H.

I would be inclined to enter a permanent ,rnture
conservation co,·cn,nt on my lond if neighbouring
landholders or friends with ,irnilar noturol areas had
permoncm covenant on ~1eirs.

I.

Pcnrunent covenants are ~n effective mcclrnnism ,is
s,ilini,y control mcosurc, where it occur, on private
lands.

I,:.,_ .. ,., ..•.• -. :;,_

;

'
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SeCti_otl. .~:·

Tbie section .Is about soda! 11'1ld cConOinic·i~suo _icL1tlng to tlic
, m.\magcmeli.t ofyOut p!Opcrty.

ffil. How m:u,y people (inclllillllg fomily) wo,k on your property on/as;
(•)· Sobrbl full time bosis?

(b) Com,mworkm?

(e). Solari,:d p1<t time bo,is?

(d) Non-poid workers?

------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------(§. Which of the following categoric, hcst describe, youtopproximlte g,0,1 income, before wr.es,
derived from your p,opctty (u,cluding leased areas) in 1999? Tfr.l: ONE only.

§

(() Zem

[

J

(5) S,00,00(<o$WO,OOO.

[]

(2) 525,000 o<lm.

I.I

(6) 5200,001 to $300,000.

tJ

(3) $25.001 10 $so,ooo.

IJ

(T) $300,001 ond mo,c.

rl

(4) $50,001 to $100,000.

[ ]

(8) Wichhold/Don.'t know

[j

Which of the fu!lowin,; cntegorics best describcsyouropproximatc gross income before taxel,
derived from sources OUTSIDE your propeny in 1999? (Tid: ONEonfy).

J

(<) 5W,ooo odm

[

(2) SlO,OOt ,o $20,000

[J

(4) 550,00< <o 570,000
(5) S70,00I •nd mo,c

(3) $20,001 to S50,000

{-]

(6) \Vt~1hold/Don't know

cl

LJ
t::J

--------·--------·······--------------------------------···- ---·---------------------·IE]. Which of the following best describes the apptorimatc total cxpcniliturc on your property
(mcluding lcssc<larco) in 1999? (fid;. ONEoofy).
I.

Zero

[]

5. SS0,001 to $100,000

2

$10,000 or foss

[ ]

6.

3. $10,001 to $30,000

[j

7. Withhold/Don't know[ ]

4. $30,001 to $50,000

[]
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-------------------------------------------------------~ Do you rulve •

eu<<ent debt on your pmpcrty?

(t)Y<S

(2)No

lJ---(Go 10 Question 16)

~ IfYES, In which of the following cotcgorie, docs the debt o.mount fall?

lI

(') SJ0,000 or less

(<) $100,001 to ~200,000

ti
LI
l:-1

(5) $200,001 to $300,000

[]

'"

Sto,oot ,o $50,000

(') S50,001 to SI00,000

(0) $300,001 to $400,000

n;J

(I) $400,001 to $500,000

fill
lil
HJ

(•) $500,000 and more

'"

\Vidtbold/Don't know

~ Comide, the total income b.forc bl( in the last lin:incial year, Wh•t proportioo ofit did
you spend to poy your debt in that period? (firk ONE ant,).
(1) None

I]

(2) between 1% and 25%

Ll

(3) between 26% anti 50%

['.l

(<) Dc<=eo S>o/cood 75%

[I

(5) between 76% 10 100%

[1

Ste don D: Thio acctlon 111 abou!yourvlew& on !he nccc••aty a&•!atani:c-to cnt<'r Permanent
Covcwmts
· ·

filj. Hove youcv« rcccivcd financial support/benefits t<> widcrt.kc nature consen'l!tioo worl,on
your land from any organisotion or,lcpsruncnt?
(!) Ycs,oncc I)
(2) Ye,,morcthononcc fj

(3) No

(.1

[21. How strongly do you sgrec wid, tbe following srntcmcnts (a-Qin the table below about the need
to ,eek ossi,rnncc and benefits of entC!lllg a pcnnancnt covcnam?
)'Cur mpunnJnm, th, /i,t
C/J{)IJI<

ef oi<w1 prov!d,d fo numbers 1-6.,md ti<k or drrl, lh• number in th, box, whid, rom,p,wU,

1.

Strongly og,ec

2
J.

Agree
Noitberogrcc nor d~agr«
4. _ Dio,greo

5.

Scrong\y di..g=

fi.

Undecided/Don't kflow

toJ~Hropinion
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The 1to1\cmenCt arc·

A. Pcmunent covenants should come with ~ mech:mism of
compensotion for lo.s of futurcprodoc•ivc osc ofmy piece of
l=d.

I

2

3

4

5

6

••

Non·financiol recognition by State one! Local gm•c,nmcnt of my
effort, Hl cunscn,c noturc would be o oignificant step in
moti,·oung me to cmcr, cm·cnant on my fond.

I

'

3

·I

5

6

c.

Pre,cnc!y, I prcfor to nuintain the nature conserv>tion "'""" on
my lane! WlTI-IOUT the use of a pcriruu,ent covenant.

I

'

3

4

5

6

D.

The benefits of a permanent co,•cnant on my lane! ore NOT
apporent to me.

I

'

3

4

5

6

E.

The co,t of entering a permanent rovcn:ini on my lane! ,houkl
be covered by the •gcncy / organisotim1 issuing the cove""n~

I

'

3

4

5

6

F.

l would NOT con,<tk,rcntering ,spwnonent Co;•cnonc under
onr circun1'!ancc.

I

'

3

4

5

6

~· \VboL impomncc would you givt 10 ~':\ch of the issues (n-d) below, in deciding whether
to cmcr a voluntary pcrrmncm co,·enant on your !:ind? (Vu 1h1fa!lowin,g Haftr 1.6 bdow lo

m~h )'Ollf roling
\. Definitely import,nt
2 l'rob,bly impnrt•nt
J.Ncuor,I
t l'ro\,ahl)' NOi' imp.,ttant
5. Definitely N(lT ,mpomnt

6. No opiniu<l/Don'! know
Ji,k or cin·I, ont nllin• [(a/, / ,6 for Mh of//Jt r/al1mtnl! fa,dJ.

A.

Whether ! will rcc<'ive frequent long-term mnnagcmcnt odvicc on
consc"·ation.

U.

\\1,cther a pcmunem covenant ".;JI bring public rccngnition and
opprcc,ation of the cons~rvntion values on m)' l,nd.

c.

Whether a pcrrn,nent covcn,nt will assure the long- term mm.u:c
conservation

D.

v;1,rthcr by entering a permanent envenom I c,!\ recci,•c some ongning financial st-{lport tn carry out the neccs,;ry conscr\'Otion work.
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3

4

2

3

4

' '

3

'

5

'

2

3

4

5

6

1

5

6
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~ · Conservation ofnonu-con your prnpc,ty hos bcnefi1, to you Md to the pubhe. Do you
consider the public to h1'"e ony responsibility for the cos! incurred in conseryotion on your
property<'

(:!) No.()

(3) Not Sure.

t'J

~ lfYES, wlmt pcrc~Tit;go of tl,e cost of naiurc conservation on your land do you consider
should be covered by the public? (Pl,,,,, tirk. or drd, /IN ,,ppropn'at, rr:,pon!t)

lf!i! ·1~ 11· 10"13
j2j
·--····---····[!]

1u-2g,1.

DI

~'!,
(4}

~lo

Mi,
[6i

)SJ

-----···---········--·-··------··-·----·-

~I·

"1

~lo

~lo

!ill

I~

--·--------------

e} In your opinion, what octions or policies c,in the Stott: government put in pb.ce to nuke
it more fovounble for 1.u,dholders to enter pemunent rovcn:utts for nature conserv.ttktn
on the!, Lu,d?

~ ln your opinion, what omons or policies should the Local government, in whose
jurisdiction your property lies, put in place to make it more fo·ourobk for l:uidlioldcrs
to entc, pcrrru.ncnt covenoms for noture consctvuion on their bnd?

Section E: Thia 1cctio11 i• for informal ion about you and your comment.
~ In whot year were ;·ou born? ,•- - - -

eN, !uc thcic any comments )'OU would Like to make obout ony otheri,sucs reloting t<"l nature
consonration on privete lands wd/or pemunenr covenants?

Thank you very much for your valuable dmc,
Plca,e check to verify you have anowcred all q11coUon1,
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Appendix 2. 6

Fmol Questionnaire- Landholder, "1th• fixed-term covcnamor ,grcement

Questionnaire Survey 011 Permanent Nature Co~scrvJlinn Covenants on

Private land io West cm Ausualia and Victoria

woo
For Landholders with a fixed-term agreement or covenant
This sw1ey is to f,nd out )'OUC pan and present views on nature conservation, and permanent
covenant, as mcdmnism, for nature conscrntion on your land. It atso seeks your views about
incentives and equity ., issues for encour,gmg the placing of pcmunent nature conSCl'\"ation
covenants on your land.
Dedara1ion of Confidcntfaliry
The inform,tion that you provide in this questionnaire will be used for the sole
purpose of the ,med objectives of the ~tudf nnd Wl!.LNOT be given 10 any
other pany. You will not be identified in the study.

By comp!etlngthe quea!iannalre you will be givingcon•ent to the teseard,er to ll\1e the
information yon provide for the •ole purpooe of the study.
Definitions of key terms used in I.bis questionnaire

1,1

'

""d

·n,e term 'permanent covenant' is
to mean a V<'luntory mon,f,,emem ogrcemcnt in pe<pctuity
th,t is amched to d,e land title, bindUlg cu«cnt and future owners of the bnd.
Fixed-term conservation covenant for namrc conservation refers to binding con,crv~don
ogrcemcnu entered into voluntarily by a landholder and another p:,rry for a specified time. ,\
rc,ed-tcrm covenant i, attached In ch, Und tide.
Fixed-term conserw11on agrcemem refor, to a non-binding agreement between a landholder
and another pe.rty for a speci~ed p~no<l of time.his based on mum,! uust to carryout the terms
of the agreement.
11,c term 'nato<c conservation" areas refers to area, set aside in their natural condition on your
Und to conserve some noiurol feature, such o.s wetland\ bushbnd, nati,·c vegcrntion, native
gra,sland. They may ,lso b,: areas th,1 are a \.,him for rare, endongored orvulncroble pbnt or
animal ,pocics, ,,e.,s that ace used a, tron,>, route by son,c native onimal,, or ar,., that ,cl'\"e m
important environmental protccti'"c
that serve an important water bol,nce functions to
the region, or areas d,nc h,.·c other fonct.,,:; vou might consider rdovom for herit•gc purposes.

role.,,"''"

========· -·=========~

-

~
\17orldng together
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\§3, ..........................

tnatc'ofSunre)f- /-----/-2000 fO!-

To fill in the survey:
Some questions rcqufrc written responses, some the circhng ofn number or pbcing of a lick in a
box next to (.be nwnbc, that corresponds to the m!cmcm or listed comment wit!, which you agrrc.
For most questions the rcquircclre,ponsc will be stated.
Please answer all the quc-stinns.

! Section A:This section is aboutyourproperty and its management.
l Whot rypcof fanndo youmanngc? (Pf,,,,, rirc/1 th, ~ppropti,,1• ,mm~
L Cropping
I J

,,'

'!

2

Crnpping/Shcep

l

l

3. Cropping/Sheep/Cottle
[' ]
4. Sheep/Cottle
{]
5. Hobby forming
fl
6.
Conscr,,·,tion purpose J J
7. Otl1c<:1 - Please specify

................ [ J

'§. How long b<ls this property been in your family?
(\) Undcr2ycar> {J

(2)2-Sycar,;

(3) 6 - 10 yca,s
(4)\1-20years
(5) 21 • 30 years

l I

!)
(·I

l]

(6)31-~0rcars
[l
(7) Morcthan40yc:m I.]

~ What ls the corn! arto of your property in hccta<cs O( acre;? 2·::~~·'.;A«cs

/ ,l~'.:'..:)-l•cmcs

ffia. What proportion of your property is;
- Owned (Freehold)? ~ %
- l\cnted or leased (FmmGovcmmcnt,company or inilividu,u)i'.,L'.~~;7%

~ Wh,.upp,oximatc size ofyourpropc.rty (NOT \c:,scd !Md) ii;

- Worked?
• Fillow?

/

ix:·::

E::::Ha

~ Whatconsu;'ation fcstum n<c on you property?(Pk"-'tlidcOR drrk 11,tapp.,,prial, n.rporm)
1. Strcsm/ river
[ ]
2. Wctlw.ds

[ I
("]
Native gros;\ands [}

3. Native bush bnd
4.

5. Others (Plcsse specify) ............................................ .

,,
,,'

(!H. \'v'hat size of1ourpropeny (NOT lea;cd lond) do th<sc conservotion f<ocurcs occupyl

,,,,
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fil Please provide infomutlon on the fi><ed-tcrm voluntary C<Jnscrvotion agtccment which is
currently on your land by lilfu,g in the to.blcs below.

a

What is the name oft.!:o
Ag«cmcm?

b

Wid1 which dep:lflmcnt/ ogcocy i,
tbc ngtecmcnt entered?

c

\'Vhat is the duration of tl,c
•grccmcm? (in ycats)
T)'P"' of cnr,scrvatlon fca!Utc,
covered l,v the a >r«mcnt (J"ick)
Total a,c:1 in hcmrcs ofihc
conservation Ccoturc covered
!,a crncntlc
·bindill"?ITick

d
e
f

Sireom/
<iver

"

Wctl:mds

0

Ibush
Native
lnnd

I Notlve

lothcrs

l~,;;1ssland,

'

~- Which of the following s1aicmcnts below Oabcllcd a·m) best describe yourpriina.-y ond
sccond,ry reasons for having re milled d,e conservation areas on your p<opcrty DEFORE you
entered o fixed· term ronsen'1tion agreement or covenont? (Pl,m, indiralr one prim~,y reason IJ
writing (I} in th, bo;.· n,~110 th, 1/at,mml, and writ, (2} in othtr bo~-rt to ir.dirat, your ,eronda,y r:aso111).
(•) Por scasonol [:razing.

{b) For recreational use.
(c) For future agriculturo\ use.
(d) To support wildlife consm·,tion.
(c) To preserve nativcYcgcrntion.
(Q "ro oct a, wind brc,k or buff«.
(,:) To act as a wildijle corridor
(11) For scenic rcn,ons

(i) Fors oil salinity conuol
l,J
(ll Cost of clearing for cropping o, pasture
wo.s not economical
{' l
(k) Fm sh,clc and shdtor for stock
[ ]
(I} Provision of fresh water.
[ I
(m) Othe<s (please specify).··-·-----

<I

(I
(I

<I
<I
<I

(I
(I

···-·-··-··········---·····-··---··--[)
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-----------------------------·-·······--------------····---------------------------··-········----------

B- Jue you• member or do you ,upport any of the following norurc con,ervation
group,/o'l,'llnisations?

(!)
(2)
(3)
(3)

L1nd Consen-atiou Group.

(']

Greening Au,tclio.

l]

Land for Wildlife.

[]

Nornrc conser.·ation group (cg. IVi!dflo•?rSori,!J, Bird.rA111/mh'a, Nalum/i,t

(,]

Club, .,)111/ru/ian Coormvlion Found.1/ioo, Con1mv1ion CouM·~.

(SJ

Others -1'1,au Sp,rijy_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

~ Jo the period before you entered• fixed-term agreement or covenant on your l.nd, did you
carry out any activity to moin1ain or enhance the con,crvation ,uca, of your property? (P/taJt ti1!r.

the upproprialt rupo,m b.tow).
(3)

Yes (

J

~'lrau/i1tth,111ainacli1i1iuMrrirdo11I)

(i) .•
(ll)

(2) No[]

Go to Qucstion B

-

ff!!I

IFYES, approxim,ucly how much mo11cy and time did you spend on the nature
conservation area,; in the laot two ycorll before you placed a fixed-tern> co,·cnont on }'Out bnti?
;...----..,.-,dollors.
,-----------:Time (!n hours or dors)

!!!! Before you placed the ford-term conservation agreement or covcnom on your lald, did )'OU
anticipate rcwnlng ownership of your property within the family in the future?

(!)Yes

[.]

(2) Nu

tI

(3) Not mtain [.}

f] Before you placed the fn;cd-tcrm cousuvatim, agreement or covrnont on you, land, did you
,uiticipatc retaining tlie management of your property within tl,e family in the furnu:?

(I) Yes t J
(2) No
(3) Not certain (.l
Fl
---------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------··-··---------------···-------

250

Appendices

·seC'tion'·B':
.·. "' · -

Thie •eirfoi,. it:cks your.'opiniolion tl!C'u'8i: or'pe1nl..:Den·tc6ye1iw.tr1

,.Da1~1.iconaetV.. tioiionp1:v~ti:l.;iidiiJ-

· ·

' '

t"or.•

,. '

IIg Please circle 'Yu' or No' or 'Nol S1m'for each of the following Statement.
At tl,c time I entered a fix•d·term agreement or covenant I knew
about permanent cuvenam (i.e. mvenan ts in porpetuitr),

y,,

N,

I only placed a fixed-term conservation agrecn,ent or covenant on
my land because it was a requi,~mcnt fo, recci,·ing support from an

y,,

N,

I have inquired about p,nn,nent covenants for n,ture con,crvition
since entering the fo:,d-tcnn covenant.

y.,

N,

I ;un famili,rwith the bosic righl> nnd obligation, in managing bnd

l'tt

N,

Not1Nrt

Yu

No

Notn1rt

·.,

N,

agency or a permit lo dc,r other parts of my bnd.

under a pcnn,ncnt eovenant.

I know the proce,.es to follow for entering a pcnnonent covenant
foe nature comcrvatiou on my lond.

I would like to know more about permanent co,.•cnants for nature
conservation.

\

I plan to retain ownmhip ofmy property within the family in the
future.
l p!an 10 rem in the management of my property "ithin the fam!I)' in
ihc future.

y.,
y,,

N,1,,,,..

"',.

Na11Hrt

@I \Vhat importance would you g-ive to each of tlie !allowing Jssuca today in making a decision on
whetli« to enter a permanent covenant for nature conservation on your land? (Uu !ht
fall•willf, m1/tt f .(, b,!ow lo maky11r rr11ini).
1. Definitely NOT in,portan!
4. Prohabl1·iinportam
2. Probaoly NOT important
5. Dcfinitclr iinponant
3. Neutral
6. No opinion/Don't know
Tick or circle one rating on the scale of 1-6 for each nfthe issue statements below.
A

Whetb.er I would receive more frequent m•nsgement
advice on conservation thatt at present.

' '

J

u

Whether there would be increased public rccogtiition and
appreciation of conservation values on my bnd.

' '

J

c

Whcd,cr a pcnm.ncnt covenant would give gre;11er ,,,.,w,,ncc
for long-term nature con,erntion than under the fixed-term
covenant.

' '

D

\\1,ether by entering a pcrmsncnt covenant I would receive
ndditional on-goin11 finaricial support <o
ooe
nccessory conservation work.

'

'""

,h, '

'
'

5

J

'

5

J

'

5

5

'
'
'
'

······-···········--"·······-······--------···----"··········-··········-········----·······---·········--·····
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fill How strongly do you agree or di'lngrec with the following, statements (a-g) in
the table below as rcflcctlng of your opinion on lhed-tcnn and pennancnt
covenants?
(Choose J'Oflr rt.pons, from the sra/e prori&d in niin1hm 1-6.)

1. Strongl)' disogrce
2. Disagree
3. Neither ogrec nor disagree

Agree
Strongly ag,ec
6. Don't Know
4.

5.

Fo: .""ch statement plcosc tick or cicclc the number that corresponds to )'OUr
op1ruon
A

I do not mind entering a conservation auang<m<nl that
plocco permanent restrictions on snmc uses of the
conservation land.

1

2

l

4

5

•

B

There we,c other more effective mechanisms than
pcrmoncnt co,·enant. for promoting the long-term
nonire conservotioti on private hnds.

1

2

l

4

5

6

Placing a permanent covcn,m on my land would cause

1

2

l

4

5

6

c

it to lose in morketvaluc.
D

I would enter a pcnmncnt nature conservation
covenant on Ill)' bnd if ncighl,ouring landholders m
friends wi!h simifar natural arcss hod pcnnancnt
covcnonr on theirs.

1

2

l

4

5

6

E

I would place a pcnn,ncnt covcnont on my fond if
there were some compensation for the funitations of
use of the !:md ;ucos covered under a cove nan~

1

2

l

4

5

6

r

l would pfacc more nm,s ofm)' land under o fixed-term
covcn,m if there were some compensation for the
limitations of use of the arcos covered under a
covenant.

1

2

l

4

5

6

G

I would not have placed a fu:cd-tcrm covenant on my
land ii!!.•c restrictions on clearing of native bushl:md
did n!'it exist

1

'

3

4

5

6

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------···-----------------
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181 How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following smtcmcnts (a-e) in
the table below as reflecting present views on permanent covenants and nature
conservation 011 private !and? (Choo,r J~"r n.tp<Jmt fa,m lbt 1caf1s pm,idrd in

m1111bm 1-0).
L

2.
3.

Strongly disagree.
Disagree.
Neither agree nor disogrcc.

4. Aiirec.
S. Sl!ongly agree.
6. Don't know.

For «1ch 1/a/mu11/ pfmst tick or drrf, th, 111t!llbrr that rormpomh lo )Wlf ,i,w.
A I would prefer to divide and ,ell off the ,mos of my land with
con,crvacion or natunl heritage value, to a conservationminded individual or organisation than to per.on oily n,ansgc it
untl<>r o permanent covcnan~

I

2

J

4

5

6

"

I would seriously consider a pcrmsncnt covenant just prior to
selling my lsnd.

1

2

J

4

5

6

c

"The benefits of• permanent covcnsnt o""" my existing fucd·
term conservotion ~grccmcnt m connant on my land arc NOT
appsrcnt.

1

2

J

4

5

6

It is NECESSARY for the organisation that mansgcs the
covenant to be intlcpcndcm ofGovcnunc,u.

1

2

J

'

5

6

1

2

J

4

5

'

'c

E I would consider cnte,ing pennancnt covcnJJt{ on my land
wh~n tl,c cnrrcnt tcnn of my fo.cd-tcrm agreement or covenant
cxpucs.
Section

C:.ThiB section is about so.cial and economic is~IICa t~liiting 'to.yoiu:.1
propert,; and it11 mnnag-cme"nt
,
:
'
,

~ How many people (rnduding famil~) work on yo"" property on/1,;
(a). Sobricd full time basis?

(b) Contract workers?

(c). Sabricd part time basis?

(d) Non-paid workm?

fill \'Clhich of the follov.ing rntegorics best describes your appioximatc gross income before 1nc,,
deri,·cd from }"Out property {indutling leased orcas) in 1999? (Tkk. ONE en!,).

(5)
(1)

Zero

(2)

525,000 or less

(J)

S25,00l ro $50.(KlO

(4)

sso,001

to

s100,ooo

l
l
l
l

I
I
I
I

$100,001

[O

$200,000

(6) S200,00I ro $300,00{)

0
lI

$300,001 ontl mote

lI

(8) Withhokl/Don'r know

II

(7)

~\Vhich of the following cotcgaric, bc,t ,lescribe, )"Out •pproxim:i!c gro.s income before Illes,
dcril'cd Crom sources OUTSIDE your property in 1999? (fM,. ONEM/y).
(I) $10,000or,lm

(11)

c-1i sso.001 to 570,000

n

(2) $10.()()1 to $20.000

lI

(S) !W,1101 ,od mo«

t:J

(3) SW,001 to $50,UOO

!,]

(6) Withhold/Don't know
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1!11Which of the foUowing best describes !he apprnximate tom! cxpcnditutc on yourprc,perty
(1.nclud.ing leased am} in 1999? (fkk ONEM/y)

j

I.

Zero

[,]

5.

$50,001 to $100,000

[-

2.

$10,000 or Im

[ ]

6.

$100,001 and more

3.

$10,001 to $30,000

[ ]

7.

Withhold/Don't kno·N

[J
[:'.l

4.

$30,001 to $50,000

[

J

~ Do you have a current debt on your ptopcny?
(!)Ye,

f.]

(2)No

[J_...(GotoQucstionl9)

~ lfYES, in which of the foUowing categories docs the debt amount fall
(5) s200,001 to S300,ooo

l

(I)

10,000 or less

(')

$10,001 to $50,000

(3)

$50,001 to $100,000

l

(')

$100,001 to 5200,000

1

(6)

$300,001 to 5400,000

[I)

$400,001 to SS00,000

(8)

$500,000 ond mou

fJ

Withhold/Don't know

)

l

l
I

~ Con side, the totol income before tsx in the lm financial )"car. Whatpropo,tion ofit <lid
)"OU spend to pay )'ou, ,kbt in that period? (1'/,,,,, tkk cr,irr/, ONE en!>).
(!) None
(2) bct=en 1% and 25%
(3) between 26% and 50%
(4) bc!WC<!n51%and75%
(5) bctwct'n 76% to 100%

fl

[]
[: J

[,l

LJ

Section D: ThiB section Is aboutyourv!cw11 on the ncceesary asel&tancc lo enter Pcnnaocnl
Covenants

~ Did you ever receive any fma11cfal support/benefit to undemkc nature conservation work on
you< land from any org,ni,ation or department before you placed • fixcd·lCttn conservatio11
agreement or covenant on your land?

(1) Ycs,once

{-]

(2) Ye,mo,etl,anonce {}
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~ How strongly do you ogrce or di,ag,cc with th.c following st:itcments (a·c) in tl,e i,::,tc
below as reflectin~ your opinion about the need to 1cck assjjt:tncc when entering a
penno.nent covenant. (Clx,a,rJWJr mp,,nufmm th, /isl of view; proPi<kd in n11mbm 1.6.and
lirk or rirrl, th, n11mb1r in t!J< box //mt ,.,rupond, to )~"ropinion).
I. Su:ongly disogrec
2. Disagree
~. Ncitl,er agree nor disogree
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree
6. Undecided/Don't know
Th e statements are: In c,•n,1'd ernw n aClll" a permanent covenant on m b d
A

Non-financial recognition by ,me and loc,1
government ofmy effort5 lo consen'c nature would be
;a ,ignifica11c step in motivating me to enter a cmcn:utl
on ffi)' l.ond.

I

2

3

4

"'
5

6

B

I believe tl,c cost of cntcriiig a permanent covmam on

I

2

3

4

5

6

I

2

3

4

5

6

my land should be covc,cd by the agency/organisation
issuing the cuvcnant.

c

I would NOT consider a permo.ncnt covenant under
any ci,cumstance.

~ Conscn·ation of nature on your property has benefits to you and to the public. Do you
consider the public to have any responsibility for th.c cost incurced in conservation on
your ptopctty?

(!) Yes'(}

(3) Not Sure

(2) No[]

[l

~ !fYES, what percentage of the cost of retaining and upkeep nature conscn"ation on
your h11d do you consider should be covered by the puL,lie? (Please 1irk orrirrlr /hr
appropriate mporm).
~ lt-10'1~
[l]

§

§

[2}

111-2(f1.

~'(·

[3]

[4] :'

~%

[SJ

~/,

[61

In your opinion, what actions at policic.; can tl,e Stale government put in phce to
make it more fuvourablc for hndholdets to phce a permanent covenant for nature
conservation on thcit hnd?

In your opinion, what actions or policfos should th.e Local government in whose
jurisdiction your property lies put in phcc to nuke it mote fav{l11t:1ble for landholders to
place a permanent covenant for nature conservation on th.cit land?
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Section E: This section is on information about you, and your comments

ejrn what year were you born?

,-,.-·: -'· ,.-_,_-··r
:._, .. ,_,_..,....,

f:mA.tc there any comments you would like to make about any other issues rcl:itingnaturo
conservation on private lands and/or permanent covenants?

Thank you very much for your valuable time.
Please check to verify you have answered ru.l questions

-,,
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Appendix3. l

Pr~nary roosnm for having mained rnnocrvaticn fr~turcs on d,c
pmperty in the period prior to taking up a permanent covenant

Frequency

Prinury rca,ono

Pcr«m of Cao••

o,

'

Seasonal G,ozing
For Rccrc,tionol u,c

Fulutc agticultur,\ uoe
To support wildlife comcf\"Otion
To suppon nalivc vcgctotion

'

''0

"
"'
"•

31.4

'",.5
,.,
,.,

5

To act as wind break. or buffer
To act a, a wildlife corridm
For scenic "'""""
Fo< soil oalinity control

05

'

Cost of cle,ring for cropping or posture w:,o
not economical
As shade ond ,heh« for ,tock

'"

Provi,io11 of f,c,lt w.itcr

05

05

Land not ,ui1>blc for formh1g

0

Rcuincd by previous owner,

0.5

Protec lion Of'-''1lcrway

0

Soil erosion control

,.5

Oth«s

o.5

Appendh: 3. 2 Approximate g,:001 income derived from the propcrty in the ycor ~
permanent covenant was placed on the land
locome c1,.,e1

Frequency Proportion ofreopondenla
(%)

(Aumalian doUan)
None
25,000 or less
25,001-50.000
50.001- 100,000
100,001- 200,000
200,001 -300,000
>300,000
Withhold
Total

.,
"•
'5

'
'

..."
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,.,.,

,.,
M

5.0

.,

u

"

100.0
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Appendix 3. 3

Perccnrnge ratio of respondents' income from property tu tntol
income
Frequency Proportion ofRespondem•

Peu:ent>.gc income
from property,

(%)

"

,s

51.1

.10,\· 50.0
50.\. 70.0

,s

'"

IH

\.20.0
20.\. J0.0

,.,,.,
,.,

'

19.9
100.0

"
'"'

>70.0
Total

Appendix 3. 4 Landholders' level of expectation ofvarions 1eivicc, and actions a,
prc·tcquisitc for entering a p,;nnancnt covenant for nsture
conservation
Services and Actior,,

Importance rating
Definitely

Prob,bly

Nut
N"t
lmponnnt lmportlnt

Neither Prob,bly
lmport>at oo, Irnp,,,cu,1
Unlrn[><lrt>nt

Dcfiniody
Did n<o<
l,"po<1111t ron,i~er i<

Mo,e frequent
management •dvice.
Increased puhhc
recognition ond
appieciation of
conocrv,tion ,•,lue, on
their bnd.
Greater muroncc for
long·letm nature
con,erv,oion th,n
undoro1h0<
conservation
,grccrncnlS.

%

,.,

,20

17.5

27.9

]G.4

16.4

%

13.7

!2.0

\4.8

w.,

19.1

"''

%

,,

u

,.,

...

73.6

13.7

Additional on·going
financi:t! ,upport to
carry out the ncco,sacy
con,crva1ion work.

%

17.8

10.8

20.5

,.,

''

31.9

lndcprndcncc of
covenanting in,ti1ution
from Government
oflili,tion

%

,.,

...

19.B

17.G

30.Z

]B.]

,.·.,

'

,,,,
1:

;;,,
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Ap~ndix3, S Proportion of cost c.,pcctcd from the public for nature
con,cn·oiion on pcivotc land, by rcspondcnl& wit!, o pcrmancnr
co,·cnont in Victori•
Proportion expected coll

Frcqucm;y

(%)

"
"'

40.9

None
1-10%
11-20 ~·.
21-30 ••

,.,
,,.,..

'

31-40%
41-500:.

"'
•
"
,s

51.60%
61-81!%
8!-100%

No re,pnn><:

mo

Tot?'i'

••''

,.,'.
I0.2

!B.8
100.0

Appendix 4. 1 fao~cnou~ ,·ori.1blc, o,sciscd in the dcsoiptivc analy,i, of fixedtcnn ,grc.:,mcnt (\'ic1ocia) •nd fae<!-tcnn co,·cnant (\x.'c,tcm
i\ustnlis) respondents
Variable

Attribu!c muourcd

.~go.

,\gc <>frespondcnt ,n ycm

Sizcofpropcrt)'

Arc, in l,cc"'c'

l'rop<:rt)" lonurc type

l'ropmU<>n of prnpWj undc, freehold ,ud/or \c,,ohn!d
lmurc

Lc,·c! of ,ncomc

Total tnonmc in .\11S1r,.fu dollars (,\l)

,l!!"hmcnt to the pmprnr

l.a11;1h of prupctl}' tc01u,c in the fonu!)"

Affdi,non ,nd ""nci,tion "1th
cun,en•;tion gtoup,

Number of cu"scrv.tion group,/ organ;,,1ions ic,pondcnl
,s member or suppnrl,

lmp1ct of debt on permanent
co,·eoant uptake

!..c,·d of dclot on prnpcrl)'

Econ om;, <lcpcnJrnce "" prnp<rt)'

Pc,ccncage rJlio uf in«1me Crum p<upoity 10 IUl>I income

Lc,·cl ofl,bonr c,.. nn,um,nt

,lm<HU\! ofbbour employcJ un p«,pcrty

RcGu,·e ,i,c of 11>tmc cun,crv>tlOn
,re, 10 toi,l prnpcil}·

Pcteon!l~c t.ttio of rnnsef\·,1io01 "'" 10 101,l properly size

I1>nuemc of fou11cL,! support for
n,ture con,oiv,1100 on p<rmancnl
co1·cnan1 upl•ko

Frequency of fmanci,\ suppo!I befo,c f,,.cd-term ,r,recmen!
(Vicio,ia) ,nJ fixcd,tcnn covenant (Wo,lcm Au,tr:tha)
upt.ke
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Appendix 4. 2 Endogenous ,·ariolib assessed in the descriptive analysis of fixed·
term agreement {Victoria) and fixed-term cm•cnont (\Vcstcrtt
Aumolin) ,coponJcm,
Mo1ivc for uking up• fumJ,lcrm
agreement nr Cixod-lcnn 0011:nant

Influence of a,.,J;d ,up part on Co:od-tenu agreement or
fixed-term co,·emnt uptake

.\w,rmc,o a\Jout l"'rmancnr cnvcn,nro

lnquir)' a\JuLot pcrm,ncnt covcn,nr

lnlcre>I in n,tmc conscn•,tion

Prim,r1· ,,.,o.,, for <et.tining n•turc conocrvotion
fo1turc, on the property

Knowledge ofperm,1,cul ,01·cnanl5

l'm·iou, knowledge of permancnl co,·cn,nr he fore
upt>kc of, fixu:l,rcnn agreement (Vic1ori,) and (u;cdterm r..-,,·cn,nt (\Veo1cm :lustrali,)

Inquiry about pcr,n,nenl co,•ciw,u

\X·l,cchc, they had made ,n inquiry ,bout permanent
rn,·cnant

l.nng rem, goal fnr rclcnltun of
OW!OCr!hip

An1icipltion of ICtecuion of o"~mship of prnpcrcy in
family

Long term go,I for <eto.,r,on of
man,gcmenl

.-\nllcip,tion uf retention of manaHcmcnt of property in
famcly

:\ttirndc> IO covm,m, in 1em1S of thci,
pcrccw,d b,n,r.cs

Strength of pcrccpc,on of permanent covenant bcncfil,

Attitude,

Sorength of o<ccptaoce of non-finaoci,l inccntisc, for

10

nnn fu,,ncial rc<<>gnitl<ln

pcrm,ornt co,·cmnt upt,ke

lmp•ct of ,e.,riction, of bn,1-usc on
perrn,ncnt cosen,nl uptake

:\llitudc, to permanent covenant rrnrictioos 011 land-use

Influence of moci>tion o.,rh neigh bouts
or friend, on pemiancnt co,·cnant up1>kc

l..:wl of inm,cncc of neighbour, or friend, on co,·coant

Interest in long·tcm1 nature rnmc"·,t10t1

;\ ttlluJc, IO cm•cn,o!s 1n tctcns of chcir abiht)-" to murc
lnng-tcnn n,turc conservation th,n other mcchmism,

lmp,cl of pcnnancnc co,·cn,ncs on l,nd
v,lue

Perception of pcrm,nent cove.,,nts in toun, of lhcor
imp,ct on land value

Influence o,f non-financi,l uiccnli,·cs on
pcnnane"t co,·cn;nt upt,okc

Atticude co non·fo,,nci,1 inccnti,-e," mooiv,ror, of•
pcrm,ocnt ro,•cn,nt upuko

Atticudc !o public ,ccognit,on ,o incentive
for permanent cm•cnat>t up!akc

I mpo,IOncc gi,•cn to P"Lhc rccogni1ion a, inccnth-e for
perm,ncnt covenant upt>kc

Perception of dfccti,•cnc" of pcm,anent
covenant forlo.,g-ter," n,rnre
comm·,tion o,·cr 01hor m,d,anis,m

cffccliccnw fo, long-lcrm na<ure con,crv>tion over

Nccrnit)" of lin,ncial ,uppnrl ,s inccntwc
for permanent cm·en,nt Ul't,ke

]..:,•d of importance &tvcn to lin,ncial ,uppmt .s
inccn1i,•c fot pcrm,ncnt ,uvcn,c\t uptake

Necmit)" of cmnpen,,iion" inccnoi,·e
fo, pcn~onent co,,,,,nt up[Jlcc

.-\t1itude ta rnmpcns;tion u, co\'cnont up

l'.quity rcqui«,..ent in cost of perm,ncnt
co,·cn•nl upr,ke

l'.xpcctation Ly n:spon<lcnt, regarding co,·cr,gc of ca><
by covcn,nwrs in permanent covcn,nt nptlle

l'.qui•y tcquircment in cost ofpm·,te
cn,10,rv.tion.

Expected level of public contribution to co>t of n,nrrc
conscrv,tian on pci,·,rc land,

.-\nin,de, to the upt,kc of a permanent
coven,n1

covcooot

uptake

Degree of ,g,cemcnl ,bout pcrmonrn! co,1:n,nt',
other con,m•;iion mech,ni,m,

Dcgttc of ,grocmcr\t with the up1a.ke of a p<rmOirent
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" Appendix 4. 3 Lengtl, of time of property ownership in family among fixcd·tenn agrcemcm
(Victoria) and fixed-term covenant (\Vestcm Au,tt;,lia) respondents
Vic1oria

<,

Westcm Auotra[ia

,.
,,,,

Y,

Count,

Period in vean

''

2,os
6 to lO

0

><o
Tot,!

-".6

,.'

.."'"

w.

"'""
m
"

11 to 20
211030
311040

Y,

Count&

'so.n."

15.4
18.5

34.?

'",.,

0

11.J
100.0

"'"

100.

Appendix 4. 4 Tn1cs and prnpo<tions of conservation features on properties offixed·tc.nn
,grccmcnt {Victoria) ond fixed-tcnn covcnsnt (\Vcstun Ausl:rafu) respondents

Conoervarion r.,muo

Count

Str,;m/!liver/ Creeks

"'"
"n

W,1t.nds
Noti,.., Bu,h/fo,c,t
Notivc Gras,
Pbntcd <rccs/pl,ot•

Wcstcm Austtalia
Coum

so

"
'°'''
""

"'""

32.1

164

"5

,0

Sall bu,hos/Solt l,kcs
Othon
None

Appendix 4.5

Victoria
'I, Re, onsco

0

%Re, onon
37.6
'20
94.6

'0

0

"'
••

0

Knowledge about pcnnanent cm·cn,nt at the time of entering o fixcd·term
ag,ccmcnt among fixcd·tcnn agreement {Victocia) and fhed·tenn covenant
(\Vcstern Anstrnlia) respondent•

Slaltmmt: Al 1h, Jim, l m1mdafi.wd-11m1,1J,mn1ml orro,~"""' 1 k.n,wa/1Qa/ pm,,ar.1ntrr::v11a11f
!,,., ro,~11,mtt In
,r,,il}'

,.

Victoria
R<o onsu

Coum

......

Appendix 4.6

CaU.'\t

49.4
50.6

"'"'"'

No

To1,l

Wcstcm Australia

""
"'

100.0

,.
49.0
5!.0
100.0

Response on desire to know more about pcm,ancnt covcnanl5 omong fixed·
term ~grcerncnt (Victoria) ond fixed·tcnn covenant (\X'cstcm Australia)
respondent,

Sid/mun!: 1 """Id like lo know mon: aboH/ ,rman,11/ wi,11anls

Vic1oria
Rconon,c1

Tru,
l'oloc
Tot,!

11':J

Count

'"'"'
'"'

Western Ausualfa

'"

56.1
43.9
100.0

-!;!1

'X
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Count
55

'"""

f'/,\

JB.S
61.5
\00.0
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Appendix 4.7

Primary reason fo, retaining namrc conscr,,ation features on the properties
among fixed-term agreement (Viciorin) ond fixed-term covenant (Western
Australia) respondents

Vic
Ca,c

Primo,y ,.,.sons

Count
Sea,onol Grazing
For I:ccre,1ional use

"'
'"

Futme ,gn,uitur,l usc
To ,upport ,,,,ildlifc comcrv,tion

Western Australia

%Number
ofeasco

0

'',5

o.,
0

70.l

"'
"
"'

As shod, and shelter for ,tock

0

Provision of fo,,h wote<

'

'''.s

To act "wind breaks m Luffcr
To oct ", wildlife co,ridor
Fm ,ccnic rca,on,
Fm ooil ulinity control
Cost of clearing for cropping or
pa,turcw.i, not economical

Land""{ ,uiiable for fanning

%Numbct
ofcaooa

05

2D

To ,uppmt notive vegetation

Case
Count

''

'"
"'

14.5

l2A

''
,.,
05

,.,
S9.B

">A
",.o

,.,,.,

Rcain,d Ly previous OWIIC!$.

Proteciion of w,tc,way

o.,

Soil ot<J>ion con!,ol

;o

Orhe"

''

Note to Appendix 4.3: l'crccn!Oge numl>cr of c.,c, exceed, 100 percent becau,c some mpondenls gave
mere 1h,n one prim,<;· re>Son for ha sing retained nature co111e,v1tion feature, on !heir bnd

Appendix 4, 8

Attitude to covenant re,tricrions on some uses of the rnnscrvaiion land
among fixed-term agreement (Victoria) and fixcd-tcnn covenant (\'Vcitcm
Austra\i,) ,cspondents

Sln/fmi,t: 1 do no/ mind mtm'ng ti ronu;,;;;,,, amin.~<mtn/ f/,af i;,i11/d m/,1i/pum mm/ mlriclion,
on I0/8' Nm of th, ronI<n~lion /dnd.

Victoria
Rcspon,e,
St. 01;,g,ee

oi.. g,oc
Neutral

Agree
S!. ,lgt<e
0/Know
To1ol

Count

"'"

'"
"''
"'
M

Wcs1crn Austrnlia
1%
10.6
15.3
10.6
33.9

"",,

100.0
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Count

'"n..

w

..."'

J'fo\

20.3

.'"••.,

14.9

H
100.0
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Appendix 4. '.I Perceptions oi a permanent covenant'• in,pact on lond vo!nc among lixcdtenn ngteetnenl (Victoria) ;111d fixed-tcnn co,·enant (\Vcstcm Aum:tl.ia)
respondents

Stat,mm/: '.ti rmanmt «mnanl is lib · to !,ad /oa !min marhJ 1"/111 o
ro
Victoria
Wcstcn1 Austrnlia
Count
Re, on•••
onion
Count
onion

"
"
.,"'"

St. Di,agrce
Di,agrec
Neutral
1\grce
St. Agree
D/Know
Total

Appendix 4. 10

;;

,.

''"

"'

!7.7
12.4

u,

15.1
24.2
100.0

'"'

''"

"""
"w"
""

,.

ID. I
23.0
20.9
19.G
12.B
\l ..1
lOll.O

llcsp onsc on the cffccti,·cncss of pcnnsncm covcnom m•cr other
mcchoni,m, atnong ftxcd-tcl'm agrccmcm (Victoria) and fir.cd-lcnn
covcnnnt {Western ,\mtrnli•) respondents

S/atm,.nl: Thm ar, ,,mh,mim11 1/ut "" mor, ,ffi,1;,. .ih,r I/Jan ,~lunla') p,mianrnl rr,1<nants fa,
promoling ti,. /on~·tmn nat1m «wrn ..rion on pn,.,1, landt.

Western Amittalia

Victoria
Ruponsco
SI. Di,ogree
Dis,g«•
Ncu1<ol
1\grcc
S~ Ag,cc
Don't know
Tot,!

Appendix 4.11

Count

''"'
"·",,

""'"
""
'"'"

12.9
17.2

32.B
100.0

Count

'

'"
"""
'""

'!,)

"'''

28.1
]9.9
17.1

'"

100.0

Attitudes ~ffited·tcrm agreement (Vicmria) end fixed-term covcnont
(\Vcstcrn Austn1lia) respotidcnt, co the ,ffiliation of a covcn,nting
organisation to Government

Stdt,mmt: ft it ntrm~o·far //,, 01Ji11i::_ati•n !hilt mandg,1 tbt p,rman<r.l rom,an/ to be ,ird,pfndtnl
o(Go,,.rnm<nl
Victoria
Western Australia
f'/ol
Rcsnonsco
Count
l'/o
Cou,n
St. Di»g,cc
Disogrco
Kcutnl
Agree
St. Ag,cc
Don',know
Total

",s
""'"
'"""

,,
''

19.G
20.6
25.9

'"

100.0
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""
""
""
'"

,.,

lS.6
32.0

""
,.,
l\.6

\Otl.0
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Appentlix 4. U

Pcrcq,tions of benefits of a pcm,ancnt rnvcnnm omong fixed-term
agrcemcm {V;ctoria) ,nd fo<ed-term envenom (\Vcsrcrn Aum,lia)
respondents

S1a1,m,nt Th, h,nefits ef a/"""''"'"/ ro,.r.,1at o,.r n!)· ,.,islingfiwd-lmn ronsmulion aJrrlfmtnl ~"'
no/a r,nt'
Vlcioria
Western Australia
Re, on,e,
Coun1
Count
%
St. Di.,g,ee
Di'1gree
14.9
22.4
Ncult.11
n.,
14.4
;,
Agtc<
33.0
25.2
St.A&t'<
118
15.6
D/Know
14.4
To1al
100.0
100.0

,.

Appendix 4.13

""'"
"""'
""

'

''

""
"'

,.,

''

""

Total mc,linn income in 1999 for fixed-term ogrecmcut/covenant
,e,pondcnts in Victoria and Western Australia

Total median
income (AU$)

Victoria
Count

35000 or le"
35001-75000
75001-150000
15000!-255000
255001..\00000
400001- 490000

Toto!

"
"'"
•'
"'
;;

Western Auotnlia

Pcrccntag<

"'
,.,,.
"

31.6
24.7

100.0

Count

"'

""

5

"'"

l'orcentage
26.0
3.l

''

19.1

''

:lS.9
100.0

Labour commitment refers lO a w,;ghtcd fiMncisl commiuncnt made to labour
emplo)ment hr a bndholde~ Labour commitment ,cores were cokubted by initially osiigning
respective points i.e. fo·e, three, 1wo, snd one points to four rcspeclivc lobom categoric> under
rc•,iew, nornbly; salaried full-time, contract, sol.,ticd parH.imr. ond non-poid, on assumption of a
dccrc.r>ing order of finoncial remuneration m,dc annually for the respective cotegorics. ,\ bbuur
score W:ts colculotcd by mulbplying the points nllocotcd to each category by the number ofpcop\e
in • particular ca1ego,y. Finally, a labour commitment score for each respondent was cJculotcd b)'
summing the score, of the difformt worker mcgocics. ·n,e higher the ,core the g,caicr tl,c
a,sumcd labour commitment.
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Appendix 4.14 Labour commitment on the property •mong fixcd·tcnn agr<<mcnt (Victoria)
and fixcd·tem1 coven mt (Western Australia) respondents

Victoria
Lo.hour commi1mcn1
ocorc cl•nc•
Zero

Count

Propoition (%)

So

,;.;

""
'""·
'""

3H

l 102

3to4
5to8
9to 15

,,;

To!al
Morn ,core (point>)
Std. Dcviotion
~bximum ,cores

,.,

]3.3

"'so

100.0
6.48

~,

Western Austrnlia
Count
P1oportion ('!,)

,.,

rn

'

'"
''

w

"""

''"

31.91

18.0

35.3
27.3
100.0

---rvw
IOG7
;,

Appendix 4.15 Recq,lion offinanci,l ,upp•,n for comen·ation work before• fi,cd-1erm
•grccmcnt/cm·cnant uptake •mong fixcd·tc,m agreement {Victoria) and ft.cJ.
tcn11 envenom (\'i/cstcm Aust,ali1) rcspondcm,

SM11mm1, /·/u,.,;·oJI mr rrctilYd jinun<idf iupport/ bmrji/$ lo 11nderl.1k1 n,turr m11unuh'on work en
)'OJ/r t.md from 11")' o ni~.ilion or d< rlmmt?

Victoria

'"

None

•

Once

•,,

Count

sos

"'

11.3
8.2
lUO.O

22

More than once
l'o,al

"

195

Western Australia
Count

'"'"
'"

149

,.
?0.5
18.8

10.7
\00.0

Appendix 4.16 Lc,·o\ uf debt on prop,·riics ninong fixed.term ,wccmcnt (Vicwri,) and food·
tcnn covenant (\X1c,1cm Australia) respondents

Victoria
Debt amount t />,.$
None
Le,. ,h,n\00,000
l00,000 to 300,000
300,00110 500,000
Mote 1h:m 500,000
Totol

Count

Western Australia
%
54.1

w;

so

2(,.8

'"

"'
'
'"

''''

Count

""
"'"u

,.
,.,

34.9

\5.1
32.9

\00.0
"'
''"
1110 rntio of income dcrivc,J from the property tn th• annual gro,s income (i.e. >he
100.0

,um of income from inside ,nd outside of 11-c property) ,,,., used to indicate a respondent',
econaiitlc dependence on the land. L:rndholJcr, wiili • higher income ratio from the propel'!)'
to totol income were assumed more cconomk,l\y dependent on the lond ih,n those with •
lower incomoc from property ratio.
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Appendix 4.17 Pe,centagc income rntio from property 10 mcdi.n total annual income among
fixcd·tenn ogrccmcnt (Victoria) ond fixed-term covcnont (Wcs,cm ,\ustrnlia)
respondents

Victoria
Percentage ratio ofinoomo
from nro~C<""
Na%
12-30%
ll-50%
Si-70%
71-90%
o,·er90%

Western Austtalia
('/,

Count

,oo

..

"''
''
''''
,oo

'""
'""

'foul

Count

(%)

..,

"'
'
'

",.,''

'"
"'"'

\IA

22.9

63.4

'"'

Appendix 4.111 Anticipation of retention uf ownmhip and monagcmcnt of the property in the
fomily among fixcd·tcnn agreement (Victoria) and fixed-term covenant (Westen,
Australis) rcspondcm,

St,1/rmrn/; l p/.,n lo rrldin thr m,mdJ/lllrnt ofmy
prop,,o· i,ithin t!.Jt fdmi!J• in ti"Ji;t~rr.

Victoria
Re1-on•••

Tru,

r,1,.

No!

!UIC

To1al

Count

'"

""

!90

Stat,mmt: I plan lo rrt,,in ownmhip ofCf)'
prop,rt;· witNn tht j,mify in Jhr fulnrr.

Western
Australia
Coun,

(%

Victoria

('/,

67.9

80.3

25.8
100.0

15.0
100.0

°'"'''

'' ""' •• """
'""
"""

We stem Aus1rnlia

,.,,,

,..
25.8
'"""
67.4

''I'•'

Counl

'"'
'""

,.,

78.1

!5.~
100.0

Appendix 4,19 Influence of ncigl,bnurs and friends on covcn,nt upt,kc among fixed-lenn
ogrccmcm {Victori,} and fixcd-1crm covcn.1111 (Wes1cm ;\u.<1ralia) respondents

Sta/mun/: J i.~11/d bt indin,J lo m/,r ,1 f"mt~nrnl cor,ndnl on II!)' !dad ,jntiJ.hbou,in_i landho/Jm or
rirnd! will, ,imi/,,r n,1ilmil ,1tt.n h,,J on, on 1/J,in.

.,.

on1e1
St. Di,,groc
Di,.grcc
Neutnl

Agree
SI, ,\g,ce
Dun', Imo"·
Tuia\

Vic
Coun!

"";s
"
,.,""

Western Australia
%
12.B
21.9
ll.0

,.,

ia.2

"'

100.0
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Coun,

"'"
""
'"

'"

,.
1(,.6

26.2
l1.0
16.6

,.''

100.0
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Appendix 4.20 Number of mcmbmhips or supp on lO conservation gtoup/organi,alion
among fixcd-tcnn ag«•cmem (Victot:io) and fixcd-1crm cm·cn,m (\'Clcstcm
Aum,dia) rcspondcnis

Vic
Number of conoctvation
None
One group
Tl<'D groups
·n1r« groups
More th1n 3 grnup,
To!>I

Western Auetrnlia.

Count

Count

(%

'"

~.,"

"""

3i.9
14.4

195

100.0

"'

""'
"
""

(%)

14.0
G0.7

,.,,.,

)4.7

~

;

'"

100.0

Appendix 4.21 lmpotlnncc b~,·cn m pro,·i,ion of mamgcmcm ad,·icc" • P"'·re<Jui,itc for
covcnon1 uptake b)• f1xcd-1cnn agreement (\'ictot:ia) and fixcd·tcnt\ covenant
(\l;'cstcrn 1\um11li,) ,c,pomlcn!S

Re, on•••
[)cfinitcl)' impotton!
l',oh;h]y import,m!

Neutral
Pto\»b\y Not impotl>n!
Defmild)' Not imporun!
No optnion
"J"oiol

Vic

,,
""
"'"
'

Count

Western Australia
27.2
2Ho
17.3
!7.3

·"'"
""
"'
'"

').9

''

1•11

•;,

Count

%

100.0

!2.l
20.6
30.2

'"'
"

14.1

100.0

Appendix 4,22 Importance f;inn to increase in public reeognili<>t\ and apprcciotiou os • prcre<juisilc for co,•cti,nt upiakc by fixed-tern, agr«mc!lt (Vicmrfa) ~nd fixed·
term cn,•enont (\\'ostoni ,\ustrnli>} respondent,

l1t11t: lr'hrrlxr Ihm ~-o~IJ b, ir..-rtJw/ pub/i,- rr,~.~n,11•• anJ appmialion efmnun'Olion "'''"' on '!r

""'

R<0 on1e1
Definitely Omponan<
Pro~>~\)' important
Neu,ral
Prob,blr Nu1 import,nt
Dofuii1elr Nu, unpomn,
No opinion

Total

Western Ausualia

Vic

•;,

Count

28.4
2l.1

'"'""
",s
'

20.0

12.6
D.~
4,7
100.0

""

j;

((
267

•;,

Count

'""

""

""
'"

2!.5
24.2
22.l
\U
lVr

"I

100.I

,,
/'
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Appendix 4.Zl In,portancc gi,·en !O g,-catcr assurance for \mig·tcrm nature conservation os •
pre-requisite for a covcnont uptake by fixed.term ,gr cement (Victori•) and fixc<i,
term covenom (Western ,\ustr.ilio) ~,pondcnts

Vic
lkopon,eo
Dcfinitel1· impmt10!1
Proh,bly impomnt
Neutral
Proh,bly Not impon,nl
Dcfinitc\1· Not important
N~ opinion
Total

Western AustraUa

Count

(%

Count

'""
"'
'
"
'"

,.,,.,
'',.,

28.3

""
""
"'"

100.0

(%)

n

47.!

15.4
24,B

u,
,.,

12.8
11.4
100.0

Appendix 4,24 lrnport,ncc g\\'cn to financi.1\ support as• prc·tcquisitc for covenant uptake by
fixcd-tc,m agrccn,cnt (Victoria) ond fhcd·1cnn covenant {\~1cstcm Austn\ia)
~•11onden1S

lm1t: tv'/,,1h,ri{}· tnt,ring~ pm,wrmt f<INn~nl 1.~11/d rrmi~ ~ddi1t'onJ/on-goin.ifirJnciJ/ '11/'f'"rl lo
<Jm· OJI/ {h, &,ctUdr)' ro,umvtion ••ork.

Vic
Re, on,co
Definitely impmlon1
l'rob,bl)' im1iomnt

Count

P,obohly Not irnpo,t;,lt
Definite~· Not in1po,11n1
Na opinion
Total

Western Australia
Count

26.2
27./
15.7

""
""
""
"'

Ncuu,1

.,.

'""
"s
"
"
"'

''
''

l~.l

100.0

•;,
40.J

"',.,
,.,
14.8

JO.I

100.0

Appendi" 4.25 ,\grccob1li1y <>n non·fii10ncial inccmi,·c by Stale ond Lncal govcmmems as
inccmivc for pcimanenr w,·cnon1 uptake by fixed-term sgrccmcnt (Victoria)
,nd r.~cd·tcnn covenant {\x.'cslem ,\umatia) respondents
Slaltmml: Noo:ftndndJ/ rr.~gnition /,y ,M, and i.1Jcdl Go1"tr11r.trnt of"rt ifJurl, In rrw,M nal#rr •v~ld
lit a ,in, wml ,1, fn m•hivlin ml lo mttr11 "'""""/ on mi· land

,.

Victoria
Re,eo~ie•
St. Di,.g,ce
Di.,grcc
Neun·;!
Agtcc

St. Agree
Don•t ki,ow

Ta11l

Co uni

'""'"
""
'""

10.4
19.8

Wc$tctn Au~tralia
Cou~t

M

''

"""
"'

'"'"

'"

a,

27.1
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'

•;,
21.l

"'
,.,s.o

23.4
20.6

100.0
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Appendix 4.26 Agrccobilitf on compcnsotion as incentive for covenont uptake among fixed·
tcnn agreement (Victoria) ond fixed-term covenant (Western Austrili•)
respondents

Slat,m,nl: 1 would place a p,rman,n/ ro,tnant on "!>' land if thm """ ;omr romp,n,ation for th,
limilalion1 o ust o !ht !anJ mt<JJ ro,trtd unikr a ro,tnan/

Victoria
Res onoc,

,."
"'"
'"n
'""

Strnngly Disogt<c

Pi,.groe
Ncutnl

,\gr,e
Strongly Ag«<
Don'I
Total

.,.

C..uot

Know

11.\
14.8

es.,
25.4
\O.f,
12.2

,oo

Western Australia
Count

""
""'"n
"'

,.,"·
"'
,,

19.9
29.5
24.0

100.0

Appendix 4.27 Agrccability on the covcn•ntor bearing the costs inrorted in the upL1kc of a
pcm1a11cnt covci,nnt ornoni; fi~cd-mm ,grccn,cnt (Victoria) and fixcd·tc,m
co,·cnsnt {Wcstcm Australia) respondent,
Sldltmmt: 'fh, CIJ// of m1<rin!, a pmnan,nt ,m~nan/ M "!Y land should b, ro,~rtd /;)• 1h,

a '" lo misalion it111in 1h, ,~,·,.,ant
Vic
Re, onoca

Count

S1.Di,.grcc
Disogn,o

;

Agree
s,. Agree
Undecided

Total
Appendix 4.28

"·

'''"

"
""'"
''""

Neutral

Western Australia

15.6
38.5
24.0
12.3

,oo

Count

''

"
"'
'"

,.
,,••'"
41.4
39.J

00

"

!00.0

Expected lcvd of public rnntnbution to coit of na!ure conservation on
private bnds among fixcd·tcnn sgrccmcnt (Victoria) ~nd fixed-term
covenant (\Vcstcm ,\ustr,lia) respondents

Q1tu/ion: IVhnl p,mntay of //i, roil of lldf11rt rrm;muliM on pur land do;·ou romid,r ;bould b, ro1trtd
ub/id

Ir,·,,,,

Vie1oria
Expected public coot
contribution 'lo

Na
1·10

11·20
21·20
31-10
41-50
5].60

&\,80
>M
Total

Count

'""
""
'
'"
"'
'"
;

Western Ausualia
{'!,

47.J

,.,''"'

2.4
\6.B

'"'"
'"'"
H
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Count

'"'
""
'

"'
'"'

""

('lo)

"·',,;;
'".,
"";;..,
21.9
100.0
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Appendix 4.29

Final path model cocfficie._:s tables fot fixed-tcrrn ~greemc,u respondents (Vicrnri~J
Unsnndardizcd
B Std. Er<or

(Const:int)
Con_int=t
Knowlcdg,:
ConR:itio

Membership

...~iii,--

Sund,roittd
Codlici1..;..;

Coefficients
1.730

A»

.187

_071

"'"

5.758&02

.WC

2.779E-03

.000

.176
.056
.083

.!65

_086

.m

Rcstricrinn.
.299
.055
.37U
V,Jue·k>«
--6.000E.02
-.086
9.6\ZE.02
.m
Benefits
.051
2. dependent "<"uiable: attitudes ro a pcmlment cm·cnant up,akc.

·"''

4.02.2
2.648
.OTI

1299
1.925
5.4;'8
-1.273

1.884

.000

95% Confidence
fotceval for B
Lm.·cr Bound
.881

.196

-.072
-.001

=
..382

UeEcr Bound
2.579

.,.,,

·"''
··""'
.191

"'
·""
335
.~,

·.153

.033

.061

-.005

.197

.056
.000

270
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Appendix 4.30

Path onalysis variable com:lation for foed-tmn agreement respondents (Vic)
Con_jntcrost

Knowledge

" "~
,.ooe

30>

.rn

30>

,.ooe

.,,."'

MO

,.ooe

.149
.175

.351
.017

Attitudes to

ConRotio Membership

Restrictions

Value_Jos,

Benefit<

.119

·""

. 160

2 ..

.149

.351

-.082

.175
.141

·""

-.082
.141

moo
.oo,

.oo,
moo

.087

.017
.168
-.216

.oo,

.219

woo

.168

-.216

.056

3,i
.016

,.ooo

.036

.117
.000

.098
2,i
000

,.ooo

200

·""'
.oo,

2"

.023

.OIO

.000

.138

.030
.489

·"'
.oo,

.412
.012

·""
.oo,

pamaricnt

cosenan,
Pe2rson
Correlation

Attitudes ro permanent
co~cn:mt uptak.e

Con_imerest
Knowledge
ConRatio
Mcmbc<5hip
Restriction.

Valuc·loss
Sig. (1-wlcd)

Benefits
At11tudes to permanent
cm,,=m upc.ke

Con_intcrcst
Knnwledgc
ConRatio
Mcmbmhip

.119

'""
·'"'

2 ..

.HS
000

.000
.036

ES

.056

.en

Restriction.

000
000

Value.loss

.016

.010
.000
.412

'""""

•000

.w,
.w,
.258

.,,,

.138

.ooe

.489

25,

.m

.012

.oo,

271

.oo,

....

··'"'

.oo,
.481
.058

.~,

.123

.oo,
.oo,

.098

oo,

....

·"''
.000

~·
.145

.003
.117

·'"

.3"
000

.481
.058

"'"

.000
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Final path model coefficients tables for fixed-term covenant (\Vestem Australfa) ttSpondents
Un,undarc!kro
Coefficients

,.,.,'

S=chrdi,ed
Coefficients
&o

Std. Error
(Coru=t)
5#
Knowledge
7.946E-02
.055
Con__in,ere><
7.048E-02
.065
.Q78
Restrictions
V21ue~loss
-.152
.061
.074
Benefits
.165
Confu.tio
i.342E-03
.oo•
"' dependent ,nriabk: atti111des rn a pamailent co,.-enan, upt:1kc

-'"

Appendix 4.32

s;g. C:-tr.iled)

.112
.088
.275

-.196
.199

.on

Sig.

,m
1.445
1.077

""

-2.470
2.497

.,,,,

.015
.151

.,,,,
.oo,

.015
.014

.m

95% Confidence
lntcn"1 for B
Lowe, Bound

.m

Uppcrllound

""

-.029
-.059
.101
-.273
.038
-.014

.lBB

200

.410
-"°30

3;,
.018

Path 2I1olysis va,fable correlotio<1 for fix,:d-tcrm cov<:<1:mt (Wes rem Austr.ilia) r~po<1de<1rs

Atti<ude to permanent
cm-cn=t uptake
Knowledge
Iknefii,
Valuc_loss
Restrictions
ConRatio
Con_in,crc,t
Attitude to pam:tru:nt
covenont uptake
Knowledge.
Ben<fits
V.Jnc_lo,s
Restrictions
Conlto.tio
Co<1._inte,esr

Attitud~ ro permanent
covenant u t:1ke

Know!edg<

moo

."(lil

200

1.00)

3;,
-.307

.247
-.115

30,

.on

·""'
.267

.00,

.000
.000
.000
.242

.oo,

.071

.,oo
.oo,

Benefits

.247

,.ooo
-.189
.195
.110
.193
.000

.oo,

V.Juc_los,

-.307

39'

-.115
-.189

·°''

.023
.195

.071
.!10

,.ooo
-.199

.m

-.1\3

.ooo
.en
.014

.014
.Oil
.IOI
.012

272

Restrictions Confu.tio

.010
.019
.094

-.199

.m

.154

,.ooo

,.ooo

"'
.000

39'
.011
.OIO
.037
.000

·'"

.,oo
.193
-.113
3,0

·=

·=
.24?.

,.ooo

'°'

.m

.101

.019
.J37

.oo,

.,,.
.ooo
.012

.481
.481

cc..--.
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Appendix 4, 33

Views.of Frn,·-Vic lnndholdcts on the State Government policic, or ac1;ons a,
mccnuves

Incentive
gmup

Dc,lud oction
(Number of
rcopondcnt,)

P<1f]lOSc/dc<ircd outcome

Economic onJ
Fum,cUl
inccn1i,"<, (69)

Frnanci•l
.,,istan,c ,nd
,ub,jdic, (52)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Tax inccnlivc

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

''"
Jnfonna1ion and
aw;uencn (34)

lnform><ion and
awon:,,o,. on
covcn,ni, (28)

•
•
•
Enliot public
p,r1icip11ion (G)

Technico!,
bbour support
,nd advice (2<J)

Ad,~cc (14)

Support weed
rnd vermin md
fire control (8)

.\ ..;,1,.;,1,
m.rcri.,l (4)
Ubour support

0)

suppotl f<ncinr,
cnrichmcnl pbnling
co,•cr full co,1, of property tillc changes
weed conlrol
bu);ng me,
exemption, for expcn,es incumd on comen•o1wn wo,k
cu,•er all or conrc .. ion of conscn·a1jon wo,k ond ;,.
rnoin1cn,nce
tax deduction, on expense, for J.nd maintcruncc
impro,;ng nrnirc comcrv.11lon ,ie"
tax reb>te, for ,·oluntem
c,ibon credit"" discount,
reduce mm~ dut •
cxpLiin impact of co,•e<unl> on hnd m,n,gcmrnt go,I,
explain ,ibO!ific,nec of con,ervaiion valu•s of ,pocif10 sites
crc,lc awarcnc,s of value of ~1dw,d.,,! contribulion to
con,crv,cion
promo le n11ural hetiu~c
educa1ion progr:uns fnr future generation, csrccially ,chools
promote ,nd cduc,fc L,ndholder, on bcnef1<, of co,·cn,nt, md
biodi,·crsin•

• co!t ,haring" a mean, to achiC\'lllg equitr "ith those ";thout
come!'\',Hion arc" by fonding tho,c 1h,c have
• public p.u1icip>tio11 o, • collcc1i,•c opproach to the ,ucccs, of
con,crv.1tion on ,rivale bnd,
• ,dcnltfica\io<> of species, no" ,n,\ fauna man,b :mont, and
ad,~ce and monogemcnt ,,.i,tancc on wood ond pest control.
• ''°'-ide onooine and free expert ,cl.ice
• make council '"d propct!)' owner liable for fcrol oroimah oi,d
noxious weeds on proper<)",
• keep wi1h prescribed mm,gcmcnt pbn, md fire conlro\
rcgune,,
• he] me,, the cmt of fire nicvcntion in ,rca, under a covcnanl
• provide ,w1ablc pbnts ,nd cqujpmcnt to port-time ,m,\1-scalc
Llndholdm
• 1emo,':I\ of diseased/ drying trees to cn,blc enrichment
nbntino. 1ourcc of 1,tx,u, cited"'"' oiccn com, ,·olnntcei,
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Appendix 4.33 continued
Incentive
gronp

Oeaired action
{Numhe,or
rcopondento)

Purpo,e/dcaired outcome

Policy and Legal
,rnngem,n1,

En1et lei,isbtion
ond enforce
regulation, (17)

• tcstcict use of ,uperphmphotes, pc,tiddes, ,nd poioon for
noxious pbnts on adjoining conservation propenic,
• change lcgisbtion to ensure co,ucrv,tion covcnon!O o,•.,cidc
minm cighcs
• enforce con,cr,;,ciun r«1ui«mcn1,
• chong< imurancc l:iw, on conl<ollcJ burning to 1cmove liabih1y
from lando";nen,
• strengthen fencing ,cgul,tion on creek frontage
• enfmce rc,,niction on clo,ring on pciv,lc nnd pubhc bnd
• enforce weed and ,-,rmin conuol on public and pri,•ote land
• oppl)' better mechod, 01hcr 1],on tulc, ""d rcguhciun, for
muli'°ting pcivatc bnd conscrv"tion
rem, wtcction nf,,..,terw.1 ·, frnm erosion ,nd nollution

(17)

.
Compens,to,y
mcaourc, (!5)

Financial
compensation
(15)
Recogni,ion and
encourogcmmt

• co,·cr for lo" nfpotcn1i,l carniug, or cn,i oi apprnpci,1c
in,n,gcmcnl of the con,erv,tion orca, ond lo" in land «s,lc
,·aluc
• pubhc ,dno"·ledgcment ofLuidholdcts fo, taking up covmont

Lc,dcrohip (8)

Lead b)' example

O,!l'nizotiono\

'"

• engage mote ,c1isc momgcmmt p,n,cularl)' in de1cciorating
ublic lands
• ,implif)' apphca1io11 procedure, and applLc,1100 <0quiroment, in
fundioe and ,,ants
• make cm•en,nt, irre,•ocohle in the fu1ua:

Rccogni1io11 (9)

,,,

'"'
o<hnioimotivc
amngcments (8)

Reduce
bmcoucracy (5)
,\,su,ancc ,bout
cnve,unt f2l
Mediation (l)

• convince other< of 1he benefil of placing a permanent co,·enant
on ,imila< auJ adjacent Lind,
• Mediate bcn,·ccn lon<'o""°" of adjacent properties on
c~neerv,tion is,uc,
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Appendix 4. 34

Views of Fcov-Vic !sndhol,krs on the Local Go,·,,rnmcnt policies or actions as
incentives

Incentive group

Dc,ircd oction

type {total

(Number of

number

re,ponden!O)

or

ne,nondento\
Economic and
Finonci>1
lnccn1i,·c, (69)
Tcclmica\ bbour
support and odvicc
(36)

"'°~

R.11cs rebate (61)
Fmanci,l
assjstancc (II)

,ition of the con,cr>'Ot!On effort
• in
• fund for weed ond vermin control
• lou• cost fln,ncine for conscmicion work

l.ab<llLt and
machinery (20)

• v,ced control and emd,cotion of pcm in the co,•enantcd "'""
,nd on ru,d ,•erge,

Ad,icc ond
tcchnlcol suppon

'"
!nfo,motion ond
Aw.t!COC5S (26)

Commen1/de,ircd outcome

lnfonnotion on
cm•cnacu, (10)
Edurotion and
awarcnc'5 (16)

• ftoe 1o,n or low cost hire of machine!)' and equipment for
he»1· cooscrvat;o., work
• material for fencing and ere co
• tJOd.,dc ,igos Ot> onim,l picscnco
• seed, and machine!)' for rc,·cgc"'ion
• laboUI as<i,t1nrn for conscrvacion works
• facilitate occes, to ,dvice on conscrvorion
• Elabor.11< on cnnsem1tio<1 1Cquircmont• by council
• prov1do full 1ime c1wironmcnt.i\ advicc lhrough spcciali,cd
people
• ad,1,e on lornliscd bnd manogcment
• maintain cnnt,,ct with landhold«s
• provide ,.,,;,unce mote f,eely
• '"istancn,ith fencii1e
• enhance knowledge ,bout co,·cn;nt,
• in,·olvc the ,nedi> in ,he exercise
• educate the public on W.)'S of idmlif)lllg loc,l os,cts
• puhlicise cuVOTl,1'>1$ and lhe,r benefito
• commence au~«ncs, progr,n,s nn conse"•atioo values
educate the public o" rights ond re,pomib1lj1tc, in
comcn•,,1jon
• educate cst,ic ,gents on conserv,do" ,•olue,
• e<eote public ou.•aicnc" o:, ovail:ibilily of rates a:Juction
• vicwcomcrvalion., a component oflhc whole fann
man,Qement

•
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Appendix 4.34 continuc<l
Incentive gton('

Dc,i.«d action
(Numbuof
respondent•)

Purpo,c/dcoircd ou(comc

Po~cy :uid L:g,1
•n1ngemcnt, (23)

Ap(>ropn>lc
policies (11)

• policy on weed and post cmlicotion patticubrly 10
neighbouring pro pert,.,,
• b,bn«d policy 1h,t «sogui>c, the !lC<cssilj' of conscl\'>rion
• policy on ro1d,jJc Hgc!a\jnn
imprnve policic, on rnad wotk• in con,crvolton zone,
• change policy on 1:1,:0, r,iing on cou,crvo1ion .,.,,
• enact opprnpri<te lcgisG!inn rc,1ui<ing the setting aside of
land porrion for comctv.tinn and <lr<mRct b)•·bw; o" land
clc11.ince
• enforce 1estrie!ion on dcatLng of vege,ation,
• enforce Luilding rnJ,s
• enforce penal~· for lack of weed control on private land
• di,courar,e trcsj»ssen on private prnp«tj• under
conscr,,auon
• cuib vioGtion, of ,.,ndan!, and ,.,ming Ly penahsrng non·
comptimce
• morn contrnl of domestic anim,I
• oct1on on weed in 1,uLlic l,c,ds
• ,upport cooperation wi1h ncL~hbou<S
• organise mc'l.1i'1gs on conscrv,tion i,sue, for landown«s
• ,uppo<t heritage listing,
• eng,gc boner rnlbhorat!on ";,1, Si,tc dep:n!mcnts ";!h
,c,oons,hilitv for n>turc conscrvoiion
• greater focu, on c,wirnnmcntal is,ue,
• p mvidc positi,·e ,upport fut comcrv>tion
• support comervation man,Reme'1t oc1i,01ic,
• cn,mc bcltcr m,na~ement of ncighbou<Lng public land
• imprnve water ,c,omce on1n,gemcnt,
• cre>tc sumin,Llc ond attrac1i,·e en,;rnnmcnt for ccoloL1rimt
• offct conces,jon, for ,ubdivisjnn
• idenlify and d0<norc,1m~ con>Otvation ,ensiri,•e areas
• recognize cunser,,atinn wmk and c (Ji,rn
• «coenizc consc"•,tluc, need, ,ncl acrions
• ,dopl imcgra1cd conservation and bnd,use planning and
monitoting,
• monitor of con,ervaliun heal<l1,
• better phnn"'!\ scheme, which in dude zoning of
conservation ate"
gre>tcr focus and increased comcn•otion priority on
cnoirnnmcntol v,l"cs in lannin~

.

Enfo,ccmcnt
(12)

Con,cn.,,tion
lcadcuhip and
management (1 BJ

Conscn•otion
bdor,hip (9)

l'rnactivc
support f:'r
conscr..1uon

'"
"ii:Ccogniti~n ,nd
encouragement (9)
Orgoniz,tionol ond

oLIT.inim,tive
arnngcments (8)

Recognition (9)
l'Gnning a11d
monl1oring
rcgUile, (7)

.
,,

ICompcn'1to,y
mcasuru(S)

Jnfnmuctun:

• maini,in infras!,ucl"tc like rood, dose to con!Cl\'ltion

Compen'1tC or
buyback (5)

• for la~d token out of pmduc1ion or
• Luv hock conscrv11ion a<co, of 1he lond
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Appendlx4.35

Reason, for rcsist.ancc to uptake ofpcmioncnt covcn:uus among fixed·tenn
agreement (Victoria) respondent,

View

View•
cote rie,

Specific commenta

Non
p,rticip,tion (5)

No to
penn,nenl
covcn,nlo (5)

• More bcncfici,l to pro,1de cdue>tion on the bcnefito of
con,cr,,'ltion ro l:rndholclcn
• prefer lo eJucotc J,ei,, on con,crvation impcr:.ti,•eo
• p,cfm:nce for 01hormcd11n!!mo such" Deed, and Tru,IO
and fmd·tenn •greemcnto
• app«hcn,jon of any Ko1·cnunent 1ntcrvcnt10n
• mi!lrll!1 ofSutc Go,·cmmcnt, •nd ]oc.,l outhoritie, to
£Cnuino1y ,uppon con,ervation
• confident oboul furn« LHld nl>n•gcr,' will and ,bili!j· 10
maintain con,crv,tion .aluos 1mhout • co,·cn:rnt
• l>eli<f 1h,1 nature consctVOlion should l,e kft ro l:iodholdcn
• no po,cei,·cd ,ignific,ncc m med for a co,•en,nt
• co,·01\0nto would m,kc futmc s,le difficult
• not oppropn,tc duo ro noturc of cxpomling u,oge of prorcrtY
onJ their bmi1arion•
• unccn,ln1y abo•,1 the ,b,lity of rcnn•ncnt covenant', long
tmn ability to protect conscrvotion ore,
• foe ri,k, due 10 co,·,n,nt,

II

,,

))
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Vie\\'S of fcov-Wcitcn, Aunrnlio bndholdcr,1 ou the St.ote Government
policies or action," incentive,

Appendix 4, 36

Incentive
group
(Total
number of
rcsnondcnto
Economic ond
fin:tnml
incentiYc, (&9)

Desired
acdon
(Numb<rof
re,pondonto)

Purpose/ desired outcome

Finand.21
,uppon (47)

•
•
•
•
•
•

Fencing cost,
(22)
Compcns,tion
meo,meo (32)

Compc11,ation
fodmd token
out of
production (28)

Cumpeno,tc
lorn!
go,·cmmcnt,
Lind putch,se
{13\

Facilir,ciYc
Coven,nt
mcchan;,m (9)

Tcchnicol,
l,bour ,uppon
ar,d ad,'ice (9)

J!l

llur offhnd

"'

flexible ,nd
,;n,plc
covenant
process ,n,I
mcch,nj,m (9)

,,,

Vermin conuol

in,·okc the public in helping to fmancc projccu
tax incen1il·c, ,ucli., cut in fud taxes
interest free fmancing
01mu,l p•rmrnts to bndholdcn
,,. inccnri,·c, for fencing,
100 to 200 percent tax deduction of all col\ocrv11ion <o>t including
en ten" O CO\'Cl\1UI
• cm·cr co,t of fr.,cing and maintenance
• p,ni,l hl 101,] co,•er of co,t

• allow chal\ge on 1hc u,c of that land to holp f>rmen co,·cr ,he com,
lo» of ",come, cost of ge11ing alten,,oi,·c cleared land dm,,hcrc,
,nd lo» of K'"""g ,ight,
·;nuuol p>pncnt fo, l,nd ,ct aside in rclum for use of arc• fo,
re,carch ,nd cJuc,tjon,1 purpu,es
,n ,nnual foe- $50 for example, fo, bnclholdcr, to man•K" the
coosctv.rnon '""
rcimbur,c b<ldu>J.,o<r, • poiccnt,go oflo!I income from bod umlcr
cm·cn,nt
• ~ermit to clc:tr uscfo\ ,oncultur>l Im~ in cxch,n"c for, co,·cn,ot
• co,·cr "'' tcbm, p,.,ed on tn bmlowncr,

•

.
.

• llur off ore,o ,.,.,hich crnno, be clootcd due to the 2()% rullrlg
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

n,,;b,lit)' ,nd cb,itr of tho coven,nt mcchani,m
make the COYen,nt le" har,h md, pk"'"" to),,,.•
allow arc,, under, co,·enaot 10 bo u,cd by otock in drough, '"""'"
rcmo,·e bncl nol used for p,nJuction frnm ti,le
coc10i,tency in '5suing • co,•«,ant
coorJin,tion "-ilh other rnn,m:,i,on ,1,a1egic•
>trc>m~n,ng fundmg dcli,·cr)', '""'J»!CUC)' and cl,rit)' of the
«quircmcnto for funding ,pprnv,l
<nKogi,·g a follow·up p«><c" 10 holp hndmmer tu enter, co,·enmt
monitor ofgranl moncr and cun,c"'•lio" >«.,
penalise uffcndm of SC! out con,cl\'"100 condotiom :md mea,urc,
ensure a co,t cff,cm·c cnven,nt nrocc"
vermin con,rol on the wiCe rnad •·••K•• ,long m,in ro,d,
1oul ,c,ponS1biln)' fn, ve1min control in bu,hbnd all onr the Scare
oUow ,he u,o "'Y<X!OC to kill foxe, and cm
sunnort older !:.ondholder, in conuollin° vermin ,nJ weed
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Appendix 4,36continucd
lncrntivc
group
(f o!al number
of rcspondcn,o
Org,n11,uon,1

'""

ailmini,tr;tP,c
mongcmonts (9)

Duircd
action

(Number of
re•nondents\
Snc,mhnc
,n,n,gomcnl

'""

coonlln,uon of
con,crntion
pwg•mn (4)

Profc,.,,m,1
,d,·icc md
guid1ncc (3)

Rcmo1•al o(
burc•"cr;g· (2)

Rccognilion and
•rrrcci11ion (5)

lnformot10n •nd
.~"·,reno" (SJ

Purpo•c:/duired outcome

1',nn101ion of
co1·enm1> ,nJ
conoe"·,uun (5)

• wrt out 11,c i55Uc ofpropctl)' lc,.c ch1ngc ill ,cl..tjon 10 n,iiyc

1itlc
• pl.cement of funWJl!l mp r>Ctinl con,crn,ion work •nJ le"
on rc,c,a:h
• o<ldrc" the "'"' of wale< u•c ond ,ck>!c in propcnic,
ndghhourirtg cun,crntion "'""
cllrify wl,o i, rcopon,ihlc for cnn,c"c.tion
rcin,bunc L<><>l gm·cmmcnn for rm, foregone to
bndhnldcn "'bn cn1er 1ntn ncrm,ncnt CO\'Cnant!
tcb'ULir up,btc, nn m,Hagcn1c,,r op1inm for r..1turc ,c,crw,
,.,nd;,J
• ,d,·icc on hrncfil> of n>1urc Conoen·,t,on
• ,d,'lcc 0<1 managing n,1urc comcf\'lli,,n >tC1' ,o the)' Jon't
become 1 brecdin~ NounJ for 1·cnl!in am.I wcod,
• h>l'C few doprnmcnlO and bu<c.,LC<>IO
• c"'>te, more direct''"" to bndholdcn
• mnm.,.J of 1hc ;pplicauon prncc» for cm·cn,nlS 1nd
renfar.cmont '-\11h 1n ,dvi,o,,• nmcc,s
• ,how an icuctc!I from time to 1imc
• ,ccogni,c primary produce!>' Input in,o conso"'"Lo11 effort,
• puhbc ,cknowledg,mcnt of tho conunilmcnt, of Lrndholdeu
"'ho pl;cc bnd under con>orv,tion
• cnCOLlU •• octwit10, of un,itholo •im ,nd ,imtl,r ,rnun,
• m,rkct 1hc v;lue of 1,nJ under con>erv>lion

,.,,,1c,

•
•
•

• '"'"""'" of benefit, 1ari;<1cd ,t 1hc loir•l p1ofc.,in'1
• incrcssc publLCLt)' on ... ,tl,b1li,r of """""'•fjon gr,nt,
• educ.ij,,n on 1he 'bigger pi<turc' and rclc,•ancc of
conoerv11ioo deoni10 lhc
of coosc"·adon ;, n«co,un•

co"'
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Appendix 4. 37

Incentive
group (Tot,]
number of
rc1nondents\
Economic
inm>1i,·e,

co

Nonp,micipalorJ' role
forlocol
Go,·emmcnt

View, of Fcov-\Vestem Australio landholdcrs on the I..oc•l Government
policies or actions as incentives
Dceircd <1.ction
{Number of
reepondcnts)

Comments/ dc5ircd outcome

lure, ,ob>to (57)

• 2r, '°'l"'"dcni, ""m 101,.Jlr exempt from""'
• 2l rc,,w,ndeni. ""m • nar1i,l <cducijon in the t.te,
• feni:u1g sub,idio, (m,teriol and etcclion), and w"d onJ
cermin cunuol
• ,ub,idizc foe protcclion
• fund Inca! l,ndcare oroun,
• co,·«conscrvolion exprn,c, rrnging from 150 to 200% IOx
concernon.

\'onou, kinJ, of
fin,nml ,uppu11

,.,

Reduction in l.nd
tax and lax
inccnti,·e, m
No role for J.nc,1
Go,•enHnenl (17)

''"

•
•
•
•
•
•

'

,,

,1,rc go1·crnmMI "'l'°'"ihility
hule finoncc <''<llablc for th;, wo,k
re,pon,ibtlu)' of I.CDC,
not rcspon,ible mo ugh with their own com«n1iun n«ds
,heir ,n,·oh•emcnt l,kol)' to imp,ct on r.itc P'l"'"
frdetol gn,•enu»rnt', rcspnr,.,1,ilit)' 10 pro,•i<le fund, 01 ra
Uocc.>11\'C!

Technical,
inft.strUCIUfO
,upport, and
advice (IS)

,\s,imnce wuh
vmnirt onJ weed
comrul 18\
Technbl
ouppmt (4)

Ad,-icc (3)

{

Admirti,nation,
m,n,gcmmt, and
pl1nnirtg (7)

l'roae1i,·c role in
man,gomcnt ,nd
pl,nning (6)

Information onJ
awucncs, (6)

CoorJin.iion (1)
lnfonn,iion
puLlid,)' (6)

Recognition onJ
opprcciation (4)

Public
recognition (4)

'

,.,J

• alrc,d • hnvc a 1'1<« ioL ,o.,nhn,ttn~ o0 riculrurc
• conirol fetal a,11,nol ,n,I v.,coJ in,·.,,o" no road ,•ergcs
odjacent I<> conservation ore,
• employ engincm v.-i1h kn<>Wlcdge ,ml opprecu!io" of the
environmenc
• u·.c m,chine npe«lot> th>t ,how<>« for notu<.!l ngetation
• cotrect drna,ge work octos, to,od, hoth eo\!ering ,nd
]o.,·ing cbc pt<Jperty
• ,,.istv.-ich ru,J, ,cce" mck, if needed
• ,howbcmfu, of mime comcrvation
• ,how how 10 m,n,go nature conservation ,re,s for control
of ,•ermin md v.·ced,
• m:uuge bnd rnbdi,-i,i~c. '" ,,isure retention of mnn,n1
hu,h <CO<)'Slcm.
• ,How ne.ablo foe management
• o,,i,, landholder, with pfanning 10 cnh,nce ptopcrl)'
pmfiubiLicy
• >pend mo« fund, on ,o~ comen•,tion
• ,how more honc,ty and undotSt>nding when considering
oppbc.rion for work th,r "-'OUld offcct neighbnu,s' cffon, to
preserve noi, ,nJ foun,
• nrotcct "-"""'" ·•
• co-orJin,ic m·:ue Se, to hanJlc all local mohlems
• pro,i~c sign to propertie, identifying l,ndO\mct ,, ri,·e,
c,rc/1'.,ldhfc l,ob,t1t/ we1bnd
• puLlicil)· ofluc,I con,m•auon ,cti,it1os
• ,upp<>lt sensitisation oF pubLie on 1hc s,crificc bf
lmdholdm in con,en-::ition
• provide ro,d,id, ,ign,ge
• support bo1aniciU oun·ey, 10 cotaloguo no rive specie, on
nri,·otc land
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Apptndix 5.1

Length of tim, of property ownftship in family
Victoria

Period in ~ca,s

<'

2to5
6to 10
I\ 10 20
211030

,.,

31 to40
Total

Appendix 5.2

'

\Vc•t•m Australia
Couot
~
;
;

1'%
>A

Count

w
""
"so"
'"
Consetvation

,,,.,

'
""
'"'"'"

u

rn

12.0
14.1
13.4

0.0
41.5

,oo

\4,B
15.4

''"
38.9

100.0

features on properties in Western Australia and Victoria

Wc•tem A11a1r11lia

Victoria
Conocrvatioo fca\uics
Stte;un/RiV<</ Creek,
Wetland,
Notivc llu,h/l'o«•t
N11ivc Gro,s
Pb.nted ta,eo/pbnto
Salt bu,1,co/S,lt bkcs
01h,rs

% Response•

c~unto

% Rc•ponsc•

"

48.2

"
"

17.8

29.9

"
"
""
•'

43.8
19.!I

.,,

"•

87.9

•

;;

,.s
,;

;

,.,
"'

11.7

'

None

Appendix 5.3

Count•

,.,

;

l'rimory reasons for rct.ining nature consctvation fcatu«s

Rcosons for retaining noturc
con,ervation areas
Sc1Sonal Grozing
For Rec«atjonal use
Future agricultuc.11 mo
To ,uppon \lilJ~fe comcfl'ation
To ,upport no live vegetation
To oct a, wind b,cak, or buff«
To act o, • wiMhfc corridor
For scenic ro,son,
l'o, soil >1liflil)' control
Co>t of d.an'ng for cropping or
P"lurc is not ecooomir,1
A, shade aod ,l,dtcr for >1ock
Pro,~sion of f,c,h v,otcr
Lond no, ,ui11blc for farming
Rct.ined by previou, OV.'11<"·

Victoria
% Re,pondento

Frequoncy

;

,.,
,.,'"

'
'

'"
"'"

11.9

IG.6
13.2

's

''
s.,
••

;;

"
"
"•
;

17.9
9.27
2.65

,..""

Pro,~lion of wa!Nwoy
Soi! cro,ion conlrol

;

O<hcr1

281

Wntcm Australia
Frequency

•
'
"
"n
0

.,.,

% Ikopomlcoto

;

u

,.,

19.3

12.S

'

",.,

"
"
"
•

15.3

;

D

'
;

,,

,.,
"••
"'

13.l

--

,_or:a:wJ177T~

Appendices

Appendix 5.4

S1ar,:mcnts,

Proportion, of respondent< according to their rnticipation of retention of
oWilership and management of the property in d1e family

...

Victoria
Re,oon,cs
Tru,

F,lsc
Not ,ure
TotJ

Appendix 5.5

1 pla• lo rrr,,i• Jh, ,,wr.a!!m•I of my p,r,p,,;;·

I ph• Jo rrlain ""'""'"'P of"!)' proprrty .;1/Jin
th, Jami'/ in /h, f•lurt.
Count

""
""'

~,,1,;, rh,fami!J i• lh, f•l•n.

Western Ausualia
Count

70.2

''

19.9
100.0

Victoria
Count

%

"'
"rn,

,.,

'"'"
"'"

85.3
.l.7

11.0
100.[

Wester:. Austr.1lia

%
72.5

Count

17.6
100.0

1%
84.3

,,

"''

"ma

]0.2
]00.0

Lc,·cl of knowledge about permanent covenant among respondents without auy
form of n covenant
Western Ausu:i.lia

Victoria
Index of
knowledge

",'
'

L,•.-cl of knowledge
of permanent
covc11an1,
No knowledge
J.i1dcknm,kdgc
Foir knowledge
Good knowlod c

Frequency

""
no
"
~

18.0
12.2
100.0

35.5
30.0
20.0
14.5
100.0

ltcspomc on desire to know more ,bout permanent covenants

S lalrm,11/: I wo11/d lik, lo know mort ~bo111 urmanm/ ronnant,
Vicmria
Reononoco

""
""'"

Tor,J

Wea tern Auotralia
Count

31.2

!'/,1
22.3

47.l

58.3

21.7

19.4
100.0

Count

Tru,
F,hc
Not Sure

Appendix S. 7

('/,)

Frequency

38.l
Jl.7

,,""
"'"

Tot,J

Appendix S.6

(%

%

\(11).0

'"

Affili,tion an<l association with nature con,crv.,tion groups smong
respondents without a covenant or agreement in Victotia and
Western Au,rnLia

Numborofgroup,

\'jctoria
Count

None
One group
Two group•
1b,ee gro'1p•

More rh,n 3 group•
Total

"
"
"
%

''"

Western Aumalia

('/,)

Count

(%)

'"

"

29.4

68.6

,,

17.1

.,

SS

49.l

'"'

16.l

"'

100.0

'

100.0
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Appendix 5,8

Jn!1ucnce of i,eighhours and friends on permanent coven,nt uptake

Stat,minl: I ,wu!d bt indintd lo mfrr a pmnantnl nat,m ,vnJ<n,1/ion ro,tnt1nl on my land if a1igh/xJ11ring
landhold," or rimd, ,rith ,imilar na111rul artaJ /w~ a m,anlnl ro,~nan/ on 1h,1".

Victoria
Rcopan,ca
St. Disag,:cc
Disog«e
Ncuu,\
Agree
St. Ag,:cc
Don't know
Totol

Appendix 5,9

Western Australia

'

Count

"'""
'"'
'""

,.

Count

13.5
27.0
19.9
0

Cm1nt

"""
""

Dio,g«e
Ncutrol
Ag,ec
St. Agree
D/Know

.,.

Count

s.;

"'"w

36.0
18.9

'

''"·"

,;

s,

•

13.5
18.0

"

Pcrccpcions of the effectiveness of permanent covenants for salinity

rnmrol

. Appendix 5.11

Count

",,

""
"
'"
,0

{'lo

(%)

Count

."

'"

w

24.S
18.2
16.4

''

"
'""

\l.8
100.0

10.7
2?.3

n.,

,0

21.4
100.0

"'""'

Landholde,s' perceptions of •ppattnt permsncnt covenant
benefits

ld/1mml: TM btn,/ill o a Nm1anmt ro;,nan1 art no/

Victoria
Rc,non,e
St.Ag,cc
,\g«e
Neutnl
Di,ogrcc
St. Disogree
D/Know
Totol

13.9
100.0

%
23.2
29.6
11.3
21.8

Stal,ment, 'p,,man,n/ roNnanlr an ,m iffe11i,~ m"hanim, a1 ra/mi!)• ron/rr,/ m;arum
wbtri it omm on hri1dl< /and,.
Victoria
Western Australia
Rcopon,e

10.2

Attitude to pcrm,nent co,•cnont rc>lrictions on some u.c, of the
conservation land

Re,ponsc
St. Disog,ec

St, DiHg,:co
Dis,g«c
N,u1ral
Ag,oc
St. ,\1-;,:co
Don'( know
Toto]'

"'s,

...

""

100.!l

S1a1tmml, I J., not mind ,nuring a ron,mation mwrff!mmt lhal n·o11!d •ntail p,,manml
rrmillion, on 1om, Iliff o tb, ron1m,,,1ion land.
Victoria
Western Australia

Appendix 5.10

]9.4
27.8

"'",s
",s'

25.5

Coubt

""
""•
"'"

rinl lo m,'

Wcs1ern Auslt'.1.lia
%

Count

,;;

"
"'
""
«

31.2
15.6

,0

15.G

""·'

;

100.0
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r'lo1
32.7
40.0

,.,

,,,.•

l].8

100.0
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Appendix 5.U bndholdcrs' ottitodes to tbe offitiacion of• Co,·ensntce to Government

Siol,mmt, 1 JJJ0111d on!J p/ar, a prrnw•ml ,.,.nan/ on "!Y kmJ wit/, an organiz.ab'on tlml;,
i.od,p,nd,nJ oft/1< Go,m1mml
Vicmria
Count

Resnonse
St Dis,grcc

n

o;,.gtce
Neutr,i]
Agree
St. Ag,eo
Don't know
Totol

'"
"
n'
""

Appendix 5.13

"'''

16.4
100.0

Victoria
Count

25.7%

"'"
'"
n•

28.1%
13.7%
21.2%
3.0%

"'

"
"n
•
"'""
1999

14.2
25.5
\D.4

,.,

\8.9

100.0

Western Australia
Count
('lo)

(%

H

{'/,)

n.o

(5

Tot:,l mcdion income ofrc,pondcnt.s in

""
"'"'
"

8.4%

100%

00

2J,J%

8.8%

11.0%
14.4%
3.3%
38.9%
100%

Prnportion of respondents L,y labour comntitmcnt on the property

Labour commitment
,core clo.,e,
Ze,o
] ,02
3 10 4
5 108
9 to 15

Victoria
Prnportio,
Count

Western Australia
Count
Proponioo

C,,

'"

"""
'""

Total
Mean ,cote (points)
Std, Deviation
Moximwn ,cotes

•

''

H

>(5

Appendix 5.15

Western Australia
Count

20.0
40.0

;o

Annual median income (A$)
350000,b,
15001-75000
75001-150000
150001-255000
255001-100000
400001-490000
Total
Appendix 5.14

,,.
,.,

'
"

21.3
13.5
20.6

'"
"'
n

'"

+<

12,1
100.0

,.,

12.27

m

/'/,)

'

(

""

10.7
14.l
W.5
:19.3
100.0
14.32
12.37
55

Reception of financiol support for conmvotion work

Stat,m<nl." Ha,,,;·011 "~' IT<rfr,Jjinand,,/ I11pporl/ brnrjit, to 11n1krlakt na/art ronm,'llrion 1:10,k
on ·011r /JnJ Imm an ' on,ani•a/io• or ,lrMrlm10/(
Fttquency of financial
OUbbOfl

None

o,~
More than once
To!al
Appendix 5.16

Victoria
Count

.

"
"'"'

(%

\VcstcmAustralia
Coun1
("/,)

44.0

M

n.,

"'"
"

32.1
100.

J.cvcl of landholders' deb, on the properties

284

69.5
16.B

13.7
100.0

Appendices

Western Augttalia

Victoria
Dc~t omow,I in AS
None
<100,000
100,000 to 300,000
300,001 to 500,000
> 500, 000
Totol
Appendix

5.17

32.1
30.0

""
""
""

30.2
11.3

""
"

n.o

n.o

2H

"'
'""

10.0

,oo
''

0

'I,\

Count

('lo

C<>unt

,s

100.0

Lan,lholders' perceptions of permanent co,·cnant's impact on land value

S/al,mm/: '.•1 /l<rman<r.l ro,~nant fr /iJ:.,f,· to !r,1d to a lot1 ,n m~rk,I 11,/11, cfm • nn,

Victoria
Re,oon,o
St. rn,,g,oc

Count

Western Australfa
Proou<tion f'/,1

t'rooonion f'lo\
Count
9
6.3

o;,.g,co

24

16.8

7

Ncutrol
:lgroc

27
41

JR.9
28.7

18
28

9.\
6.4
16.4
25.S

St. Agree

24

1(,.8
12.r,

32

29.\

rn

D/Know
Toi-.!

Appendix S.18

'"

lO

15

""

100.0

13.6
100.0

Rc,pome on the effectiveness of pcnnsncm covenant over other
mechanisms

S/a/tntM/." Thmt arr merr 1Jtdi,~ mrdJJni1m, Ihm ,.,,/i,nlal)' p,rman,n/ ro,·rnan/s far promo/in!,
/ht !ang-lrmt n11/11rr ronumllio• on p,;m1, /11nJr,
Wcotom Auotrolia

Victoria
Rc,ponoo

Count

St. Di.,gree
Di,agroe
Ncutr,l
Agree
St.Ag«•
Don"tknow
Tot1I

Appendix 5.19

('lo

",.s

0

"""
""
'"

29.6

20.4
9.9

27.5

HlO.O

u
u
25.0
28.7
16.7
14.8
100.0

Western Australia

Victoria

To11l

••
""
""
'"

l'ercentsge income ratio from property to median total onnuol income

Pucen1ago rotio of
Income
Nil'/0
12-30 'lo
31-50%
51-70%
71-90'1,

o,·.,90%

('/,)

C<>um

Count

"""
,."'"
"'

(%
1\.4

20.5
13.7
<.O
17.4
28.8
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Count

'

'

0
0

.

""

('/,)

,.,o.,•
o.,

13.G

55.6

,oo
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Apl'('ndix 5.20

Prc·rcqui,ites for perrnoncru co,·enam upukc in Victoria and Western AumaLio

&,,ph'o. •!!"1"'"1

l'•blfr rm>g•ih'on aod
appr,d,;h'oa of 1h,

oJ,,'c, •• "'"""""''"·

(ll"1tn'1ti,. ,..,,.,, ,. th

Vkraria Wooccrn

,.·
I.I

Auotu!ia
Re,pon,e
Dofinitclr

Jmnnrtant
l'rab,hi)'
Jmn~mnr
Neu,ral

l'rnb,b]y Nol

lm•art,nt
Def. Nc,t
]mn< <!ant

No opinion
/Don't know
'foul,

"''

Vic1oria

Wo,tern Victoria Wo,rem Vk!aria Wootero

Au,ualia

Au,inlia

Au,tralio

35) 24.8

24) 22 9

13) 9.2

(12)11.J

43)30.5

28)26.4

58)41.1

(0)38.1

47) 33.3

21) 20.0

33) 234

18)17.0

48)34.0 (33)31.l

39)27,7

32)30.5

(23) ](, .1 (24) 22. 9

38)27 .0

,28) 26.4 (25) 17.7

19) 17.9 (22) 15.6 (13) 12.4

20) 14.2

18) 17.1

,25) 17.7

25) 23.6

13) 9.2

14) 13.2

9) 6.4

10) 9.5

21) J.1.9

15) 14.2

5) J.5

8) 7.6

11) 7.8

8) 7.5

IDS)
100.0

141) 100.0 !06)
100.0

!(-r, 5.0
141)
100.0

Vicmria
Count

"""
'"•
"""

Dio,gtcc

Ncu1rol
Agrco
s,..~gm,

Dan'tknaw
Toul

j(7} 5.0

8) 5.7

5)4.8

kr. 6.6 bJ 5.0

6) 5.7

Im 5.0

9) 8.6

141)
100.0

105)
100.0

5) 4.7

141)
100.0

!06)
100.U

Western Australia

,,,

Count

10.1
23.2
31.2

1%

12.7
18.2
32.7
11.8
10.9
13.6

'""

""
""uo

'",·'..

,oo
''

100.0

Views on compensotion for permanent oovcnont uptake b)· l.ndholdeis

Victoria
Reo=n,e

%

'

Diugrce

"

11.3
17.7

""
•

36.9
27.0

,;

Neut,,!
Agree

"'

Western Australia

,..

Count

St. Di.,grce

Sr.,lg,oo
Don't Know
Toul

"'""""'lioo

(Caun1)o/, (Count)'/, (Counl) o/, (Coum) % (Coun1) '!. (Cuun<) o/, (Count) o/, (Count) o/,

Reonon,e
St. D,.,grce
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A11•rooft ef hog trrm RK,ption ef oo;g,,ing
'"1/Jm (l)Oltnuh',a
fna,cMfar

hog:-1,mrm"'"('l"'W

Counl

,.,

100.0

''°
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.,

''

""'w"

,,,
;.;

IM
21.8
46.4

,.,

100.0
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Appendix 5.23

View,; on bearer of co,ts of entering a pcm,ancnt cm·cn:mt

S1011111ml: Th, IOJI ojtolm'•!. o p,m,,mol ro1<noot on "!1 hoJ
" '""I•=,;,.,;,,, iJJui"' rh, tootnonl.

,,,.,,IJ h, '"'""J l:J th,

Victoria

Appendix 5.24

,,'
"rn

c..~,

,.,
no

100.0

"'""
"

,.,,.,

W,

'•

18.7
36.0
29.5

;,

"'

WcstcmAusttalia

"'·
'';o

Couot
;

R••"omo
St.Dis•gr«
p;,.g,ce
Neutril
,lgiec
St. Agree
Undecided
Total

16.4
30.9
36.4
12.7
100.0

Expected public contribution to cost of conservation on private bnd,

Q,,ti~"on: ll'"b.,I p,tunl•!! ef th, IOJI ef oo/ur, '"""""'h'" '"J'"' t,,,J Jo JON nmid,r ,h,uld b, ,oemJ l!J
'"' ..bli.l

Expected public
conlribulio11 inf'/,)

I

Victoria
Conni

""

'" •

,,..,

rn

41·50
5!·60
61·60

"•

1·10
11·20
21·20

>M
Tola!

'

'
rn

"""

Wcotern Aumalia
(%)

,.,

25.4

H
,s
,.,

28.0

,.,,s

lt.O

100.
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Count

'" '
''
'
'"'
'

"

,0

(%)

31.1

''''"
"'"
M
M

10.0
17.8
100.0
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App..ndix 5.25 V,.tfable corrclotion for respondents with no covenant or ~gtcement in landholders (Victoria)

Pconon Attitudes to•
Corrohcion pcrm"'1cnt covorunt
uptake
Econ_dcpcnd
Knm,,1cdgc
Con_inuerest
AS"
Restrictions
Valuc_lo"
Bene6ts
Sig. (I-toiled) Attitude, rn •
perm,.,,ent co,;cnrn,
upuke

Econ_deperul

Atti111des to, Econ_depcnd
pcrnunent
eo,•orunt u ukc
,.ooo
-212

-212

,.ooo

"'"

.014
-.001

300
-.118

.076

"'

-296

-365

.009

Knc.wlcdgc
Con.Jm<rcs<

·""'

A"

.000

Restriction,
Value..Jo,s
Bcnc6"

.000

.000

.oo,
.000

-.041
.018

=
.000
.495

.421
.199
.013

Benefits

-.118

-365

Con_intercst

AS"

..

3W

-296

300

-.001
.107

-.041
.013
-.124

.018

.076

.,oo

.,~
'"'

-396

-.112

-.055

-.081

~

.014

,.ooo

,.ooo

.107
.013

'"'

-.047
.000

.316

LOOO

,094

.000

.421
.000

.199
.000

.013
.107
.183

.150

.119

.«,
.OM

.084

·"''
""
.m ""
'"
""

288

,,,'"'

,.ooo

.119

.107

1.000

-.025
-.074

.495

.000

-.313

.154

""

..,,
·""'

-.074

,.ooo

- ,,.

""'

-.025

-.124
-.055
-.081

-396
-.lll

.,V.;J

·""
.324

RestrictioMValm:..Jos,

Knowledge

.M>
,,,

-.313

2"

.w,

.000

""'

,00

.000

.
-.047

·""'
.ooo
,00
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Appendix 5. U

Coefficient table of final path model fur respondents with oo covenant or agreement in landholders (Victoria)
Unst=dudized
O,.,fficicnts

'
(Coruwu)
Econ...depcnd
Kno,,·ledgc

Con....inter=t

3375
-6.o97E.03
.175

~·"''

Stmdudized
O,.,fficients
Std. Error

.665

.oo,
.091
.076

.oo,
·2447E.02
Age
.ow
Restrictions
.oo,
Vi!ne,_los,
-.114
.073
B-...nefits
a. dependent V>ri>bk: attitudes IO a pen=cnt cov=t upi,,ke

n,

Sig.

,_

-.181
.!SJ
2"
-218

5.078
·2.487
\.923
2921
·2.968

.JOO

3.995

·.140
.291

·1.666
3.735

...

95% Confidence
Jnte"':U foe B
Lowe,- l:lound

.014
.057

4.C,91

•.011

•. 001
.355

m,

"'
·'" ·"'
·""

-.041

w,
....

.rn,

·2'0
.128

=

289

2058
•.,1()5

=
·=
....

u,~

&-<

.415
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Appendix 5.27

Variable Corrd,.tion fur respondents with no covenam or~greemcm in landholders (\Vcstem Austtalio.)
Anitudes to Con_interest

Length Fin_support Membcr,;hip ConRatio

Salinity

VofoeJo,s

.080

35'

_,,.

.055
-.135
·.088
~106

-.034
-.214
-.14\
-.106

Bellefit> Restrictions

pcrm,.nent

covenant
u nke

'="

Corrd.>cion

Anilllde. to

.177

.m
-.195

·.195

·.111

LOOO

.205

.,m

.205
.30!

<.000

.139

.139

'""'"""''

co,•enmt
upt>be
Con.Jnta<st

"""'

-

,.ooo

Fin..,upport
M=bership
Con!utio
Soliniry
Value_Io,s
Benefits
Rc:,ttlctioru
Sig. (1- Anirudes to
permanent
tilled)
covcrunt
cptake
Con_interest
Lcni,h
Fin..support
Membership
ConRacio
Sol.inity
v.iue_1,,.,
Benefits
Restn"ctions

-~O

,., -'"'

LOOO
.323

.055

·.135

·.088

.356

-.0>4

-.214

-.228
.426
395

-.!32
.055

-.141
-.171
.051

-.111

20,

-"'
.032

.o;,
.020

.,oo
_,..
.088
.020

.016

.016

,oo

-"'
_o,n
.074

200

20,
.182
3D

LOOO
-.106
-.106
.20,
-.047
.115
.017

.017
.02?

_,,,
_.,,,

,ooo

-.l.l'}4

.]91
.203

_,,.

.136

.070

.135

'"

.037
2,0
.133

.015

-·-~=163

"'

.161

3,S
.181

.115

290

oos

-000

''"'
-000

-OM

~,

'-000
·.297
-.0,0

.015

.182

.000
.000

20,

.oo;

.135

.029
.080
.013

.oos

<ooo

·.207
--00•

.182
.l36

m,

.Ol7
2S<
36'
.084
2~
.101

36'

-00;
-.127
-.297

-"'
-""
.1!5
..-'"'
010

.,oo

-.111

.132

.om

.000

.\27
200
000

-.055
.040
-.051

-.132

.on

.017
200

.000

.oo;
''"'

395

.ow

.125

.000

=

-'"

""
.on

mo

""
_.,-,
-00,
'"'

.037

_,.,
_.,-,

-00<

-"'

-""
_,m

3,S
20,
.312
.161

.088

.191

.101
.181
.133
.115

.on

.o-n

.oo,

""

.015

.DIS

2"
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Appcndix5.2S

Final path model codfidcnis rnble for n:spondenis with no covenant oc agccanem in
landholders (Western Australia)
Stand=lized
C,,.,fficicnts

Unstandan:faed
C,,.,ffid=«
(Constan,)
Con.Jr,terest

""""'

F,.,_.,,pport
lllemh=!hip

C,;,nR.tio

'

2.741
.181
-.164
-.453
.4!0
l.461E-03

Salinity
V,Jue_lo,s
Benefit<
>..

·'"'

-4.419£.02

Re,,trictlon<
d"J"'ndent v,-ri,ble, attitude,

"'
.,oo

to •

Std. Error

Sig.

,,.

.073

.192

4.467
2.488

.059

-.213

-2.760

·'"'

-.256

-3.230
3.515
.273

.611

.117
.005

.054

·"''

.279
.021

·"' '""'

-.051

•. M-0

.,~

4.249
3.345

.083
.336
.057
pcrnunent eo~=• upnkc.

95% Confidence
lmecval for B

·=
.015

Lo"""" Bound

Ue~Bound
3.953

.037

326
-.0\6

l.529

.oo,
oo,
.oo,

-.282
-.732
.179

··=
.033

.785

.01\
.SB

-.181

·=
.oo,

·'"
·=

291

.~,

-.175

.012
2<S

.003
,,,
~,

~
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Appendix 5.29

V:triablc com:b.tion for combined respondents with no cove11anc or ag,:ecme11c in hndhnldcrs (Vicroria and Western Ausmtlia)
Attitudes to Knowledge
permanent
co,.. rw11
U t2ke

Pearson
Correlation

Attitudes to
permanent
covenant
Upt2ke
Knowledge
Benefits
Salinity
Va.luc_loss

Rc,u-icrions
Membership

uo""

Sig.{!c:,;Jedj

Con_intercst
Suto
Fin_,upport
Attitudes m
pcrrn.rnent

-~·

LOOO

.147

.147

,.ooo

.w,

.065
-.131

~· ~.
200

-.213
3n
-.162
3U

-2'0
.119

-247
.o75

-"~
.142
.014
,056
.017

B=<,fits

Sa.linit)' Vo,~e_lo

Re,erictiom Mrmb=ihip

"

.~,

.200

-213

·"''

-.131
.108

-.:m

,ooo

.!08
-293
.129

.oo,

..,,

-.114

,.ooo

... 2
.158
-.093
-.122

oo,

-.047
E2
-.000

-.176

.172

-.247

.M2

,.ooo

-.162

3U

.142
.091
.091

~·

.075

.201

.054

-.093

-.ll4
-.122

.!29
.158
-.183

oo,

-.209

,.ooo

-.20'J
.157
-.129

.!33

,.ooo

.m

.!56
-.195
200
.000

oo,

oo,

-.054
.037
000

.029

.000

.135

·"'"

.000

.031
.Oil

"'"
-"""

Con..Jnteccst

;n

-.183

.151
-.150

=""

.133
.024

,

__

.157
002

-.!29
.177

.024

.156
.109

''""'
,oo
.145
-.161

oo,

,.ooo

Seue F1n...support

.no

.119

.014

.056

-.047
-.176
.151
-.054
-.195
.145
-.077

.017
.000
.000

V,Jue_lo"

.oo,

.172
.029
.000

Restrictions

.000

.138

.o31

.011

Membership

.000

.002

.496

,..

.00,

2,a

.050

.000
.039
.003

.012
.03!

~,

.014
.015

Benefits
Saliniiy

uo""

Conjntcrc,t
Fl~_,u

"

.000
.oo,

.on

~·
.020

.422

000
000

.oo,

.m

=

ES

_oo,

2"

=
oo,

292

=

.027
.488
.005
.219
2~

.002
.496
000

oo,

.027
3M
.OJZ

.oo,
.oo,

.218

.141

-.46'!

,.ooo

""

·"''

.020

.422

-""

.oo,

.012
.488
3M

.031

.014

.012
.057

.219
002
.0\8

.oo,

.251

.133

.057
.010

.037

=
-.161

.141
.000

.oo,

"'"

-.150

uro

.050

oo,

20,

-.077

Upuke

Kn,,,,,)edgc

....

.133
.021

·=

-.469

~·
~,

.000
.015

.297

oo,

.010
.021

=
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Appendix 5.30 Variable codficients of the fin;il path model for combined respondents with no covenant or
agreement in landholders (Victoria and Western Au,mlia)

(Connant)

Km,w]edgc
Benefit
Silinicy
V,Jue_loss

Rcstriccions
Memkrmip
Length

Con.jr.<ere>I

293'

Std. Error
.583

·""

.066
.056

'

3~

·'"

3.476E--02
.181

.;a,;
-9.941E--02

"''

.M,

''"

·""'
.3'9

-381
-.212

S.029
1.528

-.141

6.057
3.124
.697
4.270
3.723
-2538

.203

3.674

.176

.050

Jl.\2

.M2
.090
.039
.055
.150

.237
.213

-.158
.oo,
-.!47
Ort
a. dependent ,·ariablc: attitudes to a pcmunent covenant upmkc.

Sort
Fin...su

Sig.

Sundardizcd
Coefficient>

Un,iandutliud
Coefficient>

-2.539
-2327

.eoo

·'"
.eoo

.002
.487

.eoo
.eoo

95% Confider.cc
ln<=n!forB
l..o"·er Bcund
1.784

UpperBour.d
4.085

-.029

.no

.451

229
209
.133

M,

··=

·"''
.158

205
5M

.012
.000

-.1TI

-.022

.012

-.678
-392

._o,;

'"

293

.oo,

3,0
-.032
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Appendix 5. 31
Incentive group
(Number of

cuco)
Financial focen,ivc,

(28)

Views of respondents with i,o covenant or agr«:ment in Victoria on the State
goYcmmcnt policies o. acl.ions as inccnl.ivc,
Incenri,·e
oubg,oup (No

rconondcn!ol
T,x e<emptjon
and ouboi,tie, (9)

Financial
,,.imncc/
inccnlkc, (19)

Technical suppou
and ,ervicc, (25)

Promion of
support and
,Jvicc on
m,n,gcmcnt
mdpt.nnfilg
(11)
A'5i!toncc uitl,
wcoJ onJ
vctmin control

,,1

,\,sistance ""ith
l,bcur(I)
Support 10
l,uJc,rc group,
(')
Equity 1c,pon,c
(20)

Dcobcd acriono/cmnment,

,,

Compcn,ation

po)

.•
•
•
•

.
.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

.
.
•
•

.
.
•

•

rcmo,·,1 of ,11 hnd r,x ,nd copiial L,.nd "'
,llow lax doductiM on more direct fotanci.:il benefit• on
octivitie, ,uch a, fencing, tree pilll1Ulg ond crmiun
con1rol
100 percent tox deductions from fodor:tl go,·ernmrn!
and 100 p«ccnt gron" from st,tc government
ov>il farming suh,idie, on a pro rau 1,,.;, to f,rmm fo,
con,c"·otio01
provide funds fo, specific cg. fencfilg m>tcri,1,/ onJ
labour, pc,t, pla111 and onimol control
p>)' fo1 1i1l, ocar<lic, '"'I logo! com for the pennment
co,·cnon"
cmbli,h and m,L<l,.in no\urc conscrvalion progr,m, on
form
granl> ,.,JI>~ inccnti,·es
,cimbuf!c com of na1i1·e veocwion lantii10
"'""•nee u-i,h long-term pL:..,ning ,nd ad,;cc on n,rurc
con,et\"O!iun
ex pen support fo, cst;tbbshmcnt ,nd maintcn,nce of
n,ru,e re,m·c on farm
oupport to be done thro11gh locally based landcarc cootdin,tor,
'""t:mce with u•ced ,·crmin control.
,l,,cct mi,1,ncc uithout in,·olving 4ndcarc groups
pro,·idc finonc,al ,.,ccnti,•cs In J,ndc,re r.roup, to carI)"
out nw Of \'crmin and we<d control
u,c of ,upervi,cd pnson bbou,cr,, ond rnuth on u·ork
for dole scheme.
fom, mmc L,.ndc,ic group,, and landoarc
in order
to bring con,en•>1ion closer to 1hc bndholdcr,
incrc,se fonding to landc>re gwup• but mo.kc
lmdholdcts bcor ,omc of the c0<>serv01ion coot.
annu,l ma.,,gcmont foo poymo11t to landholder, to
co,•cr com of wotko Jone in con,c""";on ore"
including labour
in ,ccognition of conmvation wutk, oud ',lon,riou'
mode by lmdholdcr
compensalion for incurred loss of use 0£ land, lo,o in
volue of l;nJ, lo'5 of il\cnmc for looked up a,c,., los,c,
ofproduelion on cuhi,·a1ed land rc,ulting from ,·cm,Ul
h"bourcd in the conscrvo!ion ,rcas, al\d cost of
m:iint:iinLilg 1bc con,crv,tion area,.
compemate hr: 1emonlof •t•mp duty on property
wuh coven,ots in order 10 off,ct v:tluc lo,., tr:ido off
bcN,een unu,ed ro,d rent rnd pcrmrnmt covenant
are.,, ond onouol p,ymcnt per beet.re of land under
con,m·.iion

''°"
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A--cndix 5.31 continued
Incentive
Incentive
,ubgroup
graup
(Number of
(Noof
reonondcnul
M,n,gomenl
Flrnhility of
p<rmanent
admini,m.tion
covenant
,~rcement !21
(13)
Rc,lnt<IU!C/
Sirc,mhne
funding
I n,oceos fl)
Le,d by
example (J)

•••••)
'""

Coordina1ion

roa

momgcmcnl

I "Remo,•c
bmerncncy
and Ulcrc"e
con,erv.tion
Ultere,t (]J
Stop coeicion

Oco1rcd octioo•/commem,

flexible p<rmancnt covon•nt ,mu,gcmotllO ouch o, muing
,llow.1nce fo, mlcg,ation of the conservation area in .rock
ro"tions.
gti:tl'1fltced Jin:c1 fonding to fannm for con>crv:a~on ,,:mk

leading hy e»mplc h)c h,hing the har,•csting old grou.1h fmc5"
porticularly in cotchmont ,reas, demon,t,md commitments
1hrough improve policies 2nd practice, and 1hrough improved
man,oemcnt 0£ l,ortlorin~ rood,idc re,or,,e,
coortlin>tc comorvation wotko ond odmUlim,tion of l,ndcarc
group• for coUcctive ,ppm.ch for Jo sited con,crv,tion outcome
op point quohfied con,erv,tion m,n,g,ment loom
,implifr covenanting proccm, by rcducUlg ihe bmcrncrac)", red
tap, onJ p•j>C!'\mrk
insti1u1c mote ,ct"•itie, and <lcmonm"e grcotcr intetcst in
con!c!'\'Ol!<ln on pri>ate bnJ,.
keep CO\'<t,,nlS volu.nr,,y.

Im
Edurnion,
information and
,,.·,rene" (8)

"

Pohcy '"'".'." (5)

Policy 1U1d Lind
v,oluat10n
criteria (])

'
.:;:

!1

Buy h,ck fand

,,1

No"
involvement "1
covonml• (lO)

Not in fa,•om
of co,·enanl>

,,1

Keep
govomrnont
outofir IJJ

""'''°""'

continue «lucotion,
of comerv,rion value,,
gi,•e encour:agcmcn!
education targe1Lllg formers b,cou,e many arc ignonnt about
con,orvotim, ,·olue,
incrc»c awotcne" of the pe,.on:il, C,mnd:il, ,od.al,
cnvironmontol odvantage, nf con,er,·,tion
inform..,on ;nd kno·,,ledge ohout coven:un,
bet1cr knowledge of the ,·,lues in implcmcl\tUlg a pmnancnt
co,•cnant
aw.1rencs, progrom by: advertising the Ultcntion, of• permanent
covenant. dis,cm"1>1ine information throu •h landcore oroun,.
rc\'icw land valu,iion to reword, conservation cffom by 1,lting
into acco,mt consorvotinn activi1ies and re,uhont improvcmcnl•
";th ,n incrcosc in value
government support ohould treat co,»erv.,ion on cqu:il tcrms
....;,h farming "1 ro,pcct w policic,, pi.,nnrng. and taxation.
ensure change in gm•cmmenl do not lead to change in policies
that affect 1hc ,1,iu, of ncrmancnt covenants.
buy b,ck l,n<l that cannot be cleared otuseJ for farming
pmpn,os
use m\unlO · '"ui.suion.
concern obout attach'.ug • permanent co,·cnant to the land litle.
covemnt occcp1>blc ifil i, Jrngncd to " ... a...,id affecting or
attachine to the title".
bndhol<lero arc 11,e owners of the land and therefore no need for
go,·cmmcnt "11e1forcnce.
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AppendiK S. 32 Views ofrc,pondcnts with no cm·enant or ag<cLmcnt in Victori, on the Loco!
government policies or ncrions os incentives
Incentive group
(Number of
)

.....

Fui,nd,l u,ccmivco

Incentive
,ubgroup
(Numbc,a£
,esnondcnts)
Jl:110 rcbo1., (27)

(:11)

Desi,od action•/ comment,

•

.

•
•

,.,

Finonciol ,uppott

T«hnk,1,upport
service, (20)

Advice on
conscrvolion (5)

Support conlrol of
v.•ccd and vcnnin

I "'
Provi,ion of
equipment ond
1,bour (7)

..
.
•
•

.
•

Non porticip•tion
ofbndholder, or
government (12)

ln[mtrucruul
suooort 12\
No to p«monmt
co,;cnonts (12)

.
.
.
•
.

reduction or tot,l exemption from :,tc, for ,iea, under
• permanent covenant
rate rcduclion ,hould he provided for •11 hnd pared,
undcreon!Owation iirespccl!vc of whcll,cr they h.ve a
p<rm:rncnt covcnont or not.
"'" adv,ntogcs should be in exec" of die r.llc value of
the land lost !o cnn,cn>ol!On.
rate rcba!cs should he conJL1ional to good monagcmcnt
of the con<cnc,tiot> ore, including the contrn\ of w<cd
rebate, O<C :ilieadv ~I nhcc in a few ,hit<,,
support fencing ond imp!cnicntation of hnd
manoocm<nt aor<cmcnto.
od,~,c onJ ,,,istoncc in a,se,sj11g sped fie local
conscrvotion noeds and choosing the best conscrva,ion
strategic, for the area
appoiot co·ortlinotor, for 11,1urn conservation i'l local
oovcmmcn"
support in wccJ ond vermin manogemcn,, porticul,ily
weed, foxes, and cots
pro;~sion of equipment anJ labour to 1upport i<l 1hc
implcm<nt>tion of covrnon1,, in the form of che>p or
f,cc hbour and hire of appropri:itc equipment such as
hulldo>cr5 or rifflcr, to plant t,ce,.
bbour obtained from work for the cla\c ,d,.mc•
adrrtinistcrcd through local government will,
opprnprim ,upcrvi,ion.
labour for contra! of weed in cnmcrv,tion ,rco, olong
to,d,idcs, and for 0<1y other co11scrvatio11 work «quired
under a CO\'cnant.
pay for and conslruct ,cccs, to coYcn>nl site, .
thi, i, not Ilic «spon,ibility of local govc,runcnt but of
O!alc and fcdo,al governments
loca\govcniment hose suflidenl work to do such as
hondting roadsjdc conscrv,1ion,
bndholdm a,c copable of mon,ging lhci, own offai,, in
rcbtlon to con,cn>otion.
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A~~cndix 5.32 continued
lnccnti,·e grnup
(Number or

ca•c•)
Pohcy, l.cei>lation
rnd enforcement

Incentive
,ubgro11p
(Number of
rc,hondcni,1
Con,cn••t10n
policy ,uppo<t (4)

Dcoircd action,/eon1mcnta

.

(10)

•

.
Conlrol and
Enforcement of
conservation
legislo1ion (6)

•
•
•

Educ,1ion,
informotion ,nd

Publicity and
information (5)

owa,rnc,s {10)

Educ,rion •nd
aw,rcn,,. (5)

Mou.I
cncourogcmcnt (6)

,,,

Encouiagcmrnt

.
•
.
•
.
•

.•
•

g«al« ,upport fo, mtmc con,ervation policy at l0<ol
government le,•el, by crcotion of a b"1,nce between
con,erv.,ion and devekipmcnt,
ensure th,i benefits p<m'id,d by loc,lgovcmment for
m,intoining nature con,crvation orco, are moinujned
u•hrn p<Of>Crtie, eh:rnged l,1.·'1•.
formuhtc policy thot ensures t1a1U<c conscrv,1ion i,
orirn,~ to tl,c pursuit of economic 0 ain,.
<Ot>lrol ond cnfor<e eri"ing conser,.':ltion "'b~•lation, by
applicmon of pcnall1co for failure 10 comply with
1casonablc conscmitiun mcasurcs
cnfmcc leg,1 icqui<cme"t of adjolning land holder, lo
co11trol weeds ,n,I vermin which threaten 10 infc., "'"
of conservation value
aJopl of tougher pcnoltic, on illegal cbring of native
vc~clalion for de,•elonmcnt
produciion of information molen,1 ,el,ting to
conservatiDI> is,uc,, targctcJ at 1he public.
encourage public anJ lourim to ,·i,il conservation
,chem es
pro,•idc on·gro,111d ,uppou ,.;,1, informa1im1 rcqui<cd
to mointoin the conservation value, of the land
provide the ,tatc goeenm::cnt with i,,formation on loc,l
"'" th>t a<c not ,.,u,hle for £,rmil\o.
owarcncss t>rgctcd at ,choo\, ond highllghting !0<01
area, of comcrvalion oignific,n<e, the impononce of
reioining nati,·c vegetation. ,nd frab~lity of the
cm,.rnnment.
recognition by indudjng the prnpertios uoith, covcn•nt
on ,hire map,
provision of roadside sign,
acknowledgement of the bcnefilO of having communi1)'
acuviue, ,elating to conserv,tion would hdp to
cncour,gc other lmdholders to become conservation
comdou,.
,ct a good cnmplc in management of council !;nd ond
rc,crvco
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Appendix 5. 33 Other comments by respondents with no covenant or agreement in Victoria on
nature consc.vation on private L,.nd, and /m pcrmanent convents
luueo about covenants
uptake{Numberof
reonondcnt,)
Ncce•lilty of firunci>l support

''"

Apprchcn,ion ,bout C<l\'cn,11!
nccc'5ity ond cffcctivcnc,s (\0)

Comm en" by rc,pondcnl,

•
•

.
•
•

.
•
Apprclien,ion obout Jo,. of

control (5)
Keep off landholder, (5)

'

..•
.
•
•
•

'

Jinmd.al con, 1uint :llld di»dvonl,ge are the moin di,inccntivc to
con,cr\'>tion
oivc conoidcr,tion to farm ,oductiun r<nui,emenU
covcnont• might not be the cight conmvacion ,ir,1egio, in 1hc
future, just like past land dc,ting po~dc,
noturc conservation i, being overly extended in covenants
pubb'c .,,,,rcne" and L:indho\d« pwidpation a<e ,u f6cient
com<rv:ation >t<Olegic•
co,·enanc, may not b< nccemry •• mor< people ,ton to oppr<date
the need fo, con,c"'ation on 1hdr prnpo<ty
.~pprchcnswc about rigidity of, cm·cnant and prefer mutu,I truot
ogr«mmlS that occount for po..,hle change, in the future when
conserntion may pmve pmsiblc 10 co-exist with some other fonn
of commcid,\ enterc ,i,e
opprchcnskc ,bout the pos5!blc lo" of control o,·or pmpcrty
CO\'<nant5 ore an 111frin cmcnt of"'°"''"' ri•~'5
pref« S1a1e ond L,;,c,I Government, to keep off pnvore
lmdholdcro
feel con,emuion on piivote land" a pcf'on,I mo lier ,nd
landholders do no1 need to be told who! to do
view rcotciction on dooring of land •• unju,r
con,etvotion ohould be cncourogcd wilhour impo,ing covcnont,
enou h l,nd o!read · locked un fo, conservation \w Government

"
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Appendix S, 34 Views of respondents with no covenant or agrceincnt in Western Awcralia on
the State G,wcmmcnt policies or actions as incentive,
Incentive
group
(Numberuf
.... ,1

lnccnti,·c
,ob"ruup
(Number of
re, <>ndcncol

Educ,1,on,
inforn,otion
:md public
aw:mnc»
(16)

Equil)' (12)

rinanci>l
incentives
_(11)

f'luhy (12)

•inmciol
upport (7)

"PP""
rnmprn,oce
hire, (4)

~fon,gcmcm

'""

1dmini,!ratlnn

fanagemcnt
ccow,t>biliry

,,

(JD)
oducc/
omove
ureaucucy and
l,,volve
;nJowrtm (7)

Policy action

{O)

otter
,o,·cmmen!
obey (4)

iund purch"c

5)

Technical
,upport
oervicc, (6)

,ov:i,ion or
obourao<l
~accri:tl (6)

Dc,i«d octiono/con,mcn"

• pro,-idc fun,hng for info•1mtion on 1he importouce of con,cr,.ation,
and pubhrny of covenant, in order to ensure f:r<atcr aw:ucncs, an,ong
the public
• c<iucatc ,hire councillors on how to promote LCDC ,,,ork
• ,<t up tri,I """ for nacurc conserv1tion a, an e""mple tn 1hc
communuy lo ocrve" an educational project for school," well» all
bndhol,lcr,.
• compen,o!ion in fom, of; fm:mcialp1ymcnt in liounfrc,.riction,
ploc,J on• cown,n!
• atlocOle ol<om>livo non-conserv,.ion bnd
• fia5e compons,non on equity noting th" "we took up bud iii, on
'Con<li1ion of Purcho,,' ]eo,c in which w, >re made to fence it anJ to
h»·c , large p<inion of it clc,ml for agricultmo. Nau•, if ,ome of It is
In 1,e rcscr,,e<l the -o,·cmmcnt ,lrnui<l - , • fo, it"
• co,•or the cxpcn,c, inrnncd in 1,king up o consorv,tion covenant
• pro,·idc r.nrncc, for erection and mointc1uncc of fence,, on-going
cum of v,nnin, "'"<l md fire con1rol
• eompcn,;tc Local Government> for r.1tc, concession, offered to
fan,lholdcfS
• ,uppoll loc,l co<1,er,,,1ion rd,icd infrnmuctuto d"•elopmcnt
• more account>blc 1mmgemcnt and policy on cm·cn,nts 1h,i i, beyond
politlcol tcnuro
• bd by cxomplo on Ct0"-'1 ht>d

.

reduce burcoucr.cy
• grcate< in,·okcm,nl of landowner, in doci,ion making
• le"°' paper wmk in fumncial ,.,;,uncc for conscrv,tion 1nd
p,,m1mcnt co,·cn:rnt uptake
remm·e lcsa! restriccion, ond ',cd tape, 1h,t combine to r«lucc the
"''!' one cm use and mm,gc the land
• "" ncgo1i,tion instead of using "hc1'1' h,ndcJ tactic, of clearing
b:m, and tcllLno Llndholder, wh>t the\· can or c,nnot Jo'
• cffccl policjc, tl,at make conscrncion profitable so th,1 "farrnero
might then hO\'C • fairer minded approach to p,,rrnoncm covenant, on
theirlmd'
• more pto><ti,•o polidc, rather than reoc1ivc ,uch., the "1,lonkct h•n
on all 1hc clo,ring of l.nd", ,nJ to "curt>U clcaring of fragile l,n<l,,
rolicies 1hat promo lo new and innovati,-, conscr,':ltion and scientific
,esc,11:h
• Either Srote Gove mm mt or •rndicatcs or conser,':ltionim should buy
the u•hole fami, for rcsm·c, and let lh<m go back to bmh, <>< to buy
off"'"" of 1he lon<l th,t h,-·c consorvotion voluc,, ,uch ,s corridor,
with ,d;o,nin° bn<lownm, , i the • rcvniltu• nmkec nrice
• J>ro,·1de bb<iur and/or mm rial for con,cr,•,.ion wmk, patt1eul,rly for
fitt con!rol, fencing, !rec phruing and rcmo.ol of noxiou, weed
• bbour ,,.a.led from Work for the dole p,ttic,
• provide con>c"''tion mmri,I, including free or oub,.di;cd tree
,codling, and plonts for rchobilitocion or enrichment plonting of
con,erv,tion '""

•
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Appendix S. 35 Views of respondent, with no cu,·cnam or agreement in Wc,tcm Austrafu. on
the Local gm•crnment policies o, actions as incentives
lnccnti•c

"""'

(Number or
ca,c,1
Financial
incenti,·e, (25)

~---Noo
pmicjpation of
~o,•cmmcnt or
lmdhol,lm (17)

Incentive
•ubgroup
(Number of
rc,•,ondento\
Roie rebate,
Fin,ncul
,uppon
Le,vc
bndownc<O
,to.,, 121
Don't in,•olvc

Dco!rcd action,/ commenta

.

rote reduction or total cxcmncion on oreo, under o covenant,
• r.nond.il support in fonn of funds to co,·«cost of «>tering •
covenant, and fencine, and 50-70% of m,noecment com.
• le"'" bndholdcn to take core of con,crv,tion withou, inteifen:nce
• moot farrnei, ,re the bc,t gu0<di:m, of the bnd.

• in,·olvcment """Id be a cost to 1hc tax pa)''" in which the
covenant holdc, would ,r;!I h,-•e tu contribute
go,•ernmcnt (9)
lack sufficient funds for m,k, any cffccti,•e contnbution
crccntion 1hat this is not loc,l ovcrrunent roncem .
No to
• no1 ccmfonablo ,.;th <cma,•,1 of control from the Lmd
p<nnancnt
lo" of m,n,gcment right,
cuvcn,nt• (~)
• vicwth1t ",ll bndhol<lero, ormait, try Vel}•hml to <lo 1hc right
thing for cons<rvotion"
• c.iu,ie, entering a permanent co,·emnt to 'giving thc lond to the
,ta!e or In °ovcmmcnt hure,uct:tt"
Better
• introduce boner plonning modulo,, mmagement ')-'stemo ond
pt.nning,
policies in con,.,valion
palido, and
• dcmanslt>le obility to monogc "'1 effective coVC'10nt programme
manogomcnt
• moke ,hire pb.nning policies cle1rond tigt<l enough
• ,ct cxamplcwilh «5Ponsible land mmogcmcnt pr.icticc, bf
rccicwing •pp~ca1ions fm ,ubdivi,ians more carefullf in ordct lo
"'°'cl the dccimotion of conscrv,tion "''" ,nd to p,cocrve bush
corrtdor, and n,1ioc vegct>tian nn road ,·ctgcs
,ct loco! monagcmcnt goal, thot provide a "bigger picture' of
comervatjo" patterns by rcgi!tering lho,c thot are willing lo enter
conm,·ation ogrecmcnts
• m,kc rnnservot,on policy 1\ustrilia·wide, not locally
• ,cmn,•c pbnning scheme, for cnnserv,tian block, ftom bigger
locotio.,, in order to cn,ure a holistic a,mrooch to -lannin~
Comult
• involve fannerS in conservation decision, through con,ultotion and
farme<S (l)
oncnno" to their oninio.,,.
f•cilitorion and • coor<lim1e and facilitate community to "'"'k 1ogether instead of
coonlinotian
<lLmting to them
role (4)
, org,ni,e volunteer g,oup,
• oct", conduit between the bndho\dcrs on<l ,tote ""Vcrnment
1\d,ice and
• ad,·jce on co,·cn1nt en!!}' process ond how to mointain q1Lslity
demonm,don
tcmnonl b,,.hbnd areo, bj' prm1dmg o mentor.
• m ,.;Jc o"n ,hire re,crvco ao demon,tralion what con be expected
in con,crvatinn ,rea,
• lcod hy example by p•nicip,ting in comervation netv,mks
• hold ,cminm ,nd field d,y, to wo,k ,t ,pecific con,enr.1tion
acti,·itie,.
Support
• ..,i,t .,.;th ro,d droin,gc- such o, in,t,ll,tion of adcqoote cul~ert,
inframucture
• ,nointcna11cc of loco! road vcrgo,
• rcmo.,\ of ticcs COll}'ing mi,c\-tolc vine,
• con>lruclion of fire brook,
Support wtlh
• hbour to co.,trnl r,bbits, foxes onJ weeds on roadsjdcvc<gcs.
manual wmk

local

.•
•

Mon,gcmcnt

rna

administration
(14)

"'

•

Technical
support ,crvioo<

'"

,,,

,,,
,.
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